13 found
Sort by:
  1. Ronald Suter (forthcoming). Augustine on Time with Some Criticisms From Wittgenstein. Revue Internationale de Philosophie.
    No categories
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Ronald Suter (2011). Clarifying the Question, "What is This Thing Called Love?". In Adrianne Leigh McEvoy (ed.), Sex, Love, and Friendship: Studies of the Society for the Philosophy of Sex and Love: 1993-2003. Rodopi.
    No categories
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Charles McCracken & Ronald Suter (2005). Memorial Minutes. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 79 (2):123 - 124.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Ronald Suter (2002). George Kerner, 1927-2001. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 75 (5):195 - 196.
    No categories
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Ronald Suter (1990). Characteristics of Criteria. Daimon 2:195-202.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Ronald Suter (1989). Interpreting Wittgenstein: A Cloud of Philosophy, a Drop of Grammar. Temple University Press.
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Ronald Suter (1989). The Early Wittgenstein on Happiness. International Philosophical Quarterly 29 (3):291-299.
  8. Ronald Suter (1986). Saul Wittgenstein's Skeptical Paradox. Philosophical Research Archives 12:183-193.
    Saul Kripke is struck by a skeptical argument which he says is neither Wittgenstein’s nor his own. I call this new skeptic “Saul Wittgenstein”. SW’s conclusion is that there is no such thing as following a rule. My first aim is to show that Kripke misunderstands the Investigations when he says it offers a “skeptical solution” to SW’s paradox. Wittgenstein’s view of philosophy commits him to a dissolution of the paradox. I show next that LW’s writing contains an implicit dissolution (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Ronald Suter (1976). The Dream Argument. American Philosophical Quarterly 13 (3):185 - 194.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Ronald Suter (1971). Strawson's Analysis of Identity Statements. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 31 (4):597-599.
    THIS PAPER DISCUSSES TWO THINGS. FIRST, STRAWSON'S EXPLANATION IN "ON REFERRING" ("MIND," 1950) WHY TWO USES OF SENTENCES OF THE FORM NN=NN MUST DIFFER FROM THOSE OF THE FORM NN=THE F, WHERE 'NN' AND 'THE F' ARE PROPER NAMES AND DEFINITE DESCRIPTIONS, RESPECTIVELY. IT IS SHOWN THAT HIS ACCOUNT OF THE MATTER HAS UNACCEPTABLE CONSEQUENCES. SECONDLY, IT IS DEMONSTRATED THAT HIS EXPLANATION OF THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN SENTENCES OF THE FORM NN=THE F AND THOSE OF THE FORM NN IS (AN) F (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Ronald Suter (1971). Sum is a Logical Consequence of Cogito. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 32 (2):235-240.
    HINTIKKA ("COGITO, ERGO SUM: INFERENCE OR PERFORMANCE?") WISHES TO REJECT (1) IF B(A) THEN THERE EXISTS X SUCH THAT X=A, POINTING OUT THAT IT WOULD CEASE TO BE PROVABLE IN QUANTIFICATION THEORY IF LOGICIANS DROPPED THE DUBIOUS ASSUMPTION THAT (2) ALL THE SINGULAR TERMS WITH WHICH WE HAVE TO DEAL DESIGNATE SOME ACTUALLY EXISTING INDIVIDUAL. HE ALSO ARGUES FOR THE FALSITY OF (3) THINKING ENTAILS EXISTENCE. WILLIAMS ("THE CERTAINTY OF THE COGITO") CONTENDS THAT DESCARTES INFERRED 'I EXIST' FROM 'I THINK' (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Ronald Suter (1969). Statements of Identity and Existential Commitments. Mind 78 (310):262-265.
    No categories
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Ronald Suter (1967). Russell's "Refutation" of Meinong in "on Denoting". Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 27 (4):512-516.
    The author replies to ronald suter's "russell's 'refutation' of meinong in 'on denoting'," "philosophy and phenomenological research," june, 1967. suter's interpretation of one of russell's arguments is criticized on exegetical grounds, and his defense of another argument is rebutted on logical grounds. meinong's thesis is presented as the thesis that all statements of a certain form are true. it is argued that all of russell's arguments are attempts to pose counter-examples to this single view. meinong is defended against russell's counter-examples.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation