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Robert Francescotti [31]Robert M. Francescotti [2]
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Profile: Robert Francescotti (San Diego State University)
  1. Robert Francescotti (2014). Intrinsic/Extrinsic: A Relational Account Defended. In , Companion to Intrinsic Properties. 175-198.
    In "How to Define Intrinsic Properties" I offered a relational account of the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction. The basic idea is that F is an intrinsic property of an item x just in case x’s having F consists entirely in x’s having certain internal properties, where an internal property is one whose instantiation does not consist in one’s relation to any distinct items (items other than oneself and one’s proper parts). I still think that this relational analysis is largely correct, and here (...)
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  2. Robert M. Francescotti (ed.) (2014). Companion to Intrinsic Properties. De Gruyter.
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  3. Robert Francescotti (2013). The Problem of Extras and the Contingency of Physicalism. Philosophical Explorations 17 (2):1-14.
    Perhaps all concrete phenomena obtain solely in virtue of physical phenomena. Even so, it seems that the world could have been otherwise. It seems that physicalism, if true, is contingently true. In fact, many believe that the actual truth of physicalism allows metaphysically possible worlds duplicating the actual world in all physical respects while containing immaterial extras, e.g. ghosts, spirits, or Cartesian souls, that no physicalist would believe actually exist. Here I focus on physicalism regarding mentality and argue that the (...)
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  4. Robert Francescotti (2013). The Problem of Animal Pain and Suffering. In Justin McBrayer Daniel Howard-Snyder (ed.), The Blackwell Companion to the Problem of Evil. 113-127.
    Here I discuss some theistic responses to the problem of animal pain and suffering with special attention to Michael Murray’s presentation in Nature Red in Tooth and Claw. The neo-Cartesian defenses he describes are reviewed, along with the appeal to nomic regularity and Murray’s emphasis on the progression of the universe from chaos to order. It is argued that despite these efforts to prove otherwise the problem of animal suffering remains a serious threat to the belief that an all-powerful, all-knowing, (...)
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  5. Robert Francescotti (2012). Understanding the Intrinsic/Extrinsic Distinction. Metascience 21 (1):91-94.
    Understanding the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-4 DOI 10.1007/s11016-011-9549-x Authors Robert Francescotti, Department of Philosophy, San Diego State University, 5500 Campanile Drive, San Diego, CA 92182-6044, USA Journal Metascience Online ISSN 1467-9981 Print ISSN 0815-0796.
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  6. Robert Francescotti (2011). Supervenience and Mind. In James Fieser & Bradley Dowden (eds.), Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  7. Robert Francescotti (2010). Psychological Continuity and the Necessity of Identity. American Philosophical Quarterly 47 (4):337-350.
  8. Robert Francescotti (2010). Realization and Physicalism. Philosophical Psychology 23 (5):601-616.
    Melnyk provides a rigorous analysis of the notion of realization with the aim of defining Physicalism. It is argued here that contrary to Melnyk's Realization Physicalism, the idea that mental phenomena are realized by physical phenomena fails to capture the physicalist belief that the former obtain in virtue of the latter. The conclusion is not that Physicalism is false, but that its truth is best explained with some notion other than realization in Melnyk's sense. I also argue that the problems (...)
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  9. Robert Francescotti (2008). Psychological Continuity, Fission, and the Non-Branching Constraint. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (1):21-31.
    Abstract: Those who endorse the Psychological Continuity Approach (PCA) to analyzing personal identity need to impose a non-branching constraint to get the intuitively correct result that in the case of fission, one person becomes two. With the help of Brueckner's (2005) discussion, it is shown here that the sort of non-branching clause that allows proponents of PCA to provide sufficient conditions for being the same person actually runs contrary to the very spirit of their theory. The problem is first presented (...)
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  10. Robert Francescotti (2008). Endurance and Discernibility. Metaphysica 9 (2):193-204.
    How can an object remain the same, numerically identical, while undergoing change? This is a worry for endurantists, who hold that for any stages, x and y, of a persisting object, x is numerically identical with y. Endurantists might try to avoid the problem of change by insisting that all properties are temporally anchored. It is argued here that while this strategy helps in many cases, it does not help in all. A type of case is presented in which a (...)
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  11. Robert Francescotti (2007). Animal Mind and Animal Ethics: An Introduction. [REVIEW] Journal of Ethics 11 (3):239-252.
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  12. Robert Francescotti (2007). Emergence. Erkenntnis 67 (1):47 - 63.
    Here I offer a precise analysis of what it takes for a property to count as emergent. The features widely considered crucial to emergence include novelty, unpredictability, supervenience, relationality, and downward causal influence. By acknowledging each of these distinctive features, the definition provided below captures an important sense in which the whole can be more than the sum of its parts.
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  13. Robert Francescotti (2005). Constitution and the Necessity of Identity. Logique Et Analyse 48 (192):311-321.
    It is tempting to think that in the case of complete spatio-temporal coincidence, the statue is identical with the constituent lump of clay. However, some philosophers have thought that accepting constitution as identity in this type of case forces one to reject the necessity of identity. I show that there is no conflict here. By distinguishing between an object's being necessarily an F and an object's being necessity identical with an F, we can see that accepting the necessity of identity (...)
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  14. Robert Francescotti (2005). Fetuses, Corpses and the Psychological Approach to Personal Identity. Philosophical Explorations 8 (1):69-81.
    Olson (1997a) tries to refute the Psychological Approach to personal identity with his Fetus Argument, and Mackie (1999) aims to do the same with the Death Argument. With the help of a suggestion made by Baker (1999), the following discussion shows that these arguments fail. In the process of defending the Psychological Approach, it is made clear exactly what one is and is not committed to as a proponent of the theory.
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  15. Robert Francescotti (2003). Statues and Their Constituents: Whether Constitution is Identity. Metaphysica 4 (2):59-77.
    This paper examines two popular arguments for the nonidentity of the statue and its constituent material. An essentialist response is provided to one of the arguments; that response is then shown to undermine the other argument as well. It is also shown that even if we accept these arguments and concede nonidentity, we can still avoid the further conclusion that constitution is not identity. These ideas are then extended to other applications of the arguments for nonidentity (specifically, their application to (...)
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  16. Robert Francescotti (2002). Understanding Physical Realization (and What It Does Not Entail). Journal of Mind and Behavior 23 (3):279-292.
    The notion of realization is defined so that we can better understand what it means to say that mentality is physically realized. It is generally thought that physical properties realize mental properties (thesis PR). The definitions provided here support this belief, but they also reveal that mental properties can be viewed as realizing physical properties. This consequence questions the value of PR in helping us capture the idea that mental phenomena are dependent upon (i.e., obtain by virtue of) physical phenomena. (...)
     
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  17. Robert Francescotti (2002). Whether Mentality is Higher-Level. Philosophical Inquiry 24 (3-4):65-76.
  18. Robert Francescotti (2001). Property Dualism Without Substance Dualism? Philosophical Papers 30 (2):93-116.
    Substance dualism is widely rejected by philosophers of mind, but many continue to accept some form of property dualism. The assumption here is that one can consistently believe that (1) mental properties are not physical properties, while denying that (2) mental particulars are not physical particulars. But is this assumption true? This paper considers several analyses of what makes something a physical particular (as opposed to a non-physical particular), and it is argued that on any plausible analysis, accepting (1) requires (...)
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  19. Robert Francescotti (2000). Introspection and Qualia: A Defense of Infallibility. Communication and Cognition 33 (3-4):161-173.
  20. Robert Francescotti (2000). Ontological Physicalism and Property Pluralism: Why They Are Incompatible. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 81 (4):349-362.
    To earn the title “ontological physicalist,” one must endorse an entailment thesis of the following sort: the physical properties that are had, together with the causal laws, determine which higher-level properties are had. I argue that if this thesis is to capture all that is essential to physicalist intuitions, the relevant set of causal laws must be restricted to purely physical laws. But then it follows that higher-level properties are physical properties. The conclusion is that one cannot consistently be an (...)
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  21. Robert Francescotti (1999). How to Define Intrinsic Properties. Noûs 33 (4):590-609.
    An intrinsic property, according to one important account, is a property that is had by all of one's duplicates. Instead, one might choose to characterize intrinsic properties as those that can be had in the absence of all distinct individuals. After reviewing the problems with these earlier accounts, the author presents a less problematic analysis. The goal is to clarify the rough idea that an intrinsic property is a special sort of non-relational property; having the property does not consist in (...)
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  22. Robert Francescotti (1999). Mere Cambridge Properties. American Philosophical Quarterly 36 (4):295-308.
    The predicates 'is outgrown by Theaetetus,' 'is 300 miles west of a lemur,' and 'is such that 9 is odd' denote properties, but there is a sense in which these properties are not genuine features of the objects that have them. The fact that we find these mere-Cambridge properties odd has something to do with their relational character. But relationality in itself is not an adequate criterion for property-genuineness for there are many relational properties that do not qualify as mere-Cambridge. (...)
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  23. Robert Francescotti (1998). Defining "Physicalism&Quot;. Journal of Mind and Behavior 19 (1):51-64.
    To earn the title “ontological physicalist,” one must endorse an entailment thesis of the following sort: the physical properties that are had, together with the causal laws, determine which higher-level properties are had. I argue that if this thesis is to capture all that is essential to physicalist intuitions, the relevant set of causal laws must be restricted to purely physical laws. But then it follows that higher-level properties are physical properties. The conclusion is that one cannot consistently be an (...)
     
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  24. Robert Francescotti (1998). The Nonreductionist's Troubles with Supervenience. Philosophical Studies 89 (1):105-24.
    I argue that there is a tension between three popular views in the philosophy of mind: (1) mental properties are not identical with physical properties (a version of nonreductionism), but (2) mental properties are had solely by virtue of physical properties (physicalism regarding the mind), which requires that (3) mental properties supervene on physical properties. To earn the title "physicalist," one must hold a sufficiently strong version of the supervenience thesis. But this, I argue, will be a version that undermines (...)
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  25. Robert Francescotti (1997). What Multiple Realizability Does Not Show. Journal of Mind and Behavior 18 (1):13-28.
    It is widely held that psychological theories cannot be reduced to those of the natural sciences. Perhaps the most common reason for rejecting psycho-physical reduction is the belief that mental properties are multiply realizable--i.e., that events of different physical types might realize the same mental property. While the multiple realizability argument has had its share of criticism, its major flaw has been overlooked. I aim to show the real reason why the argument fails and why multiple realizability is compatible with (...)
     
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  26. Robert Francescotti (1995). Even: The Conventional Implicature Approach Reconsidered. [REVIEW] Linguistics and Philosophy 18 (2):153 - 173.
    Like Bennett's account of ‘even’, my analysis incorporates the following plausible and widespread intuitions. (a) The word ‘even’ does not make a truth-functional difference; it makes a difference only in conventional implicature. In particular, ‘even’ functions neither as a universal quantifier, nor amost ormany quantifier. The only quantified statement that ‘EvenA isF’ implies is the existential claim ‘There is anx (namely,A) that isF’, but this implication is nothing more than what the Equivalence Thesis already demands. (b) ‘Even’ is epistemic in (...)
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  27. Robert Francescotti (1995). Higher-Order Thoughts and Conscious Experience. Philosophical Psychology 8 (3):239-254.
    For nearly a decade, David Rosenthal has proposed that a mental state M of a creature C is conscious just in case C has a suitable higher-order thought directed toward M. While this theory has had its share of criticism in recent years, I believe that the real difficulties have been ignored. In this essay, I show that the presence of a higher order is insufficient for conscious experience, even if we suppose that the thought satisfies the constraints that Rosenthal (...)
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  28. Robert Francescotti (1994). Qualitative Beliefs, Wide Content, and Wide Behavior. Noûs 28 (3):396-404.
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  29. Robert Francescotti (1993). Subjective Experience and Points of View. Journal of Philosophical Research 18:25-36.
    Thomas Nagel contends that facts regarding the qualitative character of conscious experience can be grasped from only a single point of view. This feature, he claims, is what renders conscious experience subjective in character, and it is what makes facts about the qualitative experience subjective facts. While much has been written regarding the ontological implications of the ‘point of view account’ relatively Iittle has been said on whether the account itself successfully defines the subjectivity of the mental. In this paper, (...)
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  30. Robert Francescotti (1991). Externalism and Marr's Theory of Vision. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 42 (June):227-38.
    According to one brand of 'externalism', cognitive theories should individuate mental content 'widely'--that is, partly in terms of environmental features. David Marr's theory of vision is often cited in support of this view. Many philosophers (most notably, Tyler Burge) regard it as a prime example of a fruitful cognitive theory that widely individuates the representations it posits. I argue that, contrary to popular belief, Marr's theory does not presuppose an externalist view of mental content.
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