77 found
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  1.  89
    Richmond H. Thomason (1970). Indeterminist Time and Truth-Value Gaps. Theoria 36 (3):264-281.
  2. Robert C. Stalnaker & Richmond H. Thomason (1970). A Semantic Analysis of Conditional Logic. Theoria 36 (1):23-42.
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  3.  7
    Richmond H. Thomason (forthcoming). The Little Nell Problem: Reasonable and Resolute Maintenance of Agent Intentions. Synthese:1-8.
    The Little Nell Problem was formulated by Drew McDermott in 1982. It reveals unexpected complexities in the interaction of the beliefs and intentions of a planning agent. This paper discusses the problem and proposes a solution.
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  4.  47
    Richmond H. Thomason (1980). A Model Theory for Propositional Attitudes. Linguistics and Philosophy 4 (1):47 - 70.
    My chief aim has been to convey the thought that the application of model theoretic techniques to natural languages needn't force a distortion of intentional phenomena. I hope that at least I have succeeded in accomplishing this.
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  5.  34
    Richmond H. Thomason (1980). A Note on Syntactical Treatments of Modality. Synthese 44 (3):391 - 395.
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  6. Catharine Saint Croix & Richmond Thomason (2014). Chisholm's Paradox and Conditional Oughts. Lecture Notes in Computer Science 8554:192-207.
    Since it was presented in 1963, Chisholm’s paradox has attracted constant attention in the deontic logic literature, but without the emergence of any definitive solution. We claim this is due to its having no single solution. The paradox actually presents many challenges to the formalization of deontic statements, including (1) context sensitivity of unconditional oughts, (2) formalizing conditional oughts, and (3) distinguishing generic from nongeneric oughts. Using the practical interpretation of ‘ought’ as a guideline, we propose a linguistically motivated logical (...)
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  7.  94
    Dustin Tucker & Richmond H. Thomason (2011). Paradoxes of Intensionality. Review of Symbolic Logic 4 (3):394-411.
    We identify a class of paradoxes that is neither set-theoretical nor semantical, but that seems to depend on intensionality. In particular, these paradoxes arise out of plausible properties of propositional attitudes and their objects. We try to explain why logicians have neglected these paradoxes, and to show that, like the Russell Paradox and the direct discourse Liar Paradox, these intensional paradoxes are recalcitrant and challenge logical analysis. Indeed, when we take these paradoxes seriously, we may need to rethink the commonly (...)
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  8.  61
    Richmond Thomason & Anil Gupta (1980). A Theory of Conditionals in the Context of Branching Time. Philosophical Review 89 (1):65-90.
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  9.  42
    Horacio Arló-Costa & Richmond H. Thomason (2001). Iterative Probability Kinematics. Journal of Philosophical Logic 30 (5):479-524.
    Following the pioneer work of Bruno De Finetti [12], conditional probability spaces (allowing for conditioning with events of measure zero) have been studied since (at least) the 1950's. Perhaps the most salient axiomatizations are Karl Popper's in [31], and Alfred Renyi's in [33]. Nonstandard probability spaces [34] are a well know alternative to this approach. Vann McGee proposed in [30] a result relating both approaches by showing that the standard values of infinitesimal probability functions are representable as Popper functions, and (...)
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  10. Richmond H. Thomason & Robert C. Stalnaker (1968). Modality and Reference. Noûs 2 (4):359-372.
  11.  39
    Richmond H. Thomason & Matthew Stone, Enlightened Update: A Computational Architecture for Presupposition and Other Pragmatic Phenomena.
    We relate the theory of presupposition accommodation to a computational framework for reasoning in conversation. We understand presuppositions as private commitments the speaker makes in using an utterance but expects the listener to recognize based on mutual information. On this understanding, the conversation can move forward not just through the positive effects of interlocutors’ utterances but also from the retrospective insight interlocutors gain about one anothers’ mental states from observing what they do. Our title, ENLIGHTENED UPDATE, highlights such cases. Our (...)
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  12.  85
    Robert C. Stalnaker & Richmond H. Thomason (1968). Abstraction in First-Order Modal Logic. Theoria 34 (3):203-207.
    The first amounts, roughly, to "It is necessarily the case that any President of the U.S. is a citizen of the U.S." But the second says, "the person who in fact is the President of the U.S, has the property of necessarily being a citizen of the U.S," Thus, while (2) is clearly true, it would be reasonable to consider (3) false.
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  13. Richmond H. Thomason (ed.) (1974). Formal Philosophy. Yale University Press.
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  14.  16
    Richmond H. Thomason (2007). Three Interactions Between Context and Epistemic Locutions. In D. C. Richardson B. Kokinov (ed.), Modeling and Using Context. Springer 467--481.
  15.  14
    Richmond H. Thomason (1969). A Semantical Study of Constructible Falsity. Zeitschrift fur mathematische Logik und Grundlagen der Mathematik 15 (16-18):247-257.
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  16.  4
    Richmond H. Thomason (1969). A Semantical Study of Constructible Falsity. Mathematical Logic Quarterly 15 (16‐18):247-257.
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  17.  18
    Richmond H. Thomason (1981). Deontic Logic as Founded on Tense Logic. In Risto Hilpinen (ed.), New Studies in Deontic Logic. 165--176.
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  18. Richmond H. Thomason (1970). Symbolic Logic. [New York]Macmillan.
  19.  34
    Richmond H. Thomason (1977). Indirect Discourse Is Not Quotational. The Monist 60 (3):340-354.
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  20. Richmond Thomason (2008). Logic and Artificial Intelligence. In Leila Haaparanta (ed.), The Development of Modern Logic. Oxford University Press
    This chapter presents an overview of the issues that arise when logic is used in helping to understand problems in intelligent reasoning and to guide the design of mechanized reasoning systems. It provides some historical and technical details concerning nonmonotonic logic and reasoning about action and change, a topic that is not only central in artificial intelligence but that is normally of considerable interest to philosophers. The remaining sections provide brief sketches of selected topics, with references to the primary literature.
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  21.  10
    Richmond H. Thomason (2011). Some Limitations to the Psychological Orientation in Semantic Theory. Journal of Philosophical Logic 40 (1):1 - 14.
    The psychological orientation treats semantics as a matter of idealized computation over symbolic structures, and semantic relations like denotation as relations between linguistic expressions and these structures. I argue that results similar to Gödel's incompleteness theorems and Tarski's theorem on truth create foundational difficulties for this view of semantics.
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  22.  43
    Richmond H. Thomason (1982). Identity and Vagueness. Philosophical Studies 42 (3):329 - 332.
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  23.  8
    Richmond H. Thomason (1981). Deontic Logic and the Role of Freedom in Moral Deliberation. In Risto Hilpinen (ed.), New Studies in Deontic Logic. 177--186.
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  24.  8
    Richmond H. Thomason (1968). On the Strong Semantical Completeness of the Intuitionistic Predicate Calculus. Journal of Symbolic Logic 33 (1):1-7.
  25. Richmond A. Thomason (1981). Deontic Logic and the Role of Freedom in Moral Deliberation. In Risto Hilpinen (ed.), New Studies in Deontic Logic.
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  26.  40
    Matthew Stone & Richmond H. Thomason, Context in Abductive Interpretation.
    This paper develops a general approach to contextual reasoning in natural language processing. Drawing on the view of natural language interpretation as abduction (Hobbs et al., 1993), we propose that interpretation provides an explanation of how an utterance creates a new discourse context in which its interpreted content is both true and promi- nent. Our framework uses dynamic theories of semantics and pragmatics, formal theories of context, and models of attentional state. We describe and illustrate a Prolog implementation.
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  27. Richmond Thomason (1997). Nonmonotonicity in Linguistics. In Benthem & Meulen (eds.), Handbook of Logic and Language. MIT Press 777--831.
     
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  28.  55
    Adam Rigoni & Richmond H. Thomason (2012). The Logic of Counterpart Theory with Actuality. Journal of Philosophical Logic (1):1-31.
    It has been claimed that counterpart theory cannot support a theory of actuality without rendering obviously invalid formulas valid or obviously valid formulas invalid. We argue that these claims are not based on logical flaws of counterpart theory itself, but point to the lack of appropriate devices in first-order logic for “remembering” the values of variables. We formulate a mildly dynamic version of first-order logic with appropriate memory devices and show how to base a version of counterpart theory with actuality (...)
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  29.  16
    Hugues Leblanc & Richmond H. Thomason (1966). The Demarcation Line Between Intuitionist Logic and Classical Logic. Zeitschrift fur mathematische Logik und Grundlagen der Mathematik 12 (1):257-262.
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  30. Richmond H. Thomason (1970). A Fitch-Style Formulation of Conditional Logic. Logique Et Analyse 52:397-412.
     
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  31.  4
    Richmond H. Thomason (1970). Some Completeness Results for Modal Predicate Calculi. In Karel Lambert (ed.), Philosophical Problems in Logic: Some Recent Developments. D. Reidel 56--76.
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  32. Richmond Thomason (1986). The Context-Sensitivity of Belief and Desire. In Michael Georgeff & Amy Lanksy (eds.), Reasoning about actions and plans. Morgan Kaufmann Publishers Inc. 341-360.
  33.  36
    Richmond H. Thomason (1969). Species, Determinates and Natural Kinds. Noûs 3 (1):95-101.
  34.  25
    Francis Jeffry Pelletier & Richmond H. Thomason (2002). Twenty-Five Years of Linguistics and Philosophy. Linguistics and Philosophy 25 (5-6):507-529.
  35. Richmond H. Thomason (1970). Symbolic Logic an Introduction. Macmillan.
     
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  36.  20
    Richmond H. Thomason (1985). Some Issues Concerning the Interpretation of Derived and Gerundive Nominals. Linguistics and Philosophy 8 (1):73 - 80.
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  37.  4
    Richmond Thomason (1975). Formal Philosophy: Selected Papers of Richard Montague. Journal of Philosophy 72 (7):196-203.
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  38.  59
    Richmond H. Thomason, Ability, Action, and Context.
    This paper proposes a formalization of ability that is motivated in part by linguistic considerations and by the philosophical literature in action theory and the logic of ability, but that is also meant to match well with planning formalisms, and so to provide an account of the role of ability in practical reasoning. Some of the philosophical literature concerning ability, and in particular [Austin, 1956], suggests that some ways of talking about ability are context-dependent. I propose a way of formalizing (...)
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  39.  47
    Richmond H. Thomason, Defeasibly Successful Action.
    “Philosophy of action” is a recognized specialty in contemporary philosophy, and the literature on action is fairly extensive: see, for instance, (Care & Landesman 1968; Goldman 1970; Hornsby 1980). The relation of actions to their effects is formulated most clearly in the more specialized literature on the logic of action; see (Belnap & Perloff 1988; Chellas 1992; Czelakowski 1996; Segerberg 1982).
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  40.  10
    Jeremy Lent & Richmond H. Thomason (2015). Action Models for Conditionals. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 24 (2):211-231.
    Possible worlds semantics for conditionals leave open the problem of how to construct models for realistic domains. In this paper, we show how to adapt logics of action and change such as John McCarthy’s Situation Calculus to conditional logics. We illustrate the idea by presenting models for conditionals whose antecedents combine a declarative condition with a hypothetical action.
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  41.  43
    G. Aldo Antonelli & Richmond H. Thomason (2002). Representability in Second-Order Propositional Poly-Modal Logic. Journal of Symbolic Logic 67 (3):1039-1054.
    A propositional system of modal logic is second-order if it contains quantifiers ∀p and ∃p, which, in the standard interpretation, are construed as ranging over sets of possible worlds (propositions). Most second-order systems of modal logic are highly intractable; for instance, when augmented with propositional quantifiers, K, B, T, K4 and S4 all become effectively equivalent to full second-order logic. An exception is S5, which, being interpretable in monadic second-order logic, is decidable.
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  42.  41
    Matthew Stone & Richmond H. Thomason, Coordinating Understanding and Generation in an Abductive Approach.
    We use a dynamic, context-sensitive approach to abductive interpretation to describe coordinated processes of understanding, generation and accommodation in dialogue. The agent updates the dialogue uniformly for its own and its interlocutors’ utterances, by accommodating a new context, inferred abductively, in which utterance content is both true and prominent. The generator plans natural and comprehensible utterances by exploiting the same abductive preferences used in understanding. We illustrate our approach by formalizing and implementing some interactions between information structure and the form (...)
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  43.  25
    Richmond H. Thomason (1975). Necessity, Quotation, and Truth: An Indexical Theory. Philosophia 5 (3):219-241.
  44.  39
    Richmond H. Thomason, Ability and Action.
    This is part of a larger project that is motivated in part by linguistic considerations and by the philosophical literature in action theory and the logic of ability, but that is also meant to suggest ways in which planning formalisms could be modified to provide an account of the role of ability in planning and practical reasoning.
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  45.  37
    Richmond H. Thomason, Progress Towards a Formal Theory of Practical Reasoning: Problems and Prospects.
    From its beginnings in Aristotle, logic was intended to account not only for reasoning that is theoretical (or conclusion-oriented), but for reasoning that is practical (or actionoriented). However, despite an interest in the topic that continues to the present, the practical side of reasoning has remained broadly speculative. At least in some domains (mathematics, in particular), there are well developed proof-theoretic and semantic theories that yield quite detailed models of correct reasoning, and these models are useful for both theoretical and (...)
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  46.  32
    K. Jon Barwise & Richmond H. Thomason (1988). Logic and Linguistics Meeting, Stanford, 1987. Journal of Symbolic Logic 53 (4):1275-1282.
  47.  25
    Richmond H. Thomason & John F. Horty, A Clash of Intuitions: The Current State of Nonmonotonic Multiple Inheritance Systems.
    Early attempts at combining multiple inheritance with nonmonotonic reasoning were based on straightforward extensions of tree-structured inheritance systems, and were theoretically unsound. In The Mathcmat~'cs of Inheritance Systcrns, or TMOIS, Touretzky described two problems these systems cannot handle: reasoning in the presence of true but redundant assertions, and coping with ambiguity. TMOIS provided a definition and analysis of a theoretically sound multiple inheritance system, accom-.
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  48.  26
    Richmond H. Thomason (1978). Critical Notice. Synthese 39 (1):141-154.
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  49.  8
    Gregory N. Carlson, Francis Jeffry Pelletier & Richmond H. Thomason (2002). Editors 'Note to the 25th Anniversary Issue'. Linguistics and Philosophy 25 (505):505-505.
  50.  21
    Richmond H. Thomason, Mixing Strict and Defeasible Inheritance.
    rich domain involves an intricate mixture of strict and defeasible information. The importance of representing defeasible information in an inheritance system has been widely recognized, but it is not enough for a sys-.
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