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Profile: Rory Madden (University College London)
  1.  62
    Rory Madden (2015). The Naive Topology of the Conscious Subject. Noûs 49 (1):55-70.
    What does our naïve conception of a conscious subject demand of the nature of conscious beings? In a series of recent papers David Barnett has argued that a range of powerful intuitions in the philosophy of mind are best explained by the hypothesis that our naïve conception imposes a requirement of mereological simplicity on the nature of conscious beings. It is argued here that there is a much more plausible explanation of the intuitions in question. Our naïve conception of a (...)
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  2.  15
    Rory Madden (2015). On Myself, and Other, Less Important Subjects, by Caspar Hare. Mind 124 (495):914-919.
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  3. Rory Madden (2013). Could a Brain in a Vat Self‐Refer? European Journal of Philosophy 21 (1):74-93.
    : Radical sceptical possibilities challenge the anti-realist view that truth consists in ideal rational acceptability. Putnam, as part of his defence of an anti-realist view, subjected the case of the brain in a vat to a semantic externalist treatment, which aimed to maintain the desired connection between truth and ideal rational acceptability. It is argued here that self-consciousness poses special problems for this externalist strategy. It is shown how, on a standard model of first-person reference, Putnam's brain in a vat (...)
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  4.  74
    Rory Madden (2011). Intention and the Self. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111 (3pt3):325-351.
    Does intention presuppose personal identity, and what relevance does the issue have for the contemporary personal identity debate? I distinguish three ways in which intention might be said to presuppose personal identity, focusing mainly on causal presupposition and content presupposition. I argue that intention often causally presupposes personal identity. I argue that intention does not content-presuppose personal identity. The former result is a potential basis for a Butlerian circularity objection to Lockean theories of personal identity. The latter result undercuts a (...)
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  5.  9
    Rory Madden (2015). The Place of The Self in Contemporary Metaphysics. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 76:77-95.
    I explain why the compositionalist conception of ordinary objects prevalent in contemporary metaphysics places the manifest image of the human self in a precarious position: the two theoretically simplest views of the existence of composites each jeopardize some central element of the manifest image. I present an alternative, nomological conception of ordinary objects, which secures the manifest image of the human self without the arbitrariness that afflicts compositionalist attempts to do the same. I close by sketching the consequences of the (...)
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  6.  3
    Rory Madden (2014). The Limits of Realism, by Tim Button. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013, 288 Pp. ISBN 978-0-19-967217-2 Hb £45.00. [REVIEW] European Journal of Philosophy 22:e4-e8.
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  7. Rory Madden (2011). Externalism and Brain Transplants. In Karen Bennett & Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics Volume 6. OUP Oxford
     
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  8. Rory Madden, The Persistence of Animate Organisms.
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  9. Rory Madden (forthcoming). Thinking Parts. In Stephan Blatti & Paul F. Snowdon (eds.), Essays on Animalism. Oxford University Press
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