We investigate what drives responsible investment of European pension funds. Pension funds are institutional investors who assure the income of part of the population for a long period of time. Increasingly, stakeholders hold pension funds accountable for the non-financial consequences of their investments and many funds have engaged in responsible investing. However, it appears that there is a wide difference between pension funds in this respect. We investigate what determines pension funds’ responsible investments on the basis of a survey of (...) more than 250 pension funds in 15 European countries in 2010. We use multinomial logistic regression and find that especially legal origin of the country, ownership of the pension fund and fund size-related variables are to be associated with pension funds′ responsible investment. For fund size, we establish a curvilinear relationship; especially the smallest and largest pension funds in the sample tend to engage with responsible investing. (shrink)
Viktor Hamburger was a developmental biologist interested in the ontogenesis of the vertebrate nervous system. A student of Hans Spemann at Freiburg in the 1920s, Hamburger picked up a holistic view of the embryo that precluded him from treating it in a reductionist way; at the same time, he was committed to a materialist and analytical approach that eschewed any form of vitalism or metaphysics. This paper explores how Hamburger walked this thin line between mechanistic reductionism and metaphysical vitalism in (...) light of his work on the factors influencing growth of neurons into limb buds, and the discovery of nerve growth factor, work carried out with Rita Levi-Montalcini and Stanley Cohen. (shrink)
Patrizia Lombardo | : Stendhal et Musil sont les deux écrivains par excellence qui se sont interrogés sur le type de connaissance qui vient de la littérature. Avant Musil et comme Musil, Stendhal répond à cette question fondamentale en montrant que le roman offre une connaissance des émotions humaines et de leur lien avec les valeurs. Il s’agit à la fois de valeurs éthiques — les situations morales dans lesquelles se trouvent les personnages — et des valeurs esthétiques et proprement (...) littéraires — le tragique, le comique, le tragi-comique, le sublime, etc. Surtout, le roman n’est pas simple représentation du réel, mais aussi du possible. L’analyse de quelques phrases hypothétiques, conjectures et expériences de pensée dans Le Rouge et le Noir, confirme la thèse que la littérature propose une connaissance du possible à travers le travail de l’imagination. | : Stendhal and Musil are deeply concerned with the question of theknowledge value of literature. Like Musil and before him, Stendhalanswered this question by showing the potential of the novel :this literary form presents human emotions and their connection tovalues. The characters deal with various situations, therefore conveyethical values, while aesthetic values —such as the comic, thetragic, the tragic-comic, the sublime- emerge from the way in whichhuman actions and emotions are represented. All these values arebrought about by the style of Stendhal, which is both form and content,both ethical and aesthetic. The analysis of some hypotheticalsentences, conjectures and thought experiments in The Red and the Blackconfirms the thesis later endorsed by Musil, that literature allows forthe knowledge of the possible, thanks to the exercise of theimagination. (shrink)
Jean-Marie Schaeffer | : La question de la relation entre vérité et littérature se pose autrement selon qu’on aborde la littérature comme une forme d’art ou comme une forme de discours. Il faut aussi distinguer plusieurs régimes de vérité/fausseté, voire plusieurs types de réussite et d’échec littéraires qui ne peuvent peut-être pas tous être analysés en termes de vérité/non-vérité. À partir de là on peut envisager la relation entre valeur de vérité et fonction cognitive. | : Answers to the problem (...) of the relation of literature and truth differ according to whether one takes literature as a form of art or as a form of discourse. One must also distinguish various regimes of truth and falsity and various kinds of literary success or failures which cannot all be analysed in terms of truth and falsity. Once these points are examined on can deal with the relation between truth value and cognitive function. (shrink)
Alexis Tadié | : Dans cet essai, on analyse la relation entre fait et fiction dans le contexte du développement de la forme romanesque. Je suggère que l’on peut approcher la nature du récit en examinant les manières dont les fictions et les histoires fictionnelles en sont venues à constituer des artefacts philosophiques complexes, la question du genre littéraire étant subordonnée à celle de fictionnalité. | : In this essay, I would like to analyse the relationship between fiction and fact (...) within the context of the development of the novel. I suggest that we may approach narratives by looking at the ways in which fiction and fictional stories came to constitute complex philosophical artefacts — the question of genre being dependent on the idea of fictionality. (shrink)
Stelios Virvidakis | : Dans cet article, je me pose la question de l’emploi du concept de vérité par la critique littéraire et je me concentre sur la théorie : « pas de vérité en littérature », élaborée par Peter Lamarque et Stein Haughom Olsen. Je tâche de développer et d’approfondir certaines critiques de leurs thèses et arguments, afin d’en proposer une évaluation d’ensemble. Je conclus que le problème principal avec Lamarque et Olsen est qu’ils veulent exclure toute considération de (...) vérité en littérature — endossant ainsi une conception de la création littéraire plus ou moins expressiviste — tout en sauvegardant la reconnaissance de la vérité de nos croyances concernant une série de notions de ce qui est d’intérêt humain et des valeurs universelles non formelles. Leur approche risque ainsi de sombrer dans l’incohérence. | : The article deals with possible uses of the concept of truth in literary criticism and focuses on the « no truth » philosophical theory of literature elaborated by Peter Lamarque et Stein Haughom Olsen. I draw on certain objections to their basic theses and arguments, which have been already put forth by various critics, trying to develop and refine them, with a view to proposing a more general evaluation. I conclude that the main problem with Lamarque and Olsen is that they want to eschew all considerations of truth in literature — endorsing a more or less expressivist conception of literary creation —, while, at the same time retaining the recognition of the truth of beliefs concerning what is of importance to human beings and notions of universal, non formal values. Such a stance threatens the coherence of their approach. (shrink)
Musical Perceptions is a much-needed text that introduces students of both music and psychology to the study of music perception and cognition. Because the book aims to foster a closer interaction between research in the science and the art of music, both psychologists and musicians contribute chapters on a wide range of topics, including the philosophy of music; research in musical performance; perception of melody, tonality, and rhythm; pedagogical issues; language and music; and neural networks. With their unique ability to (...) introduce musical and psychological concepts to first-time students in the area, Rita Aiello and John Sloboda have edited a volume that will be popular with undergraduate and graduate students taking courses in the perception, psychology, and aesthetics of music. They have prefaced each chapter with an introduction to the chapter's research. This book will also be useful to cognitive and physiological psychologists and music theorists interested in music perception. (shrink)
In this paper, I consider the claim that a corporation cannot be held to be morally responsible unless it is a person. First, I argue that this claim is ambigious. Person flags three different but related notions: metaphysical person, moral agent, moral person. I argue that, though one can make the claim that corporates are metaphysical persons, this claim is only marginally relevant to the question of corporate moral responsibility. The central question which must be answered in discussions of corporate (...) moral responsibility is whether corporations are moral agents or moral persons. I argue that, though we can make a case for saying corporations are moral agents, they are not moral persons, and hence, we can hold them responsible. In addition, we need not treat them the way we would be obligated to treat a moral person; we needn't have the same scruples about holding a corporation morally responsible as we would a moral person. (shrink)
The need for professionals to volunteer their time in crisis situations and to reach across time and culture in the service of humanitarian interventions will likely not abate in the near future. This article provides readers with multiple venues for considering the ethical dimensions present in crisis and humanitarian interventions. Core ethical concerns common to helping situations are magnified in crisis work. In addition, issues unique to the nature of volunteer and crisis work must also be considered. Using hypothetical case (...) examples, bioethical principles, and ethical decision-making models, helping professionals are encouraged to go beyond their particular ethical codes in contemplating ethically and clinically sensitive volunteering. (shrink)
Anthropology today seems to shy away from the big, comparative questions that ordinary people in many societies find compelling. Questions of Anthropology brings these issues back to the centre of anthropological concerns. Individual essays explore birth, death and sexuality, puzzles about the relationship between science and religion, questions about the nature of ritual, work, political leadership and genocide, and our personal fears and desires, from the quest to control the future and to find one's "true" identity to the fear of (...) being alone. Each essay starts with a question posed by individual ethnographic experience and then goes on to frame this question in a broader, comparative context. (shrink)
In tactile-visual sensory substitution (TVSS), images from a video camera are converted into patterns of vibrotactile stimulation that visually impaired subjects can use to perform tasks ordinarily guided by seeing. A main finding in early experiments conducted by Paul Bach-y-Rita and colleagues is that subjects equipped with a TVSS device engaged in distal attribution – attributed the cause of the stimulations they received to objects in the external, three-dimensional scene – only when they had active control over how the (...) camera moved. Subjects who received visual input passively experienced only a changing pattern of tactile stimulation. Why was this the case? According to proponents of the sensorimotor contingency theory, active control of the camera is necessary for the emergence of distal attribution because it enables the subject to acquire knowledge of the laws of sensorimotor contingency that govern use of the TVSS device. This chapter, by contrast, approaches distal attribution as a solution to a causal inference problem faced by the subject’s perceptual systems. Given all of the available endogenous and exogenous evidence available to those systems, what is the most probable source of stimulation in the substituting modality? From this perspective, active control over the camera’s movements matters for rather different reasons. First, when the subject is unaware of how (or even whether) the camera is moving, all of the evidence at her disposal is consistent with the default haptic interpretation of incoming vibrotactile stimulation: the most probable cause of that stimulation is bodily contact with an object of some kind. It is thus unsurprising that a passively stimulated subject does not learn to discriminate the spatial layout of the external scene by means of TVSS. Second, when the subject has the ability to guide camera movement, she also has a significant amount of voluntary control over whether and how incoming vibrotactile stimulation undergoes change. In consequence, the situation is now one that conflicts with the default haptic interpretation: it is not typically possible to modify sensations on the surface of one’s back by moving a camera mounted on a tripod or on one’s head. Last, active control over the camera’s movements generates proprioceptive and efference-copy based information about the camera’s body-relative position necessary to make use of the spatial cues present in the stimulation that the subject receives for purposes of egocentric object localization. (shrink)
The recent interest of cognitive- and neuro-scientists in the topic of consciousness (and the dissatisfaction with the present state of knowledge) has revealed deep conceptual differences with Humanists, who have dealt with issues of consciousness for centuries. O'Regan & Noë have attempted (unsuccessfully) to bridge those differences.
Bering's argument that human beings are endowed with a cognitive system dedicated to forming illusory representations of psychological immortality relies on the claim that children's beliefs in the afterlife are not the result of religious teaching. We suggest four reasons why this claim is unsatisfactory.
Part of an early version of this paper was read at the University of Warwick in October 1977, and a later version was read at the Newcastle Royal Institute of Philosophy in November 1977 and at Aberystwyth and Oxford in early 1978. Thanks are due to the many colleagues and friends who made helpful comments on early drafts; special thanks to Hugh Mellor, Rita Nolan and Paul Weiss for detailed written criticisms, and to Don Locke, for very helpful discussions.