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  1.  60
    Richard Foley (1993). Working Without a Net: A Study of Egocentric Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
    In this new book, Foley defends an epistemology that takes seriously the perspectives of individual thinkers. He argues that having rational opinions is a matter of meeting our own internal standards rather than standards that are somehow imposed upon us from the outside. It is a matter of making ourselves invulnerable to intellectual self-criticism. Foley also shows how the theory of rational belief is part of a general theory of rationality. He thus avoids treating the rationality of belief as a (...)
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  2.  12
    Richard Foley (1987). The Theory of Epistemic Rationality. Harvard University Press.
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  3.  44
    Richard Foley (2001). Intellectual Trust in Oneself and Others. Cambridge University Press.
    To what degree should we rely on our own resources and methods to form opinions about important matters? To what degree should we depend on various authorities, such as a recognized expert or a social tradition? In this provocative account of intellectual trust and authority, Richard Foley argues that it can be reasonable to have intellectual trust in oneself even though it is not possible to provide a defense of the reliability of one's faculties, methods, and opinions that does not (...)
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  4. Richard Foley (2009). Beliefs, Degrees of Belief, and the Lockean Thesis. In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of Belief. Springer 37-47.
    What propositions are rational for one to believe? With what confidence is it rational for one to believe these propositions? Answering the first of these questions requires an epistemology of beliefs, answering the second an epistemology of degrees of belief.
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  5.  60
    Richard Foley (1992). The Epistemology of Belief and the Epistemology of Degrees of Belief. American Philosophical Quarterly 29 (2):111 - 124.
  6.  12
    Richard Foley (2012). When is True Belief Knowledge? Princeton University Press.
    Her belief is true, but it isn't knowledge. This is a classic illustration of a central problem in epistemology: determining what knowledge requires in addition to true belief.
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  7. Richard Foley (2005). Justified Belief as Responsible Belief. In Ernest Sosa & Matthias Steup (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Blackwell 313--26.
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  8. Richard Foley (1991). Evidence and Reasons for Belief. Analysis 51 (2):98 - 102.
  9. Richard Foley, A Trial Separation Between the Theory of Knowledge and the Theory of Justified Belief.
    In his 1963 article, “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?”1 Edmund Gettier devised a pair of counterexamples designed to illustrate that knowledge cannot be adequately defined as justified true belief. The basic idea behind both of his counterexamples is that one can be justified in believing a falsehood P from which one deduces a truth Q, in which case one has a justified true belief in Q but does not know Q. Gettier’s article inspired numerous other counterexamples, and the search was (...)
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  10.  54
    Richard Foley (2002). Conceptual Diversity in Epistemology. In Paul K. Moser (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology. Oxford University Press 177--203.
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  11.  52
    Richard Foley (1983). Epistemic Conservatism. Philosophical Studies 43 (2):165 - 182.
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  12.  60
    Richard Foley (1985). What's Wrong With Reliabilism? The Monist 68 (2):188-202.
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  13.  32
    Richard Foley & Richard Fumerton (1985). Davidson's Theism? Philosophical Studies 48 (1):83 - 89.
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  14. Jonathan L. Kvanvig, Laurence Bonjour, Earl Conee, Richard Feldman, Richard Foley, Peter Klein, Jonathan Kvanvig, Keith Lehrer, William Lycan, Peter Markie, George Pappas, Alvin Plantinga, Ernest Sosa, Marshall Swain & Bas van Fraassen (1996). Warrant in Contemporary Epistemology: Essays in Honor of Plantinga's Theory of Knowledge. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
    In his widely influential two-volume work, Warrant: The Current Debate and Warrant and Proper Function, Alvin Plantinga argued that warrant is that which explains the difference between knowledge and true belief. Plantinga not only developed his own account of warrant but also mapped the terrain of epistemology. Motivated by Plantinga's work, fourteen prominent philosophers have written new essays investigating Plantingian warrant and its contribution to contemporary epistemology. The resulting collection, representing a broad array of views, not only gives readers a (...)
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  15. Richard Foley (1978). Compatibilism. Kind 87 (July):421-28.
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  16.  52
    Richard Foley (2005). Universal Intellectual Trust. Episteme 2 (1):5-12.
    All of us get opinions from other people. And not just a few. We acquire opinions from others extensively and do so from early childhood through virtually every day of the rest our lives. Sometimes we rely on others for relatively inconsequential information. Is it raining outside? Did the Yankees win today? But we also depend on others for important or even life preserving information. Where is the nearest hospital? Do people drive on the left or the right here? We (...)
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  17.  52
    Richard Foley, What Am I to Believe?
    The central issue of Descartes’s Meditations is an intensely personal one. Descartes asks a simple question of himself, one that each of us can also ask of ourselves, “What am I to believe?” One way of construing this question--indeed, the way Descartes himself construed it--is as a methodological one. The immediate aim is not so much to generate a specific list of propositions for me to believe. Rather, I want to formulate for myself some general advice about how to proceed (...)
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  18.  23
    Richard Foley (1979). Justified Inconsistent Beliefs. American Philosophical Quarterly 16 (4):247 - 257.
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  19. Richard Foley & Richard Fumerton (1984). Epistemic Indolence: A Reply to Schmitt. Mind 93 (369):108-110.
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  20. Richard Foley (1992). Working Without a Net: Essays in Egocentric Epistemology. New York: Oxford University Press.
    Avoiding treating the rationality of belief as a fundamentally different kind of phenomenon from the rationality of decision or action, Foley's approach generates promising suggestions about a wide range of issues--e.g., the distinction between epistemic and non-epistemic reasons for belief; the questions of what aspects of the Cartesian project are still worth doing; and the significance of simplicity and other theoretical virtues.
     
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  21.  36
    Richard Foley (2008). An Epistemology That Matters. In Philip L. Quinn & Paul J. Weithman (eds.), Liberal Faith: Essays in Honor of Philip Quinn. University of Notre Dame Press
    The two most fundamental questions for an epistemology are, what is involved in having good reasons to believe a claim, and what is involved in meeting the higher standard of knowing that a claim is true? The theory of justified belief tries to answer the former, whereas the theory of knowledge addresses the latter.
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  22.  19
    Richard Foley (1992). Being Knowingly Incoherent. Noûs 26 (2):181-203.
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  23.  40
    Richard Foley (1978). Inferential Justification and the Infinite Regress. American Philosophical Quarterly 15 (4):311 - 316.
    It is commonly thought that the requirements of inferential justification are such that necessarily the process of inferentially justifying a belief will come to an end. But, If this is so, We should be able to pick out those requirements of justification which necessitate an end to the justification process. Unfortunately, Although there is nearly unanimous agreement as to the need for such an end, It is by no means clear which particular requirements of justification impose this need. I examine (...)
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  24.  26
    Richard Foley (1984). ``Epistemic Luck and the Purely Epistemic&Quot. American Philosophical Quarterly 21 (2):113-124.
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  25.  69
    Richard Foley, The Foundational Role of Epistemology in a General Theory of Rationality.
    A common complaint against contemporary epistemology is that its issues are too rarified and, hence, of little relevance for the everyday assessments we make of each other=s beliefs. The notion of epistemic rationality focuses on a specific goal, that of now having accurate and comprehensive beliefs, whereas our everyday assessments of beliefs are sensitive to the fact that we have an enormous variety of goals and needs, intellectual as well as nonintellectual. Indeed, our everyday assessments often have a quasi-ethical dimension; (...)
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  26.  65
    Richard Foley (1994). Quine and Naturalized Epistemology. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1):243-260.
  27. Richard Foley (1979). ``Justified Inconsistent Beliefs&Quot. American Philosophical Quarterly 16:247-257.
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  28.  31
    Richard Foley (1994). How Should Future Opinion Affect Current Opinion? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (4):747-766.
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  29.  51
    Richard Foley (1987). Dretske's 'Information-Theoretic' Account of Knowledge. Synthese 70 (February):159-184.
  30. Richard Foley (1998). Rationality and Intellectual Self-Trust. In William Ramsey & Michael R. DePaul (eds.), Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and its Role in Philosophical Inquiry. Rowman and Littlefield Publishers 241--56.
  31.  73
    Richard Foley (2002). Review: Knowledge and its Limits. [REVIEW] Mind 111 (443):718-726.
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  32.  51
    Richard Foley (1990). Fumerton's Puzzle. Journal of Philosophical Research 15:109-113.
    There is a puzzle that is faced by every philosophical account of rational belief, rational strategy, rational planning or whatever. I describe this puzzle, examine Richard Fumerton’s proposed solution to it and then go on to sketch my own preferred solution.
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  33. Richard Foley, Epistemically Rationality as Invulnerability to Self-Criticism.
    Part of the appeal of classical foundationalism was that it purported to provide a definitive refutation of skepticism. With the fall of foundationalism, we can no longer pretend that such a refutation is possible. We must instead acknowledge that skeptical worries cannot be completely banished and that, thus, inquiry always involves an element of risk which cannot be eliminated by further inquiry, whether it be scientific or philosophical. The flip side of this point is that inquiry always involves some element (...)
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  34.  51
    Richard Foley (1979). Compatibilism and Control Over the Past. Analysis 39 (March):70-74.
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  35. Richard Foley (1991). ``Evidence and Reasons for Belief&Quot. Analysis 51:98-102.
  36.  77
    Richard Foley (1980). Reply to Van Inwagen. Analysis 40 (March):101-103.
    I reply to professor vaninwagen's comment on an earlier paper of mine ("analysis", March 1979), In which I argue that compatibilists are not committed to accepting the claim that people might have control over the past.
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  37.  12
    Richard Foley (1982). The Purely Epistemic. Journal of Philosophy 79 (11):718-718.
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  38.  61
    Richard Foley (2003). Three Attempts to Refute Skepticism and Why They Fail. In S. Luper (ed.), The Skeptics: Contemporary Essays. Ashgate Publishing
    One of the advantages of classical foundationalism was that it was thought to provide a refutation of skeptical worries, which raise the specter that our beliefs might be extensively mistaken. The most extreme versions of these worries are expressed in familiar thought experiments such as the brain-in-a-vat hypothesis, which imagines a world in which, unbeknownst to you, your brain is in a vat hooked up to equipment programmed to provide it with precisely the same visual, auditory, tactile, and other sensory (...)
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  39.  36
    Richard Foley (1989). Reply to Moser. Analysis 49 (2):89 - 92.
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  40.  66
    Richard Foley, Epistemology.
    In epistemology Chisholm was a defender of FOUNDATIONALISM [S]. He asserted that any proposition that it is justified for a person to believe gets at least part of its justification from basic propositions, which are themselves justified but not by anything else. Contingent propositions are basic insofar as they correspond to selfpresenting states of the person, which for Chisholm are states such that whenever one is in the state and believes that one is in it, one’s belief is maximally justified. (...)
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  41.  32
    Richard Foley (2000). Epistemically Rational Belief and Responsible Belief. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 5:181-188.
    Descartes, and many of the other great epistemologists of the modern period, looked to epistemology to put science and intellectual inquiry generally on a secure foundation. Epistemology’s role was to provide assurances of the reliability of properly conducted inquiry. Indeed, its role was nothing less than to be czar of the sciences and of intellectual inquiry in general. This conception of epistemology is now almost universally regarded as overly grandiose. Nonetheless, Descartes and the other great epistemologists of the modern era (...)
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  42.  2
    Richard Foley (2002). Legislative Language in the EU: The Crucible. International Journal for the Semiotics of Law - Revue Internationale de Sémiotique Juridique 15 (4):361-374.
    The present article discusses threeactors whose interests shape legislativelanguage in the EU to a significant extent: thelay reader, the legislator and the linguist. Asthe end user of legislation, the first isconcerned with inscription – a reliable,i.e., transparent, final product. The secondhas a strong professional interest in prescription – fixing meaning to achieveconsistent application of the law. The third isand must be utterly disinterested, focusing ondescription – a systematic account ofprevailing usage. The dynamic obtaining amongthese interests is illustrated through a studyof (...)
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  43.  19
    Richard Foley & Richard Fumerton (1982). Epistemic Indolence. Mind 91 (361):38-56.
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  44. Richard Foley (2012). Chapter 24. Collective Knowledge. In When is True Belief Knowledge? Princeton University Press 113-118.
     
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  45.  24
    Richard Foley (1994). The Epistemology of Sosa. Philosophical Issues 5:1-14.
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  46.  48
    Richard Foley (2008). Plato's Undividable Line: Contradiction and Method In. Journal of the History of Philosophy 46 (1):1-23.
    : Plato’s instructions entail that the line of Republic VI is divided so that the middle two segments are of equal length. Yet I argue that Plato’s elaboration of the significance of this analogy shows he believes that these segments are of unequal length because the domains they represent are not of equally clear mental states, nor perhaps of objects of equal reality. I label this inconsistency between Plato’s instructions and his explanation the “overdetermination problem.” The overdetermination problem has been (...)
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  47. Richard Foley (1994). Sosa's Epistemology. Philosophical Issues 5:42-58.
     
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  48.  44
    Richard Foley (1991). Rationality, Belief and Commitment. Synthese 89 (3):365 - 392.
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  49.  27
    Richard Foley (2010). The Order Question. Ancient Philosophy 30 (1):57-72.
  50.  15
    Richard Foley (1980). Chisholm and Coherence. Philosophical Studies 38 (1):53 - 63.
    It is generally conceded that a principle of coherence is needed to give a complete account of justification. Even the most prominent foundationalists of this century have included coherence principles among those epistemic principles which they defend. Against this prevailing view, I suggest that a principle of coherence is not needed in order to give an adequate account of justification. However, Instead of arguing directly for this claim, I defend the only slightly less controversial claim that contrary to what foundationalists (...)
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