1. Roderick Millar (1983). Valberg's Secondary Qualities. Philosophy 58 (January):107-109.
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  2. Roderick Millar (1982). A Defence of Direct Surface Realism. Philosophy 57 (July):339-355.
    It is commonly believed that there are, in the world, large numbers of objects which occupy three-dimensional space. It is also commonly believed that at least a large part of people's experience is of the surfaces of these material objects. Nevertheless, arguments have been adduced in favour of the view that we are never aware of such surfaces but only of distinct items called ‘sense-data’. It has also been suggested that if we couple the view that experience is limited to (...)
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  3. Roderick Millar (1980). Correspondence. British Journal of Aesthetics 20 (4):381-381.
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