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Profile: Robert Greenleaf Brice (Loyola University, New Orleans)
  1. Robert Greenleaf Brice (2014). Exploring Certainty: Wittgenstein and Wide Fields of Thought. Lexington Books.
  2. Robert Greenleaf Brice (2013). “Aesthetic Scaffolding”: Hagberg and Wittgensteinian Certitude. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 87 (3):397-409.
    In the penultimate chapter of his book, Art as Language, G. L. Hagberg presents an argument against Arthur Danto, George Dickie, and other advocates of the Institutional Theory (IT), arguing that a tension exists within the theory. Through conferral, a spokesperson declares what artifacts are accepted into the artworld. Hagberg finds this problematic because, while the criterion one uses is something that the later Wittgenstein would endorse, it points back to an essentialism that he clearly rejected. But Hagberg believes he (...)
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  3. Robert Greenleaf Brice (2013). Mistakes and Mental Disturbances: Pleasants, Wittgenstein, and Basic Moral Certainty. Philosophia 41 (2):477-487.
    In his article, “Wittgenstein and Basic Moral Certainty,” Nigel Pleasants argues that killing an innocent, non-threatening person is wrong. It is, he argues, “a basic moral certainty.” He believes our basic moral certainties play the “same kind of foundational role as [our] basic empirical certaint[ies] do.” I believe this is mistaken. There is not “simply one kind of foundational role” that certainty plays. While I think Pleasants is right to affiliate his proposition with a Wittgensteinian form of certainty, he exposes (...)
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  4. Robert Greenleaf Brice (2013). ‘The Whole Hurly-Burly’: Wittgenstein and Embodied Cognition. Journal of Consciousness Studies 20 (1-2):49-58.
    While typically ignored by the cognitive sciences, Wittgenstein’s later work provides those defending embodied cognition (EC) with essential philosophical tools that serve to strengthen the argument against cognitivism. Cognition, as Wittgenstein’s work demonstrates, is not simply a matter of disembodied intellect, but is actional, time-pressured, body-based, and dependent on the larger environment.
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  5. Robert Greenleaf Brice & Patrick L. Bourgeois (2012). Naturalism Reconsidered: Wittgenstein and Merleau-Ponty. Philosophy Today 56 (1):78-83.
    While naturalism is used in positive senses by the tradition of analytical philosophy, with Ludwig Wittgenstein its best example, and by the tradition of phenomenology, with Maurice Merleau-Ponty its best exemplar, it also has an extremely negative sense on both of these fronts. Hence, both Merleau-Ponty and Wittgenstein in their basic thrusts adamantly reject reductionistic naturalism. Although Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology rejects the naturalism Husserl rejects, he early on found a place for the “truth of naturalism.” In a parallel way, Wittgenstein accepts (...)
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  6. Robert Greenleaf Brice (2009). Recognizing Targets: Wittgenstein's Exploration of a New Kind of Foundationalism in on Certainty. Philosophical Investigations 32 (1):1-22.
    Bringing the views of Grayling, Moyal-Sharrock and Stroll together, I argue that in On Certainty, Wittgenstein explores the possibility of a new kind of foundationalism. Distinguishing propositional language-games from non-propositional, actional certainty, Wittgenstein investigates a foundationalism sui generis . Although he does not forthrightly state, defend, or endorse what I am characterizing as a "new kind of foundationalism," we must bear in mind that On Certainty was a collection of first draft notes written at the end of Wittgenstein's life. The (...)
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  7. Robert Greenleaf Brice (2008). A Reply to John Searle and Other Traditionalists. Multicultural Education 16 (2):37-40.
    One of the more recent pedagogical debates confronting university instructors is whether liberal education should be replaced with multiculturalism. John Searle has labeled these positions as “traditionalists” and “challengers,” respectively. While not finding “much that is objectionable in the [traditionalists’] assumptions,” Searle argues that the challengers’ assumptions are “weak” and “fallacious.” This negative outcome for the challengers however, is due in large part to Searle’s misrepresentation of their position. Searle presents a flawed, straw-man argument; he unfairly and inaccurately presents the (...)
     
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