Perhaps some simple change will do the trick, like relying less on insurance and employers as middlemen. But if we are willing to consider radical change, let me offer a different suggestion. We are buying the wrong thing. What we want is health, i.e., a long healthy life, but when we sit down and draw up a contract, what we buy is health care, i.e., a certain degree of attention from health care specialists.
The pace of scientific progress may be hindered by the tendency of our academic institutions to reward being popular, rather than being right. A market-based alternative, where scientists more formally "stake their reputation", is presented here. It offers clear incentives to be careful and honest while contributing to a visible, self-consistent consensus on controversial (or routine) scientific questions. In addition, it allows funders to choose questions to be researched without choosing people or methods. The bulk of this paper is spent (...) examining potential problems with the proposed approach. After this examination, the idea still seems plausible and worth further study. (shrink)
Until recently, technology has happened to allow for cheap wiretaps. New digital telephone technologies, however, may soon make wiretaps more difficult, and new encryption technologies may soon make them almost impossible. This may be good news to privacy buffs, but it worries U.S. police agencies -- since 1968 the law has explicitly allowed police wiretaps. And it worries U.S. spy agencies -- since 1978 the law has explicitly allowed them to wiretap foreigners.
People have long noticed that speculative markets, though created for other purposes, also do a great job of aggregating relevant information. In fact, it is hard to find information not embodied by such market prices. This is, in part, because anyone who finds such neglected information can profit by trading on it, thereby reducing the neglect.1 So far, speculative markets have done well in every known head-to-head field comparison with other forecasting institutions. Orange juice futures improved on National Weather Service (...) forecasts,2 horse race markets beat horse race experts,3 Oscar markets beat columnist forecasts,4 gas-demand markets beat gas-demand experts,5 stock markets beat the official NASA panel at fingering the guilty company in the Challenger accident,6 election markets beat national opinion polls,7 and corporate sales markets beat official corporate forecasts.8 Recently, some have considered creating new markets specifically to take.. (shrink)
What if we someday learn how to model small brain units, and so can "upload" ourselves into new computer brains? What if this happens before we learn how to make human-level artificial intelligences? The result could be a sharp transition to an upload-dominated world, with many dramatic consequences. In particular, fast and cheap replication may once again make Darwinian evolution of human values a powerful force in human history. With evolved values, most uploads would value life even when life is (...) hard or short, uploads would reproduce quickly, and wages would fall. But total wealth should rise, so we could all do better by accepting uploads, or at worse taxing them, rather than trying to delay or segregate them. (shrink)
A computer's task is often taken to be that of starting with some input, grinding for a while, and eventually returning an output. Remarkably, all such tasks can be accomplished "reversibly", with an arbitrarily low intrinsic entropy cost, and in reasonable space and time relative to irreversible approaches.
Economic growth is terribly important. Small differences in growth rates eventually overwhelm most other considerations, so the clustering and innovation externalities that create growth differences deserve far more public attention. Unfortunately most people yawn at growth theory; they prefer stories about conflict, status, moral fiber, heroes, and epic changes.
This paper presents an empirical analysis of the determinants of quantity of health insurance in the context of employer-based health insurance using the micro-level data from the 1987 National Medical Expenditure Survey (NMES). It extends the previous research by including additional factors in the analysis, which significantly affect health insurance offers by employers. This paper emphasizes two determinants of employers’ insurance offer decisions that are particularly relevant: union membership and selfinsured versus not self-insured health plans. The conducted empirical analysis reported (...) in this paper reveals the following predictors of higher health insurance coverage: union membership, not self-insured health plan(s), union membership in Midwest or South, as well as self-insured union membership. Further, other factors such as: age, male, income, for profit and other employer organizational forms, and firm’s size determine a higher level of health insurance. (shrink)
Humanity seems to have a bright future, i.e., a non-trivial chance of expanding to fill the universe with lasting life. But the fact that space near us seems dead now tells us that any given piece of dead matter faces an astronomically low chance of begating such a future. There thus exists a great filter between death and expanding lasting life, and humanity faces the ominous question: how far along this filter are we?
Hypertext publishing, the integration of a large body (perhaps billions) of public writings into a unified hypertext environment, will require the simultaneous solution of problems involving very wide database distribution, royalties, freedom of speech, and privacy. This paper describes these problems and presents, for criticism and discussion, an abstract design which seems to solve many of them. This design, called LinkText, is presented both as a specification and as design approaches grouped around various levels of electronic publishing.
Engineers’ love of technology often gets in the way of their being useful. Consider Post-it Notes or, better yet, plain paper notepads. These probably seemed like trivial ideas, but they turned out to be terribly useful. Why? Because the marvel that is the human brain has a horrible short-term memory, which means that dumb-as-dirt memory aids can make people substantially smarter.
Are you fascinated by some basic questions about science, technology, and our future? Questions like: Is cryonics technically feasible? When will nanoassemblers be feasible and how quickly will resulting changes come? Does a larger population help or hinder the world environment and economy? Will uploading be possible, and if so when? When can I live in space? Where will I be able to live free from tyranny? When will A.I.s be bucking for my job? Is there intelligent life beyond earth? (...) If you are like most Extropy readers, such question matter to you. Now how do we, as a society, go about answering such questions? People who have an appropriate background, and who are interested enough in a particular question, can research that subject in depth themselves, and come to a considered opinion. And people who happen to know, respect, and trust such a person can simply take those opinions as their own, avoiding all the hard work. But what is everyone else to do, people whose actions often implicitly depend on such questions? In practice, people usually defer to larger social institutions on most questions, institutions which combine and evaluate contributions from many specialists, and which offer apparent institutional consensus estimates on many different questions. (shrink)
We study experimental markets where privately informed traders exchange simple assets, and where uninformed third parties are asked to forecast the values of these assets, guided only by market prices. Although prices only partially aggregate information, they significantly improve the forecasts of third parties. In a second treatment, a portion of traders are given preferences over the forecasts made by observers. Although we find evidence that these traders attempt to manipulate prices in order to influence the beliefs of observers, we (...) find no evidence that observers make less accurate forecasts as a result. (shrink)
While a simple information market lets one trade on the probability of each value of a single variable, a full combinatorial information market lets one trade on any combination of values of a set of variables, including any conditional or joint probability. In laboratory experiments, we compare the accuracy of simple markets, two kinds of combinatorial markets, a call market and a market maker, isolated individuals who report to a scoring rule, and two ways to combine those individual reports into (...) a group prediction. We consider two environments with asymmetric information on sparsely correlated binary variables, one with three subjects and three variables, and the other with six subjects and eight variables (and so 256 states). (shrink)
Prediction markets are low volume speculative markets whose prices offer informative forecasts on particular policy topics. Observers worry that traders may attempt to mislead decision makers by manipulating prices. We adapt a Kyle-style market microstructure model to this case, adding a manipulator with an additional quadratic preference regarding the price. In this model, when other traders are uncertain about the manipulator’s target price, the mean target price has no effect on prices, and increases in the variance of the target price (...) can increase average price accuracy, by increasing the returns to informed trading and thereby incentives for traders to become informed. (shrink)
Compared with non-union workers, union workers take more of their compensation in the form of insurance. This may be because unions choose democratically, and democratic choice mitigates adverse selection in group insurance. Relative to individually-purchased insurance, we show that group insurance chosen by an ideal profit-maximizing employer can be worse for every employee, while group insurance chosen democratically can be much better. The reason is that democracy can fail to represent the preferences of almost half the group.
Consider a health policy issue like child car seats in the U.S., mosquito netting in the third world, preschool education for poor children, or the immunization of immigrants. Imagine that for this issue there were many good studies over several decades, including some recent studies. Imagine that after controlling for many factors, these studies usually found that variations in spending or usage were significantly, substantially, and positively related to variations in health. Furthermore, imagine this result was confirmed by a thirty (...) year old randomized experiment. (shrink)
This explains how to smoothly integrate booked orders with a combinatorial market maker, all for the general case of bets on E[x|A] for arbitrary random variables x and sets A.
Attempts to model interstellar colonization may seem hopelessly compromised by uncertainties regarding the technologies and preferences of advanced civilizations. If light speed limits travel speeds, however, then a selection effect may eventually determine frontier behavior. Making weak assumptions about colonization technology, we use this selection effect to predict colonists’ behavior, including which oases they colonize, how long they stay there, how many seeds they then launch, how fast and far those seeds fly, and how behavior changes with increasing congestion. This (...) colonization model explains several astrophysical puzzles, predicting lone oases like ours, amid large quiet regions with vast unused resources. (shrink)
We study experimental markets where privately informed traders exchange simple assets, and where uninformed third parties are asked to forecast the values of these assets, guided only by market prices. Although prices only partially aggregate information, they significantly improve the forecasts of third parties. In a second treatment, a portion of traders are given preferences over the forecasts made by observers. Although we find evidence that these traders attempt to manipulate prices in order to influence the beliefs of observers, we (...) find no evidence that observers make less accurate forecasts as a result. (shrink)
In a simple model of conflict, two agents fight over a fixed prize, and how hard they fight depends on what they believe about their abilities. To this model I add “preagents,” representing parents, leaders, or natural selection, who choose each agent’s confidence in his ability. Depending on the reason for such confidence, I find five different patterns in how confidence varies with ability. Agents who estimate their ability with error have under-confidence when ability is high and over-confidence when ability (...) is low, while strategic commitment incentives induce the opposite pattern. Agents who misjudge their value for the prize, relative to their cost of effort, induce an overor under-confidence that is independent of ability, while cooperating pre-agents choose extreme under-confidence. Agents who use confidence to signal ability have a relatively uniform over-confidence. (shrink)
Humans have slowly built more productive societies by slowly acquiring various kinds of capital, and by carefully matching them to each other. Because disruptions can disturb this careful matching, and discourage social coordination, large disruptions can cause a “social collapse,” i.e., a reduction in productivity out of proportion to the disruption. For many types of disasters, severity seems to follow a power law distribution. For some of types, such as wars and earthquakes, most of the expected harm is predicted to (...) occur in extreme events, which kill most people on Earth. So if we are willing to worry about any war or earthquake, we should worry especially about extreme versions. If individuals varied little in their resistance to such disruptions, events a little stronger than extreme ones would eliminate humanity, and our only hope would be to prevent such events. If individuals vary a lot in their resistance, however, then it may pay to increase the variance in such resistance, such as by creating special sanctuaries from which the few remaining humans could rebuild society. (shrink)
In their article, McKelvey and Page note that In previous experimental work, ... [researchers] investigated how individuals use public information to augment their original private information, and whether in doing so, a rational expectations equilibrium is attained. ... [But either] the inference processes are complicated because of the enormous number of potential interactions among the individuals, and the optimal inference processes are not analyzed. ... [or] the inference process is analyzed but the working assumption is not altogether satisfactory.
In Everett’s many-worlds interpretation, where quantum measurements are seen as decoherence events, inexact decoherence may let large worlds mangle the memories of observers in small worlds, creating a cutoff in observable world measure. I solve a growth–drift–diffusion–absorption model of such a mangled worlds scenario, and show that it reproduces the Born probability rule closely, though not exactly. Thus, inexact decoherence may allow the Born rule to be derived in a many-worlds approach via world counting, using a finite number of worlds (...) and no new fundamental physics. (shrink)
Genie nanotech, space colonies, Turing-test A.I., a local singularity, crypto credentials, and private law are all dreams of a future where some parts of the world economy and society have an unusually low level of dependence on the rest of the world. But it is the worldwide division of labor that has made us humans rich, and I suspect we won't let it go for a long time to come.
Descriptors: coordination, autonomy, actions, beliefs Abstract Distributing authority among autonomous agents can induce inconsistency costs if the agents act as if they disagree. If we define an agent’s “marginal beliefs” to be the odds at which it is willing to make bets, we find that a betting market can induce agents to act as if they almost agree, not only with respect to the bets they offer but also other actions they take. In a particular “Mars mining” scenario, I explicitly (...) show how utility maximizing agents, who are autonomous and hence distrust each other, can discover a common consensus and take concrete physical actions as if they agreed with that consensus, lowering costs to the group as a whole. Though limited, the approach has also has many unexplored possibilities. A previous version of this paper was presented at the IJCAI-91 Workshop on Reasoning in Adversarial Domains (This version is missing some cites and the graphics.). (shrink)
A simple exogenous growth model gives conservative estimates of the economic implications of machine intelligence. Machines complement human labor when they become more productive at the jobs they perform, but machines also substitute for human labor by taking over human jobs. At first, expensive hardware and software does only the few jobs where computers have the strongest advantage over humans. Eventually, computers do most jobs. At first, complementary effects dominate, and human wages rise with computer productivity. But eventually substitution can (...) dominate, making wages fall as fast as computer prices now do. An intelligence population explosion makes per-intelligence consumption fall this fast, while economic growth rates rise by an order of magnitude or more. These results are robust to automating incrementally, and to distinguishing hardware, software, and human capital from other forms of capital. (shrink)
Since utilities and probabilities jointly determine choices, event-dependent utilities complicate the elicitation of subjective event probabilities. However, for the usual purpose of obtaining the information embodied in agent beliefs, it is sufficient to elicit objective probabilities, i.e., probabilities obtained by updating a known common prior with that agent’s further information. Bayesians who play a Nash equilibrium of a certain insurance game before they obtain relevant information will afterward act regarding lottery ticket payments as if they had event-independent risk-neutral utility and (...) a known common prior. Proper scoring rules paid in lottery tickets can then elicit objective probabilities. (shrink)
Humans lie and deceive themselves, and often choose beliefs for reasons other than how closely those beliefs approximate truth. This is mainly why we disagree. Three future trends may reduce these epistemic vices. First, increased documentation and surveillance should make it harder to lie and self-deceive about the patterns of our lives. Second, speculative markets can create a relatively unbiased consensus on most debated topics in science, business, and policy. Third, brain modifications may allow our minds to be more transparent, (...) so that lies and self-deception become harder to hide. In evaluating these trends, we should be wary of moral arrogance. (shrink)
Humans clearly have trouble thinking about death. This trouble is often used to explain behavior like delay in writing wills or buying life insurance, or interest in odd medical and religious beliefs. But the problem is far worse than most people imagine. Fear of death makes us spend fifteen percent of our income on medicine, from which we get little or no health benefit, while we neglect things like exercise, which offer large health benefits.
Being read is not the same as being believed. Most reviewers have praised the book as original, well-written, thought-provoking, etc., and then gone on to take issue with one or more of Penrose's main theses. Penrose seems unfamiliar with the existing literature in cognitive science, philosophy of mind, and AI. The handful of reviewers who agree with Penrose don't seem to have paid much attention to his specific arguments - they always thought AI was bogus. See, for example, the 37 (...) reviews in Behavioral and Brain Sciences (BBS), Dec. 1990, V13, pp.643-705. (shrink)
People love to pretend, and to watch others pretending. From story-telling to plays to movies to virtual reality, we keep getting better at making people feel like they are watching imagined places and events. We also keep getting better at role-playing, i.e., creating enviroments where several people can see what happens when they all pretend they are different people in another time and place. Eventually such role-playing simulations may get so good that people will often forget that it is just (...) a simulation. (shrink)
He who pays the piper calls the tune, but he can only succesfully call for a tune that he will recognize upon hearing. Previous models, of two candidates impressing a voter and of firm managers impressing stock speculators, found experts ignoring costly superior information in favor of client preconceptions. Similar result hold when we greatly generalize the agents, choices, information structures, and preferences. When experts must pay to acquire information, have no intrinsic interest in client topics, and can coordinate to (...) acquire the same information, no expert ever pays to know more than any client will know when rewarding those experts. (shrink)
Prediction markets are increasingly being considered as methods for gathering, summarizing and aggregating diffuse information by governments and businesses alike. Critics worry that these markets are susceptible to price manipulation by agents who wish to distort decision making. We study the effect of manipulators on an experimental market, and find that manipulators are unable to distort price accuracy. Subjects without manipulation incentives compensate for the bias in offers from manipulators by setting a different threshold at which they are willing to (...) accept trades. (shrink)
Economic growth is determined by the supply and demand of investment capital; technology determines the demand for capital, while human nature determines the supply. The supply curve has two distinct parts, giving the world economy two distinct modes. In the familiar slow growth mode, rates of return are limited by human discount rates. In the fast growth mode, investment is limited by the world's wealth. Historical trends suggest that we may transition to the fast mode in roughly another century and (...) a half. (shrink)
Even outside of games, a wide range of otherwise puzzling common intuitions about fairness can be understood if the fundamental "game" of life is seen as wooing, i.e., attracting mates by showing that you have fit genes. The fairest social institutions are then those in which success correlates as much as possible with genetic fitness.
Given common priors, no agent can publicly estimate a non-zero sign for the difference between his estimate and another agent’s future estimate. Thus rational agents cannot publicly anticipate the direction in which other agents will disagree with them. 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
"Reading the Future" featured thoughtful and piquant articles by intelligent, knowledgeable, and articulate authors. Still, one cannot help noting that the authors who specialize in future studies were careful not to make any predictions, while the others, knowing that a methodological review of their accuracy is unlikely, made dramatic, thought-provoking predictions that center on current concerns.
Salop’s “Circular City” model of spatial competition is generalized to higher dimensions, and to “transportation” costs which are a power of distance. Assuming free entry, mill pricing is compared to location-based price discrimination. For dimensions above one, there is some too little entry below some cutoff power, and too much entry above it. This cutoff cost-power rises with dimension, and is larger under price discrimination. Mill pricing induces more entry for powers of four or less, and less entry for powers (...) of five or more. Overall, too much entry seems a more severe problem, which tends to price discrimination. (shrink)
My horoscope today says, “Focus on the small stuff.” Now, such advice does have content. It predicts that when readers interpret its words in the usual way as a guide to action, those who do what they think it recommends will, on average, feel they got more of what they wanted than those who ignored it. Even so, astrologers sure don’t make it easy for us to test their claims. If they wanted to make it easier, they would do what (...) forecasters in weather, sports, and business do: issue forecasts in a clear, standardized form. A horoscope is like a weather forecast that says, “Some rain likely nearby, soon.” It’s much easier to evaluate a forecast that a particular rain gauge has a.. (shrink)
A world product time series covering two million years is well fit by either a sum of four exponentials, or a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) combination of three exponential growth modes: “hunting,” “farming,” and “industry.” The CES parameters suggest that farming substituted for hunting, while industry complemented farming, making the industrial revolution a smoother transition. Each mode grew world product by a factor of a few hundred, and grew a hundred times faster than its predecessor. This weakly suggests that (...) within the next century a new mode might appear with a doubling time measured in days, not years. (shrink)
It is said you can trap a monkey by putting a nut through a small hole in a gourd. The monkey reaches in and grabs the nut, but then his fist won’t fit back through the hole. Greedy monkeys will literally let themselves be caught rather than let go of the nut. So far, no commenter on my essay seems willing to let go of the nut of effective medicine, held in the gourd of the second half of medical spending.
In practice, scoring rules elicit good probability estimates from individuals, while betting markets elicit good consensus estimates from groups. Market scoring rules combine these features, eliciting estimates from individuals or groups, with groups costing no more than individuals. Regarding a bet on one event given another event, only logarithmic versions preserve the probability of the given event. Logarithmic versions also preserve the conditional probabilities of other events, and so preserve conditional independence relations. Given logarithmic rules that elicit relative probabilities of (...) base event pairs, it costs no more to elicit estimates on all combinations of these base events. (shrink)
If we are not to conclude that most planets like Earth have evolved life as intelligent as we are, we must presume Earth is not random. This selection effect, however, also implies that the origin of life need not be as easy as the early appearance of life on Earth suggests. If a series of major evolutionary transitions were required to produce intelligent life, selection implies that a subset of these were “critical steps,” with durations that are similarly distributed. The (...) time remaining from now until simple life is no longer possible on Earth must also be similarly distributed. I show how these results provide timing tests to constrain models of critical evolutionary transitions. (shrink)
Why do we regulate the substances we can ingest, the advisors we can hear, and the products we can buy far more than similarly-important non-health choices? I review many possible arguments for such paternalistic policies, as well many possible holes in such arguments. I argue we should either be clearer about what justifies our paternalism, or we should back off and be less paternalistic.
Why are boards so slow to fire the chief? One reason is that they don't have enough skin in the game. They own few shares and therefore don't feel obligated to protect their investment from an out-of-touch boss. Besides, most of them owe their cushy jobs to the chief executive.
Since market scoring rules have become popular as a form of market maker, it seems worth reviewing just what such mechanisms are intended to do. The main function performed by most market makers is to serve as an intermediary between people who prefer to trade at different times. Traders who have the same favorite times to trade can show up together to an ordinary continuous double auction, and then make and accept offers to trade. But when traders have different favorite (...) times, a market maker can help them by first making offers that some of them will accept, and then later making opposite offers which others will accept. By adjusting prices in his favor, a market maker can even profit from providing this service. By making offers, however, a market maker opens himself up to the risk of losing to informed traders who know more than he about asset values. It is a complex and difficult task to choose the price and duration of offers in order to profit the most from intermediary trades while suffering the least from informed trades. This task requires subtle judgments about the relative fraction of informed and intermediary trades at different times, prices, quantities, and trading histories. No simple algorithm could reasonably claim to do this task optimally. Very active markets have little need for market makers, as anyone can trade at anytime. In markets with large but sporadic trades, a human will likely find it profitable to apply their considerable intelligence to the complex task of market making. The question is what to do for smaller less-active markets, which cannot afford such human attention. Trading may simply not happen there if no intermediary can be found to make such markets. A computer program with less than human intelligence that attempts to make markets runs the risk of being out-smarted by human traders. Humans might even figure out how to turn that program into a money pump, giving up cash each time it is run through some cycle of trades.. (shrink)
Before an election, two candidates choose policies which are lotteries over electionday distributive positions. I find conditions under which there exist mixed-strategy probabilistic-voting equilibria which are independent, treating voter groups independently.
Arthur Diamond comments that "it is not clear how a donor distributes money through Hanson's market". Let me try again to be clear. Imagine David Levy were to seek funding for the regression he suggests in his comments, on the relative impact of sports versus science spending on aggregate productivity. Consider what might happen under three different funding institutions.
Imagine two people share a secret which would hurt them each $1000 worth if it got out. You offer to pay them each $1 to (verifiably) tell you their secret. If this is a one-shot simultaneous game, there are two pure-strategy equilibria: one where they both tell and another where neither of them tell. But since the no-tell equilibria makes them both better off, your chances aren’t good.
This paper describes a Bayesian method for constructing a super-resolved surface model by combining information from a set of images of the given surface. We develop the theory and algorithms in detail for the 2-D reconstruction problem, appropriate for the case where all images are taken from roughly the same direction and under similar lighting conditions. We show the results of this 2-D reconstruction on Viking Martian data. These results show dramatic improvements in both spatial and gray-scale resolution. The Bayesian (...) approach uses a neighbor correlation model as well as pixel data from the image set. Some extensions of this method are discussed, including 3-D surface reconstruction and the resolution of diffraction blurred images. (shrink)
Human behavior regarding medicine seems strange; assumptions and models that seem workable in other areas seem less so in medicine. Perhaps we need to rethink the basics. Toward this end, I have collected many puzzling stylized facts about behavior regarding medicine, and have sought a small number of simple assumptions which might together account for as many puzzles as possible.
Technologists think about specific future technologies, which they may foresee in some detail. Unfortunately, such technologists then mostly use amateur intuitions about the social world to predict the broader social implications of these technologies. This makes it hard for technologists to identify the technologies which will have the largest social impact.
"Follow the money" has been the operational rule for historians and investigative journalists since at least the Watergate era, if not earlier. Futurists do not have a money trail to follow, but instead must predict the trajectory of economic relations based on assumptions of what technological and social developments the future may hold. Many futurists assume that nanotechnology in combination with Artificial Intelligence (AI) will yield a world of material abundance with little or no need for human labor. The nano/AI (...) cornucopia will rain down wealth upon one and all, giving slackers and solid workaholics equal access to almost anything they could ever need or want. But is this really the most likely scenario? (shrink)
A postcard summary of life, the universe and everything might go as follows. The universe appeared and started expanding. Life appeared somewhere and then on Earth began making larger and smarter animals. Humans appeared and became smarter and more numerous, by inventing language, farming, industry, and computers.
In standard belief models, priors are always common knowledge. This prevents such models from representing agents’ probabilistic beliefs about the origins of their priors. By embedding standard models in a larger standard model, however, pre-priors can describe such beliefs. When an agent’s prior and pre-prior are mutually consistent, he must believe that his prior would only have been different in situations where relevant event chances were different, but that variations in other agents’ priors are otherwise completely unrelated to which events (...) are how likely. Due to this, Bayesians who agree enough about the origins of their priors must have the same priors. (shrink)
The Matrix is a story of AIs who keep humans as slaves, by keeping them in a dream world, and of rebels who fight to teach people this truth and destroy this dream world. But we humans are today slaves to alien hyper-rational entities who care little about us, and who distract us with a dream world. We do not want to know this truth, and if anything fight to preserve our dream world. Go figure.
Extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence. But on uninteresting topics, surprising claims usually are surprising evidence; we rarely make claims without suffi- cient evidence. On interesting topics, however, we can have interests in exaggerating or downplaying our evidence, and our actions often deviate from our interests. In a simple model of noisy humans reporting on extraordinary evidence, we find that extraordinary claims from low noise people are extraordinary evidence, but such claims from high noise people are not; their claims are more (...) likely unusual noise than unusual truth. When people are organized into a reporting chain, noise levels grow exponentially with chain length; long chains seem incapable of communicating extraordinary evidence. (shrink)
One explanation for drug bans is that regulators know more than consumers about product quality. But why not just communicate the information in their ban, perhaps via a “would have banned” label?Because product labeling is cheap-talk, any small market failure tempts regulators to lie about quality, inducing consumers who suspect such lies to not believe everything they are told. In fact, when regulators expect market failures to result in under-consumption of a drug, and so would not ban it for informed (...) consumers, regulators ex ante prefer to commit to not banning this drug for uninformed consumers. (shrink)
You are in a grocery store, and thinking of buying some meat. You think you know what buying and eating this meat would mean for your taste buds, your nutrition, and your pocketbook, and let's assume that on those grounds it looks like a good deal. But now you want to think about the..
Will we have more or fewer deadly wars in the new few decades? Until recently it has been very hard to say much about what makes wars more more frequent or deadly. It doesn't seem to have much to do with levels or changes in population density, whether the economy is booming, how dependent a nation is on trade, or on the number of great powers around. Wars seems only weakly if at all correlated across space and time, seeming for (...) example to be a bit more deadly when they are less frequent. More democratic nations may if anything be more likely to fight wars, though perhaps they less often fight each other, and perhaps join wars more often just after an election [1]. (shrink)
In Everett’s many worlds interpretation, quantum measurements are considered to be decoherence events. If so, then inexact decoherence may allow large worlds to mangle the memory of observers in small worlds, creating a cutoff in observable world size. Smaller world are mangled and so not observed. If this cutoff is much closer to the median measure size than to the median world size, the distribution of outcomes seen in unmangled worlds follows the Born rule. Thus deviations from exact decoherence can (...) allow the Born rule to be derived via world counting, with a finite number of worlds and no new fundamental physics. (shrink)
Yes, relative to the status quo. But the role of health policy experts is not to say what policies we personally favor, but rather to make policy consequences clear to the public. Once we tell the public that such a policy would not much harm the health of the non-low-income, then it is up to them to decide if they want to use the savings to subsidize low-income coverage.
Consider two agents who want to be Bayesians with a common prior, but who cannot due to computational limitations. If these agents agree that their estimates are consistent with certain easy-to-compute consistency constraints, then they can agree to disagree about any random variable only if they also agree to disagree, to a similar degree and in a stronger sense, about an average error. Yet average error is a state-independent random variable, and one agent's estimate of it is also agreed to (...) be state-independent. Thus suggests that disagreements are not fundamentally due to differing information about the state of the world. (shrink)
There is a widespread feeling that health is special; the rules that are usually used in other policy areas are not applied in health policy. Health economists, for example, tend to be reluctant to offer economists’ usual prescription of competition and consumer choice, even though they have largely failed to justify this reluctance by showing that health economics involves special features such as public goods, externalities, adverse selection, poor consumer information, or unusually severe consequences. Similarly, while some philosophers argue for (...) bioethical conclusions based on very general ethical intuitions,1 many others rely on moral intuitions that are specific to health and medicine to draw conclusions that are meant to apply mainly in health and medicine. For example, many authors appear to start from the strong moral intuition that it typically seems wrong to deny poor people access to health care, and then seek moral principles that can both account for such intuitions and justify the claim that people have some sort of right to health care.2 In metaethics, opinions on moral intuitions range from an extreme intuitionism, which accepts all case-specific moral intuitions at face value as reliable moral guides, to an extreme foundationalism, which rejects such intuitions as evidence regarding correct general moral principles. Between these extremes, opinions vary on how severe the errors in our moral intuitions are. The practice of bioethics seems to favor the extreme intuitionist end of this spectrum, and thus implicitly expects mild errors.3 In contrast, this essay will suggest that common practice in bioethics has seriously underestimated the errors in our moral intuitions. In this essay, I consider the evolutionary origin of our moral intuitions, but avoid the extreme positions of moral skepticism and “whatever evolved must be good,” both of which are commonly associated with evolution-. (shrink)
Given a finite state space and common priors, common knowledge of the identity of an agent with the minimal (or maximal) expectation of a random variable implies âconsensusâ, i.e., common knowledge of common expectations. This âextremistâ statistic induces consensus when repeatedly announced, and yet, with n agents, requires at most log2n bits to broadcast.
Heavy reliance is currently placed on various forms of peer review to promote the growth of basic knowledge [1]. How well do these various forms of peer review promote such growth and how well do our current institutions compare, as systems of incentives and communication, with the many alternative mechanisms used by different cultures across the centuries? Many of these alternatives, such as simple prizes, rely much less on peer review.
Abstract The pace of scientific progress may be hindered by the tendency of our academic institutions to reward being popular rather than being right. A market?based alternative, where scientists can more formally ?stake their reputation?, is presented here. It offers clear incentives to be careful and honest while contributing to a visible, self?consistent consensus on controversial (or routine) scientific questions. In addition, it allows patrons to choose questions to be researched without choosing people or methods. The bulk of this paper (...) is spent in examining potential problems with the proposed approach. After this examination, the idea still seems to be plausible and worthy of further study. (shrink)
We are economists with a long-standing interest in evolutionary psychology, who recently came to appreciate the rich collections of relevant data cultural anthropologists have spent decades collecting on the social environments of a wide range of human societies. While we found some systematic collections of these observations, we could not find a systematic summary of the social environment of the subsample of societies that most resemble the social environment where most human psychology seems to have evolved: small bands of nomadic (...) foragers. This short paper therefore represents our attempt to create such a summary. Using an existing dataset aggregated from diverse ethnographies, we collect statistics on the social environment of the studied cultures which most closely resemble our hunter-gatherer ancestors. Compared with relatively modern societies, nomadic foragers had similar levels of food and disease, and less murder and suicide. They did not fight over land or resources, and they enforced justice directly and personally. They avoided class divisions like rich vs. poor, shared food more, and their leaders had no formal powers. Polygamy, premarital sex, and extramarital sex were all widespread, divorce was easy, and men and women were generally considered equal. Kids were taught to be more generous, trusting, and honest, and were never punished physically. (shrink)
