18 found
Order:
  1.  46
    Richard Scheer (1962). Professor Ambrose on Proof. Mind 71 (282):247-248.
    No categories
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  2.  52
    Richard Scheer (2004). The ‘Mental State’ Theory of Intentions. Philosophy 79 (1):121-131.
    This theory regards intentions as mental states, e.g., attitudes, which, typically, have causal power. But we do not speak of our intentions as having such powers. Instead, we speak of a person's resolve, determination, or his anxiety, eagerness, and so forth, as the ‘powers’ that move us. Of course, one desires for various reasons to carry out his various intentions but that desire is not a component of the intentions. An intention is, roughly, the course of action that one has (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  3.  50
    Richard K. Scheer (1998). How to Criticize an Incorrigibility Thesis. Philosophical Investigations 21 (4):359-368.
  4.  15
    Richard K. Scheer (2001). Intentions, Motives, and Causation. Philosophy 76 (3):397-413.
    I criticize the ‘Humean’ view of reasons for actions, the view that the reasons for an action can be stated in terms of desires and beliefs. I point out that this view must ignore concepts which are central to our understanding of human actions, namely, intention, motivation and associated concepts such as decision. One can then see just how inadequate the Humean view is.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  5.  33
    Richard Scheer (2009). Was Wittgenstein an Anti-Realist? Philosophical Investigations 32 (4):319-328.
    William Child has said that Wittgenstein is an anti-realist with respect to a person's dreams, recent thoughts that he has consciously entertained and other things. I discuss Wittgenstein's comments about these matters in order to show that they do not commit him to an anti-realist view or a realist view. He wished to discredit the idea that when a person reports his dream or his thoughts, or past intentions, the person is reading off the contents of his mind or memory. (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  6.  8
    Richard K. Scheer (1991). Wittgenstein's Indeterminism. Philosophy 66 (255):5 - 23.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  7.  25
    Richard K. Scheer (1967). Statements About the Past. Mind 76 (303):432-434.
    No categories
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  8.  13
    Richard Scheer (1989). Conditional Intentions. Philosophical Investigations 12 (1):52-62.
    No categories
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  9.  8
    Richard K. Scheer (1994). The Causal Theory of Intentions. Philosophical Investigations 17 (2):417-434.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  10.  15
    Richard K. Scheer (1967). Predictions of Events. Philosophical Quarterly 17 (68):257-261.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  11.  13
    Richard Scheer & Professor Emeritus (2006). The Origin of Intentions. Philosophical Investigations 29 (4):358–368.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  12.  14
    Richard K. Scheer (2003). Two Puzzles About Intentions. Philosophical Investigations 26 (2):97–108.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  13.  12
    Richard K. Scheer (1999). The Extent of Self-Deception. Philosophical Investigations 22 (4):330-334.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  14.  11
    Richard K. Scheer (1979). Margolis on Remembering. Mind 88 (April):280-281.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  15.  5
    Richard K. Scheer (1996). What I Will Do and What I Intend to Do. Philosophy 71 (278):531 - 539.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  16.  4
    Richard K. Scheer (1960). Verification and the Performatory Theory of Truth. Mind 69 (276):568.
    No categories
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  17. Richard K. Scheer (1991). Wittgenstein's Indeterminism: Richard K. Scheer. Philosophy 66 (255):5-23.
    Does it follow from Wittgenstein's views about indeterminism that irregularities of nature could take place? Did he believe that chairs could simply disappear and reappear, that water could behave differently than it has, and that a man throwing a fair die might throw ones for a week? Or are these things only imaginable? Is his view simply that if we adopted an indeterministic point of view we would no longer look for causes, or would not always look for causes, because (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  18. Richard K. Scheer (1996). What I Will Do and What I Intend To Do: Richard K.Scheer. Philosophy 71 (278):531-539.
    If one thinks of intentions as entities of some sort, states or dispositions, for example, it should eventually strike him that there are peculiar difficulties with the idea. For example, he will have trouble counting his intentions. In a particular situation, we ask someone, ‘What are you going to do about that? And this?’ And his answer might be, ‘My intention is to pay that, and, as for this, my intention is to ignore it.’ But of course he may have (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography