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Ronald N. Giere [78]Ronald N. Giere [1]
  1. Ronald N. Giere, Computation and Agency in Scientific Cognition.
    I begin with a representative example of a contemporary scientific activity, observations using the Hubble Space Telescope, and ask what approaches within the cognitive sciences seem most fruitful as aids in developing an overall account of this sort of scientific activity. After presenting the Hubble Space Telescope System and a recent result, I consider applying a standard computational paradigm to this system. I find difficulties in identifying an appropriate cognitive agent and in making a suitable place for the instrumentation that (...)
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  2. Ronald N. Giere, Critical Hypothetical Evolutionary Naturalism.
    Among philosophers, Don Campbell is best known for his naturalistic, evolutionary approach to epistemology. There can be no doubt, however, that he was a thoroughgoing naturalist in all matters, even though he seems to have had little interest in exploring naturalism as a general philosophical position. He was professionally more interested in the origins and workings of knowledge producing social systems. I am interested in these things too, but also naturalism in general. So my tribute to Don will be to (...)
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  3. Ronald N. Giere, Oof.
    6 ABSTRACT. Scientific realism is a doctrine that was both in and out of fashion 7 several times during the twentieth century. I begin by noting three presuppositions of 8 a succinct characterization of scientific realism offered initially by the foremost critic..
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  4. Ronald N. Giere, The Role of Computation in Scientific Cognition.
    This paper is a contribution to that part of science studies known as 'the cognitive study of science'. The general goal of such studies is to understand cogni-.
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  5. Ronald N. Giere (2013). Kuhn as Perspectival Realist. Topoi 32 (1):53-57.
    In this essay I argue that T. S. Kuhn, at least in his later works, can be regarded as a perspectival realist. This is a retrospective interpretation based mainly on the essays published posthumously under the title The Road Since Structure (Kuhn 2000). Among the strongest grounds for this interpretation is that Kuhn explicitly states that one must have a “lexicon” in place before raising questions about the truth or falsity of claims made using elements of the lexicon. This, in (...)
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  6. Ronald N. Giere (2012). A New Program for the Philosophy of Science? Perspectives on Science 20 (3):339-343.
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  7. Ronald N. Giere (2012). Dirk R. Johnson . Nietzsche's Anti-Darwinism . New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010. Pp. 240. $89.00 (Cloth). Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 2 (2):380-382.
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  8. Ronald N. Giere (2012). Scientific Cognition: Human Centered but Not Human Bound. Philosophical Explorations 15 (2):199 - 206.
    While agreeing that cognition in the sciences is usefully thought of as involving processes encompassing both humans and artifacts, I object to attributing cognitive states to extended systems. I argue that cognitive states, such as ?knowing?, should be confined to the human components of cognitive systems. My argument appeals to the large dimensions, both spatial and temporal, of many scientific cognitive systems, the existence of epistemic norms, and the need for agents in science.
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  9. Ronald N. Giere (2011). Distributed Cognition as Human Centered Although Not Human Bound: Reply to Vaesen 1. Social Epistemology 25 (4):393 - 399.
    At issue is the usefulness of a concept of distributed cognition for the philosophy of science. I have argued for the desirability of regarding scientific systems such as the Hubble Space Telescope as distributed cognitive systems. But I disagree with those who would ascribe cognitive states, such as knowledge, to such systems as a whole, and insist that cognitive states are ascribable only to the human components of such systems. Vaesen, appealing to a well-known ?parity principle,? insists that if there (...)
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  10. Ronald N. Giere (2010). Objective Single-Case Probabilities and the Foundations of Statistics. In Antony Eagle (ed.), Philosophy of Probability: Contemporary Readings. Routledge.
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  11. Ronald N. Giere (2009). Bas C. Van Fraassen: Scientific Representation: Paradoxes of Perspective,. [REVIEW] Philosophy of Science 76 (1).
  12. Ronald N. Giere (2009). Essay Review-Bas C. Van Fraassen: Scientific Representation: Paradoxes of Perspective. Philosophy of Science 76 (1):101.
     
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  13. Ronald N. Giere (2009). Essay Review: Scientific Representation and Empiricist Structuralism*:Scientific Representation: Paradoxes of Perspective. Philosophy of Science 76 (1):101-111.
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  14. Ronald N. Giere (2009). Is Computer Simulation Changing the Face of Experimentation? Philosophical Studies 143 (1):59 - 62.
    Morrison points out many similarities between the roles of simulation models and other sorts of models in science. On the basis of these similarities she claims that running a simulation is epistemologically on a par with doing a traditional experiment and that the output of a simulation therefore counts as a measurement. I agree with her premises but reject the inference. The epistemological payoff of a traditional experiment is greater (or less) confidence in the fit between a model and a (...)
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  15. Ronald N. Giere (2009). Scientific Perspectivism: Behind the Stage Door. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 40 (2):221-223.
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  16. Ronald N. Giere (2008). Human Moral Responsibility is Moral Responsibility Enough: A Reply to F. Allan Hanson. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (3):425-427.
    Hanson claims that moral responsibility should be distributed among both the humans and artifacts comprising complex wholes that produce morally relevant outcomes in the world. I argue that this claim is not sufficiently supported. In particular, adopting a consequentialist understanding of morality does not by itself support the view that the existence of a causally necessary object in such a complex whole is sufficient for assigning moral responsibility to that object. Moreover, there are good reasons, both evolutionary and contemporary, for (...)
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  17. Ronald N. Giere, Why Scientific Models Are Not Works of Fiction.
    The usual question, “Are models fictions?” is replaced by the question, “Should scientific models be regarded as works of fiction?” This makes it clear that the issue is not one of definition but of interpretation. First one must distinguish between the ontology of scientific models and their function in the practice of science. Theoretical models and works of fiction are ontologically on a par, their both being creations of human imagination. It is their differing functions in practice that makes it (...)
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  18. Ronald N. Giere (2007). Distributed Cognition Without Distributed Knowing. Social Epistemology 21 (3):313 – 320.
    In earlier works, I have argued that it is useful to think of much scientific activity, particularly in experimental sciences, as involving the operation of distributed cognitive systems, as these are understood in the contemporary cognitive sciences. Introducing a notion of distributed cognition, however, invites consideration of whether, or in what way, related cognitive activities, such as knowing, might also be distributed. In this paper I will argue that one can usefully introduce a notion of distributed cognition without attributing other (...)
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  19. Ronald N. Giere (2007). Review of Steve Fuller, The Philosophy of Science and Technology Studies. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2007 (4).
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  20. Ronald N. Giere (2006). Scientific Perspectivism. University of Chicago Press.
    Many people assume that the claims of scientists are objective truths. But historians, sociologists, and philosophers of science have long argued that scientific claims reflect the particular historical, cultural, and social context in which those claims were made. The nature of scientific knowledge is not absolute because it is influenced by the practice and perspective of human agents. Scientific Perspectivism argues that the acts of observing and theorizing are both perspectival, and this nature makes scientific knowledge contingent, as Thomas Kuhn (...)
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  21. Ronald N. Giere (2006). Modest Evolutionary Naturalism. Biological Theory 1 (1):52-60.
    I begin by arguing that a consistent general naturalism must be understood in terms of methodological maxims rather than metaphysical doctrines. Some specific maxims are proposed. I then defend a generalized naturalism from the common objection that it is incapable of accounting for the normative aspects of human life, including those of scientific practice itself. Evolutionary naturalism, however, is criticized as being incapable of providing a sufficient explanation of categorical moral norms. Turning to the epistemological norms of science itself, particularly (...)
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  22. Ronald N. Giere (2006). The Role of Agency in Distributed Cognitive Systems. Philosophy of Science 73 (5):710-719.
    In previous publications I have argued that much scientific activity should be thought of as involving the operation of distributed cognitive systems. Since these contributions to the cognitive study of science appear in venues not necessarily frequented by philosophers of science, I begin with a brief introduction to the notion of a distributed cognitive system. I then describe what I take to be an exemplary case of a scientific distributed cognitive system, the Hubble Space Telescope (HST). I do not here (...)
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  23. Ronald N. Giere (2005). Is Realism Dead? Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 86 (1):287-304.
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  24. Ronald N. Giere (2005). Scientific Realism: Old and New Problems. [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 63 (2):149 - 165.
    Scientific realism is a doctrine that was both in and out of fashion several times during the twentieth century. I begin by noting three presuppositions of a succinct characterization of scientific realism offered initially by the foremost critic in the latter part of the century, Bas van Fraassen. The first presupposition is that there is a fundamental distinction to be made between what is “empirical” and what is “theoretical”. The second presupposition is that a genuine scientific realism is committed to (...)
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  25. Michael Dickson, Don Howard, Scott Tanona, Mathias Frisch, Eric Winsberg, Arnold Koslow, Paul Teller, Ronald N. Giere, Mary S. Morgan & Mauricio Suárez (2004). 1. Preface Preface (P. Vii). Philosophy of Science 71 (5).
     
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  26. Ronald N. Giere (2004). How Models Are Used to Represent Reality. Philosophy of Science 71 (5):742-752.
    Most recent philosophical thought about the scientific representation of the world has focused on dyadic relationships between language-like entities and the world, particularly the semantic relationships of reference and truth. Drawing inspiration from diverse sources, I argue that we should focus on the pragmatic activity of representing, so that the basic representational relationship has the form: Scientists use models to represent aspects of the world for specific purposes. Leaving aside the terms "law" and "theory," I distinguish principles, specific conditions, models, (...)
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  27. Ronald N. Giere (2004). The Problem of Agency in Scienti?C Distributed Cognitive Systems. Journal of Cognition and Culture 4 (3-4):759-774.
    From the perspective of cognitive science, it is illuminating to think of much contemporary scienti?c research as taking place in distributed cognitive systems. This is particularly true of large-scale experimental and observational systems such as the Hubble Telescope. Clark, Hutchins, Knorr-Cetina, and Latour insist or imply such a move requires expanding our notions of knowledge, mind, and even consciousness. Whether this is correct seems to me not a straightforward factual question. Rather, the issue seems to be how best to develop (...)
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  28. Ronald N. Giere (2003). A New Program for Philosophy of Science? Philosophy of Science 70 (1):15-21.
    I contend that Janet Kourany's "A Philosophy of Science for the Twenty-First Century" contains three levels of projects: (1) a naturalistic project, (2) a critical project, and (3) a political project. The naturalistic project is already well established. The critical project is less valued and less established within the profession, but seems a worthy and achievable goal. The political project, I argue, takes one outside the professional pursuit of the philosophy of science. The critical project encompasses both the evaluation of (...)
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  29. Ronald N. Giere (2003). Review: Social Empiricism. [REVIEW] Mind 112 (448):799-802.
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  30. Ronald N. Giere (2003). Social Empiricism. Mind 112 (448):799-802.
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  31. Ronald N. Giere (2003). The Dappled World. International Studies in Philosophy 35 (4):189-190.
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  32. Ronald N. Giere & B. Moffatt (2003). Distributed Cognition: Where the Cognitive and the Social Merge. Social Studies of Science 33:301--310.
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  33. Noretta Koertge, Janet A. Kourany, Ronald N. Giere, Peter Gildenhuys, Thomas A. C. Reydon, Stéphanie Ruphy, Samir Okasha, Jaakko Hintikka & John Symons (2003). 10. Simulated Experiments: Methodology for a Virtual World Simulated Experiments: Methodology for a Virtual World (Pp. 105-125). [REVIEW] Philosophy of Science 70 (1).
     
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  34. Barton Moffatt & Ronald N. Giere (2003). Distributed Cognition: Where the Cognitive and the Social Merge. Social Studies of Science 33 (2):301-310.
    Among the many contested boundaries in science studies is that between the cognitive and the social. Here, we are concerned to question this boundary from a perspective within the cognitive sciences based on the notion of distributed cognition. We first present two of many contemporary sources of the notion of distributed cognition, one from the study of artificial neural networks and one from cognitive anthropology. We then proceed to reinterpret two well-known essays by Bruno Latour, ‘Visualization and Cognition: Thinking with (...)
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  35. Ronald N. Giere (2002). Distributed Cognition in Epistemic Cultures. Philosophy of Science 69 (4):637--644.
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  36. Ronald N. Giere (2002). Discussion Note: Distributed Cognition in Epistemic Cultures. Philosophy of Science 69 (4):637-644.
    In Epistemic Cultures (1999), Karin Knorr Cetina argues that different scientific fields exhibit different epistemic cultures. She claims that in high energy physics (HEP) individual persons are displaced as epistemic subjects in favor of experiments themselves. In molecular biology (MB), by contrast, individual persons remain the primary epistemic subjects. Using Ed Hutchins' (1995) account of navigation aboard a traditional US Navy ship as a prototype, I argue that both HEP and MB exhibit forms of distributed cognition. That is, in both (...)
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  37. Ronald N. Giere, How Models Are Used to Represent Physical Reality.
    What are models that they may be used to represent reality? Here is a first pass. Models are objects that can be used to represent reality by exhibiting a designated similarity to physical objects. To be more specific, I need to indicate the kinds of objects models may be and how they may exhibit a designated similarity to real objects. My prototype for a model is a standard road map. This is a physical object (usually made of paper) that I (...)
     
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  38. Ronald N. Giere (2001). Agent Based Teaching. Endoxa 14:35-39.
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  39. Ronald N. Giere (2001). A New Framework for Teaching Scientific Reasoning. Argumentation 15 (1):21-33.
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  40. Ronald N. Giere (2001). The Nature and Function of Models. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (6):1060-1060.
    There is no best scientific model of anything; there are only models more or less good for different purposes. Thus, there is no general answer to the question of whether one should model biological behavior using computer simulations or robots. It all depends on what one wants to learn. This is not a question about models, but about scientific goals.
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  41. Ronald N. Giere (2000). Book Review:The Dappled World: A Study of the Boundaries of Science Nancy Cartwright. [REVIEW] Philosophy of Science 67 (3):527-.
  42. Ronald N. Giere (1999). From W Issenschaftliche Philosophie to Philosophy of Science. University of Chicago Press.
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  43. Ronald N. Giere (1999). Science Without Laws. University of Chicago Press.
    Debate over the nature of science has recently moved from the halls of academia into the public sphere, where it has taken shape as the "science wars." At issue is the question of whether scientific knowledge is objective and universal or socially mediated, whether scientific truths are independent of human values and beliefs. Ronald Giere is a philosopher of science who has been at the forefront of this debate from its inception, and Science without Laws offers a much-needed mediating perspective (...)
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  44. Ronald N. Giere (1999). Using Models to Represent Reality. In. In L. Magnani, N. J. Nersessian & P. Thagard (eds.), Model-Based Reasoning in Scientific Discovery. Kluwer/Plenum. 41--57.
  45. Ronald N. Giere (1997). Scientific Inference: Two Points of View. Philosophy of Science 64 (4):184.
    This short paper serves as an introduction to a debate between representatives of two fundamentally different points of view regarding the nature of scientific inference. Colin Howson and Peter Urbach represent a Bayesian point of view and Deborah Mayo represents a version of classical statistics called error statistics. The paper begins by reviewing earlier versions of the same two points of view due to Rudolf Carnap and Hans Reichenbach, respectively. After a few remarks about philosophical approaches to understanding scientific reasoning (...)
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  46. Ronald N. Giere (1996). The Feminism Question in the Philosophy of Science. In. In Lynn Hankinson Nelson & Jack Nelson (eds.), Feminism, Science, and the Philosophy of Science. 3--15.
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  47. Ronald N. Giere (1996). The Scientist as Adult. Philosophy of Science 63 (4):538-541.
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  48. Ronald N. Giere (1994). No Representation Without Representation. Biology and Philosophy 9 (1):113-120.
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  49. Ronald N. Giere (1994). The Cognitive Structure of Scientific Theories. Philosophy of Science 61 (2):276-296.
    This paper explores a new reason for preferring a model-theoretic approach to understanding the nature of scientific theories. Identifying the models in philosophers' model-theoretic accounts of theories with the concepts in cognitive scientists' accounts of categorization suggests a structure to families of models far richer than has commonly been assumed. Using classical mechanics as an example, it is argued that families of models may be "mapped" as an array with "horizontal" graded structures, multiply hierarchical "vertical" structures, and local "radial" structures. (...)
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