How exactly is accepting the bad side effects of good choices morally defensible? The best defense to date is by Joseph Boyle, John Finnis, and Germain Grisez and relies on the claim that bad side effects are unavoidable. But are they? Three accounts of why bad side effects are unavoidable—one by John Zeis, a second by Boyle, Finnis, and Grisez jointly, and a third by Boyle independently—are examined and rejected. Next, an alternative proposal which suggests bad side effects are always (...) avoidable is also examined and rejected. Finally, an adequate account of why bad side effects are unavoidable is presented and defended. This defense relies on certain facts about the goods which human agents ultimately find fulfilling and about human agents’ attempts to instantiate those goods through various projects. (shrink)
This essay describes conversation as an ensemble accomplishment that can be illuminated by critics working with specific texts within a rhetorical framework. We first establish dialogue as the key concept for any criticism of conversation, specifying the rhetorical dimensions of interpersonal dialogue. Second, we show how template thinking is particularly dangerous for conversational critics and suggest a research (anti)method, based on a coauthorship, that provides a thoroughgoing dialogical access to texts. Finally, we exemplify dialogic criticism of a conversational text by (...) analyzing the famous 1957 dialogue of philosopher Martin Buber and psychologist Carl Rogers. (shrink)
Most scholars in political theory and sociology have dismissed journalism as an institutional force in the public sphere, in part because of journalists' largely self-defined and curiously marginalized role as a mere transmission apparatus for traditional news. The authors advocate a philosophy ofpublic journalism faithful to the commons, in which newspapers become a site for public dialogue accessible to all citizens, where positions that could not or would not be explored elsewhere are advanced, argued, assessed, and acted upon.
This article places the issue of quoting practices in journalism - widely debated in public and professional forums since the Masson-Malcolm (Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, 1991) dispute - into both practical and ethical contexts. It suggests that the multitude of ethical dilemmas facing journalists in the handling of quotations can be addressed by adapting Bok's (1979) test of publicity, which requires that journalists willingly imagine themselves under scrutiny. The spirit of the test asks journalists to embrace this central orienting (...) rhetorical question: Is my behavior such that I'd be comfortable having all my audiences - interview subject, editor, public, and self - simultaneously monitor my choice(s), knowing that I might later be called upon to justify my actions. (shrink)
On reading the grain argument as advanced by Meehl and Sellars, I find that there is not one but two grain arguments. According to one argument, mental events cannot be the same as neural events because mental events have a continuity that neural events do not have. The other argues for the same conclusion from the simplicity of experienced quality. I answer these arguments by claiming that these properties of experience are illusory. I detail a dual threshold theory of visual (...) experience and show that given this model the mind-brain identity theory predicts the existence of these illusions. (shrink)