65 found
Sort by:
  1. Robert van Gulick (2013). Phenomenal Unity, Representation and the Self. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (1):209-214.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Robert van Gulick (2012). On the Supposed Inconceivability of Absent Qualia Functional Duplicates--A Reply to Tye. Philosophical Review 121 (2):277-284.
    In “Absent Qualia and the Mind-Body Problem,” Michael Tye (2006) presents an argument by which he claims to show the inconceivability of beings that are functionally equivalent to phenomenally conscious beings but lack any qualia. On that basis, he concludes that qualia can be fully defined in functional terms. The argument does not suffice to establish the claimed results. In particular it does not show that such absent qualia cases are inconceivable. Tye’s argument relies on a principle P according to (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Robert van Gulick (2012). Subjective Consciousness and Self-Representation. Philosophical Studies 159 (3):457-465.
    Subjective consciousness and self-representation Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-9 DOI 10.1007/s11098-011-9765-7 Authors Robert Van Gulick, Department of Philosophy, Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY, USA Journal Philosophical Studies Online ISSN 1573-0883 Print ISSN 0031-8116.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Robert Van Gulick (2011). Drugs, Mental Instruments, and Self-Control. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (6):325-326.
    The instrumental model offered by Müller & Schumann (M&S) is broadened to apply not only to drugs, but also to other methods of self-control, including the use of mental constructs to produce adaptive changes in behavior with the possibility of synergistic interactions between various instruments.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Robert Van Gulick (2011). Life, Holism and Emergence: Converging Themes. Journal of Consciousness Studies 18 (5-6):139 - 147.
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Robert Van Gulick (2011). Non-Reductive Physicalism and the Teleo-Pragmatic Theory of Mind. Philosophia Naturalis 47 (1-2):1-2.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Robert van Gulick (2009). And the Knowledge Argument. In Ian Ravenscroft (ed.), Minds, Ethics, and Conditionals: Themes From the Philosophy of Frank Jackson. Oxford University Press.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Robert Van Gulick (2009). Functionalism. In Brian McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. Oup Oxford.
    No categories
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Robert Van Gulick (2009). Jackson's Change of Mind: Representationalism, a Priorism and the Knowledge Argument. In Ian Ravenscroft (ed.), Minds, Ethics, and Conditionals: Themes From the Philosophy of Frank Jackson. Oup Oxford.
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Robert Van Gulick (2007). Functionalism and Qualia. In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell.
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Robert Van Gulick (2007). What If Phenomenal Consciousness Admits of Degrees? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (5-6):528-529.
    If the phenomenality of consciousness admits of degrees and can be partial and indeterminate, then Block's inference to the best explanation may need to be revaluated both in terms of the supposed data on phenomenal overflow and the range of alternatives against which his view is compared.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Robert Van Gulick (2006). Mirror, Mirror -- Is That All? In Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness. MIT Press.
    Consciousness and self-awareness seem intuitively linked, but how they intertwine is less than clear. Must one be self-aware in order to be consciousness? Indeed, is consciousness just a special type of self-awareness? Or perhaps it is the other way round: Is being self-aware a special way of being conscious? Discerning their connections is complicated by the fact that both the main relata themselves admit of many diverse forms and levels. One might be conscious or self- aware in many different ways (...)
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Robert van Gulick, Consciousness. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  14. Robert Van Gulick (2004). Higher-Order Global States (Hogs): An Alternative Higher-Order Model of Consciousness. In Rocco J. Gennaro (ed.), Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness: An Anthology. John Benjamins.
  15. Robert Van Gulick (2004). Higher-Order Global States (HOGS) An Alternative Higher-Order Model. In Rocco J. Gennaro (ed.), Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness: An Anthology. John Benjamins.. 67.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Robert van Gulick (2004). Neural Correlates and the Diversity of Content. Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (1).
  17. Robert Van Gulick (2004). Outing the Mind. In Richard Schantz (ed.), The Externalist Challenge. De Gruyter. 255--284.
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Robert van Gulick (2004). Peer Commentary on Are There Neural Correlates of Consciousness: Neural Correlates and the Diversity of Content. Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (1):82-86.
  19. Robert van Gulick (2004). So Many Ways of Saying No to Mary. In Peter Ludlow, Yujin Nagasawa & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), There's Something About Mary: Essays on Phenomenal Consciousness and Frank Jackson's Knowledge Argument. MIT Press.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Robert Van Gulick (2003). Beautiful Red Squares. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):50-51.
    The reflectance types that Byrne & Hilbert identify with colors count as types only in a way that is more dependent on, and more relative to color perceivers, than their account suggests. Their account of perceptual content may be overly focused on input conditions and distal causes.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. Robert Van Gulick (2003). 11. Maps, Gaps, and Traps. In Quentin Smith & Aleksandar Jokic (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. Robert van Gulick (2003). Maps, Gaps, and Traps. In Quentin Smith & Aleksandar Jokic (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press.
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. Robert van Gulick (2002). Nonreduction, Consciousness and Physical Causation. Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (11):41-49.
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. Robert van Gulick (2001). Reduction, Emergence and Other Recent Options on the Mind/Body Problem: A Philosophic Overview. Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (9-10):1-34.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. Robert Van Gulick (2001). Still Room for Representations. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (5):1007-1008.
    One can support O'Regan & Noë's (O&N's) commitment to the active nature of vision and the importance of sensorimotor contingencies without joining them in rejecting any significant role for neurally realized visual representations in the process.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. Robert van Gulick (2000). Closing the Gap? Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (4):93-97.
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. Robert van Gulick (2000). Inward and Upward: Reflection, Introspection, and Self-Awareness. Philosophical Topics 28 (2):275-305.
  28. Robert van Gulick (2000). Inward and Upward. Philosophical Topics 28 (2):275-305.
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. Robert Van Gulick (2000). Is the Higher Order of Linguistic Thought Model of Feeling Adequate? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (2):218-219.
    Despite its explanatory value, the “higher order linguistic thought” model comes up short as an account of the felt aspect of motivational states.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. Robert van Gulick (1999). Conceiving Beyond Our Means: The Limits of Thought Experiments. In Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & David J. Chalmers (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness III. MIT Press. 13.
  31. Robert Van Gulick (1999). Out of Sight but Not Out of Mind: Isomorphism and Absent Qualia. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (6):974-974.
    The isomorphism constraint places plausible limits on the use of third-person evidence to explain color experience but poses no difficulty for functionalists; they themselves argue for just such limits. Palmer's absent qualia claim is supported by neither the Color Machine nor Color Room examples. The nature of color experience depends on relations external to the color space, as well as internal to it.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. Robert van Gulick (1999). Taking a Step Back From the Gap. In The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy, Volume 2: Metaphysics. Bowling Green: Philosophy Doc Ctr.
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  33. Robert van Gulick (1999). The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy, Volume 2: Metaphysics. Bowling Green: Philosophy Doc Ctr.
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. Robert Van Gulick (1999). Vehicles, Processes, and Neo-Classical Revival. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1):170-171.
    O'Brien & Opie unfairly restrict the classicist's range of options for explaining phenomenal consciousness. Alternative approaches that rely upon differences among representation types offer better prospects of success. The authors rely upon two distinctions: one between symbol processing and connectionist models, the other between process and vehicle models. In this context, neither distinction may be as clear as they assume.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  35. Robert Van Gulick (1998). Analytical Isomorphism and Marilyn Monroe. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (6):776-777.
    Pessoa, Thompson & Noë present compelling evidence in support of their central claims about the diversity of filling-in, but they embed those claims within a larger framework that rejects analytical isomorphism and uses the personal/subpersonal distinction to challenge the explanatory importance of filling-in. The latter views seem more problematic.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  36. Robert van Gulick (1995). Dennett, Drafts, and Phenomenal Realism. Philosophical Topics 22 (1/2):443-55.
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  37. Robert Van Gulick (1995). Explaining Consciousness: What Would Count? In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience. Ferdinand Schoningh.
    No categories
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  38. Robert van Gulick (1995). How Should We Understand the Relation Between Intentionality and Phenomenal Consciousness. Philosophical Perspectives 9:271-89.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  39. Robert van Gulick (1995). Why the Connection Argument Doesn't Work. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (1):201-7.
  40. Robert van Gulick (1995). What Would Count as Explaining Consciousness? In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience. Imprint Academic.
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  41. Robert van Gulick (1994). Are Beliefs Brain States? And If They Are What Might That Explain? Philosophical Studies 76 (2-3):205-15.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  42. Robert van Gulick (1994). Deficit Studies and the Function of Phenomenal Consciousness. In George Graham & G. Lynn Stephens (eds.), Philosophical Psychopathology. MIT Press.
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  43. Robert Van Gulick (1994). Prosopagnosia, Conscious Awareness and the Interactive Brain. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):84.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  44. Robert van Gulick (1993). Charge Here? And Who's Doing All the Work? In Mental Causation. New York: Clarendon Press.
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  45. Robert van Gulick (1993). Understanding the Phenomenal Mind: Are We All Just Armadillos? In Martin Davies & Glyn W. Humphreys (eds.), Consciousness: Psychological and Philosophical Essays. Blackwell.
  46. Robert Van Gulick (1993). Understanding the Phenomenal Mind: Are We All Just Armadillos? Part I: Phenomenal Knowledge and Explanatory Gaps. In M. Davies & G. Humphreys (eds.), Consciousness: A Mind and Language Reader. Blackwell.
    No categories
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  47. Robert van Gulick (1993). Who's. In Charge Here? And Who's Doing All the Work? In Mental Causation. New York: Clarendon Press.
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  48. Robert van Gulick (1993). Who's in Charge Here? And Who's Doing All the Work? In John Heil & Alfred R. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation. Oxford University Press. 233-56.
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  49. Robert van Gulick (1992). Nonreductive Materialism and the Nature of Intertheoretical Constraint. In Ansgar Beckermann, Hans Flohr & Jaegwon Kim (eds.), Emergence or Reduction?: Prospects for Nonreductive Physicalism. De Gruyter.
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
1 — 50 / 65