8 found
Sort by:
See also:
Profile: Rory Madden (University College London)
  1. Rory Madden, The Persistence of Animate Organisms.
    No categories
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Rory Madden (forthcoming). Thinking Parts. In Stephan Blatti & Paul F. Snowdon (eds.), Essays on Animalism. Oxford University Press
    No categories
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Rory Madden (2015). On Myself, and Other, Less Important Subjects, by Caspar Hare. Mind 124 (495):914-919.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Rory Madden (2015). The Naive Topology of the Conscious Subject. Noûs 49 (1):55-70.
    What does our naïve conception of a conscious subject demand of the nature of conscious beings? In a series of recent papers David Barnett has argued that a range of powerful intuitions in the philosophy of mind are best explained by the hypothesis that our naïve conception imposes a requirement of mereological simplicity on the nature of conscious beings. It is argued here that there is a much more plausible explanation of the intuitions in question. Our naïve conception of a (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Rory Madden (2015). The Place of The Self in Contemporary Metaphysics. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 76:77-95.
    I explain why the compositionalist conception of ordinary objects prevalent in contemporary metaphysics places the manifest image of the human self in a precarious position: the two theoretically simplest views of the existence of composites each jeopardize some central element of the manifest image. I present an alternative, nomological conception of ordinary objects, which secures the manifest image of the human self without the arbitrariness that afflicts compositionalist attempts to do the same. I close by sketching the consequences of the (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Rory Madden (2013). Could a Brain in a Vat Self‐Refer? European Journal of Philosophy 21 (1):74-93.
    : Radical sceptical possibilities challenge the anti-realist view that truth consists in ideal rational acceptability. Putnam, as part of his defence of an anti-realist view, subjected the case of the brain in a vat to a semantic externalist treatment, which aimed to maintain the desired connection between truth and ideal rational acceptability. It is argued here that self-consciousness poses special problems for this externalist strategy. It is shown how, on a standard model of first-person reference, Putnam's brain in a vat (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Rory Madden (2011). Externalism and Brain Transplants. In Karen Bennett & Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics Volume 6. OUP Oxford
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Rory Madden (2011). Intention and the Self. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111 (3pt3):325-351.
    Does intention presuppose personal identity, and what relevance does the issue have for the contemporary personal identity debate? I distinguish three ways in which intention might be said to presuppose personal identity, focusing mainly on causal presupposition and content presupposition. I argue that intention often causally presupposes personal identity. I argue that intention does not content-presuppose personal identity. The former result is a potential basis for a Butlerian circularity objection to Lockean theories of personal identity. The latter result undercuts a (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation