I want to discuss a certain argument for the claim that definite descriptions are ambiguous between a Russellian quantificational interpretation and a predicational interpretation.1 The argument is found in James McCawley’s (1981) book Everything Linguists Have Always Wanted to Know about Logic (but were ashamed to ask). The argument has also been resuscitated by RichardLarson and Gabriel Segal in their more recent (1995) book Knowledge of Meaning.2 If successful, the argument would not only show that descriptions have (...) both quantificational and predicational interpretations, but would also provide confirmation for the commonly held view that the verb ‘to be’ is ambiguous in its interpretation—that it sometimes expresses the ‘‘‘is’ of identity’’ and sometimes the ‘‘‘is’ of predication.’’ But the argument is not successful; it contains an obvious flaw. What’s interesting is that when you try to correct the flaw, certain puzzles arise about the nature of propositional attitudes and the semantics of their ascriptions. (shrink)
An attractive semantic theory presented by Richard K. Larson and Peter Ludlow takes a report of propositional attitudes, e.g 'Tom believes Judy Garland sang', to report a believing relation between Tom and an interpreted logical form constructed from 'Judy Garland sang'. We briefly outline the semantic theory and indicate its attractions. However, the definition of interpreted logical forms given by Larson and Ludlow is shown to be faulty, and an alternative definition is offered which matches their intentions. (...) This definition is then shown to imply that Tom does not know his own mind, a result without intuitive support. A third definition is offered to deal with this problem. (shrink)
According to James McCawley (1981) and RichardLarson and Gabriel Segal (1995), the following sentence is three-ways ambiguous: -/- Harry wants to be the mayor of Kenai. -/- According to them also, the three-way ambiguity cannot be accommodated on the Russellian view that definite descriptions are quantified noun phrases. In order to capture the three-way ambiguity of the sentence, these authors propose that definite descriptions must be ambiguous: sometimes they are predicate expressions; sometimes they are Russellian quantified noun (...) phrases. After explaining why the McCawley-Larson-Segal solution contains an obvious flaw, I discuss how an effort to correct the flaw brings to light certain puzzles about the individuation of desires, about quantifying in, and about the disambiguation of desire ascriptions. (shrink)
In A Puzzle About Belief, Saul Kripke tells the story of a person caught in a classic Frege case. Peter is unaware that Paderewski the famous Polish politician, and Paderewski the famous Polish musician, are one and the same person. What is supposed to distinguish this Frege case from many others is that Peter associates a single name, 'Paderewski' with both of his conceptions. But not everyone may agree with this description. RichardLarson and Peter Ludlow, and Robert (...) Fiengo and Robert May have suggested that Peter's idiolect contains two 'Paderewski' names (or syntactic expressions). Just as ordinary English speakers may have two 'bank' words each with its own meaning, Peter has two homophonic names each corresponding to one of his conceptions of Paderewski. I will call this position, which will be subject to further clarification, 'the two-name view'. According to the two-name view, the syntactic facts concerning an agent's language should reflect, in this peculiar way, her own perspective on the world. In this sense then, the two-name view is a symptom of an individualistic conception of the words that make up a person's language. (shrink)
In 1914, James Leuba, a psychologist at Bryn Mawr, conducted several surveys of scientists and college students regarding their religious beliefs, publishing his findings in a 1916 book titled The Belief in God and Immortality. Among scientists generally, 41.8 percent indicated they were believers in a personal God (defined as a being to whom one could pray, expecting a response), whereas 41.5 percent expressed disbelief in such a God and 16.7 percent declared themselves to be agnostic. Among elite scientists (those (...) with an asterisk by their names in James McKean Cattell's American Men of Science), the percentage of believers was lower, at 31.6 percent. Among elite biologists, the subset who believed in God was even smaller—16.9 percent. In 1996 and 1998, Edward Larson and Larry Witham replicated Leuba's study, publishing their findings in the April 23, 1997, and July 23, 1998, issues of Nature. Their surveys revealed that of all scientists questioned, 39.3 percent professed belief in a personal God, about the same as in the 1914 study. However, among elite scientists—now defined as members of the National Academy of Sciences—the proportion who were believers had plummeted to 7 percent, with biologists showing the least religious conviction at 5.5 percent. In the general population of the United States, some 86 percent profess belief in the existence of a personal God, according to a 1999 Gallup poll. These figures dramatically indicate the great no-mans land separating the religious convictions of ordinary citizens from those of the scientific community, especially its leading members. This dissensus has fueled many of the bitter battles recently fought over evolution and stem cells and has ignited explosive devices laid along several political byways. (shrink)
