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Profile: Robert Lockie
  1. Robert Lockie (forthcoming). Perspectivism, Deontologism And Epistemic Poverty. Social Epistemology.
    The epistemic poverty objection is commonly levelled by externalists against deontological conceptions of epistemic justification. This is that an ‘oughts’ based account of epistemic justification together with ‘ought’ implies ‘can’ must lead us to hold to be justified, epistemic agents who are objectively not truth-conducive cognizers. The epistemic poverty objection has led to a common response from deontologists, namely to embrace accounts of bounded (perspectival) rationality – subjective, practical or regulative accounts rather than objective, absolute or theoretical accounts. But the (...)
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  2. Robert Lockie (forthcoming). The Epistemology of Neo-Gettier Epistemology. South African Journal of Philosophy.
    The paper begins by drawing a number of ‘levels’ distinctions in epistemology. It notes that a theory of knowledge must be an attempt to obtain knowledge (about knowledge). It is suggested that we can make sense of much of the work found in analytic theory of knowledge by seeing three (tacit) framework assumptions as underpinning this work. First, that to have philosophical knowledge of knowledge requires us to have an analysis. Second, that much of what we require from a theory (...)
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  3. Robert Lockie (forthcoming). The Regulative and the Theoretical in Epistemology. Abstracta.
    The distinction between the regulative (‘practical’, ‘subjective’, ‘decision-procedural’) and the theoretical (‘objective’, ‘absolute’) pertains to the aims (the desiderata) of an account of justification. This distinction began in ethics and spread to epistemology. Each of internalism, externalism, is separately forced to draw this distinction to avoid a stock, otherwise fatal, argument levelled against them by the other. Given this situation however, we may finesse much partisan conflict in epistemology by simply seeing differing accounts of justification as answering to radically distinct (...)
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  4. Robert Lockie (forthcoming). Three Recent Frankfurt Cases. Philosophia:1-28.
    Three recent ‘state of the art’ Frankfurt cases are responded to: Widerker’s Brain-Malfunction-W case and Pereboom’s Tax Evasion cases (2 & 3). These cases are intended by their authors to resurrect the neo-Frankfurt project of overturning the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP) in the teeth of the widespread acceptance of some combination of the WKG (Widerker-Kane-Ginet) dilemma, the Flicker of Freedom strategy and the revised PAP response (‘Principle of Alternative Blame’, ‘Principle of Alternative Expectations’). The three neo-Frankfurt cases of Pereboom (...)
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  5. Robert Lockie (2008). Problems for Virtue Theories in Epistemology. Philosophical Studies 138 (2):169 - 191.
    This paper identifies and criticizes certain fundamental commitments of virtue theories in epistemology. A basic question for virtues approaches is whether they represent a ‘third force’––a different source of normativity to internalism and externalism. Virtues approaches so-conceived are opposed. It is argued that virtues theories offer us nothing that can unify the internalist and externalist sub-components of their preferred success-state. Claims that character can unify a virtues-based axiology are overturned. Problems with the pluralism of virtues theories are identified––problems with pluralism (...)
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  6. Robert Lockie (2006). Response to Anders Tolland's 'Iterated Non-Refutation: Robert Lockie on Relativism'. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 14 (2):245 – 254.
    This Article is a short response to Anders Tolland's "Iterated Non-Refutation: Robert Lockie on Relativism", International Journal of Philosophical Studies Vol. 14, no. 2, 245-254, 2006. Tolland's article was itself a response to Lockie, R (2003) "Relativism and Reflexivity", International Journal of Philosophical Studies Vol. 11, no. 3, 319-339.
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  7. Robert Lockie (2004). Knowledge, Provenance and Psychological Explanation. Philosophy 79 (3):421-433.
    Analytic theories of knowledge have traditionally maintained that the provenance of a true belief is critically important to deciding whether it is knowledge. However, a comparably widespread view is that it is our beliefs alone, regardless of their (potentially dubious) provenance which feature in psychological explanation, including the explanation of action: thus, that knowledge itself and as such is irrelevant in psychological explanation. The paper gives initial reasons why the ‘beliefs alone’ view of explanation should be resisted—arguments deriving ultimately from (...)
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  8. Robert Lockie (2003). Depth Psychology and Self-Deception. Philosophical Psychology 16 (1):127-148.
    This paper argues that self-deception cannot be explained without employing a depth-psychological ("psychodynamic") notion of the unconscious, and therefore that mainstream academic psychology must make space for such approaches. The paper begins by explicating the notion of a dynamic unconscious. Then a brief account is given of the "paradoxes" of self-deception. It is shown that a depth-psychological self of parts and subceptive agency removes any such paradoxes. Next, several competing accounts of self-deception are considered: an attentional account, a constructivist account, (...)
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  9. Robert Lockie (2003). Relativism and Reflexivity. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 11 (3):319 – 339.
    This paper develops a version of the self-refutation argument against relativism in the teeth of the prevailing response by relativists: that this argument begs the question against them. It is maintained that although weaker varieties of relativism are not self-refuting, strong varieties are faced by this argument with a choice between making themselves absolute (one thing is absolutely true - relativism); or reflexive (relativism is 'true for' the relativist). These positions are in direct conflict. The commonest response, Reflexive Relativism, is (...)
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  10. Robert Lockie (2003). Transcendental Arguments Against Eliminativism. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 54 (4):569-589.
    Eliminativism was targeted by transcendental arguments from the first. Three responses to these arguments have emerged from the eliminativist literature, the heart of which is that such arguments are question-begging. These responses are shown to be incompatible with the position, eliminativism, they are meant to defend. Out of these failed responses is developed a general transcendental argument against eliminativism (the "Paradox of Abandonment"). Eliminativists have anticipated this argument, but their six different attempts to counter it are shown to be separately (...)
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  11. Robert Lockie (2003). Self-Deception Unmasked By Alfred Mele Princeton: Princeton University Press (2001). Pp Xi + 124. Philosophy 78 (2):289-307.
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  12. Robert Lockie (2003). Review of Mele, A: “Self-Deception Unmasked”. [REVIEW] Philosophy 78 (304):296-300.
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  13. Robert Lockie (1998). What's Wrong with Moral Internalism. Ratio 11 (1):14–36.
    Moral Internalism is the claim that it is a priori that moral beliefs are reasons for action. At least three conceptions of 'reason' may be disambiguated: psychological, epistemological, and purely ethical. The first two conceptions of Internalism are false on conceptual, and indeed empirical, grounds. On a purely ethical conception of 'reasons', the claim is true but is an Externalist claim. Positive arguments for Internalism — from phenomenology, connection and oddness — are found wanting. Three possible responses to the stock (...)
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