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Profile: Robert Rupert (University of Colorado, Boulder, University of Edinburgh)
  1. Robert D. Rupert, Against Group Cognitive States.
  2. Robert D. Rupert, Extended Cognition, Extended Selection, and Developmental Systems Theory.
    I respond to Karola Stotz's criticisms of my previously published challenges to the inference from developmental systems theory to an extended view of cognition.
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  3. Robert D. Rupert, Embodied Knowledge, Conceptual Change, and the A Priori; or, Justification, Revision, and the Ways Life Could Go.
  4. Robert D. Rupert, Individual Minds as Groups, Group Minds as Individuals.
  5. Robert D. Rupert, Keeping HEC in CHEC.
    According to the hypothesis of extended cognition (HEC, hereafter), human cognitive processing extends beyond the boundary of the human organism.1 As I understand HEC, it is a claim in the..
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  6. Robert D. Rupert (forthcoming). Critical Study of Andy Clark's Supersizing the Mind. Journal of Mind and Behavior.
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  7. Robert D. Rupert (forthcoming). Causal Theories of Intentionality. In Hal Pashler (ed.), The Encyclopedia of the Mind. Sage.
    This entry surveys a range of proposed solutions to the problem of intentionality, that is, the problem of explaining how human thoughts can be about, or be directed toward, objects. The family of solutions described here takes the content of a mental representation—what that concept represents or is about—to be a function of causal relations between mental representations and their typically external objects. This emphasis on causal relations should be understood broadly, however, so as to cover theories couched in terms (...)
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  8. Robert D. Rupert (forthcoming). Nativism and Empiricism, and Situated Cognition. In P. Robbins & Murat Aydede (eds.), Cambridge Handbook on Situated Cognition. Cambridge.
     
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  9. Robert D. Rupert (forthcoming). Review of Jerry Fodor, LOT 2. [REVIEW] Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
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  10. Robert D. Rupert (forthcoming). The Sufficiency of Objective Representation. In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Current Controversies in Philosophy of Mind. Routledge.
  11. Bryce Huebner & Robert D. Rupert (2014). Massively Representational Minds Are Not Always Driven by Goals, Conscious or Otherwise. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 37 (2):145-146.
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  12. Robert D. Rupert (2014). Necessity Is Unnecessary: A Response to Bradley. Noûs 48 (3):558-564.
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  13. Robert D. Rupert (2013). Memory, Natural Kinds, and Cognitive Extension; or, Martians Don't Remember, and Cognitive Science Is Not About Cognition. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 4 (1):25-47.
    This paper evaluates the Natural-Kinds Argument for cognitive extension, which purports to show that the kinds presupposed by our best cognitive science have instances external to human organism. Various interpretations of the argument are articulated and evaluated, using the overarching categories of memory and cognition as test cases. Particular emphasis is placed on criteria for the scientific legitimacy of generic kinds, that is, kinds characterized in very broad terms rather than in terms of their fine-grained causal roles. Given the current (...)
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  14. Robert D. Rupert (2012). Mental Representations and Millikan's Theory of Intentional Content. Southern Journal of Philosophy 37 (1):113-140.
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  15. Robert D. Rupert (2011). Cognitive Systems and the Supersized Mind. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 152 (3):427 - 436.
    In Supersizing the Mind: Embodiment, Action, and Cognitive Extension (Clark, 2008), Andy Clark bolsters his case for the extended mind thesis and casts a critical eye on some related views for which he has less enthusiasm. To these ends, the book canvasses a wide range of empirical results concerning the subtle manner in which the human organism and its environment interact in the production of intelligent behavior. This fascinating research notwithstanding, Supersizing does little to assuage my skepticism about the hypotheses (...)
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  16. Robert D. Rupert (2011). Empirical Arguments for Group Minds: A Critical Appraisal. Philosophy Compass 6 (9):630-639.
  17. Robert D. Rupert (2011). Embodiment, Consciousness, and the Massively Representational Mind. Philosophical Topics 39 (1):99-120.
    In this paper, I claim that extant empirical data do not support a radically embodied understanding of the mind but, instead, suggest (along with a variety of other results) a massively representational view. According to this massively representational view, the brain is rife with representations that possess overlapping and redundant content, and many of these represent other mental representations or derive their content from them. Moreover, many behavioral phenomena associated with attention and consciousness are best explained by the coordinated activity (...)
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  18. Robert D. Rupert (2011). On the Scientific Unity of Concepts. Metascience 20 (1):147-151.
  19. Robert D. Rupert (2011). Review of Mark Rowlands, The New Science of the Mind: From Extended Mind to Embodied Phenomenology. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2011 (3).
    In recent years, much has been written about situated cognition, a movement in cognitive science that appears to have important philosophical implications (Robbins and Aydede 2009). Agents of this situated turn expound a variety of positive views; thus, at least initially, the movement may be best explained in terms of what its practitioners reject. The great majority of situated theorists direct their philosophical ire at a computer-based vision of human thought that came to prominence in the 1960s.
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  20. Robert D. Rupert (2010). LOT 2: The Language of Thought Revisited. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (3):559-562.
  21. Robert D. Rupert (2010). Representation in Extended Cognitive Systems : Does the Scaffolding of Language Extend the Mind? In Richard Menary (ed.), The Extended Mind. Mit Press.
  22. Robert D. Rupert (2010). Systems, Functions, and Intrinsic Natures: On Adams and Aizawa's The Bounds of Cognition. [REVIEW] Philosophical Psychology 23 (1):113-123.
  23. Robert D. Rupert (2009). Cognitive Systems and the Extended Mind. OUP USA.
    Cognitive Systems and the Extended Mind surveys philosophical issues raised by the situated movement in cognitive science, that is, the treatment of cognitive phenomena as the joint product of brain, body, and environment. The book focuses primarily on the hypothesis of extended cognition, which asserts that human cognitive processes literally comprise elements beyond the boundary of the human organism. Rupert argues that the only plausible way in which to demarcate cognitions is systems-based: cognitive states or processes are the states of (...)
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  24. Robert D. Rupert (2009). Innateness and the Situated Mind. In P. Robbins & M. Aydede (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition. Cambridge University Press. 96--116.
    forthcoming in P. Robbins and M. Aydede (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition (Cambridge UP).
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  25. Robert D. Rupert (2008). Ceteris Paribus Laws, Component Forces, and the Nature of Special-Science Properties. Noûs 42 (3):349-380.
    Laws of nature seem to take two forms. Fundamental physics discovers laws that hold without exception, ‘strict laws’, as they are sometimes called; even if some laws of fundamental physics are irreducibly probabilistic, the probabilistic relation is thought not to waver. In the nonfundamental, or special, sciences, matters differ. Laws of such sciences as psychology and economics hold only ceteris paribus – that is, when other things are equal. Sometimes events accord with these ceteris paribus laws (c.p. laws, hereafter), but (...)
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  26. Robert D. Rupert (2008). Causal Theories of Mental Content. Philosophy Compass 3 (2):353–380.
    Causal theories of mental content (CTs) ground certain aspects of a concept's meaning in the causal relations a concept bears to what it represents. Section 1 explains the problems CTs are meant to solve and introduces terminology commonly used to discuss these problems. Section 2 specifies criteria that any acceptable CT must satisfy. Sections 3, 4, and 5 critically survey various CTs, including those proposed by Fred Dretske, Jerry Fodor, Ruth Garrett Millikan, David Papineau, Dennis Stampe, Dan Ryder, and the (...)
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  27. Robert D. Rupert (2008). Frege’s Puzzle and Frege Cases: Defending a Quasi-Syntactic Solution. Cognitive Systems Research 9:76-91.
    There is no doubt that social interaction plays an important role in language-learning, as well as in concept acquisition. In surprising contrast, social interaction makes only passing appearance in our most promising naturalistic theories of content. This is particularly true in the case of mental content (e.g., Cummins, 1996; Dretske, 1981, 1988; Fodor, 1987, 1990a; Millikan, 1984); and insofar as linguistic content derives from mental content (Grice, 1957), social interaction seems missing from our best naturalistic theories of both.1 In this (...)
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  28. Robert D. Rupert (2008). The Causal Theory of Properties and the Causal Theory of Reference, or How to Name Properties and Why It Matters. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (3):579 - 612.
    forthcoming in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
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  29. Robert D. Rupert (2007). Realization, Completers, and Ceteris Paribus Laws in Psychology. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 58 (1):1-11.
    University of Colorado, Boulder If there are laws of psychology, they would seem to hold only ceteris paribus (c.p., hereafter), i.e., other things being equal. If a person wants that q and believes that doing a is the most efficient way to make it the case that q, then she will attempt to do a—but not, however, if she believes that a carries with it consequences much more hated than q is liked, or she believes she is incapable of doing (...)
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  30. Robert D. Rupert (2007). Review of J. T. Ismael, The Situated Self. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2007 (10).
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  31. Robert D. Rupert (2006). Functionalism, Mental Causation, and the Problem of Metaphysically Necessary Effects. Noûs 40 (2):256-83.
    The recent literature on mental causation has not been kind to nonreductive, materialist functionalism (‘functionalism’, hereafter, except where that term is otherwise qualified). The exclusion problem2 has done much of the damage, but the epiphenomenalist threat has taken other forms. Functionalism also faces what I will call the ‘problem of metaphysically necessary effects’ (Block, 1990, pp. 157-60, Antony and Levine, 1997, pp. 91-92, Pereboom, 2002, p. 515, Millikan, 1999, p. 47, Jackson, 1998, pp. 660-61). Functionalist mental properties are individuated partly (...)
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  32. Robert D. Rupert (2006). Review of Raymond W. Gibbs, Jr., Embodiment and Cognitive Science. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2006 (8).
  33. Robert D. Rupert (2005). Minding One's Cognitive Systems: When Does a Group of Minds Constitute a Single Cognitive Unit? Episteme 1 (3):177-188.
    The possibility of group minds or group mental states has been considered by a number of authors addressing issues in social epistemology and related areas (Goldman 2004, Pettit 2003, Gilbert 2004, Hutchins 1995). An appeal to group minds might, in the end, do indispensable explanatory work in the social or cognitive sciences. I am skeptical, though, and this essay lays out some of the reasons for my skepticism. The concerns raised herein constitute challenges to the advocates of group minds (or (...)
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  34. Robert D. Rupert (2004). Challenges to the Hypothesis of Extended Cognition. Journal of Philosophy 101 (8):389-428.
  35. Robert D. Rupert (2001). Coining Terms In The Language of Thought. Journal of Philosophy 98 (10):499-530.
    Robert Cummins argues that any causal theory of mental content (CT) founders on an established fact of human psychology: that theory mediates sensory detection. He concludes,.
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  36. Robert D. Rupert (2000). Dispositions Indisposed: Semantic Atomism and Fodor's Theory of Content. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 81 (3):325-349.
    According to Jerry Fodor’s atomistic theory of content, subjects’ dispositions to token mentalese terms in counterfactual circumstances fix the contents of those terms. I argue that the pattern of counterfactual tokenings alone does not satisfactorily fix content; if Fodor’s appeal to patterns of counterfactual tokenings has any chance of assigning correct extensions, Fodor must take into account the contents of subjects’ various mental states at the times of those tokenings. However, to do so, Fodor must abandon his semantic atomism. And (...)
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  37. Robert D. Rupert (1999). Mental Representations and Millikan's Theory of Intentional Content: Does Biology Chase Causality? Southern Journal of Philosophy 37 (1):113-140.
    In her landmark book, Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories (Millikan1984),1 Ruth Garrett Millikan utilizes the idea of a biological function to solve philosophical problems associated with the phenomena of language, thought, and meaning. Language and thought are activities of biological organisms, according to Millikan, and we should treat them as such when trying to answer related philosophical questions. Of special interest is Millikan’s treatment of intentionality. Here Millikan employs the notion of a biological function to explain what it is (...)
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  38. Robert D. Rupert (1999). The Best Test Theory of Extension: First Principle(S). Mind and Language 14 (3):321–355.
    This paper presents the leading idea of my doctoral dissertation and thus has been shaped by the reactions of all the members of my thesis committee: Charles Chastain, Walter Edelberg, W. Kent Wilson, Dorothy Grover, and Charles Marks. I am especially grateful for the help of Professors Chastain, Edelberg, and Wilson; each worked closely with me at one stage or another in the development of the ideas contained in the present work. Shorter versions of this paper were presented at the (...)
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  39. Robert D. Rupert (1998). On the Relationship Between Naturalistic Semantics and Individuation Criteria for Terms in a Language of Thought. Synthese 117 (1):95-131.
    Naturalistically minded philosophers hope to identify a privileged nonsemantic relation that holds between a mental representation m and that which m represents, a relation whose privileged status underwrites the assignment of reference to m. The naturalist can accomplish this task only if she has in hand a nonsemantic criterion for individuating mental representations: it would be question-begging for the naturalist to characterize m, for the purpose of assigning content, as 'the representation with such and such content'. If we individuate mental (...)
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