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  1. William P. Bechtel, Pete Mandik, Jennifer Mundale & Robert S. Stufflebeam (eds.) (2001). Philosophy and the Neurosciences: A Reader. Blackwell.
    2. Daugman, J. G. Brain metaphor and brain theory 3. Mundale, J. Neuroanatomical Foundations of Cognition: Connecting the Neuronal Level with the Study of Higher Brain Areas.
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  2. William P. Bechtel & Robert S. Stufflebeam (2001). Epistemic Issues in Procuring Evidence About the Brain: The Importance of Research Instruments and Techniques. In William P. Bechtel, Pete Mandik, Jennifer Mundale & Robert S. Stufflebeam (eds.), Philosophy and the Neurosciences: A Reader. Blackwell. 55--81.
  3. Robert S. Stufflebeam (2001). Brain Matters: A Case Against Representations in the Brain. In William P. Bechtel, P. M, Valerie , Jennifer Mundale & Robert S. Stufflebeam (eds.), Philosophy and the Neurosciences: A Reader. Blackwell.
     
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  4. Robert S. Stufflebeam (2001). Representations in the Brain. In William P. Bechtel, Pete Mandik, Jennifer Mundale & Robert S. Stufflebeam (eds.), Philosophy and the Neurosciences: A Reader. Blackwell. 395.
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  5. William P. Bechtel & Robert S. Stufflebeam (1997). PET: Exploring the Myth and the Method. Philosophy of Science 64 (4):S95 - S106.
    New research tools such as PET can produce dramatic results. But they can also produce dramatic artifacts. Why is PET to be trusted? We examine both the rationale that justifies interpreting PET as measuring brain activity and the strategies for interpreting PET results functionally. We show that functional ascriptions with PET make important assumptions and depend critically on relating PET results to those secured through other research techniques.
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  6. Robert S. Stufflebeam (1997). Why Computation Need Not Be Traded Only for Internal Representation. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1):80-81.
    Although Clark & Thornton's “trading spaces” hypothesis is supposed to require trading internal representation for computation, it is not used consistently in that fashion. Not only do some of the offered computation-saving strategies turn out to be nonrepresentational, others (e.g., cultural artifacts) are external representations. Hence, C&T's hypothesis is consistent with antirepresentationalism.
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  7. Robert S. Stufflebeam & William P. Bechtel (1997). PET: Exploring the Myth and the Method. Philsophy of Science 64 (4):95-106.
    New research tools such as PET can produce dramatic results. But they can also produce dramatic artifacts. Why is PET to be trusted? We examine both the rationale that justifies interpreting PET as measuring brain activity and the strategies for interpreting PET results functionally. We show that functional ascriptions with PET make important assumptions and depend critically on relating PET results to those secured through other research techniques.
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  8. Robert S. Stufflebeam (1996). Adam Drozdek, The Moral Dimension of Man in the Age of Computers Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 16 (2):97-98.
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