Online research in philosophy

Richard Peters pioneered a form of philosophical analysis in relation to educational discourse that was criticised by some at the time and is today somewhat out of fashion. This paper argues that much of the objection to Peters' methodology is based on a misunderstanding of what it does and does not involve, that consequently philosophical analysis is often wrongly seen as one of a number of comparable alternative traditions or approaches to philosophy of education between which one needs to choose, (...) and that, partly consequentially, there is a relative lack of philosophical expertise among today's ‘philosophers of education’. Furthermore, his methodology vindicated, it can be said that Peters was indeed ‘nearly right about education’, perhaps more so than he has subsequently come to believe himself. (shrink)

Integrity : a shared moral value -- Religion, nature and intuition as possible sources of moral truth -- Some distinctions and some mistakes -- Rights and procedures -- Principles that define morality -- Reasons for being moral -- Relativism -- Second order principles -- Moral vs. social, ecological and sexual values -- Moral vs. health and safety values -- Moral questions in education -- The question of moral education -- Forms of moral education.

In the 4th edition of this best-selling textbook, the authors introduce students to the business of philosophizing, thereby inducting them into the art of reasoning and analyzing key concepts in education. This introductory text, continuously in print for more than thirty years, is a classic in its field. It shows, first and foremost, the importance of philosophy in educational debate and as a background to any practical activity such as teaching. What is involved in the idea of educating a person (...) or the idea of educational success? What, if anything, can be known and how should we organize what we know for curriculum purposes? What are the criteria for establishing the optimum balance between formal and informal teaching techniques? How trustworthy is educational research? In addition to these questions, which strike to the heart of the rationale for the educative process as a whole, the authors explore such concepts as culture, creativity, autonomy, indoctrination, needs, interests and learning by discovery. In this new updated edition, the authors draw on the latest research in genetics to argue that education is uniquely human and is essentially what develops us as humans. Resisting modern tendencies to equate knowledge with opinion, and value judgments with taste, this book leads the reader into the business of philosophizing and champions the cause of reason in education. (shrink)

: This paper defends the commonsense view that judgments about the quality of human achievement in the arts can be true or false and shown to be so by objective reasoning, as against both subjectivist views and, more particularly, the view that they can be quantitatively expressed and scientifically demonstrated. It focuses on Charles Murray's recent attempt to rank-order the great achievers in an objective manner, arguing that it is fundamentally flawed, especially in confusing the quantification of references with an (...) argument for quality. Any attempt to justify a judgment relating to the quality of achievement must involve expertise in the sense, at least, of a thorough understanding of the nature of the activity in question. Nothing in Murray's lengthy book in fact relates to justification for any of the judgments. The paper concludes that the trappings of science do not make for science; that expertise in a field is necessary for making sound judgments in that field; that the broader the judgment, the harder it is to justify; that objectivity is to be distinguished from precision (as truth is from certainty); and that understanding of what counts as literature (art, sculpture, etc.) is an indispensable part of arguing for the quality of a work or an artist. (shrink)

A policy of inclusion may, in certain circumstances, be justified but inclusion is not an inherently moral principle. On occasion, the practice of inclusion may clearly offend against the principles of fairness. It is crucially important to distinguish between empirical arguments for inclusion and would-be moral arguments. That having been done, it is not clear that there are in general any compelling empirical arguments for a widespread policy of inclusion, and it is tolerably clear that inclusion is not morally incumbent (...) upon us. (shrink)

The essence of the argument in this article is threefold: that empirical questions about laws governing human activity do not have definitive answers; that certain conceptual questions do, and when they do they have important practical implications; but that many conceptual questions do not have definitive answers either. The argument is pursued by reference to Wilson's views on the nature and importance of philosophy, and to moral education by way of example. The conclusion drawn is that empirical research into education (...) as such, and other specifically human activities, is misconceived. The reason that we still debate such questions as ''Can virtue be taught?'' is that they have no answer, but that does not mean that any view can equally well be adopted or that anything goes in every specific case. A better or worse understanding, a more or less efficacious response, can still be reached in particular cases. Such understanding is achieved through philosophy and the study of the humanities. (shrink)

This paper argues that there is an urgent need for philosophers to convince educationalists of the practical value and the necessity of the philosophical task, particularly analysis. The nature of philosophical analysis is outlined in terms of the criteria of clarity, coherence, completeness and compatibility, which, it is argued, in turn lead to a degree of commonality. The tendency to substitute metaphor or analogy for analysis in argument is then considered, with illustrative reference to the idea of teaching as a (...) craft. In the final section, it is suggested that resort to analogy is merely one example of a more general tendency to distance ourselves from the task of coming to grips with what is actually our field of interest, namely education. (shrink)

This collection of essays by philosophers and educationalists of international reputation, all published here for the first time, celebrates Paul Hirst's professional career. The introductory essay by Robin Barrow and Patricia White outlines Paul Hirst's career and maps the shifts in his thought about education, showing how his views on teacher education, the curriculum and educational aims are interrelated. Contributions from leading names in British and American philosophy of education cover themes ranging from the nature of good teaching to Wittgensteinian (...) aesthetics. The collection concludes with a paper in which Paul Hirst sets out his latest views on the nature of education and its aims. The book also includes a complete bibliography of works by Hirst and a substantial set of references to his writing. (shrink)

Abstract Socrates, as an Athenian living in the 5th century BC, belonged to a very different world from that of 20th century Britain. However, his moral example and thought do not therefore become foreign. This is not only because the West is, as a matter of fact, heir to the influence of Plato. It is also because morality, like science, knows no boundaries; although in both cases cultural factors will affect understanding, interpretation, implications etc., morality, like science, soccer or anything (...) else must retain certain characteristics or become something different (rather than a different version of the same thing). Education is not the same thing as training, socialization, indoctrination, etc. This now familiar truth is in danger of losing its cutting edge. But people had better recognize the distinctions referred to by such terms and decide firmly what it is they want: do they in fact want moral education? Or is it rather effective training and socialization they require? I firmly champion moral education, albeit superimposed on a degree of moral training and socialization. But where does the provision of such a programme of moral upbringing leave the reality of competing/perhaps conflicting life styles and values, hostile and/or bad behaviour, racist attitudes etc.? It certainly does not solve our problems as, in this respect, they might be by more restrictive and totalitarian approaches, which are not open to us. However, it is a programme that seeks to provide understanding of both different traditions and the fact that vividly different practices, when they are moral practices, are merely different interpretations, given different circumstances, of essentially similar principles and conceptions of moral behaviour. Such understanding is a necessary condition of a situation in which people are both morally committed and able to tolerate diversity. It is to be preferred to, e.g., values clarification exercises, purely descriptive or historical accounts of moral belief, or confusion with religious education. (shrink)

Introduction I i Plato's critics The view that I shall put forward is that utilitarianism is the only acceptable ethical theory and that this was recognised ...