Questions about perception remain some of the most difficult and insoluble in both epistemology and in the philosophy of mind. This controversial but highly accessible introduction to the area explores the philosophical importance of those questions by re-examining what had until recent times been the most popular theory of perception - the sense-datum theory. Howard Robinson surveys the history of the arguments for and against the theory from Descartes to Husserl. He then shows that the objections to the theory, particularly (...) Wittgenstein's attack on privacy and those of the physicalists, have been unsuccessful. He argues that we should return to the theory sense-data in order to understand perception. In doing so he seeks to overturn a consensus that has dominated the philosophy of perception for nearly half a century. (shrink)

The assumption of materialism Howard Robinson believes is false.

In this paper, I suggest that, if we are committed to accepting a threshold approach to personhood, according to which all beings above the threshold are persons with equal moral status, there are strong reasons to also recognise a second threshold that would be reached through human pregnancy, and that would confer on pregnant women a temporary superior moral status. This proposal is not based on the moral status of the fetus, but on the moral status of the pregnant woman. (...) It is not only the fetus which is an organism sui generis: the pregnant woman, also, is a unique being. Following almost any view on the moral status of the fetus, the pregnant woman should be regarded, herself, as more than a singular individual. She is, herself, ‘more than one’. Pregnant women are also necessary for the continued survival of the human species, and there are important justice-based reasons to recognise the higher status. Furthermore, the recognition of a superior moral status for pregnant women does not imply that pregnancy should always be viewed as desirable, or imply any position on the permissibility of abortion. My proposal is not as radical as it might seem, as it does not require that pregnant women should always receive superior treatment, but only that they should to some extent. It could have a range of potential positive practical consequences. Finally, my approach does not threaten, but rather promotes, human equality. (shrink)

This entry concerns dualism in the philosophy of mind. The term ‘dualism’ has a variety of uses in the history of thought. In general, the idea is that, for some particular domain, there are two fundamental kinds or categories of things or principles. In theology, for example a ‘dualist’ is someone who believes that Good and Evil — or God and the Devil — are independent and more or less equal forces in the world. Dualism contrasts with monism, which is (...) the theory that there is only one fundamental kind, category of thing or principle; and, rather less commonly, with pluralism, which is the view that there are many kinds or categories. In the philosophy of mind, dualism is the theory that the mental and the physical — or mind and body or mind and brain — are, in some sense, radically different kinds of thing. Because common sense tells us that there are physical bodies, and because there is intellectual pressure towards producing a unified view of the world, one could say that materialist monism is the ‘default option’. Discussion about dualism, therefore, tends to start from the assumption of the reality of the physical world, and then to consider arguments for why the mind cannot be treated as simply part of that world. (shrink)

This entry concerns dualism in the philosophy of mind. The term ‘dualism’ has a variety of uses in the history of thought. In general, the idea is that, for some particular domain, there are two fundamental kinds or categories of things or principles. In theology, for example a ‘dualist’ is someone who believes that Good and Evil — or God and the Devil — are independent and more or less equal forces in the world. Dualism contrasts with monism, which is (...) the theory that there is only one fundamental kind, category of thing or principle; and, rather less commonly, with pluralism, which is the view that there are many kinds or categories. In the philosophy of mind, dualism is the theory that the mental and the physical — or mind and body or mind and brain — are, in some sense, radically different kinds of thing. Because common sense tells us that there are physical bodies, and because there is intellectual pressure towards producing a unified view of the world, one could say that materialist monism is the ‘default option’. Discussion about dualism, therefore, tends to start from the assumption of the reality of the physical world, and then to consider arguments for why the mind cannot be treated as simply part of that world. (shrink)

Published in 1982 by CUP (pb. 2009) it discusses the forms of materialism then current, including Davidson, early Rorty, but concentrating on Smart and Armstrong, and arguing that central state materialism fails to give a better 'occurrent' account of conscious states than does behaviourism/functionalism, as Armstrong claims. The book starts with a version of the 'knowledge argument' and ends with a chapter claiming that our conception of matter/the physical is more problematic than our conception of mind.

This book presents a strong case for substance dualism and offers a comprehensive defense of the knowledge argument, showing that materialism cannot accommodate or explain the 'hard problem' of consciousness. Bringing together the discussion of reductionism and semantic vagueness in an original and illuminating way, Howard Robinson argues that non-fundamental levels of ontology are best treated by a conceptualist account, rather than a realist one. In addition to discussing the standard versions of physicalism, he examines physicalist theories such as those (...) of McDowell and Price, and accounts of neutral monism and panpsychism from Strawson, McGinn and Stoljar. He also explores previously unnoticed historical parallels between Frege and Aristotle, and between Hume and Plotinus. His book will be a valuable resource for scholars and advanced students of philosophy of mind, in particular those looking at consciousness, dualism, and the mind-body problem. (shrink)

It is a standard feature of modern philosophy, at least from Locke, to tie together the questions of how we perceive the world and what we have reason to think the world is like in itself. This is a natural connection, because the questions of how we perceive it, and what kind of conception of it we can best form on the basis of that mode of perception, are obviously intimately linked. Part I of this volume defends the sense-datum theory (...) of perception against its opponents, and argues that the sense-datum theory is much closer to a form of direct realism than is normally thought: we directly perceive the world in the form that it naturally manifests itself to creatures like us. This leaves open the question of what it is like in itself, and Part II tries to show that a Berkeleian interpretation—that the world is a nomological structure in the mind of God—is the most plausible option. Arguments with roots in Berkeley, in modern philosophers such as John Foster, and in modern science, are drawn on to support this conclusion. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work. This work is in the public domain (...) in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

Physicalism has, over the past twenty years, become almost an orthodoxy, especially in the philosophy of mind. Many philosophers, however, feel uneasy about this development, and this volume is intended as a collective response to it. Together these papers, written by philosophers from Britain, the United States, and Australasia, show that physicalism faces enormous problems in every area in which it is discussed. The contributors not only investigate the well-known difficulties that physicalism has in accommodating sensory consciousness, but also bring (...) out its inadequacies in dealing with thought, intentionality, abstract objects, , and principles of both theoretical and practical reason; even its ability to cope with the physical world itself is called into question. Both strong "reductionist" versions and weaker "supervenience" theories are discussed and found to face different but equally formidable obstacles. Contributors include George Bealer, Peter Forrest, John Foster, Grant Gillett, Bob Hale, Michael Lockwood, George Myro, Nicholas Nathan, David Smith, Steven Wagner, Ralph Walker, and Richard Warner. (shrink)

In recent years, a significant number of philosophers from an orthodox analytic background have begun to advocate theories of composite objects, which they say are strikingly similar to Aristotle’s hylomorphism. These theories emphasize the importance of structure, or organization—which they say is closely connected to Aristotle’s notion of form—in defining what it is for a composite to be a genuine object. The reality of these structures is closely connected with the fact that they are held to possess powers, again in (...) what is held to be a broadly Aristotelian sense, and so to be genuinely efficacious. Naturally enough, they want to do all this without espousing the discredited aspects of Aristotelian science. It is the purpose of this essay to cast a skeptical eye on whether this objective can be achieved. (shrink)

Presents for the first time in English, this 1967 text which came to be known as the 'bible' of a new movement in German philosophy of language, the 'Erlanger School.' This school of linguistic philosophy's treatment of language is rooted in the tradition of transcendentalism, and bases its system on Kant and his Continental successors. For the Erlanger School, 'language is not just a fact we discover...but a human cultural accomplishment whose construction reason can and should be controlled.' An influential (...) work which will be a valuable resource for students of philosophy, particularly philosophy of language and transcendentalism. (shrink)

This chapter starts by restating the causal-hallucinatory argument against naive realism. This argument depends on the possibility of “philosophers' hallucinations.” It draws attention to the role of what the chapter refers to as the nonarbitrariness of philosophers' hallucinations in supporting this argument. The chapter then discusses three attempts to refute the argument. Two of them, those associated with John McDowell and with Michael Martin, are explicitly forms of disjunctivism. The third, exemplified by Mark Johnston, has, the chapter claims, disjunctivist features. (...) None of these responses to the argument is plausible. (shrink)

This article will review reasons why it is argued that the law on abortion on the grounds of disability is discriminatory, as well as recent unsuccessful attempts to address this discrimination in the law. These attempts include ones which would have moderately restricted access to abortion in certain limited cases, and another that might have opened to door to a number of different possibilities, including both to options that could have restricted access to abortion, and to other options that might (...) have increased access. Finally, this article will also examine reasons why some of the most important challenges surrounding disability equality cannot be sufficiently addressed through legal change alone. While there are strong reasons to support some form of change in the law, a more foundational change in values is necessary if we want to live in a more ethical society that is truly capable of welcoming disabled children. (shrink)

This article will review reasons why it is argued that the law on abortion on the grounds of disability is discriminatory, as well as recent unsuccessful attempts to address this discrimination in the law. These attempts include ones which would have moderately restricted access to abortion in certain limited cases, and another that might have opened to door to a number of different possibilities, including both to options that could have restricted access to abortion, and to other options that might (...) have increased access. Finally, this article will also examine reasons why some of the most important challenges surrounding disability equality cannot be sufficiently addressed through legal change alone. While there are strong reasons to support some form of change in the law, a more foundational change in values is necessary if we want to live in a more ethical society that is truly capable of welcoming disabled children. (shrink)

Vision consists of four essays: “Seeing distance,” “Size,” “Perceptual inference,” and “A Gibsonian alternative?” The continuous thread is the Berkeleian treatment of the perception of spatial properties, particularly in connection with what is and is not “immediately perceived.” The first two essays are closely connected with specific Berkeleian arguments and modern responses to them. The second two essays deal more generally with modern discussions by psychologists of whether visual perception is “direct” or “indirect.” The claims on the cover that the (...) book is “unique in its blend of philosophical and historical perspectives on contemporary issues in vision studies” and that it is “clearly written” and suitable “for an interdisciplinary readership in philosophy of mind, philosophy of science, cognitive psychology and history of science” are all entirely justified. (shrink)

Marking the tercentenary of Berkeley's birth, this collection of previously unpublished essays covers such Berkeleian topics as: imagination, experience, and possibility; the argument against material substance; the physical world; idealism; science; the self; action and inaction; beauty; and the general good. Among the contributors are: Christopher Peacocke, Ernest Sosa, Margaret Wilson, C.C.W. Taylor, and J.O. Urmson.

In this paper I hope to show that a particular modern approach to Aristotle's philosophy of mind is untenable and, out of that negative discussion, develop some tentative suggestions concerning the interpretation of two famous and puzzling Aristotelian maxims. These maxims are, first, that the soul is the form of the body and, second, that perception is the reception of form without matter. The fashionable interpretation of Aristotle which I wish to criticize is the attempt to assimilate him to certain (...) modern philosophies of mind by making him into a functionalist. I shall therefore begin by explaining this modern term of art. (shrink)

In my feature article, ‘Pregnancy and superior moral status: a proposal for two thresholds of personhood’, 1 I argue that there are reasons to recognise that pregnant women have a superior moral status. This is a new argument on personhood in philosophy, and I am not surprised that it has generated some discussion. While I am grateful that many authors have engaged with my ideas, I have not identified from the six commentaries any aspect in my approach that would need (...) to be revised. I will do my best here, in the space available, to address the main points raised. Gibson starts off by correctly noting that my proposal rests on a starting assumption (which I do not defend) that we follow a first threshold of personhood, but then seems to leave this aside in the rest of his critique. 2 He says I have not justified... (shrink)

Substance dualism is the view that humans are essentially immaterial souls, and that conscious events are events in that soul. This chapter considers the arguments for and against this view. It argues that such questions as ‘Would I have existed if my mother's egg had been fertilized by a different though genetically identical sperm from my father?’ must have a sharp yes-or-no answer, but that they would not have a sharp answer if being me consisted simply of being made of (...) similar genetic material and having a similar conscious life. (shrink)

I argue that the idea that mental states possess a primitive intentionality in virtue of which they are able to represent or ‘intend’ putative particulars derives largely from Brentano‘s misinterpretation of Aristotle and the scholastics, and that without this howler the application of intentionality to phenomenal content would never have gained currency.