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  1. Richard J. Hall (2008). If It Itches, Scratch! Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (4):525 – 535.
    Many bodily sensations are connected quite closely with specific actions: itches with scratching, for example, and hunger with eating. Indeed, these connections have the feel of conceptual connections. With the exception of D. M. Armstrong, philosophers have largely neglected this aspect of bodily sensations. In this paper, I propose a theory of bodily sensations that explains these connections. The theory ascribes intentional content to bodily sensations but not, strictly speaking, representational content. Rather, the content of these sensations is an imperative: (...)
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  2. Richard J. Hall (2007). Phenomenal Properties as Dummy Properties. Philosophical Studies 135 (2):199 - 223.
    Can the physicalist consistently hold that representational content is all there is to sensory experience and yet that two perceivers could have inverted phenomenal spectra? Yes, if he holds that the phenomenal properties the inverts experience are dummy properties, not instantiated in the physical objects being perceived nor in the perceivers.
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  3. Richard J. Hall & Charles R. Johnson (1998). The Epistemic Duty to Seek More Evidence. American Philosophical Quarterly 35 (2):129 - 139.
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  4. Richard J. Hall (1997). Philosophy of Mind By Kim Jaegwon Westview Press: Boulder, and Oxford, 1966, Xii + 258 Pp. [REVIEW] Philosophy 72 (280):317-.
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  5. Richard J. Hall (1996). The Evolution of Color Vision Without Colors. Philosophy of Science Supplement 63 (3):125-33.
    The standard adaptationist explanation of the presence of a sensory mechanism in an organism--that it detects properties useful to the organism--cannot be given for color vision. This is because colors do not exist. After arguing for this latter claim, I consider, but reject, nonadaptationist explanations. I conclude by proposing an explanation of how color vision could have adaptive value even though it does not detect properties in the environment.
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  6. Richard J. Hall (1990). Does Representational Content Arise From Biological Function? PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1990:193 - 199.
    In virtue of what does a representational state have the content it does? Several philosophers have recently proposed that a representational state gets its content from its biological function. After explaining the sense of biological function used in these views, I criticise the proposal. I argue that biological function only determines representational content up to extensional equivalence. I maintain that this holds even if biological function is defined in terms of an intensional notion like Sober's "selection for".
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  7. Richard J. Hall (1989). Are Pains Necessarily Unpleasant? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 49 (June):643-59.
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  8. Richard J. Hall (1985). An Argument That the Language of Belief is Not English. Philosophical Studies 48 (2):235 - 240.
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  9. Richard J. Hall (1985). Perception and Cognition. By John Heil. Modern Schoolman 62 (3):210-211.
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  10. Richard J. Hall (1984). Pierre and the New World Makers. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 62 (3):283 – 288.
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  11. Richard J. Hall (1979). Seeing Perfectly Dark Things and the Causal Conditions of Seeing. Theoria 45 (3):127-134.
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  12. Richard J. Hall (1978). Criticism and Revision of Chisholm's Epistemic Principle for Perception. Philosophia 7 (July):477-488.
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  13. Richard J. Hall (1977). "Perception, Common Sense, and Science," by James W. Cornman. Modern Schoolman 54 (2):206-206.
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  14. Richard J. Hall (1977). Seeing and Naming. Synthese 35 (3):381 - 393.
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  15. Richard J. Hall (1976). Chisholm's Epistemic Principles and Our Knowledge About Particular Things in the External World. Philosophical Studies 30 (1):29 - 37.
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  16. Richard J. Hall (1970). Can We Use the History of Science to Decide Between Competing Methodologies? PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1970:151 - 159.
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  17. Richard J. Hall (1970). Kuhn and the Copernican Revolution. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 21 (2):196-197.
  18. Richard J. Hall (1965). A Philosophy of Geometry. Philosophia Mathematica (1):13-31.
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  19. Richard J. Hall (1964). The Term Sense-Datum. Mind 73 (January):130-131.
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