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Profile: Richard Menary (Macquarie University)
  1. Richard Menary (2014). Neural Plasticity, Neuronal Recycling and Niche Construction. Mind and Language 29 (3):286-303.
    In Reading in the Brain, Stanislas Dehaene presents a compelling account of how the brain learns to read. Central to this account is his neuronal recycling hypothesis: neural circuitry is capable of being ‘recycled’ or converted to a different function that is cultural in nature. The original function of the circuitry is not entirely lost and constrains what the brain can learn. It is argued that the neural niche co-evolves with the environmental niche in a way that does not undermine (...)
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  2. Richard Menary & Michael Kirchhoff (2013). Cognitive Transformations and Extended Expertise. Educational Philosophy and Theory:1-14.
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  3. Richard Menary (2012). Cognitive Practices and Cognitive Character. Philosophical Explorations 15 (2):147 - 164.
    The argument of this paper is that we should think of the extension of cognitive abilities and cognitive character in integrationist terms. Cognitive abilities are extended by acquired practices of creating and manipulating information that is stored in a publicly accessible environment. I call these cognitive practices (2007). In contrast to Pritchard (2010) I argue that such processes are integrated into our cognitive characters rather than artefacts; such as notebooks. There are two routes to cognitive extension that I contrast in (...)
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  4. Richard Menary (2011). Our Glassy Essence: The Fallible Self in Pragmatist Thought. In Shaun Gallagher (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Self. Oup Oxford.
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  5. Richard Menary (2010). Dimensions of Mind. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (4):561-578.
    In their papers for this issue, Sterelny and Sutton provide a dimensional analysis of some of the ways in which mental and cognitive activities take place in the world. I add two further dimensions, a dimension of manipulation and of transformation. I also discuss the explanatory dimensions that we might use to explain these cases.
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  6. Richard Menary (2010). Introduction to the Special Issue on 4E Cognition. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (4):459-463.
  7. Richard Menary (2010). The Extended Mind and Cognitive Integration. In , The Extended Mind. Mit Press.
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  8. Richard Menary (2010). The Holy Grail of Cognitivism: A Response to Adams and Aizawa. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (4):605-618.
    Adams and Aizawa (2010b) define cognitivism as the processing of representations with underived content. In this paper, I respond to their use of this stipulative definition of cognition. I look at the plausibility of Adams and Aizawa’s cognitivism, taking into account that they have no criteria for cognitive representation and no naturalistic theory of content determination. This is a glaring hole in their cognitivism—which requires both a theory of representation and underived content to be successful. I also explain why my (...)
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  9. Richard Menary (ed.) (2010). The Extended Mind. Mit Press.
    Leading scholars respond to the famous proposition by Andy Clark and David Chalmers that cognition and mind are not located exclusively in the head.
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  10. Richard Menary (2009). Intentionality and Consciousness. In William Banks (ed.), Encyclopaedia of Consciousness. Elsevier.
    Intentionality is usually defined as the directedness of the mind toward something other than itself. My desire for a cold beer is directed at the cold beer in front of me. Much of consciousness is intentional, my conscious experiences are usually directed at something. However, conscious experiences typically have a phenomenal character: there is something it is like for me to see the deep blue of the Pacific Ocean and to feel the warm water lapping over my feet, and to (...)
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  11. Richard Menary (2009). Intentionality, Cognitive Integration and the Continuity Thesis. Topoi 28 (1):31-43.
    Naturalistic philosophers ought to think that the mind is continuous with the rest of the world and should not, therefore, be surprised by the findings of the extended mind, cognitive integration and enactivism. Not everyone is convinced that all mental phenomena are continuous with the rest of the world. For example, intentionality is often formulated in a way that makes the mind discontinuous with the rest of the world. This is a consequence of Brentano’s formulation of intentionality, I suggest, and (...)
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  12. Richard Menary (2008). Embodied Narratives. Journal of Consciousness Studies 15 (6):63-84.
    Is the self narratively constructed? There are many who would answer yes to the question. Dennett (1991) is, perhaps, the most famous proponent of the view that the self is narratively constructed, but there are others, such as Velleman (2006), who have followed his lead and developed the view much further. Indeed, the importance of narrative to understanding the mind and the self is currently being lavished with attention across the cognitive sciences (Dautenhahn, 2001; Hutto, 2007; Nelson, 2003). Emerging from (...)
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  13. Richard Menary (2007). Cognitive Integration: Mind and Cognition Unbounded. Palgrave Macmillan.
    In Cognitive Integration: Attacking The Bounds of Cognition Richard Menary argues that the real pay-off from extended-mind-style arguments is not a new form of externalism in the philosophy of mind, but a view in which the 'internal' and 'external' aspects of cognition are integrated into a whole. Menary argues that the manipulation of external vehicles constitutes cognitive processes and that cognition is hybrid: internal and external processes and vehicles complement one another in the completion of cognitive tasks. However, we cannot (...)
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  14. Richard Menary (2007). Writing As Thinking. Language Sciences 29:621-632.
    In this paper I aim to show that the creation and manipulation of written vehicles is part of our cognitive processing and, therefore, that writing transforms our cognitive abilities. I do this from the perspective of cognitive integration: completing a complex cognitive, or mental, task is enabled by a co-ordinated interaction between neural processes, bodily processes and manipulating written sentences. In section one I introduce Harris’ criticisms of ways in which writing has been said to restructure thought (Goody 1968; McLuhan (...)
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  15. Richard Menary (2006). Attacking the Bounds of Cognition. Philosophical Psychology 19 (3):329-344.
    Recently internalists have mounted a counter-attack on the attempt to redefine the bounds of cognition. The counter-attack is aimed at a radical project which I call "cognitive integration," which is the view that internal and external vehicles and processes are integrated into a whole. Cognitive integration can be defended against the internalist counter arguments of Adams and Aizawa (A&A) and Rupert. The disagreement between internalists and integrationists is whether the manipulation of external vehicles constitutes a cognitive process. Integrationists think that (...)
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  16. Richard Menary (2006). Radical Enactivism: Intentionality, Phenomenology and Narrative: Focus on the Philosophy of Daniel D. Hutto. Amsterdam: J Benjamins.
    This collection is a much-needed remedy to the confusion about which varieties of enactivism are robust yet viable rejections of traditional representionalism...
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  17. Richard Menary (2006). Radical Enactivism: Intentionality, Phenomenology, and Narrative. John Benjamins.
    “ is collection is a much-needed remedy to the confusion about which varieties of enactivism are robust yet viable rejections of traditional representationalism approaches to cognitivism – and which are not. Hutto’s paper is the pivot around which the expert commentators, enactivists and non-enactivists alike, sketch out the implications of enactivism for a wide variety of issues: perception, emotion, the theory of content, cognition, development, social interaction, and more. e inclusion of thoughtful replies from Hutto gives the volume a further (...)
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