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  1. Richard Sharvy (2007). Who's to Say What's Right or Wrong? People Who Have Ph. D. S in Philosophy, That's Who. Journal of Libertarian Studies 21 (3):3-24.
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  2. R. S. Bluck, Benson Mates, William Prior, Gail Fine, Richard Parry, Richard Sharvy & Paul Schweizer (1997). How (Not) to Exempt Platonic Forms From Parmenides' Third Man. Phronesis 42:1.
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  3. Richard Sharvy (1987). Erratum: Plato's Causal Logic and the Third Man Argument. Noûs 21 (3):455 -.
  4. Richard Sharvy (1986). Plato's Causal Logic and the Third Man Argument. Noûs 20 (4):507-530.
    (1) anything that fs does so because it participates in the f itself. (2) it is impossible that: a form phi fs because phi participates in phi. (3) the f itself fs. These are inconsistent all right, but (1) is not a doctrine of the theory of forms, and (2) is neither reasonable nor held by plato! but the tma does not involve any of these three. Rather, the tma is aimed at (4) anything that fs does so (a) because (...)
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  5. Richard Sharvy (1985). Searle on Programs and Intentionality. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 11:39-54.
     
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  6. Richard Sharvy (1983). Aristotle on Mixtures. Journal of Philosophy 80 (8):439-457.
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  7. Richard Sharvy (1983). Individuation, Essence and Plenitude. Philosophical Studies 44 (1):61 - 70.
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  8. Richard Sharvy (1983). I. It Ain't the Meat, It's the Motion. Inquiry 26 (1):125 – 131.
    John R. Searle has recently observed that something might instantiate a Chinese??understanding? computer program without having any understanding of Chinese. He thinks that this implies that instantiating such a program is ?never by itself a sufficient condition of intentionality?. I show that this phrase is incoherent, and that all that follows is that instantiating such a program is not in every case a sufficient condition for the given intentionality. But the conclusion to Searle's argument, thus revised, is neither new nor (...)
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  9. Richard Sharvy (1983). Mixtures. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 44 (2):227-239.
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  10. Richard Sharvy (1983). The Bottle Imp. Philosophia 12 (3-4):401-401.
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  11. Richard Sharvy (1980). A More General Theory of Definite Descriptions. Philosophical Review 89 (4):607-624.
    A unified theory is offered to account for three types of definite descriptions: with singular, plural, & mass predicates, & to provide an account for the word the in descriptions. It is noted that B. Russell's analysis ("On Denoting," Mind, 1905, 14, 479-493) failed to account for plural & mass descriptions. The proposed theory differs from Russell's only by the substitution of the notation (less than or equal to) for Russell's =. It is suggested that for every predicate G there (...)
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  12. Richard Sharvy (1975). [Omnibus Review]. Journal of Symbolic Logic 40 (4):577-578.
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  13. Richard Sharvy (1975). Review: Michael Kassler, The Decision of Arnold Schoenberg's Twelve-Note-Class System and Related Systems; Michael Kassler, A Sketch of the Use of Formalized Languages for the Assertion of Music; Michael Kassler, Toward a Theory That is the Twelve-Note-Class System. [REVIEW] Journal of Symbolic Logic 40 (4):576-577.
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  14. Richard Sharvy (1973). Reply to Widerker. Philosophia 3 (4):453-455.
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  15. Richard Sharvy (1972). Euthyphro 9d-11b: Analysis and Definition in Plato and Others. Noûs 6 (2):119-137.
    Piety = god-lovedness, then if a thing is loved by the gods because it is pious, then it is loved by the gods because it is god-loved, and if a thing is god-loved because it is loved by the gods, then it is pious because it is loved by the god' (10e9-11a3), to be based on some principle of substitutivity of identity or of definitional equivalents. I show that this is inadequate and mistaken, and that this premise (and the whole (...)
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  16. Richard Sharvy (1972). Three Types of Referential Opacity. Philosophy of Science 39 (2):153-161.
    Three distinct things have been called "referential opacity," causing some confusion. A noun position in a sentence may be opaque in three different ways: (1) substitutivity of identity may fail there, (2) quantifiers prefixed to the sentence may not be able to bind variables in that position, or (3) substitutivity of identity may fail when the singular nouns in question are read as having small scope. Some connections among these three types of opacity are examined.
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  17. Richard Sharvy (1970). Truth-Functionality and Referential Opacity. Philosophical Studies 21 (1-2):5 - 9.
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  18. Richard Sharvy (1969). Things. The Monist 53 (3):488-504.
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  19. Richard Sharvy (1968). Why a Class Can't Change its Members. Noûs 2 (4):303-314.
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  20. Richard Sharvy (1964). Tautology and Fatalism. Journal of Philosophy 61 (10):293-295.
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  21. Richard Sharvy (1963). A Logical Error in Taylor's "Fatalism". Analysis 23 (4):96 -.
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