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Profile: Richard Heck (Brown University)
  1. Richard G. Heck Jr (2012). Solving Frege's Puzzle. Journal of Philosophy 109 (1/2):132-174.
    So-called 'Frege cases' pose a challenge for anyone who would hope to treat the contents of beliefs (and similar mental states) as Russellian propositions: It is then impossible to explain people's behavior in Frege cases without invoking non-intentional features of their mental states, and doing that seems to undermine the intentionality of psychological explanation. In the present paper, I develop this sort of objection in what seems to me to be its strongest form, but then offer a response to it. (...)
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  2. George Boolos & Richard G. Heck (1998). Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik, 82-3. In Matthias Schirn (ed.), Bulletin of Symbolic Logic. Clarendon Press 407-28.
    This paper contains a close analysis of Frege's proofs of the axioms of arithmetic §§70-83 of Die Grundlagen, with special attention to the proof of the existence of successors in §§82-83. Reluctantly and hesitantly, we come to the conclusion that Frege was at least somewhat confused in those two sections and that he cannot be said to have outlined, or even to have intended, any correct proof there. The proof he sketches is in many ways similar to that given in (...)
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  3. Richard G. Heck (2014). Predicative Frege Arithmetic and ‘Everyday’ Mathematics. Philosophia Mathematica 22 (3):279-307.
    The primary purpose of this note is to demonstrate that predicative Frege arithmetic naturally interprets certain weak but non-trivial arithmetical theories. It will take almost as long to explain what this means and why it matters as it will to prove the results.
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    Richard G. Heck (2012). Reading Frege's Grundgesetze. OUP Oxford.
    Richard G. Heck presents a new account of Gottlob Frege's Grundgesetze der Arithmetik, or Basic Laws of Arithmetic, which establishes it as a neglected masterpiece at the center of Frege's philosophy. He explores Frege's philosophy of logic, and argues that Frege knew that his proofs could be reconstructed so as to avoid Russell's Paradox.
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  5. Richard G. Heck (2014). Frege's Theorem. Oxford University Press Uk.
    Richard Heck explores a key idea in the work of the great philosopher/logician Gottlob Frege: that the axioms of arithmetic can be logically derived from a single principle. Heck uses the theorem to explore historical, philosophical, and technical issues in philosophy of mathematics and logic, relating them to key areas of contemporary philosophy.
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    Richard G. Heck (2015). Consistency and the Theory of Truth. Review of Symbolic Logic 8 (3):424-466.
    This paper attempts to address the question what logical strength theories of truth have by considering such questions as: If you take a theory T and add a theory of truth to it, how strong is the resulting theory, as compared to T? Once the question has been properly formulated, the answer turns out to be about as elegant as one could want: Adding a theory of truth to a finitely axiomatized theory T is more or less equivalent to a (...)
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    Richard G. Heck (2014). Intuition and the Substitution Argument. Analytic Philosophy 55 (1):1-30.
    The 'substitution argument' purports to demonstrate the falsity of Russellian accounts of belief-ascription by observing that, e.g., these two sentences: -/- (LC) Lois believes that Clark can fly. (LS) Lois believes that Superman can fly. -/- could have different truth-values. But what is the basis for that claim? It seems widely to be supposed, especially by Russellians, that it is simply an 'intuition', one that could then be 'explained away'. And this supposition plays an especially important role in Jennifer Saul's (...)
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    Richard G. Heck (2014). In Defense of Formal Relationism. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 3 (3):243-250.
    In his paper “Flaws of Formal Relationism”, Mahrad Almotahari argues against the sort of response to Frege's Puzzle I have defended elsewhere, which he dubs ‘Formal Relationism’. Almotahari argues that, because of its specifically formal character, this view is vulnerable to objections that cannot be raised against the otherwise similar Semantic Relationism due to Kit Fine. I argue in response that Formal Relationism has neither of the flaws Almotahari claims to identify.
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    Richard G. Heck (2016). Is Frege's Definition of the Ancestral Adequate. Philosophia Mathematica 24 (1):91-116.
    Why should one think Frege's definition of the ancestral correct? It can be proven to be extensionally correct, but the argument uses arithmetical induction, and that seems to undermine Frege's claim to have justified induction in purely logical terms. I discuss such circularity objections and then offer a new definition of the ancestral intended to be intensionally correct; its extensional correctness then follows without proof. This new definition can be proven equivalent to Frege's without any use of arithmetical induction. This (...)
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