Classical American pragmatism: the pragmatist -- Enlightenment-and its problematic semantics -- Analyzing pragmatism: pragmatics and pragmatisms -- A Kantian rationalist pragmatism: pragmatism -- Inferentialism, and modality in Sellars's arguments against -- Empiricism -- Linguistic pragmatism and pragmatism about norms: an arc of -- Thought from Rorty's eliminative materialism to his pragmatism -- Vocabularies of pragmatism: synthesizing naturalism and -- Historicism -- Towards an analytic pragmatism: meaning-use analysis -- Pragmatism, expressivism, and anti-representationalism: -- Local and global possibilities.
Este artigo analisa importantes elementos na recepção da filosofia de Hegel na atualidade. Com a finalidade de alcançar tal meta discute-se como a filosofia analítica acolhe a filosofia de Hegel. Para tanto se reconstrói a recepção da filosofia analítica em face de Hegel, notadamente a partir daqueles autores que foram centrais neste movimento de recepção e distanciamento de sua filosofia, a saber, Bertrand Russell, Frege e Wittgenstein. Outro ponto central do presente texto é a análise do livro de Paul Redding, (...) Analytic Philosophy and the Return of Hegelian Thought, em cotejo com a recepção de Hegel, desenvolvida aqui pela filosofia analítica. Ao final, mostra-se como é possível um diálogo produtivo destas correntes aparentemente contrapostas. (shrink)
Metaphilosophical Reflections on the Idea of Metaphysics Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-14 DOI 10.1007/s11406-011-9332-7 Authors Robert Brandom, Philosophy Department, 1001 Cathedral of Learning, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA 15260, USA Journal Philosophia Online ISSN 1574-9274 Print ISSN 0048-3893.
Extending the project of analysis -- Elaborating abilities : the expressive role of logic -- Artificial intelligence and analytic pragmatism -- Modality and normativity : from Hume and Quine to Kant and Sellars -- Incompatibility, modal semantics, and intrinsic logic -- Intentionality as a pragmatically mediated semantic relation -- Afterword : philosophical analysis and analytic philosophy.
The Anglophone philosophical world is currently riding a swelling wave of enthusiasm for a big, dense, blockbuster of a book by the previously unknown Jena philosopher, George Hegel. His Phenomenology of Spirit, originally in German, now available also in English, picks up and weaves together in a surprising and wholly original way a large number of today’s most fashionable ideas. Although he never comes right out and says so, I take it that the main topic the book addresses is the (...) notion of conceptual content. I say “main” topic—and even that with trepidation—because along the way, Hegel discusses practically everything: history, politics, art, literature, religion, psychology, sociology, natural science, and on and on. One of the masterful features of this magnum opus is the convincing way in which the arguments and considerations he brings to bear, in the course of articulating criteria of adequacy for an adequate semantics (which he thinks is inseparable from an adequate pragmatics), reverberate and ramify throughout our understanding of human culture generally. (shrink)
It is argued that at the center of Hegel’s phenomenology of consciousness is the notion that experience is shaped by identification and sacrifice. Experience is the process of self-constitution and self-transformation of a self-conscious being that risks its own being. The transition from desire to recognition is explicated as a transition from the tripartite structure of want and fulfillment of biological desire to a socially structured recognition that is achieved only in reciprocal recognition, or reflexive recognition. At the center of (...) the Hegelian notion of selfhood is thus the realization that selves are the locus of accountatibility. To be a self, it is concluded, is to be the subject of normative statuses that refer to commitments; it means to be able to take a normative stand on things, to commit oneself and undertake responsibilities. Key Words: commitments • desire • experience • G.W.F.Hegel • identity • recognition • risk • sacrifice • self-consciousness • self-constitution. (shrink)
Kant’s innovative normative characterization of what one is doing in judging is appealed to as the basis of a story about how he moves from an inferential to a representational characterization of the contents of judgment. His normative notion of freedom and his demarcation of the normative in terms of autonomy are connected to his account of the status of modal concepts.
Kant’s innovative normative characterization of what one is doing in judging is appealed to as the basis of a story about how he moves from an inferential to a representational characterization of the contents of judgment. His normative notion of freedom and his demarcation of the normative in terms of autonomy are connected to his account of the status of modal concepts.
A work in the history of systematic philosophy that is itself animated by a systematic philosophic aspiration, this book by one of the most prominent American ...
Thirteen of the most distinguished living philosophers - including Donald Davidson, Jürgen Habermas, Hilary Putnam, John McDowell, Jacques Bouveresse, and Daniel Dennett - assess Richard Rorty's arguments for revising our philosophical conceptions of truth, reality, objectivity, and justification. These essays, together with Rorty's substantial replies to each, and other new material by him, offer by far the most thorough and thoughtful discussion of the work of the thinker who has been called 'the most interesting philosopher alive.'.
What would something unlike us--a chimpanzee, say, or a computer--have to be able to do to qualify as a possible knower, like us? To answer this question at the very heart of our sense of ourselves, philosophers have long focused on intentionality and have looked to language as a key to this condition. Making It Explicit is an investigation into the nature of language--the social practices that distinguish us as rational, logical creatures--that revises the very terms of this inquiry. Where (...) accounts of the relation between language and mind have traditionally rested on the concept of representation, this book sets out an alternate approach based on inference, and on a conception of certain kinds of implicit assessment that become explicit in language. Making It Explicit is the first attempt to work out in detail a theory that renders linguistic meaning in terms of use--in short, to explain how semantic content can be conferred on expressions and attitudes that are suitably caught up in social practices. -/- At the center of this enterprise is a notion of discursive commitment. Being able to talk--and so in the fullest sense being able to think--is a matter of mastering the practices that govern such commitments, being able to keep track of one’s own commitments and those of others. Assessing the pragmatic significance of speech acts is a matter of explaining the explicit in terms of the implicit. As he traces the inferential structure of the social practices within which things can be made conceptually explicit, the author defines the distinctively expressive role of logical vocabulary. This expressive account of language, mind, and logic is, finally, an account of who we are. (shrink)
Developments over the past four decades have secured Immanuel Kant’s status as being for contemporary philosophers what the sea was for Swinburne: the great, gray mother of us all. And Kant mattered as much for the classical American pragmatists as he does for us today. But we look back at that sepia-toned age across an extended period during which Anglophone philosophy largely wrote Kant out of its canon. The founding ideology of Bertrand Russell and G.E. Moore, articulating the rationale and (...) fighting faith for the rising tide of analytic philosophy, was forged in a recoil from the perceived defects of a British idealism inspired by Hegel. Mindful of the massive debt evidently and self-avowedly owed by Hegel to Kant, and putting aside neo-Kantian <span class='Hi'>readings</span> of Kant as an empiricist philosopher of science that cast him in a light they would have found more favorable, Russell and Moore diagnosed the idealist rot as having set in already with Kant. For them, and for many of their followers down through the years, the progressive current in philosophy should be seen to have run directly from Locke, Leibniz, and Hume, to Mill and Frege, without any dangerous diversion into the oxbow of German idealism. (shrink)
