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  1. Richard Foley, A Trial Separation Between the Theory of Knowledge and the Theory of Justified Belief.
    In his 1963 article, “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?”1 Edmund Gettier devised a pair of counterexamples designed to illustrate that knowledge cannot be adequately defined as justified true belief. The basic idea behind both of his counterexamples is that one can be justified in believing a falsehood P from which one deduces a truth Q, in which case one has a justified true belief in Q but does not know Q. Gettier’s article inspired numerous other counterexamples, and the search was (...)
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  2. Richard Foley, Epistemology.
    In epistemology Chisholm was a defender of FOUNDATIONALISM [S]. He asserted that any proposition that it is justified for a person to believe gets at least part of its justification from basic propositions, which are themselves justified but not by anything else. Contingent propositions are basic insofar as they correspond to selfpresenting states of the person, which for Chisholm are states such that whenever one is in the state and believes that one is in it, one’s belief is maximally justified. (...)
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  3. Richard Foley, Epistemically Rationality as Invulnerability to Self-Criticism.
    Part of the appeal of classical foundationalism was that it purported to provide a definitive refutation of skepticism. With the fall of foundationalism, we can no longer pretend that such a refutation is possible. We must instead acknowledge that skeptical worries cannot be completely banished and that, thus, inquiry always involves an element of risk which cannot be eliminated by further inquiry, whether it be scientific or philosophical. The flip side of this point is that inquiry always involves some element (...)
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  4. Richard Foley, The Foundational Role of Epistemology in a General Theory of Rationality.
    A common complaint against contemporary epistemology is that its issues are too rarified and, hence, of little relevance for the everyday assessments we make of each other=s beliefs. The notion of epistemic rationality focuses on a specific goal, that of now having accurate and comprehensive beliefs, whereas our everyday assessments of beliefs are sensitive to the fact that we have an enormous variety of goals and needs, intellectual as well as nonintellectual. Indeed, our everyday assessments often have a quasi-ethical dimension; (...)
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  5. Richard Foley, What Am I to Believe?
    The central issue of Descartes’s Meditations is an intensely personal one. Descartes asks a simple question of himself, one that each of us can also ask of ourselves, “What am I to believe?” One way of construing this question--indeed, the way Descartes himself construed it--is as a methodological one. The immediate aim is not so much to generate a specific list of propositions for me to believe. Rather, I want to formulate for myself some general advice about how to proceed (...)
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  6. Richard Foley (forthcoming). The Drama of Medjugorje (Dublin. Veritas.
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  7. Richard Foley (2012). Contents. In , When is True Belief Knowledge? Princeton University Press.
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  8. Richard Foley (2012). Chapter 1. An Observation. In , When is True Belief Knowledge? Princeton University Press. 3-5.
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  9. Richard Foley (2012). Chapter 23. A Priori Knowledge. In , When is True Belief Knowledge? Princeton University Press. 110-112.
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  10. Richard Foley (2012). Chapter 25. A Look Back. In , When is True Belief Knowledge? Princeton University Press. 121-123.
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  11. Richard Foley (2012). Chapter 20. Believing That I Don’T Know. In , When is True Belief Knowledge? Princeton University Press. 99-101.
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  12. Richard Foley (2012). Chapter 15. Closure and Skepticism. In , When is True Belief Knowledge? Princeton University Press. 81-85.
  13. Richard Foley (2012). Chapter 24. Collective Knowledge. In , When is True Belief Knowledge? Princeton University Press. 113-118.
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  14. Richard Foley (2012). Chapter 16. Disjunctions. In , When is True Belief Knowledge? Princeton University Press. 86-87.
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  15. Richard Foley (2012). Chapter 26. Epistemology Within a General Theory of Rationality. In , When is True Belief Knowledge? Princeton University Press. 124-133.
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  16. Richard Foley (2012). Chapter 17. Fixedness and Knowledge. In , When is True Belief Knowledge? Princeton University Press. 88-90.
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  17. Richard Foley (2012). Chapter 4. Intuitions About Knowledge. In , When is True Belief Knowledge? Princeton University Press. 12-18.
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  18. Richard Foley (2012). Chapter 5. Important Truths. In , When is True Belief Knowledge? Princeton University Press. 19-31.
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  19. Richard Foley (2012). Chapter 18. Instability and Knowledge. In , When is True Belief Knowledge? Princeton University Press. 91-94.
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  20. Richard Foley (2012). Chapter 21. Introspective Knowledge. In , When is True Belief Knowledge? Princeton University Press. 102-105.
  21. Richard Foley (2012). Chapter 3. Knowledge Stories. In , When is True Belief Knowledge? Princeton University Press. 9-11.
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  22. Richard Foley (2012). Chapter 8. Knowledge Blocks. In , When is True Belief Knowledge? Princeton University Press. 46-50.
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  23. Richard Foley (2012). Chapter 14. Lucky Knowledge. In , When is True Belief Knowledge? Princeton University Press. 78-80.
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  24. Richard Foley (2012). Chapter 6. Maximally Accurate and Comprehensive Beliefs. In , When is True Belief Knowledge? Princeton University Press. 32-40.
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  25. Richard Foley (2012). Chapter 19. Misleading Defeaters. In , When is True Belief Knowledge? Princeton University Press. 95-98.
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  26. Richard Foley (2012). Chapter 2. Post-Gettier Accounts of Knowledge. In , When is True Belief Knowledge? Princeton University Press. 6-8.
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  27. Richard Foley (2012). Chapter 22. Perceptual Knowledge. In , When is True Belief Knowledge? Princeton University Press. 106-109.
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  28. Richard Foley (2012). Chapter 13. Reverse Lottery Stories. In , When is True Belief Knowledge? Princeton University Press. 73-77.
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  29. Richard Foley (2012). Chapter 7. The Beetle in the Box. In , When is True Belief Knowledge? Princeton University Press. 41-45.
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  30. Richard Foley (2012). Chapter 9. The Theory of Knowledge and Theory of Justified Belief. In , When is True Belief Knowledge? Princeton University Press. 51-56.
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  31. Richard Foley (2012). Chapter 10. The Value of True Belief. In , When is True Belief Knowledge? Princeton University Press. 59-64.
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  32. Richard Foley (2012). Chapter 11. The Value of Knowledge. In , When is True Belief Knowledge? Princeton University Press. 65-69.
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  33. Richard Foley (2012). Chapter 12. The Lottery and Preface. In , When is True Belief Knowledge? Princeton University Press. 70-72.
  34. Richard Foley (2012). Chapter 27. The Core Concepts of Epistemology. In , When is True Belief Knowledge? Princeton University Press. 134-136.
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  35. Richard Foley (2012). Index. In , When is True Belief Knowledge? Princeton University Press. 149-153.
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  36. Richard Foley (2012). Notes. In , When is True Belief Knowledge? Princeton University Press. 137-148.
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  37. Richard Foley (2012). When is True Belief Knowledge? Princeton University Press.
    Her belief is true, but it isn't knowledge. This is a classic illustration of a central problem in epistemology: determining what knowledge requires in addition to true belief.
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  38. Richard Foley (2010). The Order Question. Ancient Philosophy 30 (1):57-72.
  39. Richard Foley (2009). Beliefs, Degrees of Belief, and the Lockean Thesis. In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of Belief. Springer. 37-47.
    What propositions are rational for one to believe? With what confidence is it rational for one to believe these propositions? Answering the first of these questions requires an epistemology of beliefs, answering the second an epistemology of degrees of belief.
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  40. Richard Foley (2009). The Better Part of Valor: The Role of Wisdom in Plato's "Laches". History of Philosophy Quarterly 26 (3):213 - 233.
  41. Richard Foley (2008). An Epistemology That Matters. In Philip L. Quinn & Paul J. Weithman (eds.), Liberal Faith: Essays in Honor of Philip Quinn. University of Notre Dame Press.
    The two most fundamental questions for an epistemology are, what is involved in having good reasons to believe a claim, and what is involved in meeting the higher standard of knowing that a claim is true? The theory of justified belief tries to answer the former, whereas the theory of knowledge addresses the latter.
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  42. Richard Foley (2008). Plato's Undividable Line: Contradiction and Method In. Journal of the History of Philosophy 46 (1):1-23.
    : Plato’s instructions entail that the line of Republic VI is divided so that the middle two segments are of equal length. Yet I argue that Plato’s elaboration of the significance of this analogy shows he believes that these segments are of unequal length because the domains they represent are not of equally clear mental states, nor perhaps of objects of equal reality. I label this inconsistency between Plato’s instructions and his explanation the “overdetermination problem.” The overdetermination problem has been (...)
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  43. Richard Foley (2005). Justified Belief as Responsible Belief. In Ernest Sosa & Matthias Steup (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Blackwell. 313--26.
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  44. Richard Foley (2005). Universal Intellectual Trust. Episteme 2 (1):5-12.
    All of us get opinions from other people. And not just a few. We acquire opinions from others extensively and do so from early childhood through virtually every day of the rest our lives. Sometimes we rely on others for relatively inconsequential information. Is it raining outside? Did the Yankees win today? But we also depend on others for important or even life preserving information. Where is the nearest hospital? Do people drive on the left or the right here? We (...)
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  45. Richard Foley (2004). Willi Goetschel, Spinoza's Modernity Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 24 (5):328-330.
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  46. Richard Foley (2004). Willi Goetschel, Spinoza's Modernity. [REVIEW] Philosophy in Review 24:328-330.
     
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  47. Richard Foley (2003). 44. Epistemically Rational Belief as Invulnerability to Self-Criticism1. In Steven Luper (ed.), Essential Knowledge: Readings in Epistemology. Longman. 458.
     
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  48. Richard Foley (2003). Three Attempts to Refute Skepticism and Why They Fail. In S. Luper (ed.), The Skeptics: Contemporary Essays. Ashgate Publishing.
    One of the advantages of classical foundationalism was that it was thought to provide a refutation of skeptical worries, which raise the specter that our beliefs might be extensively mistaken. The most extreme versions of these worries are expressed in familiar thought experiments such as the brain-in-a-vat hypothesis, which imagines a world in which, unbeknownst to you, your brain is in a vat hooked up to equipment programmed to provide it with precisely the same visual, auditory, tactile, and other sensory (...)
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  49. Richard Foley (2002). Convention as Intention – The Institution in All of Us. International Journal for the Semiotics of Law - Revue Internationale de Sémiotique Juridique 15 (4):431-434.
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  50. Richard Foley (2002). Conceptual Diversity in Epistemology. In Paul K. Moser (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology. Oxford University Press. 177--203.
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