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Robert T. Lehe [4]Robert Tad Lehe [1]
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  1. Robert T. Lehe (2004). A Response to the Argument From the Reasonableness of Nonbelief. Faith and Philosophy 21 (2):159-174.
    According to J. L. Schellenberg’s argument from the reasonableness of nonbelief, the fact that many people inculpably fail to find sufficient evidence for the existence of God constitutes evidence for atheism. Schellenberg argues that since a loving God would not withhold the benefits of belief, the lack of evidence for God’s existence is incompatible with divine love. I argue that Schellenberg has not successfully defended his argument’s two controversial premises, that God’s love is incompatible with his allowing some to remain (...)
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  2. Robert T. Lehe (1998). Realism and Reality. Journal of Philosophical Research 23:219-237.
    Although there are a host of distinct issues associated with discussions of realism and antirealism, the most fundamental is the ontological question whether there is a mind-independent world, a world with a determinate, intrinsic nature that is independent of our theoretical and practical interaction with it. That there is such a mind-independent world is the minimal and most crucial requirement of realism. The main purpose of this paper is to defend this ontological requirement of realism. The ontological requirement involves two (...)
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  3. Robert T. Lehe (1989). Coherence and the Problem of the Criterion. Idealistic Studies 19 (2):112-120.
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  4. Robert T. Lehe (1986). God's Perfection and Freedom. Faith and Philosophy 3 (3):319-323.
    In a recent article in Faith and Philosophy, Wesley Morriston argues that Plantinga’s Free Will Defense is incompatible with his version of the ontological argument because the former requires that God be free in a sense that precludes a requirement of the latter---that God be morally perfect in all possible worlds. God’s perfection, according to Morriston, includes moral goodness, which requires that God be free in the sense that entails that in some possible worlds God performs wrong actions. I argue (...)
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  5. Robert Tad Lehe (1983). Coherence—Criterion and Nature of Truth. Idealistic Studies 13 (3):177-189.
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