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Profile: Richard Samuels (Ohio State University)
  1. Joshua Knobe & Richard Samuels (2013). Thinking Like a Scientist: Innateness as a Case Study. Cognition 126 (1):72-86.
    The concept of innateness appears in systematic research within cognitive science, but it also appears in less systematic modes of thought that long predate the scientific study of the mind. The present studies therefore explore the relationship between the properly scientific uses of this concept and its role in ordinary folk understanding. Studies 1-4 examined the judgments of people with no specific training in cognitive science. Results showed (a) that judgments about whether a trait was innate were not affected by (...)
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  2. Timothy Fuller & Richard Samuels (2011). Overselling the Case Against Normativism. Brain and Behavioral Sciences 34 (5):255.
    Though we are in broad agreement with much of Elqayam & Evans' (E&E's) position, we criticize two aspects of their argument. First, rejecting normativism is unlikely to yield the benefits that E&E seek. Second, their conception of rational norms is overly restrictive and, as a consequence, their arguments at most challenge a relatively restrictive version of normativism.
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  3.  96
    Richard Samuels (2002). Nativism in Cognitive Science. Mind and Language 17 (3):233-65.
    Though nativist hypotheses have played a pivotal role in the development of cognitive science, it remains exceedingly obscure how they—and the debates in which they figure—ought to be understood. The central aim of this paper is to provide an account which addresses this concern and in so doing: a) makes sense of the roles that nativist theorizing plays in cognitive science and, moreover, b), explains why it really matters to the contemporary study of cognition. I conclude by outlining a range (...)
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  4. Richard Samuels (1998). Evolutionary Psychology and the Massive Modularity Hypothesis. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 49 (4):575-602.
    In recent years evolutionary psychologists have developed and defended the Massive Modularity Hypothesis, which maintains that our cognitive architecture—including the part that subserves ‘central processing’ —is largely or perhaps even entirely composed of innate, domain-specific computational mechanisms or ‘modules’. In this paper I argue for two claims. First, I show that the two main arguments that evolutionary psychologists have offered for this general architectural thesis fail to provide us with any reason to prefer it to a competing picture of the (...)
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  5. Richard Samuels, Stephen Stich & Michael Bishop (2002). Ending the Rationality Wars: How to Make Disputes About Human Rationality Disappear. In Renee Elio (ed.), Common Sense, Reasoning and Rationality. Oxford University Press 236-268.
    During the last 25 years, researchers studying human reasoning and judgment in what has become known as the “heuristics and biases” tradition have produced an impressive body of experimental work which many have seen as having “bleak implications” for the rationality of ordinary people (Nisbett and Borgida 1975). According to one proponent of this view, when we reason about probability we fall victim to “inevitable illusions” (Piattelli-Palmarini 1994). Other proponents maintain that the human mind is prone to “systematic deviations from (...)
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  6.  98
    Richard Samuels (2004). Innateness in Cognitive Science. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 8 (3):136-141.
    has a more specific role to play in the development of Of course, the conclusion to draw is not that innateness innate cognitive structure. In particular, a common claim claims are trivially false or that they cannot be character-.
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  7. Richard Samuels (2006). Is the Human Mind Massively Modular? In Rod Stainton (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Cognitive Science. Blackwell
    Among the most pervasive and fundamental assumptions in cognitive science is that the human mind (or mind-brain) is a mechanism of some sort: a physical device com- posed of functionally specifiable subsystems. On this view, functional decomposition – the analysis of the overall system into functionally specifiable parts – becomes a central project for a science of the mind, and the resulting theories of cognitive archi- tecture essential to our understanding of human psychology.
     
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  8.  74
    Richard Samuels (2012). Science and Human Nature. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 70 (112):1-28.
    There is a puzzling tension in contemporary scientific attitudes towards human nature. On the one hand, evolutionary biologists correctly maintain that the traditional essentialist conception of human nature is untenable; and moreover that this is obviously so in the light of quite general and exceedingly well-known evolutionary considerations. On the other hand, talk of human nature abounds in certain regions of the sciences, especially in linguistics, psychology and cognitive science. In this paper I articulate a conception of human nature that (...)
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  9. Richard Samuels & Stephen P. Stich (2004). Rationality and Psychology. In Piers Rawling & Alfred R. Mele (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Rationality. Oxford: Oxford University Press 279-300.
    Samuels and Stich explore the debate over the extent to which ordinary human reasoning and decision making is rational. One prominent cluster of views, often associated with the heuristics and biases tradition in psychology, maintains that human reasoning is, in important respects, normatively problematic or irrational. Samuels and Stich start by sketching some key experimental findings from this tradition and describe a range of pessimistic claims about the rationality of ordinary people that these and related findings are sometimes taken to (...)
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  10.  70
    Richard Samuels (2000). Massively Modular Minds: Evolutionary Psychology and Cognitive Architecture. In Peter Carruthers (ed.), Evolution and the Human Mind. Cambridge University Press 13--46.
    What are the elements from which the human mind is composed? What structures make up our _cognitive architecture?_ One of the most recent and intriguing answers to this question comes from the newly emerging interdisciplinary field of evolutionary psychology. Evolutionary psychologists defend a _massively modular_ conception of mental architecture which views the mind –including those parts responsible for such ‘central processes’ as belief revision and reasoning— as composed largely or perhaps even entirely of innate, special-purpose computational mechanisms or ‘modules’ that (...)
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  11.  26
    Richard Samuels & Michael Ferreira (2010). Why Don't Concepts Constitute a Natural Kind? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (2-3):222 - 223.
    Machery argues that concepts do not constitute a natural kind. We argue that this is a mistake. When appropriately construed, his discussion in fact bolsters the claim that concepts are a natural kind.
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  12.  53
    Richard Samuels (2010). Classical Computationalism and the Many Problems of Cognitive Relevance. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 41 (3):280-293.
    In this paper I defend the classical computational account of reasoning against a range of highly influential objections, sometimes called relevance problems. Such problems are closely associated with the frame problem in artificial intelligence and, to a first approximation, concern the issue of how humans are able to determine which of a range of representations are relevant to the performance of a given cognitive task. Though many critics maintain that the nature and existence of such problems provide grounds for rejecting (...)
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  13.  38
    Richard Samuels (2009). The Magical Number Two, Plus or Minus: Dual Process Theory as a Theory of Cognitive Kinds. In Keith Frankish & Jonathan St B. T. Evans (eds.), In Two Minds: Dual Processes and Beyond. Oxford University Press 129--146.
  14.  35
    Richard Samuels (2009). Delusions as a Natural Kind. In Matthew Broome & Lisa Bortolotti (eds.), Psychiatry as Cognitive Neuroscience: Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press 49--79.
  15. Richard Samuels (2005). The Complexity of Cognition: Tractability Arguments for Massive Modularity. In Peter Carruthers, Stephen Laurence & Stephen Stich (eds.), The Innate Mind: Structure and Contents. New York: Oxford University Press New York 107.
  16.  58
    Tim Fuller & Richard Samuels (2014). Scientific Inference and Ordinary Cognition: Fodor on Holism and Cognitive Architecture. Mind and Language 29 (2):201-237.
    Do accounts of scientific theory formation and revision have implications for theories of everyday cognition? We maintain that failing to distinguish between importantly different types of theories of scientific inference has led to fundamental misunderstandings of the relationship between science and everyday cognition. In this article, we focus on one influential manifestation of this phenomenon which is found in Fodor's well-known critique of theories of cognitive architecture. We argue that in developing his critique, Fodor confounds a variety of distinct claims (...)
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  17. Richard Samuels, Stephen Stich & Luc Faucher (2004). Reason and Rationality. In M. Sintonen, J. Wolenski & I. Niiniluoto (eds.), Handbook of Epistemology. Kluwer 1-50.
    Over the past few decades, reasoning and rationality have been the focus of enormous interdisciplinary attention, attracting interest from philosophers, psychologists, economists, statisticians and anthropologists, among others. The widespread interest in the topic reflects the central status of reasoning in human affairs. But it also suggests that there are many different though related projects and tasks which need to be addressed if we are to attain a comprehensive understanding of reasoning.
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  18.  79
    Richard Samuels (1998). What Brains Won't Tell Us About the Mind: A Critique of the Neurobiological Argument Against Representational Nativism. Mind and Language 13 (4):548-570.
  19.  27
    Richard Samuels, Eric Margolis & Stephen Stich (2012). Introduction: Philosophy and Cognitive Science. In Eric Margolis, Richard Samuels & Stephen Stich (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Cognitive Science. Oxford University Press 3-18.
    This chapter offers a high-level overview of the philosophy of cognitive science and an introduction to the Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Cognitive Science. The philosophy of cognitive science emerged out of a set of common and overlapping interests among philosophers and scientists who study the mind. We identify five categories of issues that illustrate the best work in this broad field: (1) traditional philosophical issues about the mind that have been invigorated by research in cognitive science, (2) issues regarding (...)
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  20.  14
    Richard Samuels (2007). Is Innateness a Confused Notion? In Peter Carruthers, Stephen Laurence & Stephen Stich (eds.), The Innate Mind: Foundations and the Future. Oxford University Press
  21.  46
    Kelso Cratsley & Richard Samuels (2013). Cognitive Science and Explanations of Psychopathology. In K. W. M. Fulford (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Psychiatry. Oxford University Press 413-433.
    This chapter examines the core explanatory strategies of cognitive science and their application to the study of psychopathology. In addition to providing a taxonomy of different strategies, we illustrate their application, with special attention to Autism Spectrum Disorder and Major Depressive Disorder. We conclude by considering two challenges to the prospects of a developed cognitive science of psychopathology.
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  22. Richard Samuels (2009). The Magical Number Two, Plus or Minus: Dual-Process Theory as a Theory of Cognitive Kinds. In Two Minds: Dual Processes and Beyond.
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  23.  38
    Richard Samuels (2012). Massive Modularity. In Eric Margolis, Richard Samuels & Stephen Stich (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Cognitive Science. Oxford University Press
  24.  2
    Richard Samuels, Stephen Stich & Patrice D. Tremoulet (1999). Rethinking Rationality: From Bleak Implications to Darwinian Modules. In . Springer Netherlands 21-62.
    There is a venerable philosophical tradition that views human beings as intrinsically rational, though even the most ardent defender of this view would admit that under certain circumstances people’s decisions and thought processes can be very irrational indeed. When people are extremely tired, or drunk, or in the grip of rage, they sometimes reason and act in ways that no account of rationality would condone. About thirty years ago, Amos Tversky, Daniel Kahneman and a number of other psychologists began reporting (...)
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  25.  4
    Richard Samuels & Stephen Stich (2002). Rationality. In Lynn Nadel (ed.), The Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science. Macmillan
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  26.  13
    Richard Samuels (2002). The Spatial Reorientation Data Do Not Support the Thesis That Language is the Medium of Cross-Modular Thought. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (6):697-698.
    A central claim of the target article is that language is the medium of domain-general, cross-modular thought; and according to Carruthers, the main, direct evidence for this thesis comes from a series of fascinating studies on spatial reorientation. I argue that the these studies, in fact, provide us with no reason whatsoever to accept this cognitive conception of language.
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  27. Gary Purpura & Richard Samuels (2000). Colin Allen and Marc Bekoff Species of Mind: The Philosophy and Biology of Cognitive Ethology. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 51 (2):375-380.
     
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  28.  9
    Tim Fuller & Richard Samuels (2011). Overselling the Case Against Normativism. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (5):255.
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  29.  20
    Michael Bishop, Richard Samuels & Stephen Stich (2000). Editors' Note. Synthese 122 (1-2):1-1.
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  30. Richard Samuels, Descartes' Challenge: Flexibility and the Architecture of Cogniton.
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  31. Eric Margolis, Richard Samuels & Stephen P. Stich (eds.) (2012). The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Cognitive Science. Oxford University Press Usa.
    The philosophy of cognitive science is concerned with fundamental philosophical and theoretical questions connected to the sciences of the mind. How does the brain give rise to conscious experience? Does speaking a language change how we think? Is a genuinely intelligent computer possible? What features of the mind are innate? Advances in cognitive science have given philosophers important tools for addressing these sorts of questions; and cognitive scientists have, in turn, found themselves drawing upon insights from philosophy-insights that have often (...)
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  32. Richard Samuels, Stephen Stich & Patrice D. Tremoulet (1999). . Springer Netherlands.
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  33. Richard I. Samuels (1998). Massively Modular Minds: The Nature, Plausibility and Philosophical Implications of Evolutionary Psychology. Dissertation, Rutgers the State University of New Jersey - New Brunswick
    This dissertation focuses on the massive modularity hypothesis defended by evolutionary psychologists---the hypothesis that the human mind is composed largely or perhaps even entirely of special purpose information processing organs or "modulees" that have been shaped by natural selection to handle the sorts of recurrent information processing problems that confronted our hunter-gatherer forebears. ;In discussing MMH, I have three central goals. First, I aim to clarify the hypothesis and develop theoretically useful notions of "module" and "domain-specificity" that can play the (...)
     
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  34. Richard Samuels (2009). Nativism. In John Symons & Paco Calvo (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Psychology. Routledge
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  35. Richard Samuels (2008). Psychology. In Stathis Psillos & Martin Curd (eds.), The Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Science.
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  36. Richard Samuels (1997). PaulThagardMind: Introduction to Cognitive Science1996MIT Press0 262 20106 2. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 1 (4):156.
     
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  37. Richard Samuels (1991). The Formation of Science in Japan: Building a Research Tradition by James R. Bartholomew. [REVIEW] Isis: A Journal of the History of Science 82:107-108.
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  38. Richard J. Samuels (1991). The Formation of Science in Japan: Building a Research TraditionJames R. Bartholomew. Isis 82 (1):107-108.
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