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  1. Robert C. Stalnaker, On Knowing Where You Are and What It's Like.
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  2. Robert C. Stalnaker (1999). Context and Content. Oxford University Press.
    Two themes in particular run through these collected essays: the role that the context in which speech takes place plays in accounting for the way language is ...
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  3. Robert C. Stalnaker (1997). Reference and Necessity. In Bob Hale & Crispin Wright (eds.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Language. Blackwell.
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  4. Robert C. Stalnaker (1996). On What Possible Worlds Could Not Be. In S. Stich & A. Morton (eds.), Benacerraf and his Critics.
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  5. Robert C. Stalnaker (1981). A Defense of Conditional Excluded Middle. In William Harper, Robert C. Stalnaker & Glenn Pearce (eds.), Ifs. Reidel. 87-104.
  6. Robert C. Stalnaker (1981). Indexical Belief. Synthese 49 (1):129-151.
  7. Robert C. Stalnaker (1976). Possible Worlds. Noûs 10 (1):65-75.
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  8. Robert C. Stalnaker (1973). Review: Henry Albert Finch, An Explication of Counterfactuals by Probability Theory; Richard C. Jeffrey, A Note on Finch's An Explication of Counterfactuals by Probability Theory; Henry Albert Finch, Due Care in Explicating Counterfactuals: A Reply to Mr. Jeffrey. [REVIEW] Journal of Symbolic Logic 38 (1):145-146.
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  9. Robert C. Stalnaker (1973). Tenses and Pronouns. Journal of Philosophy 70 (18):610-612.
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  10. Robert C. Stalnaker (1970). Pragmatics. Synthese 22 (1-2):272--289.
  11. Robert C. Stalnaker (1970). Probability and Conditionals. Philosophy of Science 37 (1):64-80.
    The aim of the paper is to draw a connection between a semantical theory of conditional statements and the theory of conditional probability. First, the probability calculus is interpreted as a semantics for truth functional logic. Absolute probabilities are treated as degrees of rational belief. Conditional probabilities are explicitly defined in terms of absolute probabilities in the familiar way. Second, the probability calculus is extended in order to provide an interpretation for counterfactual probabilities--conditional probabilities where the condition has zero probability. (...)
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  12. Robert C. Stalnaker & Richmond H. Thomason (1970). A Semantic Analysis of Conditional Logic. Theoria 36 (1):23-42.
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  13. Robert C. Stalnaker (1969). Wallace on Propositional Attitudes. Journal of Philosophy 66 (22):803-806.
    This note is a solution to a paradox proposed by john wallace in "propositional attitudes and identity" ('j. phil'. 66, 145-152). wallace deduced from a set of 'prima facie' plausible premisses the conclusion that the ideally rational man believes to be true every proposition that he desires to be true. in my note, i present a counterexample to one of the premisses, and then suggest two weaker versions of the premiss--neither sufficient to derive the paradoxical conclusion--to account for its plausibility.
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  14. Robert C. Stalnaker (1968). A Theory of Conditionals. In Nicholas Rescher (ed.), Studies in Logical Theory. Blackwell. 98-112.
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  15. Robert C. Stalnaker & Richmond H. Thomason (1968). Abstraction in First-Order Modal Logic. Theoria 34 (3):203-207.
    The first amounts, roughly, to "It is necessarily the case that any President of the U.S. is a citizen of the U.S." But the second says, "the person who in fact is the President of the U.S, has the property of necessarily being a citizen of the U.S," Thus, while (2) is clearly true, it would be reasonable to consider (3) false.
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  16. Richmond H. Thomason & Robert C. Stalnaker (1968). Modality and Reference. Noûs 2 (4):359-372.
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  17. Robert C. Stalnaker (1967). Reviews. [REVIEW] British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 18 (1):72-74.
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