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  1. Robert Shaver (2014). Ross on Self and Others. Utilitas 26 (3):303-320.
    Ross suggests a trilemma:(i) Innocent pleasure is good as an end.(ii) I have a prima facie duty to produce what is good as an end.(iii) I have no prima facie duty to produce innocent pleasure for myself.In The Right and the Good, he denies (iii). In Foundations of Ethics, he denies (i). Neither of these solutions is satisfactory. One ought instead to deny (ii). I close by considering a similar trilemma concerning justice.
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  2. Robert Shaver (2014). Sidgwick's Axioms and Consequentialism. Philosophical Review 123 (2):173-204.
    Sidgwick gives various tests for highest certainty. When he applies these tests to commonsense morality, he finds nothing of highest certainty. In contrast, when he applies these tests to his own axioms, he finds these axioms to have highest certainty. The axioms culminate in Benevolence: “Each one is morally bound to regard the good of any other individual as much as his own, except in so far as he judges it to be less, when impartially viewed, or less certainly knowable (...)
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  3. Robert Shaver (2013). Sidgwickian Ethics (Review). Journal of the History of Philosophy 51 (1):136-137.
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  4. Robert Shaver (2013). Utilitarianism and Egoism in Sidgwickian Ethics. Revue D’Études Benthamiennes 12.
    In his excellent Sidgwickian Ethics, David Phillips argues that Sidgwick’s argument for utilitarianism from the axioms is less successful than Sidgwick believes. He also argues that Sidgwick’s argument for egoism is more successful than this argument for utilitarianism. I disagree. I close by noting, briefly, a possible solution to an epistemological puzzle in Sidgwick that Phillips raises.I. UtilitarianismPhillips takes the argument for utilitarianism to have two premises:(U) The good of any..
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  5. Robert Shaver (2013). Utilitarianism : Bentham and Rashdall. In Roger Crisp (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the History of Ethics. Oxford University Press. 292.
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  6. Robert Shaver (2011). The Birth of Deontology. In Thomas Hurka (ed.), Underivative Duty: British Moral Philosophers From Sidgwick to Ewing. Oxford University Press.
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  7. Robert Shaver (2011). The Beloved Self: Morality and the Challenge From Egoism – Alison Hills. Philosophical Quarterly 61 (244):658-660.
  8. Robert Shaver, Egoism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Egoism can be a descriptive or a normative position. Psychological egoism, the most famous descriptive position, claims that each person has but one ultimate aim: her own welfare. Normative forms of egoism make claims about what one ought to do, rather than describe what one does do. Ethical egoism claims that it is necessary and sufficient for an action to be morally right that it maximize one's self-interest. Rational egoism claims that it is necessary and sufficient for an action to (...)
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  9. Robert Shaver (2007). Contractualism and Restrictions. Philosophical Studies 132 (2):293 - 299.
    T.M. Scanlon writes that deontological constraints on taking lives are to be defended “by considering what principles licensing others to take our lives could be reasonably rejected.” I argue that Scanlon can offer no such defence of deontological constraints.
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  10. Robert Shaver (2007). Non-Naturalism. In Susana Nuccetelli & Gary Seay (eds.), Themes From G. E. Moore: New Essays in Epistemology and Ethics. Clarendon Press.
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  11. Robert Shaver (2006). Korsgaard on Hypothetical Imperatives. Philosophical Studies 129 (2):335 - 347.
    I argue that rationalists need not adopt Kant’s method for determining what one has reason to do, where by “Kant’s method” I mean the view that normative guidance comes only from directives imposed on the agent by the agent’s own will. I focus on Kant’s argument for “imperatives of skill,” one sort of hypothetical imperative. I argue, against Korsgaard, that Kant’s argument is neither better nor significantly different than the sort of argument non-Kantian rationalists offer. I close by arguing that (...)
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  12. Robert Shaver (2006). Sidgwick on Moral Motivation. Philosophers' Imprint 6 (1):1-14.
    Sidgwick holds that moral judgments are claims about what it is reasonable to do. He also holds that these judgments about what it is reasonable to do can motivate. He must, then, respond to Hume’s argument that reason cannot motivate. I clarify Sidgwick’s claims, give his argument against Hume, and reply to various Humean objections.
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  13. Robert Shaver (2006). Virtues, Utility, and Rules. In Knud Haakonssen (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Adam Smith. Cambridge University Press.
     
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  14. Robert Shaver (2005). Review of Bart Schultz, Henry Sidgwick: Eye of the Universe. An Intellectual Biography. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2005 (2).
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  15. Robert Shaver (2004). Freedom and Moral Sentiment. International Studies in Philosophy 36 (1):280-281.
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  16. Robert Shaver (2004). The Appeal of Utilitarianism. Utilitas 16 (3):235-250.
    Utilitarianism continues to vex its critics even in the absence of generally respected arguments in its favour. I suggest that utilitarianism survives largely because of its welfarism. This explains why it survives without the backing of respected arguments. It survives without such arguments because justifying the value of welfare requires no such argument. Correspondence:c1 bshaver@cc.umanitoba.ca.
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  17. Robert Shaver (2003). Henry Sidgwick (Review). Journal of the History of Philosophy 41 (4):569-570.
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  18. Robert Shaver (2003). Principia Then and Now. Utilitas 15 (03):261-.
    Moore is taken to have followed Sidgwick in his arguments against naturalism and in his consequentialism. I argue that there are differences on both issues. Sidgwick's arguments against naturalism do not rely on a controversial view of analysis, and one of his arguments for consequentialism gives him greater resources against critics of consequentialism such as T. M. Scanlon.
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  19. Robert Shaver (2002). Welfare and Outcome. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 32 (1):103 - 115.
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  20. Robert Shaver (2001). Book Review. Moral Theory David S. Oderberg. [REVIEW] Mind 110 (438):531-534.
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  21. Robert Shaver (2000). Sidgwick's Minimal Metaethics. Utilitas 12 (03):261-.
    Non-naturalism has a shady reputation. This reputation is undeserved, at least in the case of one variety of non-naturalism – the variety Sidgwick offers. In section I, I present Sidgwick's view, distinguishing it from views with which it is often lumped. In II and III, I defend Sidgwick against recent objections to non-naturalism from motivation and supervenience. In IV, I briefly consider objections which brought about the downfall of non-naturalism at the middle of the century. In V, I consider the (...)
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  22. Robert Shaver (2000). A New History of Modern Moral Philosophy. Dialogue 39 (03):585-.
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  23. Robert Shaver (1998). Rational Egoism: A Selective and Critical History. Cambridge University Press..
    This book is the first full-length treatment of rational egoism, and it provides both a selective history of the subject as well as a philosophical analysis of the arguments that have been deployed in its defense.
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  24. Robert Shaver (1997). Sidgwick's False Friends. Ethics 107 (2):314-320.
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  25. Robert Shaver (1996). Grotius on Scepticism and Self-Interest. Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 78 (1):27-47.
  26. Robert Shaver (1996). Tom Sorell, Ed., The Cambridge Companion to Hobbes Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 16 (5):374-376.
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  27. Robert Shaver (1995). Hume's Moral Theory? History of Philosophy Quarterly 12 (3):317 - 331.
    Hume's moral theory is often taken to be descriptive rather then normative. This is a misinterpretation: Hume justifies moral claims, as he justifies claims about what to believe, by appeal to initially credible cases. This procedure is defensible.
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  28. Robert Shaver (1994). Hume's Self-Interest Requirement. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 24 (1):1 - 17.
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  29. Robert Shaver (1994). Inescapable and Affective Moralities. Philosophical Studies 75 (3):175 - 199.
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  30. Robert Shaver (1994). Montaigne and the Problem of Living in Others. History of European Ideas 18 (3):347-360.
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  31. Robert Shaver (1992). Hume on the Duties of Humanity. Journal of the History of Philosophy 30 (4):545-556.
  32. Robert Shaver (1990). Emile's Education. Journal of Philosophy of Education 24 (2):245–255.
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  33. Robert Shaver (1990). Leviathan, King of the Proud. Hobbes Studies 3 (1):54-74.
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  34. Robert Shaver (1989). Rousseau and Recognition. Social Theory and Practice 15 (3):261-283.
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