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  1. Robyn Langdon, Emily Connaughton & Max Coltheart (2014). The Fregoli Delusion: A Disorder of Person Identification and Tracking. Topics in Cognitive Science 6 (4):615-631.
    Fregoli delusion is the mistaken belief that some person currently present in the deluded person's environment (typically a stranger) is a familiar person in disguise. The stranger is believed to be psychologically identical to this known person (who is not present) even though the deluded person perceives the physical appearance of the stranger as being different from the known person's typical appearance. To gain a deeper understanding of this contradictory error in the normal system for tracking and identifying known persons, (...)
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  2. Michael H. Connors, Amanda J. Barnier, Robyn Langdon, Rochelle E. Cox, Vince Polito & Max Coltheart (2013). A Laboratory Analogue of Mirrored-Self Misidentification Delusion: The Role of Hypnosis, Suggestion, and Demand Characteristics. Consciousness and Cognition 22 (4):1510-1522.
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  3. Robyn Langdon (2013). Folie à Deux and its Lessons for Two-Factor Theorists. Mind and Language 28 (1):72-82.
    In folie à deux, a ‘primary’ patient transmits a delusional belief to one or more ‘secondary’ patients who then adopt and share the belief. This paper applies the two-factor theory of delusion to retrospectively analyse published cases of folie à deux. Lessons from this retrospective analysis include, firstly, that two-factor theorists need to shift their focus from endogenous processes to consider the exogenous source of delusional content in most secondaries. Secondly, secondaries who come to share the belief via normal processes (...)
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  4. Robyn Langdon & Max Coltheart (2013). Introduction to Radden Symposium. Mind and Language 28 (1):55-56.
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  5. Robyn Langdon, Matthew Finkbeiner, Michael H. Connors & Emily Connaughton (2013). Masked and Unmasked Priming in Schizophrenia. Consciousness and Cognition 22 (4):1206-1213.
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  6. Robyn Langdon & Kristy Delmas (2012). Moral Reasoning and Psychopathic Tendencies in the General Community. In Robyn Langdon & Catriona Mackenzie (eds.), Emotions, Imagination, and Moral Reasoning. Psychology Press. 91.
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  7. Robyn Langdon & Catriona Mackenzie (eds.) (2012). Emotions, Imagination, and Moral Reasoning. Psychology Press.
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  8. Vince Polito, Robyn Langdon & Jac Brown (2010). The Experience of Altered States of Consciousness in Shamanic Ritual: The Role of Pre-Existing Beliefs and Affective Factors. Consciousness and Cognition 19 (4):918--925.
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  9. Robyn Langdon (2009). Confabulation and Delusion: A Review of Hirstein's Brain Fiction. [REVIEW] Philosophical Psychology 22 (6):785 – 802.
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  10. Robyn Langdon (2009). Pathological and Non-Pathological Factors in Delusional Misbelief. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (6):527-528.
    In their pursuit of adaptively biased misbelief-making systems, McKay & Dennett (M&D) describe a putative doxastic shear-pin system which enables misbeliefs to form in situations of extreme psychological stress. Rather than discussing their argument, I consider how this shear-pin system might combine with both pathological belief-making ( breakdowns caused by neuropathy) and normal belief-making to explain a spectrum of delusions.
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  11. Robyn Langdon & Jon Brock (2008). Hypo- or Hyper-Mentalizing: It All Depends Upon What One Means by “Mentalizing”. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (3):274-275.
    By conceiving of autism and psychosis as diametrically opposite phenotypes of underactive and overactive mentalizing, respectively, Crespi & Badcock (C&B) commit themselves to a continuum view of intercorrelated mentalizing functions. This view fails to acknowledge dissociations between mentalizing functions and that psychotic people show a mixture of both hypo- and hyper-mentalizing.
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  12. Robyn Langdon (2005). Theory of Mind in Schizophrenia. In B. Malle & S. Hodges (eds.), Other Minds. Guilford Press.
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  13. Robyn Langdon (2003). Psychotic Solipsism Versus Autistic Asociality. In B. Repacholi & V. Slaughter (eds.), Individual Differences in Theory of Mind: Implications for Typical and Atypical Development. Hove, E. Sussex: Psychology Press. 240.
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  14. Robyn Langdon, Martin Davies & Max Coltheart (2002). Understanding Minds and Understanding Communicated Meanings in Schizophrenia. Mind and Language 17 (1&2):68-104.
  15. Martin Davies, Max Coltheart, Robyn Langdon & N. Breen (2001). Monothematic Delusions: Towards a Two-Factor Account. Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology 8 (2-3):133-58.
    We provide a battery of examples of delusions against which theoretical accounts can be tested. Then, we identify neuropsychological anomalies that could produce the unusual experiences that may lead, in turn, to the delusions in our battery. However, we argue against Maher’s view that delusions are false beliefs that arise as normal responses to anomalous experiences. We propose, instead, that a second factor is required to account for the transition from unusual experience to delusional belief. The second factor in the (...)
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  16. Robyn Langdon & Max Coltheart (2001). Visual Perspective-Taking and Schizotypy: Evidence for a Simulation-Based Account of Mentalizing in Normal Adults. Cognition 82 (1):1-26.
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  17. Robyn Langdon & Max Coltheart (2000). The Cognitive Neuropsychology of Delusions. Mind and Language 15 (1):183-216.
  18. Max Coltheart & Robyn Langdon (1998). Autism, Modularity and Levels of Explanation in Cognitive Science. Mind and Language 13 (1):138-152.
  19. Max Coltheart, Robyn Langdon & Nora Breen (1997). Misidentification Syndromes and Cognitive Neuropsychiatry. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 1 (5):157-158.
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