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  1. Robert N. Audi (2004). Handbook of Epistemology. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Pub.
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  2. Robert N. Audi (2004). Perception and Consciousness. In Ilkka Niiniluoto, Matti Sintonen & Jan Wolenski (eds.), Handbook of Epistemology. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Pub. 57--108.
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  3. Robert N. Audi (1994). Dispositional Beliefs and Dispositions to Believe. Noûs 28 (4):419-34.
  4. Robert N. Audi (1993). Mental Causation: Sustaining and Dynamic. In John Heil & Alfred R. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation. Oxford University Press.
    I. the view that reasons cannot be causes. II. the view that the explanatory relevance of psychological states such as beliefs and intentions derives from their content, their explanatory role is not causal and we thus have no good reason to ascribe causal power to them. III. the idea that if the mental supervenes on the physical, then what really explains our actions is the physical properties determining our propositional attitudes, and not those attitudes themselves. IV. the thesis that since (...)
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  5. Robert N. Audi (1982). Self-Deception, Action, and Will. Erkenntnis 18 (September):133-158.
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  6. Robert N. Audi (1978). The Ontological Status of Mental Images. Inquiry 21 (1-4):348-61.
    This paper explores the question whether an adequate account of the facts about imagination and mental imagery must construe mental images as objects. Much of the paper is a study of Alastair Hannay's defense of an affirmative answer in his wide?ranging study, Mental Images ? A Defence. The paper first sets out and evaluates Hannay's case. The second part develops an alternative account of mental images, including non?visual images, which Hannay does not treat in detail. The alternative account is analogous (...)
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  7. Robert N. Audi (1976). B.F. Skinner on Freedom, Dignity, and the Explanation of Behavior. Behaviorism 4 (2):163-186.
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  8. Robert N. Audi (1976). Epistemic Disavowals and Self-Deception. Personalist 57:378-385.
     
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  9. Robert N. Audi (1975). The Epistemic Authority of the First Person. Personalist 56:5-15.
     
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  10. Robert N. Audi (1974). Moral Responsibility, Freedom, and Compulsion. American Philosophical Quarterly 11 (January):1-14.
    This paper sets out and defends an account of free action and explores the relation between free action and moral responsibility. Free action is analyzed as a certain kind of uncompelled action. The notion of compulsion is explicated in detail, And several forms of compulsion are distinguished and compared. It is argued that contrary to what is usually supposed, A person may be morally responsible for doing something even if he did not do it freely. On the basis of the (...)
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  11. Robert N. Audi (1974). The Limits of Self-Knowledge. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 4 (December):253-267.