Search results for 'Robert Anthony Williams' (try it on Scholar)

988 found
Sort by:
  1. J. Robert & G. Williams (2012). Counterfactual Triviality. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (3):648-670.score: 2799.9
    I formulate a counterfactual version of the notorious 'Ramsey Test'. Whereas the Ramsey Test for indicative conditionals links credence in indicatives to conditional credences, the counterfactual version links credence in counterfactuals to expected conditional chance. I outline two forms: a Ramsey Identity on which the probability of the conditional should be identical to the corresponding conditional probabihty/expectation of chance; and a Ramsey Bound on which credence in the conditional should never exceed the latter.Even in the weaker, bound, form, the counterfactual (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. McCrudden Christopher, Ford Robert & Heath Anthony (2004). Legal Regulation of Affirmative Action in Northern Ireland: An Empirical Assessment. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 24 (3).score: 2400.0
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Patricia J. Williams (1998). Seeing a Cohr-Blind Future: The Paradox of Race (New York: Farrar, Straus and GiroUX, 1997); Robert Gooding-Williams," Race. Multiculturalism, and Democracy,". Constellations 5:i8 - 41.score: 900.0
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Owen Flanagan & Robert Anthony Williams (2010). What Does the Modularity of Morals Have to Do With Ethics? Four Moral Sprouts Plus or Minus a Few. Topics in Cognitive Science 2 (3):430-453.score: 870.0
    Flanagan (1991) was the first contemporary philosopher to suggest that a modularity of morals hypothesis (MMH) was worth consideration by cognitive science. There is now a serious empirically informed proposal that moral competence is best explained in terms of moral modules-evolutionarily ancient, fast-acting, automatic reactions to particular sociomoral experiences (Haidt & Joseph, 2007). MMH fleshes out an idea nascent in Aristotle, Mencius, and Darwin. We discuss the evidence for MMH, specifically an ancient version, “Mencian Moral Modularity,” which claims four innate (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. C. J. F. Williams, Anthony Savile, Richard Norman, Robert Black, R. G. Swinburne, David Holdcroft, Eva Schaper, Thomas McPheron & Karl Britton (1973). New Books. [REVIEW] Mind 82 (328):617-638.score: 810.0
    No categories
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. John D. Sommer, Ed Casey, Mary C. Rawlinson, Eva Kittay, Michael A. Simon, Patrick Grim, Clyde Lee Miller, Rita Nolan, Marshall Spector, Don Ihde, Peter Williams, Anthony Weston, Donn Welton, Dick Howard, David A. Dilworth, Tom Foster Digby 3d, Anthony Appiah, David Auerbach, Annette Baier, Seyla Benhabib, Akeel Bilgrami, Richard Boyd, Robert Brandon, Joshua Cohen, Arnold Davidson, Owen Flanagan, Nancy Fraser, Marcia Lind, Alexander Nehamas, Linda Nicholson, Adrian Piper, Lynne Tirrell, Lawrence Blum, Lawrence Foster, Roma Farion, Mitchel Silver, Jenifer Radden, Jack Bayne, Robert K. Shope, Jane Roland Martin, Arthur B. Millman, Beebe Nelson, Robert Rosenfeld, Janet Farrell-Smith, David E. Flesche, Daniel E. Anderson, J. R. Brown, F. Cunningham, D. Goldstick, I. Hacking, C. Normore, A. Ripstein, W. Sumner, Alison M. Jaggar, Harry Deutsch, Irving Stein, John Hund, George Englebretsen, Fred Strohm, D. L. Ouren, P. Bilimoria, F. B. D. & Nora Nevin (1993). Letters to the Editor. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 66 (5):97 - 112.score: 810.0
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Robert R. Williams (2012). Tragedy, Recognition, and the Death of God: Studies in Hegel and Nietzsche. Oup Oxford.score: 520.0
    Robert R. Williams offers a bold new account of divergences and convergences in the work of Hegel and Nietzsche. He explores four themes - the philosophy of tragedy; recognition and community; critique of Kant; and the death of God - and explicates both thinkers' critiques of traditional theology and metaphysics.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. David M. Williams, Robert W. Scotland, Christopher J. Humphries & Darrell J. Siebert (1996). Confusion in Philosophy: A Comment on Williams (1992). Synthese 108 (1):127 - 136.score: 480.0
    Patricia Williams made a number of claims concerning the methods and practise of cladistic analysis and classification. Her argument rests upon the distinction of two kinds of hierarchy: a divisional hierarchy depicting evolutionary descent and the Linnean hierarchy describing taxonomic groups in a classification. Williams goes on to outline five problems with cladistics that lead her to the conclusion that systematists should eliminate cladism as a school of biological taxonomy and to replace it either with something that is (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Robert R. Williams (2006). Review of Robert M. Wallace, Hegel's Philosophy of Reality, Freedom, and God. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2006 (1).score: 420.0
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Robert R. Williams (2010). G. W. F. Hegel, Robert F. Brown (Ed., Tr.), Lectures on the History of Philosophy 1825-6: Volume I: Introduction and Oriental Philosophy. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2010 (7).score: 420.0
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Robert Williams, Indeterminate Survival.score: 300.0
    Most views of personal identity allow that sometimes, facts of personal identity can be borderline or indeterminate. Bernard Williams argued that regarding questions of one’s own survival as borderline “had no comprehensible representation” in one’s emotions and expectations. Whether this is the case, I will argue, depends crucially on what account of indeterminacy is presupposed.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. John N. Williams (2009). Justifying Circumstances and Moore-Paradoxical Beliefs: A Response to Brueckner. Analysis 69 (3):490-496.score: 300.0
    In 2004, I explained the absurdity of Moore-paradoxical belief via the syllogism (Williams 2004): (1) All circumstances that justify me in believing that p are circumstances that tend to make me believe that p. (2) All circumstances that tend to make me believe that p are circumstances that justify me in believing that I believe that p. (3) All circumstances that justify me in believing that p are circumstances that justify me in believing that I believe that p. I (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. J. Robert G. Williams, Chancy Counterfactuals, Redux: Response to Dodd.score: 300.0
    Chancy counterfactuals are a headache. Dylan Dodd (2009) presents an interesting argument against a certain general strategy for accounting for them, instances of which are found in the appendices to Lewis (1979) and in Williams (2008). I will argue (i) that Dodd’s understates the counterintuitiveness of the conclusions he can reach; (ii) that the counterintuitiveness can be thought of as an instance of more general oddities arising when we treat vagueness and indeterminacy in a classical setting; and (iii) the (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. J. Robert G. Williams (2012). Generalized Probabilism: Dutch Books and Accuracy Domination. [REVIEW] Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (5):811-840.score: 300.0
    Jeff Paris (2001) proves a generalized Dutch Book theorem. If a belief state is not a generalized probability (a kind of probability appropriate for generalized distributions of truth-values) then one faces ‘sure loss’ books of bets. In <span class='Hi'>Williams</span> (manuscript) I showed that Joyce’s (1998) accuracy-domination theorem applies to the same set of generalized probabilities. What is the relationship between these two results? This note shows that (when ‘accuracy’ is treated via the Brier Score) both results are easy corollaries (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. J. Robert G. Williams, Dutch Books and Accuracy Domination.score: 300.0
    Jeff Paris (2001) proves a generalized Dutch Book theorem. If a belief state is not a generalized probability (a kind of probability appropriate for generalized distributions of truth-values) then one faces ‘sure loss’ books of bets. In Williams (manuscript) I showed that Joyce’s (1998) accuracy-domination theorem applies to the same set of generalized probabilities. What is the relationship between these two results? This note shows that (when ‘accuracy’ is treated via the Brier Score) both results are easy corollaries of (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Robert W. Armstrong, Robert J. Williams & J. Douglas Barrett (2004). The Impact of Banality, Risky Shift and Escalating Commitment on Ethical Decision Making. Journal of Business Ethics 53 (4):365-370.score: 280.0
    This paper posits that organizational variables are the factors that lead to the moral decline of companies like Enron and Worldcom. The individuals involved created environments within the organizations that precipitated a spiral of unethical decision-making. It is proposed that at the executive level, it is the organizational factors associated with power and decision-making that have the critical influence on moral and ethical behavior. The study has used variables that were deemed to be surrogate measures of the ethical violations (OSHA (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Robert A. Hicks, Susan L. Williams & Felice Ferrante (1979). Eye Color and the Pupillary Attributions of College Students to Happy and Angry Faces. Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 13 (1):55-56.score: 280.0
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Kelleen Toohey, Bill Johnston, C. Philip Kearney, Robert R. Sherman, Stephen S. Williams, William M. Stallings, Philip A. Cusick, Doris Walker Weathers, Ronald Podeschi & Elaine Pearson (1989). Book Review Section 2. [REVIEW] Educational Studies 20 (3):296-351.score: 280.0
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Robert A. Opoku & Edem B. Williams (2010). Stakeholder Management Online: An Empirical Analysis of US and Swedish Political Party Web Sites. Journal of Information, Communication and Ethics in Society 8 (3):249-269.score: 280.0
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. James Wetzel, Leonard F. Wheat, Robert L. Wicks, Robert R. Williams & David Wolfsdorf (2013). Editions and Translations. Journal of the History of Philosophy 51 (3):503-505.score: 280.0
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. J. Robert G. Williams & Elizabeth Barnes (2011). A Theory of Metaphysical Indeterminacy. In Karen Bennett & Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics volume 6. Oxford University Press. 103-148.score: 240.0
    If the world itself is metaphysically indeterminate in a specified respect, what follows? In this paper, we develop a theory of metaphysical indeterminacy answering this question.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. J. Robert G. Williams (2007). Eligibility and Inscrutability. Philosophical Review 116 (3):361-399.score: 240.0
    Inscrutability arguments threaten to reduce interpretationist metasemantic theories to absurdity. Can we find some way to block the arguments? A highly influential proposal in this regard is David Lewis’ ‘eligibility’ response: some theories are better than others, not because they fit the data better, but because they are framed in terms of more natural properties. The purposes of this paper are (1) to outline the nature of the eligibility proposal, making the case that it is not ad hoc, but instead (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. J. Robert G. Williams (2008). Ontic Vagueness and Metaphysical Indeterminacy. Philosophy Compass 3 (4):763-788.score: 240.0
    Might it be that world itself, independently of what we know about it or how we represent it, is metaphysically indeterminate? This article tackles in turn a series of questions: In what sorts of cases might we posit metaphysical indeterminacy? What is it for a given case of indefiniteness to be 'metaphysical'? How does the phenomenon relate to 'ontic vagueness', the existence of 'vague objects', 'de re indeterminacy' and the like? How might the logic work? Are there reasons for postulating (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. Robert Williams, Aristotelian Indeterminacy and the Open Future.score: 240.0
    I explore the thesis that the future is open, in the sense that future contingents are neither true nor false. The paper is divided into three sections. In the first, I survey how the thesis arises on a variety of contemporary views on the metaphysics of time. In the second, I explore the consequences for rational belief of the ‘Aristotelian’ view that indeterminacy is characterized by truth-value gaps. In the third, I outline one line of defence for the Aristotelian against (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. Robert Williams (2010). Fundamental and Derivative Truths. Mind 119 (473):103-141.score: 240.0
    This article investigates the claim that some truths are fundamentally or really true — and that other truths are not. Such a distinction can help us reconcile radically minimal metaphysical views with the verities of common sense. I develop an understanding of the distinction whereby Fundamentality is not itself a metaphysical distinction, but rather a device that must be presupposed to express metaphysical distinctions. Drawing on recent work by Rayo on anti-Quinean theories of ontological commitments, I formulate a rigourous theory (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. Robert Williams, On Sider on Naturalness.score: 240.0
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. Robert Williams (2008). The Price of Inscrutability. Noûs 42 (4):600 - 641.score: 240.0
  28. J. Robert G. Williams (2010). Defending Conditional Excluded Middle. Noûs 44 (4):650-668.score: 240.0
    Lewis (1973) gave a short argument against conditional excluded middle, based on his treatment of ‘might’ counterfactuals. Bennett (2003), with much of the recent literature, gives an alternative take on ‘might’ counterfactuals. But Bennett claims the might-argument against CEM still goes through. This turns on a specific claim I call Bennett’s Hypothesis. I argue that independently of issues to do with the proper analysis of might-counterfactuals, Bennett’s Hypothesis is inconsistent with CEM. But Bennett’s Hypothesis is independently objectionable, so we should (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. Robert Williams (2008). Multiple Actualities and Ontically Vague Identity. Philosophical Quarterly 58 (230):134-154.score: 240.0
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. Lee Walters & Robert Williams (2013). An Argument for Conjunction Conditionalization. Review of Symbolic Logic 6 (4):573-588.score: 240.0
    Are counterfactuals with true antecedents and consequents automatically true? That is, is Conjunction Conditionalization: if (X & Y), then (X > Y) valid? Stalnaker and Lewis think so, but many others disagree. We note here that the extant arguments for Conjunction Conditionalization are unpersuasive, before presenting a family of more compelling arguments. These arguments rely on some standard theorems of the logic of counterfactuals as well as a plausible and popular semantic claim about certain semifactuals. Denying Conjunction Conditionalization, then, requires (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. Robert Williams (2008). Chances, Counterfactuals, and Similarity. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (2):385-420.score: 240.0
    John Hawthorne in a recent paper takes issue with Lewisian accounts of counterfactuals, when relevant laws of nature are chancy. I respond to his arguments on behalf of the Lewisian, and conclude that while some can be rebutted, the case against the original Lewisian account is strong.I develop a neo-Lewisian account of what makes for closeness of worlds. I argue that my revised version avoids Hawthorne’s challenges. I argue that this is closer to the spirit of Lewis’s first (non-chancy) proposal (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. Robert Williams (forthcoming). Degree Supervaluational Logic. Review of Symbolic Logic.score: 240.0
    Supervaluationism is often described as the most popular semantic treatment of indeterminacy. There’s little consensus, however, about how to fill out the barebones idea to include a characterization of logical consequence. In a recent paper, Achille Varzi writes: it is pretty clear that there is not just one supervaluational semantics out there–there are lots of such semantics; and although it is true that they all exploit the same insight, their relative differences are by no means immaterial . . . a (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  33. Robert Williams (2008). Gavagai Again. Synthese 164 (2):235 - 259.score: 240.0
    Quine (1960, "Word and object". Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, ch. 2) claims that there are a variety of equally good schemes for translating or interpreting ordinary talk. 'Rabbit' might be taken to divide its reference over rabbits, over temporal slices of rabbits, or undetached parts of rabbits, without significantly affecting which sentences get classified as true and which as false. This is the basis of his famous 'argument from below' to the conclusion that there can be no fact of the (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. Robert Williams, Metaphysical Indeterminacy, Supervenience, and Emergence.score: 240.0
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  35. Robert Williams (2006). An Argument for the Many. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 106 (1):411-419.score: 240.0
    If one believes that vagueness is an exclusively representational phenomenon, one faces the problem of the many. In the vicinity of Kilimanjaro, there are many many ‘mountain candidates’ all, apparently, with more-or-less equal claim to be mountains. David Lewis has defended a radical claim: that all the billions of mountain candidates are mountains. This paper argues that the supervaluationist about vagueness should adopt Lewis’ proposal, on pain of losing their best explanation of the seductiveness of the sorites.
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  36. J. Robert G. Williams, A Lewis-Impossibility Result for Counterfactuals.score: 240.0
    I formulate a counterfactual version of the notorious ‘Ramsey Test’. Even in a weak form, this makes counterfactuals subject to the very argument that Lewis used to persuade the majority of the philosophical community that indicative conditionals were in hot water. I outline two reactions: to indicativize the debate on counterfactuals; or to counterfactualize the debate on indicatives.
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  37. J. Robert G. Williams (2008). Conversation and Conditionals. Philosophical Studies 138 (2):211 - 223.score: 240.0
    I outline and motivate a way of implementing a closest world theory of indicatives, appealing to Stalnaker’s framework of open conversational possibilities. Stalnakerian conversational dynamics helps us resolve two outstanding puzzles for a such a theory of indicative conditionals. The first puzzle—concerning so-called ‘reverse Sobel sequences’—can be resolved by conversation dynamics in a theory-neutral way: the explanation works as much for Lewisian counterfactuals as for the account of indicatives developed here. Resolving the second puzzle, by contrast, relies on the interplay (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  38. J. Robert G. Williams (2007). The Possibility of Onion Worlds: Rebutting an Argument for Structural Universals. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (2):193 – 203.score: 240.0
    Some argue that theories of universals should incorporate structural universals, in order to allow for the metaphysical possibility of worlds of 'infinite descending complexity' ('onion worlds'). I argue that the possibility of such worlds does not establish the need for structural universals. So long as we admit the metaphysical possibility of emergent universals, there is an attractive alternative description of such cases.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  39. Robert Williams, Metaphysical Indeterminacy and Ontic Vagueness (Draft).score: 240.0
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  40. J. Robert G. Williams (2013). Part‐Intrinsicality. Noûs 47 (3):431-452.score: 240.0
    In some sense, survival seems to be an intrinsic matter. Whether or not you survive some event seems to depend on what goes on with you yourself —what happens in the environment shouldn’t make a difference. Likewise, being a person at a time seems intrinsic. The principle that survival seems intrinsic is one factor which makes personal fission puzzles so awkward. Fission scenarios present cases where if survival is an intrinsic matter, it appears that an individual could survive twice over. (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  41. J. Robert G. Williams (2014). Decision-Making Under Indeterminacy. Philosophers' Imprint 14 (4).score: 240.0
    Decisions are made under uncertainty when there are distinct outcomes of a given action, and one is uncertain to which the act will lead. Decisions are made under indeterminacy when there are distinct outcomes of a given action, and it is indeterminate to which the act will lead. This paper develops a theory of (synchronic and diachronic) decision-making under indeterminacy that portrays the rational response to such situations as inconstant. Rational agents have to capriciously and randomly choose how to resolve (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  42. Robert R. Williams (2008). Ricoeur on Recognition. European Journal of Philosophy 16 (3):467-473.score: 240.0
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  43. Robert Williams (2009). Vagueness, Conditionals and Probability. Erkenntnis 70 (2):151 - 171.score: 240.0
    This paper explores the interaction of well-motivated (if controversial) principles governing the probability conditionals, with accounts of what it is for a sentence to be indefinite. The conclusion can be played in a variety of ways. It could be regarded as a new reason to be suspicious of the intuitive data about the probability of conditionals; or, holding fixed the data, it could be used to give traction on the philosophical analysis of a contentious notion—indefiniteness. The paper outlines the various (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  44. Robert J. Williams & J. Douglas Barrett (2000). Corporate Philanthropy, Criminal Activity, and Firm Reputation: Is There a Link? [REVIEW] Journal of Business Ethics 26 (4):341 - 350.score: 240.0
    This study examined the influence of corporate giving programs on the link between certain categories of corporate crime and corporate reputation. Specifically, firms that violate EPA and OSHA regulations should, to some extent, experience a decline in their reputations, while firms that contribute to charitable causes should see their reputations enhanced. The results of this study support both of these contentions. Further, the results suggest that corporate giving significantly moderates the link between the number of EPA and OSHA violations committed (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  45. Robert Williams, Aristotelian Indeterminacy and Partial Belief: Including Case Studies of the Open Future and Vague Survival.score: 240.0
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  46. J. Robert G. Williams, Requirements on Reality.score: 240.0
    There are advantages to thrift over honest toil. If we can make do without numbers we avoid challenging questions over the metaphysics and epistemology of such entities; and we have a good idea, I think, of what a nominalistic metaphysics should look like. But minimizing ontology brings its own problems; for it seems to lead to error theory— saying that large swathes of common-sense and best science are false. Should recherche philosophical arguments really convince us to give all this up? (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  47. J. Robert G. Williams, Counterfactual Desire as Belief.score: 240.0
    Bryne & H´ajek (1997) argue that Lewis’s (1988; 1996) objections to identifying desire with belief do not go through if our notion of desire is ‘causalized’ (characterized by causal, rather than evidential, decision theory). I argue that versions of the argument go through on certain assumptions about the formulation of decision theory. There is one version of causal decision theory where the original arguments cannot be formulated—the ‘imaging’ formulation that Joyce (1999) advocates. But I argue this formulation is independently objectionable. (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  48. Robert R. Williams (1985). Hegel and Transcendental Philosophy. Journal of Philosophy 82 (11):595-606.score: 240.0
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  49. J. Robert G. Williams (2008). Permutations and Foster Problems: Two Puzzles or One? Ratio 21 (1):91–105.score: 240.0
    How are permutation arguments for the inscrutability of reference to be formulated in the context of a Davidsonian truth-theoretic semantics? Davidson (1979) takes these arguments to establish that there are no grounds for favouring a reference scheme that assigns London to “Londres”, rather than one that assigns Sydney to that name. We shall see, however, that it is far from clear whether permutation arguments work when set out in the context of the kind of truth-theoretic semantics which Davidson favours. The (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  50. J. Robert G. Williams (2012). Counterfactual Triviality. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (3):648-670.score: 240.0
    I formulate a counterfactual version of the notorious 'Ramsey Test'. Whereas the Ramsey Test for indicative conditionals links credence in indicatives to conditional credences, the counterfactual version links credence in counterfactuals to expected conditional chance. I outline two forms: a Ramsey Identity on which the probability of the conditional should be identical to the corresponding conditional probabihty/expectation of chance; and a Ramsey Bound on which credence in the conditional should never exceed the latter.Even in the weaker, bound, form, the counterfactual (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
1 — 50 / 988