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Profile: Richard Samuels (Ohio State University)
  1. Tim Fuller & Richard Samuels (2014). Scientific Inference and Ordinary Cognition: Fodor on Holism and Cognitive Architecture. Mind and Language 29 (2):201-237.
    Do accounts of scientific theory formation and revision have implications for theories of everyday cognition? We maintain that failing to distinguish between importantly different types of theories of scientific inference has led to fundamental misunderstandings of the relationship between science and everyday cognition. In this article, we focus on one influential manifestation of this phenomenon which is found in Fodor's well-known critique of theories of cognitive architecture. We argue that in developing his critique, Fodor confounds a variety of distinct claims (...)
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  2. Kelso Cratsley & Richard Samuels (2013). Cognitive Science and Explanations of Psychopathology. In K. W. M. Fulford (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Psychiatry. Oxford University Press. 413.
  3. Joshua Knobe & Richard Samuels (2013). Thinking Like a Scientist: Innateness as a Case Study. Cognition 126 (1):72-86.
  4. Richard Samuels (2012). Massive Modularity. In Eric Margolis, Richard Samuels & Stephen Stich (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Cognitive Science. Oxford University Press.
  5. Richard Samuels (2012). Science and Human Nature. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 70:1-28.
    There is a puzzling tension in contemporary scientific attitudes towards human nature. On the one hand, evolutionary biologists correctly maintain that the traditional essentialist conception of human nature is untenable; and moreover that this is obviously so in the light of quite general and exceedingly well-known evolutionary considerations. On the other hand, talk of human nature abounds in certain regions of the sciences, especially in linguistics, psychology and cognitive science. In this paper I articulate a conception of human nature that (...)
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  6. Tim Fuller & Richard Samuels (2011). Overselling the Case Against Normativism. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (5):255.
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  7. Timothy Fuller & Richard Samuels (2011). Overselling the Case Against Normativism. Brain and Behavioral Sciences 34 (5):255.
    Though we are in broad agreement with much of Elqayam & Evans' (E&E's) position, we criticize two aspects of their argument. First, rejecting normativism is unlikely to yield the benefits that E&E seek. Second, their conception of rational norms is overly restrictive and, as a consequence, their arguments at most challenge a relatively restrictive version of normativism.
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  8. Richard Samuels (2010). Classical Computationalism and the Many Problems of Cognitive Relevance. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 41 (3):280-293.
  9. Richard Samuels & Michael Ferreira (2010). Why Don't Concepts Constitute a Natural Kind? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (2-3):222 - 223.
    Machery argues that concepts do not constitute a natural kind. We argue that this is a mistake. When appropriately construed, his discussion in fact bolsters the claim that concepts are a natural kind.
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  10. Richard Samuels (2009). Delusions as a Natural Kind. In Matthew Broome & Lisa Bortolotti (eds.), Psychiatry as Cognitive Neuroscience: Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press. 49--79.
  11. Richard Samuels (2009). Nativism. In John Symons & Paco Calvo (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Psychology. Routledge.
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  12. Richard Samuels (2009). The Magical Number Two, Plus or Minus: Dual Process Theory as a Theory of Cognitive Kinds. In Keith Frankish & Jonathan St B. T. Evans (eds.), In Two Minds: Dual Processes and Beyond. Oxford University Press. 129--146.
  13. Richard Samuels (2008). Psychology. In Stathis Psillos & Martin Curd (eds.), The Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Science.
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  14. Richard Samuels (2007). Is Innateness a Confused Notion? In Peter Carruthers, Stephen Laurence & Stephen Stich (eds.), The Innate Mind: Foundations and the Future. Oxford University Press.
  15. Richard Samuels, Descartes' Challenge: Flexibility and the Architecture of Cogniton.
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  16. Richard Samuels (2006). Is the Human Mind Massively Modular? In Rod Stainton (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Cognitive Science. Blackwell.
    Among the most pervasive and fundamental assumptions in cognitive science is that the human mind (or mind-brain) is a mechanism of some sort: a physical device com- posed of functionally specifiable subsystems. On this view, functional decomposition – the analysis of the overall system into functionally specifiable parts – becomes a central project for a science of the mind, and the resulting theories of cognitive archi- tecture essential to our understanding of human psychology.
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  17. Richard Samuels (2005). The Complexity of Cognition: Tractability Arguments for Massive Modularity. In Peter Carruthers, Stephen Laurence & Stephen Stich (eds.), The Innate Mind: Structure and Contents. New York: Oxford University Press New York. 107.
  18. Richard Samuels (2004). Innateness in Cognitive Science. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 8 (3):136-141.
    has a more specific role to play in the development of Of course, the conclusion to draw is not that innateness innate cognitive structure. In particular, a common claim claims are trivially false or that they cannot be character-.
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  19. Richard Samuels & Stephen P. Stich (2004). Rationality and Psychology. In Piers Rawling & Alfred R. Mele (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Rationality. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 279-300.
  20. Richard Samuels, Stephen Stich & Luc Faucher (2004). Reason and Rationality. In M. Sintonen, J. Wolenski & I. Niiniluoto (eds.), Handbook of Epistemology. Kluwer. 1-50.
    Over the past few decades, reasoning and rationality have been the focus of enormous interdisciplinary attention, attracting interest from philosophers, psychologists, economists, statisticians and anthropologists, among others. The widespread interest in the topic reflects the central status of reasoning in human affairs. But it also suggests that there are many different though related projects and tasks which need to be addressed if we are to attain a comprehensive understanding of reasoning.
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  21. Richard Samuels (2002). Nativism in Cognitive Science. Mind and Language 17 (3):233-65.
    Though nativist hypotheses have played a pivotal role in the development of cognitive science, it remains exceedingly obscure how they—and the debates in which they figure—ought to be understood. The central aim of this paper is to provide an account which addresses this concern and in so doing: a) makes sense of the roles that nativist theorizing plays in cognitive science and, moreover, b), explains why it really matters to the contemporary study of cognition. I conclude by outlining a range (...)
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  22. Richard Samuels (2002). The Spatial Reorientation Data Do Not Support the Thesis That Language is the Medium of Cross-Modular Thought. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (6):697-698.
    A central claim of the target article is that language is the medium of domain-general, cross-modular thought; and according to Carruthers, the main, direct evidence for this thesis comes from a series of fascinating studies on spatial reorientation. I argue that the these studies, in fact, provide us with no reason whatsoever to accept this cognitive conception of language.
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  23. Richard Samuels & Stephen Stich (2002). Rationality. In Lynn Nadel (ed.), The Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science. Macmillan.
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  24. Richard Samuels, Stephen Stich & Michael Bishop (2002). Ending the Rationality Wars: How to Make Disputes About Human Rationality Disappear. In Renee Elio (ed.), Common Sense, Reasoning and Rationality. Oxford University Press. 236-268.
    During the last 25 years, researchers studying human reasoning and judgment in what has become known as the “heuristics and biases” tradition have produced an impressive body of experimental work which many have seen as having “bleak implications” for the rationality of ordinary people (Nisbett and Borgida 1975). According to one proponent of this view, when we reason about probability we fall victim to “inevitable illusions” (Piattelli-Palmarini 1994). Other proponents maintain that the human mind is prone to “systematic deviations from (...)
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  25. Michael Bishop, Richard Samuels & Stephen Stich (2000). Editors' Note. Synthese 122 (1-2):1-1.
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  26. Gary Purpura & Richard Samuels (2000). Colin Allen and Marc Bekoff Species of Mind: The Philosophy and Biology of Cognitive Ethology. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 51 (2):375-380.
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  27. Richard Samuels (2000). Massively Modular Minds: Evolutionary Psychology and Cognitive Architecture. In Peter Carruthers (ed.), Evolution and the Human Mind. Cambridge University Press. 13--46.
    What are the elements from which the human mind is composed? What structures make up our _cognitive architecture?_ One of the most recent and intriguing answers to this question comes from the newly emerging interdisciplinary field of evolutionary psychology. Evolutionary psychologists defend a _massively modular_ conception of mental architecture which views the mind –including those parts responsible for such ‘central processes’ as belief revision and reasoning— as composed largely or perhaps even entirely of innate, special-purpose computational mechanisms or ‘modules’ that (...)
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  28. Richard Samuels (1998). Evolutionary Psychology and the Massive Modularity Hypothesis. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 49 (4):575-602.
    In recent years evolutionary psychologists have developed and defended the Massive Modularity Hypothesis, which maintains that our cognitive architecture—including the part that subserves ‘central processing’ —is largely or perhaps even entirely composed of innate, domain-specific computational mechanisms or ‘modules’. In this paper I argue for two claims. First, I show that the two main arguments that evolutionary psychologists have offered for this general architectural thesis fail to provide us with any reason to prefer it to a competing picture of the (...)
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  29. Richard Samuels (1998). What Brains Won't Tell Us About the Mind: A Critique of the Neurobiological Argument Against Representational Nativism. Mind and Language 13 (4):548-570.
  30. Richard Samuels (1997). PaulThagardMind: Introduction to Cognitive Science1996MIT Press0 262 20106 2. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 1 (4):156.
     
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