"In this paper, I explore the ways that phenomenological concepts like intercorporeality and mutual incorporation offer new tools in trying to make sense of human experiences via mediating systems. In particular, I think about how the COVID-19 pandemic hastened a large population into mediated interactions, and what is lost, perhaps contingently or perhaps intrinsically, when human experiences are mediated in this way. I look to research in presence, skillful interaction, and enactive social cognition to argue that there remains something ineffable (...) or at least extremely hard to pin down about intercorporeality, and embodied togetherness has not yet been replicated in the mediating systems we currently embrace. Keywords: intercorporeality, participatory sense-making, mediating technologies, presence. ". (shrink)

Philosophical Psychology, Volume 0, Issue 0, Page 1-5, Ahead of Print.

This book surveys and examines the most famous philosophical arguments against building a machine with human-level intelligence. From claims and counter-claims about the ability to implement consciousness, rationality, and meaning, to arguments about cognitive architecture, the book presents a vivid history of the clash between the philosophy and AI. Tellingly, the AI Wars are mostly quiet now. Explaining this crucial fact opens new paths to understanding the current resurgence AI (especially, deep learning AI and robotics), what happens when philosophy meets (...) science, and the role of philosophy in the culture in which it is embedded. -/- Organising the arguments into four core topics - 'Is AI possible', 'Architectures of the Mind', 'Mental Semantics and Mental Symbols' and 'Rationality and Creativity' - this book shows the debate that played out between the philosophers on both sides of the question, and, as well, the debate between philosophers and AI scientists and engineers building AI systems. Up-to-date and forward-looking, the book is packed with fresh insights and supporting material, including: -/- - Accessible introductions to each war, explaining the background behind the main arguments against AI - Each chapter details what happened in the AI wars, the legacy of the attacks, and what new controversies are on the horizon. - Extensive bibliography of key readings. (shrink)

In the seventy years since AI became a field of study, the theoretical work of philosophers has played increasingly important roles in understanding many aspects of the AI project, from the metaphysics of mind and what kinds of systems can or cannot implement them, the epistemology of objectivity and algorithmic bias, the ethics of automation, drones, and specific implementations of AI, as well as analyses of AI embedded in social contexts (for example). Serious scholarship in AI ethics sometimes quotes Asimov’s (...) speculative laws of robotics as if they were genuine proposals, and yet Lem remains historically undervalued as a theorist who uses fiction as his vehicle. Here, I argue that Lem’s fiction (in particular his fiction about robots) is overlooked but highly nuanced philosophy of AI, and that we should recognize the lessons he tried to offer us, which focused on the human and social failures rather than technological breakdowns. Stories like “How the World Was Saved” and “Upside Down Evolution” ask serious philosophical questions about AI metaphysics and ethics, and offer insightful answers that deserve more attention. Highlighting some of this work from The Cyberiad and the stories in Mortal Engines in particular, I argue that the time has never been more appropriate to attend to his philosophy in light of the widespread technological and social failures brought about by the quest for artificial intelligence. In service of this argument, I discuss some of the history and philosophical debates around AI in the last decades, as well as contemporary events that illustrate Lem’s strongest claims in critique of the human side of AI. (shrink)

Notions of human nature and what is natural are vague and contradictory within the field of bioethics, especially evident through individuals critical of bodily diversity through nanobiology and biotechnology in general. This paper discusses the paradoxical aspects of these notions of human nature, while showing that they rely on a notion of a standard body that all humans allegedly share. I examine several writings on biotechnology by bioethicists, specifically by people working in policy—it is here that the normativity of human (...) nature becomes a pressing concern. Once it has been shown that there is no standard body, and indeed typical bioethical notions of human nature are internally contradictory, a more productive conversation can be engaged in that allows for morphological diversity, be it through biotechnological change or via nature itself. (shrink)

Notions of human nature and what is natural are vague and contradictory within the field of bioethics, especially evident through individuals critical of bodily diversity through nanobiology and biotechnology in general. This paper discusses the paradoxical aspects of these notions of human nature, while showing that they rely on a notion of a standard body that all humans allegedly share. I examine several writings on biotechnology by bioethicists, specifically by people working in policy—it is here that the normativity of human (...) nature becomes a pressing concern. Once it has been shown that there is no standard body, and indeed typical bioethical notions of human nature are internally contradictory, a more productive conversation can be engaged in that allows for morphological diversity, be it through biotechnological change or via nature itself. (shrink)

Cognitive science is undergoing a rebirth, overturning much of the traditional thought established by people like Chomsky and Newell and Simon. This second-generation thought, exemplified by people like Clark, Lakoff, and Johnson, is pursuing the same project as the traditional thinkers, but with evolutionary considerations. This revision of cognitive science can trace its roots back to the American Pragmatists, while still attending to even the most recent work in neuroscience and evolutionary psychology. If one takes this embodied, evolutionary story seriously, (...) we can eliminate many of the oppressive problems that plague cognitive science, including those surrounding qualia, intelligence, and even consciousness. (shrink)

Our human forms of embodiment, the many various ways real bodies appear in the real world, structure our experiences, memories, thoughts, and language in ways both subtle and important. On The Good Place, we have bodies in the afterlife, and they must be real enough that they can be filled with pins and butthole spiders. Researchers recognized the importance of having a body in the real world as a method of building artificial intelligence (AI). Throughout the first three seasons of (...) The Good Place, Janet herself recognizes the ways she is changing. The change is subtle early on, so it's easy to continue to see her as the Busty Alexa that Eleanor sees at first. Janet is a refreshing way to think about AI going forward. She is a model for how AI researchers ought to think about the emergence of mind, thoughts and feelings that a system previously lacked. (shrink)

In this paper, I will be arguing that the most recent incarnation of AI research -- that of embodied robotics and situated cognition -- demonstrates a strict and remarkable parallel with the work of mid-century French phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and that through this parallel we see demonstration and confirmation of ideas about minds, bodies, and what Merleau-Ponty often called a 'dialogue with the world'. Seeing these theories confirmed in AI research will ultimately provide us with evidence that suggests our traditional (...) understanding of minds as these isolated entities shuffling symbolic representations around in the absence of interaction is simply absurd, and in fact dialogue itself comes first -- dialogue with others and dialogue with the world itself. (shrink)