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Robert Francescotti [30]Robert M. Francescotti [2]
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Profile: Robert Francescotti (San Diego State University)
  1. Robert M. Francescotti (ed.) (2014). Companion to Intrinsic Properties. De Gruyter.
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  2. Robert Francescotti (2013). The Problem of Extras and the Contingency of Physicalism. Philosophical Explorations 17 (2):1-14.
    Philosophical Explorations, Volume 0, Issue 0, Page 1-14, Ahead of Print.
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  3. Robert Francescotti (2013). The Problem of Animal Pain and Suffering. In Justin McBrayer Daniel Howard-Snyder (ed.), The Blackwell Companion to the Problem of Evil. 113-127.
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  4. Robert Francescotti (2012). Understanding the Intrinsic/Extrinsic Distinction. Metascience 21 (1):91-94.
    Understanding the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-4 DOI 10.1007/s11016-011-9549-x Authors Robert Francescotti, Department of Philosophy, San Diego State University, 5500 Campanile Drive, San Diego, CA 92182-6044, USA Journal Metascience Online ISSN 1467-9981 Print ISSN 0815-0796.
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  5. Robert Francescotti (2011). Supervenience and Mind. In James Fieser & Bradley Dowden (eds.), Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  6. Robert Francescotti (2010). Psychological Continuity and the Necessity of Identity. American Philosophical Quarterly 47 (4):337-350.
  7. Robert Francescotti (2010). Realization and Physicalism. Philosophical Psychology 23 (5):601-616.
    Melnyk provides a rigorous analysis of the notion of realization with the aim of defining Physicalism. It is argued here that contrary to Melnyk's Realization Physicalism, the idea that mental phenomena are realized by physical phenomena fails to capture the physicalist belief that the former obtain in virtue of the latter. The conclusion is not that Physicalism is false, but that its truth is best explained with some notion other than realization in Melnyk's sense. I also argue that the problems (...)
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  8. Robert Francescotti (2008). Psychological Continuity, Fission, and the Non-Branching Constraint. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (1):21-31.
    Abstract: Those who endorse the Psychological Continuity Approach (PCA) to analyzing personal identity need to impose a non-branching constraint to get the intuitively correct result that in the case of fission, one person becomes two. With the help of Brueckner's (2005) discussion, it is shown here that the sort of non-branching clause that allows proponents of PCA to provide sufficient conditions for being the same person actually runs contrary to the very spirit of their theory. The problem is first presented (...)
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  9. Robert Francescotti (2008). Endurance and Discernibility. Metaphysica 9 (2):193-204.
    How can an object remain the same, numerically identical, while undergoing change? This is a worry for endurantists, who hold that for any stages, x and y, of a persisting object, x is numerically identical with y. Endurantists might try to avoid the problem of change by insisting that all properties are temporally anchored. It is argued here that while this strategy helps in many cases, it does not help in all. A type of case is presented in which a (...)
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  10. Robert Francescotti (2007). Animal Mind and Animal Ethics: An Introduction. [REVIEW] Journal of Ethics 11 (3):239-252.
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  11. Robert Francescotti (2007). Emergence. Erkenntnis 67 (1):47 - 63.
    Here I offer a precise analysis of what it takes for a property to count as emergent. The features widely considered crucial to emergence include novelty, unpredictability, supervenience, relationality, and downward causal influence. By acknowledging each of these distinctive features, the definition provided below captures an important sense in which the whole can be more than the sum of its parts.
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  12. Robert Francescotti (2005). Constitution and the Necessity of Identity. Logique Et Analyse 48 (192):311-321.
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  13. Robert Francescotti (2005). Fetuses, Corpses and the Psychological Approach to Personal Identity. Philosophical Explorations 8 (1):69-81.
    Olson (1997a) tries to refute the Psychological Approach to personal identity with his Fetus Argument, and Mackie (1999) aims to do the same with the Death Argument. With the help of a suggestion made by Baker (1999), the following discussion shows that these arguments fail. In the process of defending the Psychological Approach, it is made clear exactly what one is and is not committed to as a proponent of the theory.
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  14. Robert Francescotti (2003). Statues and Their Constituents: Whether Constitution is Identity. Metaphysica 4 (2):59-77.
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  15. Robert Francescotti (2002). Understanding Physical Realization (and What It Does Not Entail). Journal of Mind and Behavior 23 (3):279-292.
     
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  16. Robert Francescotti (2002). Whether Mentality is Higher-Level. Philosophical Inquiry 24 (3-4):65-76.
  17. Robert Francescotti (2001). Property Dualism Without Substance Dualism? Philosophical Papers 30 (2):93-116.
    Abstract Substance dualism is widely rejected by philosophers of mind, but many continue to accept some form of property dualism. The assumption here is that one can consistently believe that (1) mental properties are not physical properties, while denying that (2) mental particulars are not physical particulars. But is this assumption true? This paper considers several analyses of what makes something a physical particular (as opposed to a non-physical particular), and it is argued that on any plausible analysis, accepting (1) (...)
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  18. Robert Francescotti (2000). Introspection and Qualia: A Defense of Infallibility. Communication and Cognition 33 (3-4):161-173.
  19. Robert Francescotti (2000). Ontological Physicalism and Property Pluralism: Why They Are Incompatible. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 81 (4):349-362.
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  20. Robert Francescotti (1999). How to Define Intrinsic Properties. Noûs 33 (4):590-609.
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  21. Robert Francescotti (1999). Mere Cambridge Properties. American Philosophical Quarterly 36 (4):295-308.
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  22. Robert Francescotti (1998). Defining "Physicalism&Quot;. Journal of Mind and Behavior 19 (1):51-64.
     
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  23. Robert Francescotti (1998). The Nonreductionist's Troubles with Supervenience. Philosophical Studies 89 (1):105-24.
  24. Robert Francescotti (1997). What Multiple Realizability Does Not Show. Journal of Mind and Behavior 18 (1):13-28.
     
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  25. Robert Francescotti (1995). Even: The Conventional Implicature Approach Reconsidered. [REVIEW] Linguistics and Philosophy 18 (2):153 - 173.
    Like Bennett's account of ‘even’, my analysis incorporates the following plausible and widespread intuitions. (a) The word ‘even’ does not make a truth-functional difference; it makes a difference only in conventional implicature. In particular, ‘even’ functions neither as a universal quantifier, nor amost ormany quantifier. The only quantified statement that ‘EvenA isF’ implies is the existential claim ‘There is anx (namely,A) that isF’, but this implication is nothing more than what the Equivalence Thesis already demands. (b) ‘Even’ is epistemic in (...)
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  26. Robert Francescotti (1995). Higher-Order Thoughts and Conscious Experience. Philosophical Psychology 8 (3):239-254.
    For nearly a decade, David Rosenthal has proposed that a mental state M of a creature C is conscious just in case C has a suitable higher-order thought directed toward M. While this theory has had its share of criticism in recent years, I believe that the real difficulties have been ignored. In this essay, I show that the presence of a higher order is insufficient for conscious experience, even if we suppose that the thought satisfies the constraints that Rosenthal (...)
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  27. Robert Francescotti (1994). Qualitative Beliefs, Wide Content, and Wide Behavior. Noûs 28 (3):396-404.
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  28. Robert Francescotti (1993). Subjective Experience and Points of View. Journal of Philosophical Research 18:25-36.
    Thomas Nagel contends that facts regarding the qualitative character of conscious experience can be grasped from only a single point of view. This feature, he claims, is what renders conscious experience subjective in character, and it is what makes facts about the qualitative experience subjective facts. While much has been written regarding the ontological implications of the ‘point of view account’ relatively Iittle has been said on whether the account itself successfully defines the subjectivity of the mental. In this paper, (...)
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  29. Robert Francescotti (1991). Externalism and Marr's Theory of Vision. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 42 (June):227-38.