Search results for 'Riggs Wayne' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Wayne Riggs, Understanding, Knowledge, and the Meno Requirement Wayne D. Riggs.
    Jonathan Kvanvig's book, The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding (Kvanvig, 2003), is a wonderful example of doing epistemology in a style that Kvanvig himself has termed "value−driven epistemology." On this approach, one takes questions about epistemic value to be central to theoretical concerns, including the concern to provide an adequate account of knowledge. This approach yields the demand that theories of knowledge must provide, not just an adequate account of the nature of knowledge, but also an account (...)
     
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  2. Wayne D. Riggs (2009). Epistemic Value. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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  3.  87
    Wayne Riggs (2007). Why Epistemologists Are so Down on Their Luck. Synthese 158 (3):329 - 344.
    It is nearly universally acknowledged among epistemologists that a belief, even if true, cannot count as knowledge if it is somehow largely a matter of luck that the person so arrived at the truth. A striking feature of this literature, however, is that while many epistemologists are busy arguing about which particular technical condition most effectively rules out the offensive presence of luck in true believing, almost no one is asking why it matters so much that knowledge be immune from (...)
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  4.  73
    Wayne D. Riggs (2002). Reliability and the Value of Knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (1):79-96.
    Reliabilism has come under recent attack for its alleged inability to account for the value we typically ascribe to knowledge. It is charged that a reliably-produced true belief has no more value than does the true belief alone. I reply to these charges on behalf of reliabilism; not because I think reliabilism is the correct theory of knowledge, but rather because being reliably-produced does add value of a sort to true beliefs. The added value stems from the fact that a (...)
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  5.  62
    Wayne Riggs (2009). Two Problems of Easy Credit. Synthese 169 (1):201 - 216.
    This paper defends the theory that knowledge is credit-worthy true belief against a family of objections, two instances of which were leveled against it in a recent paper by Jennifer Lackey. Lackey argues that both innate knowledge (if there is any) and testimonial knowledge are too easily come by for it to be plausible that the knower deserves credit for it. If this is correct, then knowledge would appear not to be a matter of credit for true belief. I will (...)
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  6.  63
    Wayne Riggs (2010). Open-Mindedness. Metaphilosophy 41 (1):172-188.
    Abstract: Open-mindedness is typically at the top of any list of the intellectual or "epistemic" virtues. Yet, providing an account that simultaneously explains why open-mindedness is an epistemically valuable trait to have and how such a trait is compatible with full-blooded belief turns out to be a challenge. Building on the work of William Hare and Jonathan Adler, I defend a view of open-mindedness that meets this challenge. On this view, open-mindedness is primarily an attitude toward oneself as a believer, (...)
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  7.  45
    Wayne Riggs (2008). The Value Turn in Epistemology. In Vincent Hendricks (ed.), New Waves in Epistemology. Palgrave Macmillan 300--23.
    forthcoming 2007 in New Waves in Epistemology, Vincent Hendricks & Duncan Pritchard, eds.
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  8.  59
    Wayne D. Riggs (2003). Balancing Our Epistemic Goals. Noûs 37 (2):342–352.
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  9. Wayne D. Riggs (2009). ``Understanding, Knowledge, and the M Eno Requirement&Quot. In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Epistemic Value. Oxford: Oxford University Press
     
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  10. Wayne Riggs (2009). Luck, Knowledge, and Control. In Pritchard, Haddock & MIllar (eds.), Epistemic Value. Oxford: Oxford University Press 204--221.
     
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  11.  19
    Wayne D. Riggs (1998). What Are the “Chances” of Being Justified? The Monist 81 (3):452-472.
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  12.  46
    Jonathan L. Kvanvig & Wayne D. Riggs (1992). Can a Coherence Theory Appeal to Appearance States? Philosophical Studies 67 (3):197-217.
    Coherence theorists have universally defined justification as a relation only among (the contents of) belief states, in contradistinction to other theories, such as some versions of founda­tionalism, which define justification as a relation on belief states and appearance states.
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  13.  36
    Wayne D. Riggs (2008). Epistemic Risk and Relativism. Acta Analytica 23 (1):1-8.
    It is generally assumed that there are (at least) two fundamental epistemic goals: believing truths, and avoiding the acceptance of falsehoods. As has been often noted, these goals are in conflict with one another. Moreover, the norms governing rational belief that we should derive from these two goals depend on how we weight them relative to one another. However, it is not obvious that there is one objectively correct weighting for everyone in all circumstances. Indeed, as I shall argue, it (...)
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  14. Wayne D. Riggs (2007). Understanding 'Virtue' and the Virtue of Understanding. In Michael DePaul & Linda Zagzebski (eds.), Intellectual Virtue: Perspectives From Ethics and Epistemology. Clarendon Press
     
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  15.  37
    Wayne Riggs (2012). Culpability for Epistemic Injustice: Deontic or Aretetic? Social Epistemology 26 (2):149-162.
    This paper focuses on several issues that arise in Miranda Fricker?s book Epistemic injustice surrounding her claims about our (moral) culpability for perpetrating acts of testimonial injustice. While she makes frequent claims about moral culpability with respect to specific examples, she never addresses the issue in its full generality, and we are left to extrapolate her general view about moral culpability for acts of testimonial injustice from these more restricted and particular claims. Although Fricker never describes testimonial injustice in such (...)
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  16. Wayne D. Riggs (2003). ``Understanding `Virtue' and the Virtue of Understanding&Quot. In Michael DePaul & Linda Zagzebski (eds.), Intellectual Virtue: Persepectives From Ethics and Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press 203-227.
     
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  17.  39
    Wayne D. Riggs (2002). Beyond Truth and Falsehood: The Real Value of Knowing That P. Philosophical Studies 107 (1):87--108.
    Current epistemological dogma has it that the twin goalsof believing truths and avoiding errors exhaust our cognitive aspirations.On such a view, (call it the TG view) the only evaluationsthat count as genuinely epistemological are those that evaluatesomething (a belief, believer, set of beliefs, a cognitivetrait or process, etc.) in terms of its connection to thesetwo goods. In particular, this view implies that all theepistemic value of knowledge must be derived from thevalue of the two goals cited in TG. I argue (...)
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  18.  17
    Wayne D. Riggs (2014). Luck, Knowledge, and “Mere” Coincidence. Metaphilosophy 45 (4-5):627-639.
    There are good reasons for pursuing a theory of knowledge by way of understanding the connection between knowledge and luck. Not surprisingly, then, there has been a burgeoning of interest in “luck theories” of knowledge as well as in theories of luck in general. Unfortunately, “luck” proves to be as recalcitrant an analysandum as “knows.” While it is well worth pursuing a general theory of luck despite these difficulties, our theory of knowledge might be made more manageable if we could (...)
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  19. Wayne Riggs (2009). Two Problems of Easy Credit. Synthese 169 (1):201-216.
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  20.  6
    Wayne D. Riggs (1997). The Weakness of Strong Justification. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 75 (2):179 – 189.
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  21.  21
    Wayne Riggs (2004). Review of Jonathan Kvanvig, The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2004 (3).
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  22.  2
    Wayne D. Riggs (2000). Beyond Truth and Falsehood: The. Philosophical Studies:87-108.
    Current epistemological dogma has it that the twin goalsof believing truths and avoiding errors exhaust our cognitive aspirations. On such a view, (call it the "TG view") the only evaluations that count as genuinely epistemological are those that evaluate something (a belief, believer, set of beliefs, a cognitive trait or process, etc.) in terms of its connection to these two goods. In particular, this view implies that all the epistemic value of knowledge must be derived from the value of the (...)
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  23. Wayne Riggs (2009). Getting the Meno Requirement Right. In Pritchard, Haddock & MIllar (eds.), Epistemic Value. Oxford: Oxford University Press 331--38.
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  24. Wayne Riggs, Insight, Open−Mindedness and Understanding.
    I am interested in epistemic virtues for reasons rather different than most. I do not offer a virtue theory of anything, I don't argue that we can solve various long−standing problems in epistemology by appeal to epistemic virtues, nor am I an opponent of any of these things (though I certainly find some of these projects more plausible than others.) Rather, my interest in the epistemic virtues stems from a long−standing commitment to epistemic value pluralism, and a belief that, until (...)
     
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  25. Wayne Riggs, Reliability and the Value of Knowledge1 1. Introduction.
    Is knowledge more valuable than mere true belief? Few question the value of having true beliefs, and insofar as having knowledge entails (at least) having a true belief, we value knowledge. But traditionally it has been assumed that whatever it takes to turn true belief into knowledge has some additional value. Traditionally, then, philosophers have been committed to what I will call the ‘Value Principle'.
     
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  26.  40
    Riggs Wayne (2009). Two Problems of Easy Credit. Synthese 169:201 - 216.
    In this paper I defend the theory that knowledge is credit-worthy true belief against a family of objections, one of which was leveled against it in a recent paper by Jennifer Lackey. In that paper, Lackey argues that testimonial knowledge is problematic for the credit-worthiness theory because when person A comes to know that p by way of the testimony of person B, it would appear that any credit due to A for coming to believe truly that p belongs to (...)
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  27.  2
    Damien W. Riggs (2009). Book Review: The Sexual Demon of Colonial Power: Pan-African Embodiment and Erotic Schemes of Empire by Greg Thomas Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2007 Reviewed by Damien W. Riggs. [REVIEW] Body and Society 15 (3):120-121.
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  28.  10
    D. A. Coady (2012). Critical Reply to'Culpability for Epistemic Injustice: Deontic or Aretetic'by Wayne Riggs. Social Epistemology: Review and Reply Collective 1 (5):3-6.
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  29.  14
    Damien W. Riggs (2007). Reassessing the Foster-Care System: Examining the Impact of Heterosexism on Lesbian and Gay Applicants. Hypatia 22 (1):132-148.
    : In this essay, Riggs demonstrates how heterosexism shapes foster-care assessment practices in Australia. Through an examination of lesbian and gay foster-care applicants' assessment reports and with a focus on the heteronormative assumptions contained within them, Riggs demonstrates that foster-care public policy and research on lesbian and gay parenting both promote the idea that lesbian and gay parents are always already "just like" heterosexual parents. To counter this idea of "sameness," Riggs proposes an approach to both assessing (...)
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  30.  12
    Joel Katzav (1998). Riggs on Strong Justification. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (4):631 – 639.
    In 'The Weakness of Strong Justification' Wayne Riggs claims that the requirement that justified beliefs be truth conducive (likely to be true) is not always compatible with the requirement that they be epistemically responsible (arrived at in an epistemically responsible manner)1. He supports this claim by criticising Alvin Goldman's view that if a belief is strongly justified, it is also epistemically responsible. In light of this, Riggs recommends that we develop two independent conceptions of justification, one that (...)
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  31. Andrew Wayne, Emergence, Singular Limits and Basal Explanation.
    Recent work on emergence in physics has focused on the presence of singular limit relations between basal and upper-level theories as a criterion for emergence. However, over-emphasis on the role of singular limit relations has somewhat obscured what it means to say that a property or behaviour is emergent. This paper argues that singular limits are not central to emergence and develops an alternative account of emergence in terms of the failure of basal explainability. As a consequence, emergence and reduction, (...)
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  32. Andrew Wayne, Explanatory Idealizations.
    A signal development in contemporary physics is the widespread use, in explanatory contexts, of highly idealized models. This paper argues that some highly idealized models in physics have genuine explanatory power, and it extends the explanatory role for such idealizations beyond the scope of previous philosophical work. It focuses on idealizations of nonlinear oscillator systems.
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  33.  48
    Andrew Wayne (2011). Expanding the Scope of Explanatory Idealization. Philosophy of Science 78 (5):830-841.
    Many explanations in physics rely on idealized models of physical systems. These explanations fail to satisfy the conditions of standard normative accounts of explanation. Recently, some philosophers have claimed that idealizations can be used to underwrite explanation nonetheless, but only when they are what have variously been called representational, Galilean, controllable or harmless idealizations. This paper argues that such a half-measure is untenable and that idealizations not of this sort can have explanatory capacities.
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  34.  57
    Ann Riggs (2006). Editor's Page. Philosophy and Theology 18 (2):401-402.
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  35. Marcia Y. Riggs (forthcoming). Book Review: Enfleshing Freedom: Body, Race, and Being. [REVIEW] Interpretation 65 (2):214-215.
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  36. Andrew Wayne & Michal Arciszewski (2009). Emergence in Physics. Philosophy Compass 4 (5):846-858.
    This paper begins by tracing interest in emergence in physics to the work of condensed matter physicist Philip Anderson. It provides a selective introduction to contemporary philosophical approaches to emergence. It surveys two exciting areas of current work that give good reason to re-evaluate our views about emergence in physics. One area focuses on physical systems wherein fundamental theories appear to break down. The other area is the quantum-to-classical transition, where some have claimed that a complete explanation of the behaviors (...)
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  37.  20
    Andrew Wayne (1995). Bayesianism and Diverse Evidence. Philosophy of Science 62 (1):111-121.
    A common methodological adage holds that diverse evidence better confirms a hypothesis than does the same amount of similar evidence. Proponents of Bayesian approaches to scientific reasoning such as Horwich, Howson and Urbach, and Earman claim to offer both a precise rendering of this maxim in probabilistic terms and an explanation of why the maxim should be part of the methodological canon of good science. This paper contends that these claims are mistaken and that, at best, Bayesian accounts of diverse (...)
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  38.  14
    P. Mitchell & Kevin J. Riggs (eds.) (2000). Children's Reasoning and the Mind. Psychology Press/Taylor & Francis.
    This book offers a thorough investigation into the development of the cognitive processes that underpin judgements about mental states (often termed 'theory of ...
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  39.  4
    Donald M. Peterson & Kevin J. Riggs (1999). Adaptive Modelling and Mindreading. Mind and Language 14 (1):80–112.
  40.  43
    Andrew Wayne (2012). Emergence and Singular Limits. Synthese 184 (3):341-356.
    Recent work by Robert Batterman and Alexander Rueger has brought attention to cases in physics in which governing laws at the base level “break down” and singular limit relations obtain between base- and upper-level theories. As a result, they claim, these are cases with emergent upper-level properties. This paper contends that this inference—from singular limits to explanatory failure, novelty or irreducibility, and then to emergence—is mistaken. The van der Pol nonlinear oscillator is used to show that there can be a (...)
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  41.  22
    Ann R. Riggs (2010). Rahner Papers Editor's Page. Philosophy and Theology 22 (1/2):195-196.
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  42.  80
    Peter J. Riggs (1997). The Principal Paradox of Time Travel. Ratio 10 (1):48–64.
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  43.  19
    A. R. Riggs (1985). David Hume's Practical Economics. Hume Studies 11 (2):154-165.
    David hume rejected utopian experiments in government. He presented his own "idea of a perfect commonwealth," but his approach to political economy was practical and surprisingly modern. In nine essays on economics he argued that 1) national strength lies in productivity; 2) trade indirectly benefits the state by enriching all the people; 3) luxury, Economic growth and refinement in the arts are compatible; 4) the international flow of money should be encouraged; 5) rate of interest is a key to a (...)
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  44.  17
    Sarah L. Gorniak, Kevin J. Riggs & Sarah R. Beck (2011). Relating Developments in Children's Counterfactual Thinking and Executive Functions. Thinking and Reasoning 15 (4):337-354.
    The performance of 93 children aged 3 and 4 years on a battery of different counterfactual tasks was assessed. Three measures: short causal chains, location change counterfactual conditionals, and false syllogisms—but not a fourth, long causal chains—were correlated, even after controlling for age and receptive vocabulary. Children's performance on our counterfactual thinking measure was predicted by receptive vocabulary ability and inhibitory control. The role that domain general executive functions may play in 3- to 4-year olds' counterfactual thinking development is discussed.
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  45.  17
    Ann R. Riggs (2010). Rahner Papers Editor's Page. Philosophy and Theology 22 (1/2):195-196.
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  46.  31
    Ann R. Riggs (2010). Rahner Papers Editor's Page. Philosophy and Theology 22 (1/2):195-196.
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  47.  10
    Sarah L. Gorniak, Kevin J. Riggs & Sarah R. Beck (2011). Relating Developments in Children's Counterfactual Thinking and Executive Functions. Thinking and Reasoning 15 (4):337-354.
    The performance of 93 children aged 3 and 4 years on a battery of different counterfactual tasks was assessed. Three measures: short causal chains, location change counterfactual conditionals, and false syllogisms—but not a fourth, long causal chains—were correlated, even after controlling for age and receptive vocabulary. Children's performance on our counterfactual thinking measure was predicted by receptive vocabulary ability and inhibitory control. The role that domain general executive functions may play in 3- to 4-year olds' counterfactual thinking development is discussed.
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  48.  19
    Katherine Wayne & Kathleen Cranley Glass (2010). The Research Imperative Revisited Considerations for Advancing the Debate Surrounding Medical Research as Moral Imperative. Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 53 (3):373-387.
    The continuous pursuit and support of medical research on both a societal and individual level is frequently presupposed as laudable, or even obligatory. However, some critics have challenged the assumption that medical research ought to be conducted. These critics reject claims that there is a moral obligation to pursue research, and that medical research may always be justifiable given adequate safeguards and regulations. We align ourselves with critics of the research imperative to the extent that we believe that medical research (...)
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  49. Peter J. Riggs (1992). Whys and Ways of Science: Introducing Philosophical and Sociological Theories of Science. Melbourne University Press.
  50.  39
    Peter J. Riggs (1991). A Critique of Mellor's Argument Against 'Backwards' Causation. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 42 (1):75-86.
    In this paper, criticisms are made of the main tenets of Professor Mellor's argument against ‘backwards’ causation. He requires a closed causal chain of events if there is to be ‘backwards’ causation, but this condition is a metaphysical assumption which he cannot totally substantiate. Other objections to Mellor's argument concern his probabilistic analysis of causation, and the use to which he puts this analysis. In particular, his use of conditional probability inequality to establish the ‘direction’ of causation is shown to (...)
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