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  1. Robin Findlay Hendry (2012). Chemical Substances and the Limits of Pluralism. Foundations of Chemistry 14 (1):55-68.
    In this paper I investigate the relationship between vernacular kind terms and specialist scientific vocabularies. Elsewhere I have developed a defence of realism about the chemical elements as natural kinds. This defence depends on identifying the epistemic interests and theoretical conception of the elements that have suffused chemistry since the mid-eighteenth century. Because of this dependence, it is a discipline-specific defence, and would seem to entail important concessions to pluralism about natural kinds. I argue that making this kind of concession (...)
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  2. Robin Findlay Hendry (2010). Entropy and Chemical Substance. Philosophy of Science 77 (5):921-932.
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  3. Robin Findlay Hendry (2010). Emergence Vs. Reduction in Chemistry. In Cynthia Macdonald & Graham Macdonald (eds.), Emergence in Mind. Oup Oxford.
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  4. Robin Findlay Hendry & Darrell P. Rowbottom (2009). Dispositional Essentialism and the Necessity of Laws. Analysis 69 (4):668-677.
    We argue that the inference from dispositional essentialism about a property (in the broadest sense) to the metaphysical necessity of laws involving it is invalid. Let strict dispositional essentialism be any view according to which any given property’s dispositional character is precisely the same across all possible worlds. Clearly, any version of strict dispositional essentialism rules out worlds with different laws involving that property. Permissive dispositional essentialism is committed to a property’s identity being tied to its dispositional profile or causal (...)
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  5. Robin Findlay Hendry (2008). Two Conceptions of the Chemical Bond. Philosophy of Science 75 (5):909-920.
    In this article I sketch G. N. Lewis’s views on chemical bonding and Linus Pauling’s attempt to preserve Lewis’s insights within a quantum‐mechanical theory of the bond. I then set out two broad conceptions of the chemical bond, the structural and the energetic views, which differ on the extent in which they preserve anything like the classical chemical bond in the modern quantum‐mechanical understanding of molecular structure. †To contact the author, please write to: Department of Philosophy, Durham University, 50 Old (...)
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  6. Robin Findlay Hendry & Paul Needham (2007). Le Poidevin on the Reduction of Chemistry. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 58 (2):339 - 353.
    In this article we critically evaluate Robin Le Poidevin's recent attempt to set out an argument for the ontological reduction of chemistry independently of intertheoretic reduction. We argue, firstly, that the argument he envisages applies only to a small part of chemistry, and that there is no obvious way to extend it. We argue, secondly, that the argument cannot establish the reduction of chemistry, properly so called.
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  7. Robin Findlay Hendry (2006). Elements, Compounds and Other Chemical Kinds. Philosophy of Science 73 (5):864--875.
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  8. Robin Findlay Hendry (2006). Substantial Confusion. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 37 (2):322-336.
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  9. Robin Findlay Hendry (2005). Book Review: Jaap Van Brakel: Philosophy of Chemistry: Between the Manifest and the Scientific Image Leuven University Press, Leuven, 2000, XIV + 246 Pp., ISBN 90-5867-063-. [REVIEW] Foundations of Chemistry 7 (2):187-197.
  10. Robin Findlay Hendry (2005). Book Review: Jaap van Brakel: Leuven University Press, Leuven, 2000, Xiv+ 246 Pp., ISBN 90-5867-063-5. [REVIEW] Foundations of Chemistry 7 (2):187-197.
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  11. Robin Findlay Hendry (2005). Lavoisier and Mendeleev on the Elements. Foundations of Chemistry 7 (1):31-48.
    Lavoisier defined an element as a chemicalsubstance that cannot be decomposed usingcurrent analytical methods. Mendeleev saw anelement as a substance composed of atoms of thesame atomic weight. These `definitions' doquite different things: Lavoisier'sdistinguishes the elements from the compounds,so that the elements may form the basis of acompositional nomenclature; Mendeleev's offersa criterion of sameness and difference forelemental substances, while Lavoisier's doesnot. In this paper I explore the historical andtheoretical background to each proposal.Lavoisier's and Mendeleev's explicitconceptions of elementhood differed from eachother, and (...)
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  12. Robin Findlay Hendry (2004). The Physicists, the Chemists, and the Pragmatics of Explanation. Philosophy of Science 71 (5):1048-1059.
    In this paper I investigate two views of theoretical explanation in quantum chemistry, advocated by John Clarke Slater and Charles Coulson. Slater argued for quantum‐mechanical rigor, and the primacy of fundamental principles in models of chemical bonding. Coulson emphasized systematic explanatory power within chemistry, and continuity with existing chemical explanations. I relate these views to the epistemic contexts of their disciplines.
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  13. Robin Findlay Hendry (2001). Are Realism and Instrumentalism Methodologically Indifferent? Proceedings of the Philosophy of Science Association 2001 (3):S25-.
    Arthur Fine and André Kukla have argued that realism and instrumentalism are indifferent with respect to scientific practice. I argue that this claim is ambiguous. One interpretation is that for any practice, the fact that that practice yields predictively successful theories is evidentially indifferent between scientific realism and instrumentalism. On the second construal, the claim is that for any practice, adoption of that practice by a scientist is indifferent between their being a realist or instrumentalist. I argue that there are (...)
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  14. Robin Findlay Hendry (1998). Models and Approximations in Quantum Chemistry. Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 63:123-142.
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  15. Robin Findlay Hendry (1997). Review. [REVIEW] British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 48 (1):287-291.
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  16. Robin Findlay Hendry (1995). Realism and Progress: Why Scientists Should Be Realists. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 38:53-72.
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