Stephane Savanah (Savanah Biol Philos 28:657–673, 2013) provides a critique of theories of self-recognition that largely mirrors my own critique (though without recognizing it) that I began publishing two decades ago. In addition, he both misconstrues my kinesthetic-visual matching model of mirror self-recognition (MSR) in multiple ways (though he appears to agree with the actual model), and misconstrues the evidence in the scientific literature on MSR. I describe points of agreement in our thinking about self-recognition, and criticize and rectify inaccuracies.
Barsalou's interesting model might benefit from defining simulation and clarifying the implications of prior critiques for simulations (and not just for perceptual symbols). Contrary to claims, simulators (or frames) appear, in the limit, to be amodal. In addition, the account of abstract terms seems extremely limited.
Apes imitate the effects of others' actions, but the evidence for program-level imitation seems contradictory and the evidence against bodily imitation and trial and error in learning the organization of complex activities seems ambiguous. Action-level imitations are more flexible than described and may derive from imitation of the effects of others' actions on objects.
Heyes's literature review of deception, imitation, and self-recognition is inadequate, misleading, and erroneous. The anaesthetic artifact hypothesis of self-recognition is unsupported by the data she herself examines. Her proposed experiment is tantalizing, indicating that theory of mind is simply a Turing test.