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Profile: Robert van Gulick (Syracuse University)
  1. Robert Van Gulick (2006). Mirror, Mirror -- Is That All? In Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness. MIT Press
    Consciousness and self-awareness seem intuitively linked, but how they intertwine is less than clear. Must one be self-aware in order to be consciousness? Indeed, is consciousness just a special type of self-awareness? Or perhaps it is the other way round: Is being self-aware a special way of being conscious? Discerning their connections is complicated by the fact that both the main relata themselves admit of many diverse forms and levels. One might be conscious or self- aware in many different ways (...)
     
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  2. Robert van Gulick (2001). Reduction, Emergence and Other Recent Options on the Mind/Body Problem: A Philosophic Overview. Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (9-10):1-34.
    Though most contemporary philosophers and scientists accept a physicalist view of mind, the recent surge of interest in the problem of consciousness has put the mind /body problem back into play. The physicalists' lack of success in dispelling the air of residual mystery that surrounds the question of how consciousness might be physically explained has led to a proliferation of options. Some offer alternative formulations of physicalism, but others forgo physicalism in favour of views that are more dualistic or that (...)
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  3.  80
    Robert van Gulick (1989). What Difference Does Consciousness Make? Philosophical Topics 17 (1):211-30.
  4. Robert van Gulick (1993). Understanding the Phenomenal Mind: Are We All Just Armadillos? In Martin Davies & Glyn W. Humphreys (eds.), Consciousness: Psychological and Philosophical Essays. Blackwell
  5. Robert van Gulick, Consciousness. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  6. Robert Van Gulick (1985). Conscious Wants and Self-Awareness. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (4):555-556.
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  7. Robert van Gulick (2000). Inward and Upward: Reflection, Introspection, and Self-Awareness. Philosophical Topics 28 (2):275-305.
  8. Robert Van Gulick (2004). Higher-Order Global States : An Alternative Higher-Order Model of Consciousness. In Rocco J. Gennaro (ed.), Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness: An Anthology. John Benjamins
  9.  42
    Raphael van Riel & Robert Van Gulick, Scientific Reduction. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  10. Robert van Gulick (2012). Subjective Consciousness and Self-Representation. Philosophical Studies 159 (3):457-465.
    Subjective consciousness and self-representation Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-9 DOI 10.1007/s11098-011-9765-7 Authors Robert Van Gulick, Department of Philosophy, Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY, USA Journal Philosophical Studies Online ISSN 1573-0883 Print ISSN 0031-8116.
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  11.  11
    Robert Van Gulick (2007). What If Phenomenal Consciousness Admits of Degrees? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (5-6):528-529.
    If the phenomenality of consciousness admits of degrees and can be partial and indeterminate, then Block's inference to the best explanation may need to be revaluated both in terms of the supposed data on phenomenal overflow and the range of alternatives against which his view is compared.
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  12. Robert van Gulick (2004). So Many Ways of Saying No to Mary. In Peter Ludlow, Yujin Nagasawa & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), There's Something About Mary: Essays on Phenomenal Consciousness and Frank Jackson's Knowledge Argument. MIT Press
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  13. Robert van Gulick (1993). Who's in Charge Here? And Who's Doing All the Work? In John Heil & Alfred R. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation. Oxford University Press 233-56.
  14.  17
    Robert van Gulick (1985). Physicalism and the Subjectivity of the Mental. Philosophical Topics 13 (3):51-70.
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  15.  87
    Robert van Gulick (1988). A Functionalist Plea for Self-Consciousness. Philosophical Review 97 (April):149-88.
  16.  68
    Robert van Gulick (2013). Phenomenal Unity, Representation and the Self. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (1):209-214.
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  17.  81
    Robert van Gulick (2012). On the Supposed Inconceivability of Absent Qualia Functional Duplicates--A Reply to Tye. Philosophical Review 121 (2):277-284.
    In “Absent Qualia and the Mind-Body Problem,” Michael Tye (2006) presents an argument by which he claims to show the inconceivability of beings that are functionally equivalent to phenomenally conscious beings but lack any qualia. On that basis, he concludes that qualia can be fully defined in functional terms. The argument does not suffice to establish the claimed results. In particular it does not show that such absent qualia cases are inconceivable. Tye’s argument relies on a principle P according to (...)
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  18.  7
    Robert van Gulick (1992). Three Bad Arguments for Intentional Property Epiphenomenalism. Erkenntnis 36 (3):311-331.
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  19.  96
    Robert van Gulick (1995). How Should We Understand the Relation Between Intentionality and Phenomenal Consciousness. Philosophical Perspectives 9:271-89.
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  20. Robert van Gulick (2003). Maps, Gaps, and Traps. In Quentin Smith & Aleksandar Jokic (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press
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  21.  67
    Robert van Gulick (1994). Are Beliefs Brain States? And If They Are What Might That Explain? Philosophical Studies 76 (2-3):205-15.
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  22.  14
    Robert van Gulick (1995). What Would Count as Explaining Consciousness? In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience. Imprint Academic
  23.  72
    Robert van Gulick (1999). Conceiving Beyond Our Means: The Limits of Thought Experiments. In Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & David J. Chalmers (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness Iii. MIT Press 13.
  24. Robert van Gulick (1994). Deficit Studies and the Function of Phenomenal Consciousness. In George Graham & G. Lynn Stephens (eds.), Philosophical Psychopathology. MIT Press
     
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  25.  4
    Robert Van Gulick (1992). Time for More Alternatives. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (2):228-229.
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  26. Robert van Gulick (2009). And the Knowledge Argument. In Ian Ravenscroft (ed.), Minds, Ethics, and Conditionals: Themes From the Philosophy of Frank Jackson. Oxford University Press
     
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  27.  11
    Robert Van Gulick (2007). Functionalism and Qualia. In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell
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  28.  43
    Robert Van Gulick (1999). Out of Sight but Not Out of Mind: Isomorphism and Absent Qualia. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (6):974-974.
    The isomorphism constraint places plausible limits on the use of third-person evidence to explain color experience but poses no difficulty for functionalists; they themselves argue for just such limits. Palmer's absent qualia claim is supported by neither the Color Machine nor Color Room examples. The nature of color experience depends on relations external to the color space, as well as internal to it.
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  29.  6
    Robert van Gulick (2000). Closing the Gap? Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (4):93-97.
    [opening paragraph]: Nicholas Humphrey's ambitiously titled paper falls into two main parts. In the first, he offers a diagnosis of the current state of the mind-body debate and a general prescription for how to go about seeking its solution. In the second, he aims to fill that prescription with a specific proposal that he regards as bringing us much closer to a resolution of the underlying problem. Though I will take issue below with a few important details, I largely agree (...)
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  30.  12
    Robert Van Gulick (2003). Beautiful Red Squares. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):50-51.
    The reflectance types that Byrne & Hilbert identify with colors count as types only in a way that is more dependent on, and more relative to color perceivers, than their account suggests. Their account of perceptual content may be overly focused on input conditions and distal causes.
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  31.  8
    Robert van Gulick (1982). Functionalism as a Theory of Mind. Philosophy Research Archives 185:185-204.
    A general characterization of functionalist theories of mind is offered and a number of issues are discussed which allow for alternative versions of functionalism. Some issues, such as the distinction between the implicit definition and partial specification views are of a general nature, while others raise questions more specific to functionalism, such as whether the relation between psychological and physiological properties is one of identity or instantiation. Section II attempts to undermine several arguments which have been offered to support the (...)
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  32.  10
    Robert van Gulick (2000). Inward and Upward. Philosophical Topics 28 (2):275-305.
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  33. Robert Van Gulick (1993). Understanding the Phenomenal Mind: Are We All Just Armadillos? Part I: Phenomenal Knowledge and Explanatory Gaps. In M. Davies & G. Humphreys (eds.), Consciousness: A Mind and Language Reader. Blackwell
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  34.  16
    Robert Van Gulick (1999). Vehicles, Processes, and Neo-Classical Revival. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1):170-171.
    O'Brien & Opie unfairly restrict the classicist's range of options for explaining phenomenal consciousness. Alternative approaches that rely upon differences among representation types offer better prospects of success. The authors rely upon two distinctions: one between symbol processing and connectionist models, the other between process and vehicle models. In this context, neither distinction may be as clear as they assume.
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  35. Robert Van Gulick (1995). Explaining Consciousness: What Would Count? In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience. Ferdinand Schoningh
     
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  36. Robert van Gulick (1982). Mental Representation: A Functionalist View. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 63 (January):3-20.
     
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  37.  4
    Robert Van Gulick (1994). Prosopagnosia, Conscious Awareness and the Interactive Brain. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):84.
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  38.  6
    Robert van Gulick (1995). Dennett, Drafts, and Phenomenal Realism. Philosophical Topics 22 (1/2):443-55.
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  39.  24
    Robert Van Gulick (2001). Still Room for Representations. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (5):1007-1008.
    One can support O'Regan & Noë's (O&N's) commitment to the active nature of vision and the importance of sensorimotor contingencies without joining them in rejecting any significant role for neurally realized visual representations in the process.
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  40.  3
    Robert Van Gulick (2011). Drugs, Mental Instruments, and Self-Control. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (6):325-326.
    The instrumental model offered by Müller & Schumann (M&S) is broadened to apply not only to drugs, but also to other methods of self-control, including the use of mental constructs to produce adaptive changes in behavior with the possibility of synergistic interactions between various instruments.
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  41.  3
    Robert van Gulick (1995). Why the Connection Argument Doesn't Work. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (1):201-7.
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  42.  6
    Robert Van Gulick (2004). Higher-Order Global States (HOGS) An Alternative Higher-Order Model. In Rocco J. Gennaro (ed.), Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness: An Anthology. John Benjamins. 67.
  43. Robert van Gulick (1980). Functionalism, Information and Content. Nature and System 2 (September-December):139-62.
  44.  5
    Robert Van Gulick (2011). Non-Reductive Physicalism and the Teleo-Pragmatic Theory of Mind. Philosophia Naturalis 47 (1-2):1-2.
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  45. Robert Van Gulick (2009). Jackson's Change of Mind: Representationalism, a Priorism and the Knowledge Argument. In Ian Ravenscroft (ed.), Minds, Ethics, and Conditionals: Themes From the Philosophy of Frank Jackson. OUP Oxford
     
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  46.  2
    Robert van Gulick (1999). Taking a Step Back From the Gap. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 1999:123-133.
    In this paper, I reflect on the assumptions implicit in the psychophysical explanatory gap metaphor. There are clearly gaps in our current understanding of the psycho-physical link, but how great are they? Are they different in kind from other gaps in our understanding of the world that cause us less metaphysical and epistemological distress? Further, why are we supposed to regard the gaps in our psychological understanding differently? Rather than assess such theories of why a special gap exists, I want (...)
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  47.  4
    Robert Van Gulick (2003). 11. Maps, Gaps, and Traps. In Quentin Smith & Aleksandar Jokic (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press
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  48. Robert van Gulick (1989). Metaphysical Arguments for Internalism and Why They Don't Work. In Stuart Silvers (ed.), ReRepresentation. Kluwer
  49.  13
    Robert Van Gulick (2000). Is the Higher Order of Linguistic Thought Model of Feeling Adequate? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (2):218-219.
    Despite its explanatory value, the “higher order linguistic thought” model comes up short as an account of the felt aspect of motivational states.
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  50. Robert van Gulick (1988). Consciousness, Intrinsic Intentionality, and Self-Understanding Machines. In Anthony J. Marcel & E. Bisiach (eds.), Consciousness in Contemporary Science. Oxford University Press
     
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