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Ron Chrisley [19]Ronald L. Chrisley [17]Ronald Chrisley [2]
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Profile: Ron Chrisley (University of Sussex)
  1. Ron Chrisley, Author's Personal Copy.
    replicated by artificial intelligence (AI). The firstpersonal, subjective, what-it-is-like-to-be-something nature of consciousness is thought to be untouchable by the computations, algorithms, processing and functions of AI method. Since AI is the most promising avenue toward artificial consciousness (AC), the conclusion many draw is that AC is..
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  2. Ron Chrisley, Brain Inspired Cognitive Systems (BICS).
    This Neurocomputing special issue is based on selected, expanded and significantly revised versions of papers presented at the Second International Conference on Brain Inspired Cognitive Systems (BICS 2006) held at Lesvos, Greece, from 10 to 14 October 2006. The aim of BICS 2006, which followed the very successful first BICS 2004 held at Stirling, Scotland, was to bring together leading scientists and engineers who use analytic, syntactic and computational methods both to understand the prodigious processing properties of biological systems and, (...)
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  3. Ron Chrisley, Embodied Artificial Intelligence.
    Mike Anderson1 has given us a thoughtful and useful field guide: Not in the genre of a bird-watcher’s guide which is carried in the field and which contains detailed descriptions of possible sightings, but in the sense of a guide to a field (in this case embodied cognition) which aims to identify that field’s general principles and properties. I’d like to make some comments that will hopefully complement Anderson’s work, highlighting points of agreement and disagreement between his view of the (...)
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  4. Ron Chrisley, Painting an Experience.
    Paintings are usually paintings of things: a room in a palace, a princess, a dog. But what would it be to paint not those things, but the experience of seeing those things? Las Meninas is sufficiently sophisticated and masterfully executed to help us explore this question. Of course, there are many kinds of paintings: some abstract, some conceptual, some with more traditional subjects. Let us start with a focus on naturalistically depictive paintings: paintings that aim to cause an experience in (...)
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  5. Ron Chrisley, Robotic Specification of The.
    Standard, linguistic means of specifying the content of mental states do so by expressing the content in question. Such means fail when it comes to capturing non-conceptual aspects of visual experience, since no linguistic expression can adequately express such content. One alternative is to use depictions: images that either evoke (reproduce in the recipient) or refer to the content of the experience. Practical considerations concerning the generation and integration of such depictions argue in favour of a synthetic approach: the generation (...)
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  6. Ron Chrisley, Some Foundational Issues Concerning Anticipatory Systems.
    Some foundational conceptual issues concerning anticipatory systems are identified and discussed: 1) The doubly temporal nature of anticipation is noted: anticipations are directed toward one time, and exist at another; 2) Anticipatory systems can be open: they can perturb and be perturbed by states external to the system; 3) Anticipation may be facilitated by a system modeling the relation between its own output, its environment, and its future input; 4) Anticipations must be a part of the system whose anticipations they (...)
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  7. Ron Chrisley & Andy Holland, Connectionist Synthetic Epistemology: Requirements for the Development of Objectivity.
    A connectionist system that is capable of learning about the spatial structure of a simple world is used for the purposes of synthetic epistemology: the creation and analysis of artificial systems in order to clarify philosophical issues that arise in the explanation of how agents, both natural and artificial, represent the world. In this case, the issues to be clarified focus on the content of representational states that exist prior to a fully objective understanding of a spatial domain. In particular, (...)
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  8. Ronald L. Chrisley, Contents.
    2.4 The Example: Infants and object-(im)permanence : : : : : : : : : : : : : : 17 2.4.1 Why a contentful account is warranted: Perspectival sensitivity : : : 17 2.4.2 The \searching under a cloth" and \AB" data : : : : : : : : : : : : 24 2.4.3 Two constraints on objectuality : : : : : : : : : : : : : Error: Illegal entry in bfrange block in (...)
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  9. Ronald L. Chrisley, Connectionism, Cognitive Maps & the Development of Objectivity.
    It is claimed that there are pre-objective phenomena, which cognitive science should explain by employing the notion of non-conceptual representational content. It is argued that a match between parallel distributed processing (PDP) and non-conceptual content (NCC) not only provides a means of refuting recent criticisms of PDP as a cognitive architecture; it also provides a vehicle for NCC that is required by naturalism. A connectionist cognitive mapping algorithm is used as a case study to examine the affinities between PDP and (...)
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  10. Ronald L. Chrisley, Externalism Before Language: The Real Reason Why “Thoughts Ain't in the Head”.
    It is argued that standard arguments for the Externalism of mental states do not succeed in the case of pre-linguistic mental states. Further, it is noted that standard arguments for Internalism appeal to the principle that our individuation of mental states should be driven by what states are explanatory in our best cognitive science. This principle is used against the Internalist to reject the necessity of narrow individuation of mental states, even in the prelinguistic case. This is done by showing (...)
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  11. Ronald L. Chrisley, Learning in Non-Superpositional Quantum Neurocomputers.
    In both the search for ever smaller and faster computational devices, and the search for a computational understanding of biological systems such as the brain, one is naturally led to consider the possibility of computational devices the size of cells, molecules, atoms, or on even smaller scales. Indeed, it has been pointed out Braunstein, 1995] that if trends over the last forty years continue, we may reach atomic-scale computation by the year 2010 Keyes, 1988]. This move down in scale takes (...)
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  12. Ronald L. Chrisley, Non-Compositional Representation in Connectionist Networks.
    have context-sensitive constituents, but rather because they sometimes have no constituents at all. The argument to be rejected depends on the assumption that one can only assign propositional contents to representations if one starts by assigning sub-propositional contents to atomic representations. I give some philosophical arguments and present a counterexample to show that this assumption is mistaken.
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  13. Ronald L. Chrisley, (Ronc@Cogs.Susx.Ac. Uk).
    imply that computational states are not "real", and cannot, for example, provide a foundation for the cognitive sciences. In particular, Putnam has argued that every ordinary open physical system realizes every abstract finite automaton, implying that the fact that a particular computational characterization applies to a physical system does not tell one anything about the nature of that system. Putnam's argument is scrutinized, and found inadequate because, among other things, it employs a notion of causation that is too weak. I (...)
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  14. Ronald L. Chrisley, Singular Terms and Reference: Evans and "Julius&Quot.
    used) (Evans 1982: 31). He dubbed these terms "descriptive names"1, and used them as a foil against which to test several theories of reference: Frege's, Russell's, and his own.
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  15. Ronald L. Chrisley, Transparent Computationalism.
    Summary. A distinction is made between two senses of the claim “cognition is computation”. One sense, the opaque reading, takes computation to be whatever is described by our current computational theory and claims that cognition is best understood in terms of that theory. The transparent reading, which has its primary allegiance to the phenomenon of computation, rather than to any particular theory of it, is the claim that the best account of cognition will be given by whatever theory turns out (...)
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  16. Ronald L. Chrisley, Weak Strong AI: An Elaboration of the English Reply to the Chinese Room.
    Searle (1980) constructed the Chinese Room (CR) to argue against what he called \Strong AI": the claim that a computer can understand by virtue of running a program of the right sort. Margaret Boden (1990), in giving the English Reply to the Chinese Room argument, has pointed out that there isunderstanding in the Chinese Room: the understanding required to recognize the symbols, the understanding of English required to read the rulebook, etc. I elaborate on and defend this response to Searle. (...)
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  17. Ron Chrisley (forthcoming). Appearances Can Be Deceiving: Critical Notice of Consciousness and Robot Sentience. Philosophical Explorations.
    Ron Chrisley, Int. J. Mach. Conscious., 06, 13 (2014). DOI: 10.1142/S1793843014400034.
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  18. Ron Chrisley & Robert W. Clowes (2012). Guest Editors' Introduction. International Journal of Machine Consciousness 4 (02):313-323.
  19. Robert W. Clowes & Ron Chrisley (2012). Virtualist Representation. International Journal of Machine Consciousness 4 (02):503-522.
    This paper seeks to identify, clarify, and perhaps rehabilitate the virtual reality metaphor as applied to the goal of understanding consciousness. Some proponents of the metaphor apply it in a way that implies a representational view of experience of a particular, extreme form that is indirect, internal and inactive (what we call “presentational virtualism”). In opposition to this is an application of the metaphor that eschews representation, instead preferring to view experience as direct, external and enactive (“enactive virtualism”). This paper (...)
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  20. Ron Chrisley (2009). Synthetic Phenomenology. International Journal of Machine Consciousness 1 (01):53-70.
    The term \synthetic phenomenology" refers to: 1) any attempt to characterize the phenomenal states possessed, or modeled by, an artefact (such as a robot); or 2) any attempt to use an artefact to help specify phenomenal states (independently of whether such states are possessed by a naturally conscious being or an artefact). The notion of synthetic phenomenology is clari¯ed, and distinguished from some related notions. It is argued that much work in machine consciousness would bene¯t from being more cognizant of (...)
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  21. Ron Chrisley (2008). Painting an Experience: Las Meninas, Consciousness and the Aesthetic Mode. Journal of Consciousness Studies 15 (9):40-45.
    Paintings are usually paintings of things: a room in a palace, a princess, a dog. But what would it be to paint not those things, but the experience of seeing those things? Las Meninas is sufficiently sophisticated and masterfully executed to help us explore this question. Of course, there are many kinds of paintings: some abstract, some conceptual, some with more traditional subjects. Let us start with a focus on naturalistically depictive paintings: paintings that aim to cause an experience in (...)
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  22. Ron Chrisley, I. Aleksander, S. Bringsjord, R. Clowes, J. Parthemore, S. Stuart, S. Torrance & T. Ziemke (2008). Assessing Artificial Consciousness: A Collective Review Article. Journal of Consciousness Studies 15 (7):95-110.
    While the recent special issue of JCS on machine consciousness (Volume 14, Issue 7) was in preparation, a collection of papers on the same topic, entitled Artificial Consciousness and edited by Antonio Chella and Riccardo Manzotti, was published. The editors of the JCS special issue, Ron Chrisley, Robert Clowes and Steve Torrance, thought it would be a timely and productive move to have authors of papers in their collection review the papers in the Chella and Manzotti book, and include these (...)
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  23. Ron Chrisley & J. Parthemore (2007). Synthetic Phenomenology:Exploiting Embodiment to Specify the Non-Conceptual Content of Visual Experience. Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (7):44-58.
    Not all research in machine consciousness aims to instantiate phenomenal states in artefacts. For example, one can use artefacts that do not themselves have phenomenal states, merely to simulate or model organisms that do. Nevertheless, one might refer to all of these pursuits -- instantiating, simulating or modelling phenomenal states in an artefact -- as 'synthetic phenomenality'. But there is another way in which artificial agents (be they simulated or real) may play a crucial role in understanding or creating consciousness: (...)
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  24. Robert Clowes, Steve Torrance & Ron Chrisley (2007). Machine Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (7):7-14.
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  25. Ron Chrisley (2006). IgorAleksanderThe World in My Mind, My Mind in the World: Key Mechanisms of Consciousness in People, Animals and Machines2005Imprint Academic1 845 40021 6£ 17.95 (UK)/$34.90 (US)(196 Pp.). [REVIEW] Trends in Cognitive Sciences 10 (1):5-6.
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  26. Ron Chrisley (2003). Embodiment. In L. Nagel (ed.), The Macmillan Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science. Macmillan.
  27. Ron Chrisley (2003). The Macmillan Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science.
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  28. Aaron Sloman & Ronald L. Chrisley (2003). Virtual Machines and Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (4-5):133-172.
    Replication or even modelling of consciousness in machines requires some clarifications and refinements of our concept of consciousness. Design of, construction of, and interaction with artificial systems can itself assist in this conceptual development. We start with the tentative hypothesis that although the word “consciousness” has no well-defined meaning, it is used to refer to aspects of human and animal informationprocessing. We then argue that we can enhance our understanding of what these aspects might be by designing and building virtual-machine (...)
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  29. Ron Chrisley, Aaron Sloman, Matthias Scheutz & Nick Hawes (2002). How Velmans' Conscious Experiences Affected Our Brains. Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (11):58-62.
    Velmans’ paper raises three problems concerning mental causation: (1) How can consciousness affect the physical, given that the physical world appears causally closed? 10 (2) How can one be in conscious control of processes of which one is not consciously aware? (3) Conscious experiences appear to come too late to causally affect the processes to which they most obviously relate. In an appendix Velmans gives his reasons for refusing to resolve these problems through adopting the position (which he labels ‘physicalism’) (...)
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  30. Ronald Chrisley (ed.) (2001). Artificial Intelligence: Critical Concepts in Cognitive Science. Routledge.
    The scientific field of Artificial Intelligence (AI) began in the 1950s but the concept of artificial intelligence, the idea of something with mind-like attributes, predates it by centuries. This historically rich concept has served as a blueprint for the research into intelligent machines. But it also has staggering implications for our notions of who we are: our psychology, biology, philosophy, technology and society. This reference work provides scholars in both the humanities and the sciences with the material essential for charting (...)
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  31. Ronald L. Chrisley (2001). A View From Anywhere: Prospects for an Objective Understanding of Consciousness. In Paavo Pylkkanen & Tere Vaden (eds.), Dimensions of Conscious Experience. John Benjamins.
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  32. Ronald L. Chrisley (2001). A View From Anywhere Prospects for an Objective Understanding. In Paavo Pylkkanen & Tere Vaden (eds.), Dimensions of Conscious Experience. John Benjamins. 37--3.
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  33. Ronald L. Chrisley (1998). What Might Dynamical Intentionality Be, If Not Computation? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (5):634-635.
    (1) Van Gelder's concession that the dynamical hypothesis is not in opposition to computation in general does not agree well with his anticomputational stance. (2) There are problems with the claim that dynamic systems allow for nonrepresentational aspects of computation in a way in which digital computation cannot. (3) There are two senses of the “cognition is computation” claim and van Gelder argues against only one of them. (4) Dynamical systems as characterized in the target article share problems of universal (...)
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  34. Ronald Chrisley (1995). Quantum Learning. In P. Pyllkkänen & P. Pyllkkö (eds.), New Directions in Cognitive Science. Finnish Society for Artificial Intelligence.
  35. Ronald L. Chrisley (1994). European Review of Philosophy, Volume 1: Philosophy of Mind. Stanford: CSLI Publications.
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  36. Ronald L. Chrisley (1994). Taking Embodiment Seriously: Nonconceptual Content and Robotics. In Kenneth M. Ford, C. Glymour & Patrick Hayes (eds.), Android Epistemology. MIT Press.
    The development and deployment of the notion of pre-objective or nonconceptual content for the purposes of intentional explanation of requires assistance from a practical and theoretical understanding of computational/robotic systems acting in real-time and real-space. In particular, the usual "that"-clause specification of content will not work for non-conceptual contents; some other means of specification is required, means that make use of the fact that contents are aspects of embodied and embedded systems. That is, the specification of non-conceptual content should use (...)
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  37. Ronald L. Chrisley (1994). The Ontological Status of Computational States. In European Review of Philosophy, Volume 1: Philosophy of Mind. Stanford: CSLI Publications.
     
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  38. Ronald L. Chrisley (1994). Why Everything Doesn't Realize Every Computation. Minds and Machines 4 (4):403-20.
    Some have suggested that there is no fact to the matter as to whether or not a particular physical system relaizes a particular computational description. This suggestion has been taken to imply that computational states are not real, and cannot, for example, provide a foundation for the cognitive sciences. In particular, Putnam has argued that every ordinary open physical system realizes every abstract finite automaton, implying that the fact that a particular computational characterization applies to a physical system does not (...)
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