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Robert F. Allen [9]Robert Francis Allen [3]
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Profile: Robert Allen
  1. Robert F. Allen, Agent Causation and Ultimate Responsibility.
    Positions taken in the current debate over free will can be seen as responses to the following conditional: If every action is caused solely by another event and a cause necessitates its effect, then there is no action to which there is an alternative. The Libertarian, who believes that alternatives are a requirement of free will, responds by denying the right conjunct of C’s antecedent, maintaining that some actions are caused, either mediately or immediately, by events whose effects could be (...)
     
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  2. Robert F. Allen, The Subject is Qualia.
     
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  3. Robert Francis Allen (2010). Free Will and Indeterminism. Journal of Philosophical Research 30:341-355.
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  4. Robert F. Allen (2005). Free Will and Indeterminism: Robert Kane's Libertarianism. Journal of Philosophical Research 30:341-355.
    Drawing on Aristotle’s notion of “ultimate responsibility,” Robert Kane argues that to be exercising a free will an agent must have taken some character forming decisions for which there were no sufficient conditions or decisive reasons.1 That is, an agent whose will is free not only had the ability to develop other dispositions, but could have exercised that ability without being irrational. To say it again, a person has a free will just in case her character is the product of (...)
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  5. Robert F. Allen, The Subject is Qualia: Paronyms and Temporary Identity.
  6. Robert F. Allen, Free Will and Evaluation: Remarks on Noel Hendrickson's "Free Will Nihilism and the Question of Method".
    Noel Hendrickson believes that free will is separable from the “evaluative intuitions” with which it has been traditionally associated. But what are these intuitions? Answer: principles such as PAP, Β, and UR (6). The thesis that free will is separable from these principles, however, is hardly unique, as they are also eschewed by compatibilists who are unwilling to abdicate altogether evaluative intuitions. We are told in addition that there are “metaphysical senses” of free will that are not “relevant to responsibility” (...)
     
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  7. Robert Francis Allen (2004). Robust Alternatives and Responsibility. Journal of Moral Philosophy 1 (1):21-29.
    The Principle of Robust Alternatives (PRA) states that an agent is responsible for doing something only if he/she could have performed a ‘robust’ alternative: another action having a different moral or practical value. Defenders of PRA maintain that it is not refuted by a ‘Frankfurt case’, given that its agent can be seen as having had such an alternative provided that we properly qualify that for which she is responsible . I argue here against two versions of this defense. First, (...)
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  8. J. Glenn Friesen, Eberhard Herrmann, Robert Francis Allen, Vincent Brümmer, Benjamin Murphy, Lance Ashdown, S. Mark Heim, Niels Henrik Gregersen, Nick Trakakis & Dirk-Martin Grube (2003). The Mystical Dooyeweerd. Ars Disputandi 3.
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  9. Arthur S. Reber & Robert F. Allen (2000). Individual Differences in Implicit Learning: Implications for the Evolution of Consciousness. In Robert G. Kunzendorf & B. Alan Wallace (eds.), Individual Differences in Conscious Experience. John Benjamin.
     
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  10. Robert F. Allen (1998). Absolutism Vs. Relativism in Contemporary Ontology. Journal of Philosophical Research 23:343-352.
    In this paper, I examine Emest Sosa’s defense of Conceptual Relativism: the view that what exists is a function of human thought. My examination reveals that his defense entails an ontology that is indistinguishable from that of the altemative he labels less “sensible,” viz., Absolutism: the view that reality exists independently of our thinking. I conclude by defending Absolutism against Sosa’s objections.
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  11. Robert F. Allen (1997). Responsibility and Motivation. Southern Journal of Philosophy 35 (3):289-299.
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  12. Arthur S. Reber, Robert F. Allen & S. Regan (1985). Syntactical Learning and Judgment, Still Unconscious and Still Abstract: Comment on Dulany, Carlson, and Dewey. Journal of Experimental Psychology 114:17-24.