Search results for 'Rory Smead Brian Skyrms' (try it on Scholar)

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  1.  47
    Simon M. Huttegger, Brian Skyrms, Rory Smead & Kevin J. S. Zollman (2010). Evolutionary Dynamics of Lewis Signaling Games: Signaling Systems Vs. Partial Pooling. [REVIEW] Synthese 172 (1):177 - 191.
    Transfer of information between senders and receivers, of one kind or another, is essential to all life. David Lewis introduced a game theoretic model of the simplest case, where one sender and one receiver have pure common interest. How hard or easy is it for evolution to achieve information transfer in Lewis signaling?. The answers involve surprising subtleties. We discuss some if these in terms of evolutionary dynamics in both finite and infinite populations, with and without mutation.
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  2. Simon M. Huttegger, Brian Skyrms, Rory Smead & Kevin J. S. Zollman (2010). Evolutionary Dynamics of Lewis Signaling Games: Signaling Systems Vs. Partial Pooling. Synthese 172 (1):177-191.
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  3.  11
    Rory Smead (2011). Brian Skyrms , Signals: Evolution, Learning, and Information . New York: Oxford University Press (2010), 208 Pp., $27.00 (Paper). [REVIEW] Philosophy of Science 78 (4):702-705.
  4.  10
    Brian McLoone & Rory Smead (2014). The Ontogeny and Evolution of Human Collaboration. Biology and Philosophy 29 (4):559-576.
    How is the human tendency and ability to collaborate acquired and how did it evolve? This paper explores the ontogeny and evolution of human collaboration using a combination of theoretical and empirical resources. We present a game theoretic model of the evolution of learning in the Stag Hunt game, which predicts the evolution of a built-in cooperative bias. We then survey recent empirical results on the ontogeny of collaboration in humans, which suggest the ability to collaborate is developmentally stable across (...)
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  5.  19
    Brian Skyrms (2010). Signals: Evolution, Learning, and Information. OUP Oxford.
    Brian Skyrms offers a fascinating demonstration of how fundamental signals are to our world. He uses various scientific tools to investigate how meaning and communication develop. Signals operate in networks of senders and receivers at all levels of life, transmitting and processing information. That is how humans and animals think and interact.
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  6. Brian Skyrms (2006). The Stag Hunt and the Evolution of Social Structure. Cambridge University Press.
    Brian Skyrms, author of the successful Evolution of the Social Contract has written a sequel. The book is a study of ideas of cooperation and collective action. The point of departure is a prototypical story found in Rousseau's A Discourse on Inequality. Rousseau contrasts the pay-off of hunting hare where the risk of non-cooperation is small but the reward is equally small, against the pay-off of hunting the stag where maximum cooperation is required but where the reward (...)
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  7.  22
    Brian Skyrms (1996). Evolution of the Social Contract. Cambridge University Press.
    In this book, Brian Skyrms, a recognised authority on game and decision theory, investigates traditional problems of the social contract in terms of evolutionary dynamics. Game theory is employed to offer new interpretations of a wide variety of social phenomena, including justice, mutual aid, commitment, convention and meaning. Skyrms eschews any grand, unified theory. Rather, he presents the reader with tools drawn from evolutionary game theory for the purpose of analysing and coming to understand the social contract. (...)
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  8.  9
    Brian Skyrms (2012). Learning to Signal with Probe and Adjust. Episteme 9 (2):139-150.
    Research Articles Brian Skyrms, Episteme, FirstView Article.
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  9. Brian Skyrms (2012). Evolution of the Social Contract. Cambridge University Press.
    In this pithy and highly readable book, Brian Skyrms, a recognised authority on game and decision theory, investigates traditional problems of the social contract in terms of evolutionary dynamics. Game theory is skilfully employed to offer new interpretations of a wide variety of social phenomena, including justice, mutual aid, commitment, convention and meaning. The author eschews any grand, unified theory. Rather, he presents the reader with tools drawn from evolutionary game theory for the purpose of analysing and coming (...)
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  10. Brian Skyrms (2012). From Zeno to Arbitrage: Essays on Quantity, Coherence, and Induction. Oxford University Press Uk.
    Brian Skyrms presents a set of influential essays on the nature of quantity, probability, coherence, and induction. The first part explores the nature of quantity and includes essays on tractarian nominalism, combinatorial possibility, and coherence. Part Two proceeds to examine coherent updating of degrees of belief in various learning situations. Finally, in Part Three, Skyrms develops an account of aspects of inductive reasoning, which proceeds from specific problems to general considerations. These essays span the breadth of (...)'s illustrious career and will be essential reading for scholars and advanced students in philosophy of science and formal epistemology. (shrink)
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  11. Brian Skyrms (2012). The Stag Hunt and the Evolution of Social Structure. Cambridge University Press.
    Brian Skyrms, author of the successful Evolution of the Social Contract has written a sequel. The book is a study of ideas of cooperation and collective action. The point of departure is a prototypical story found in Rousseau's A Discourse on Inequality. Rousseau contrasts the pay-off of hunting hare where the risk of non-cooperation is small but the reward is equally small, against the pay-off of hunting the stag where maximum cooperation is required but where the reward (...)
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  12. Brian Skyrms (2003). The Stag Hunt and the Evolution of Social Structure. Cambridge University Press.
    Brian Skyrms, author of the successful Evolution of the Social Contract has written a sequel. The book is a study of ideas of cooperation and collective action. The point of departure is a prototypical story found in Rousseau's A Discourse on Inequality. Rousseau contrasts the pay-off of hunting hare where the risk of non-cooperation is small but the reward is equally small, against the pay-off of hunting the stag where maximum cooperation is required but where the reward (...)
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  13. Brian Skyrms (2014). Evolution of the Social Contract. Cambridge University Press.
    In this new edition of Evolution of the Social Contract, Brian Skyrms uses evolutionary game theory to analyze the genesis of social contracts and investigates social phenomena including justice, communication, altruism, and bargaining. Featuring new material on evolution and information transfer, and including recent developments in game theory and evolution literature, his book introduces and applies appropriate concepts of equilibrium and evolutionary dynamics, showing how key issues can be modeled as games and considering the ways in which evolution (...)
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  14.  10
    Brian Skyrms (2014). Social Dynamics. OUP Oxford.
    Brian Skyrms applies adaptive dynamics (of cultural evolution and individual learning) to social theory, investigating altruism, spite, fairness, trust, division of labor, and signaling. Correlation is seen to be fundamental. Spontaneous emergence of social structure and of signaling systems are examined in the context of learning dynamics.
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  15.  9
    Brian Skyrms (1980). Causal Necessity: A Pragmatic Investigation of the Necessity of Laws. Yale University Press.
  16. Brian Skyrms (1990). The Dynamics of Rational Deliberation. Harvard University Press.
     
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  17.  19
    Brian Skyrms, Raffaele Argiento, Robin Pemantle & and Stanislav Volkov, Learning to Signal: Analysis of a Micro-Level Reinforcement Model.
    We consider the following signaling game. Nature plays first from the set {1, 2}. Player 1 (the Sender) sees this and plays from the set {A, B}. Player 2 (the Receiver) sees only Player 1’s play and plays from the set {1, 2}. Both players win if Player 2’s play equals Nature’s play and lose otherwise. Players are told whether they have won or lost, and the game is repeated. An urn scheme for learning coordination in this game is as (...)
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  18.  4
    Brian Skyrms (1988). Pragmatics and Empiricism. Philosophical Review 97 (1):118-121.
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  19.  34
    Brian Skyrms (2008). Signals. Philosophy of Science 75 (5):489-500.
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  20.  35
    Brian Skyrms, A Dynamic Model of Social Network Formation.
    This contribution is part of the special series of Inaugural Articles by members of the National Academy of Sciences elected on April 27, 1999.
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  21.  37
    Patrick Forber & Rory Smead (2014). An Evolutionary Paradox for Prosocial Behavior. Journal of Philosophy 111 (3):151-166.
    We investigate how changes to the payoffs of cooperative behavior affect the evolutionary dynamics. Paradoxically, the larger the benefits of cooperation, the less likely it is to evolve. This holds true even in cases where cooperation is strictly dominant. Increasing the benefits from prosocial behavior has two effects: first, in some circumstances it promotes the evolution of spite; and second, it can decrease the strength of selection leading to nearly neutral evolution of strategies. In light of these results we must (...)
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  22. Cristina Bicchieri, Richard Jeffrey & Brian Skyrms (eds.) (2009). The Dynamics of Norms. Cambridge University Press.
    In the social sciences norms are sometimes taken to play a key explanatory role. Yet norms differ from group to group, from society to society, and from species to species. How are norms formed and how do they change? This 'state-of-the-art' collection of essays presents some of the best contemporary research into the dynamic processes underlying the formation, maintenance, metamorphosis and dissolution of norms. The volume combines formal modelling with more traditional analysis, and considers biological and cultural evolution, individual learning, (...)
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  23.  57
    John Basl, Ronald Sandler, Rory Smead & Patrick Forber (2014). A Bargaining Game Analysis of International Climate Negotiations. Nature Climate Change 4:442-445.
    Climate negotiations under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change have so far failed to achieve a robust international agreement to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Game theory has been used to investigate possible climate negotiation solutions and strategies for accomplishing them. Negotiations have been primarily modelled as public goods games such as the Prisoner’s Dilemma, though coordination games or games of conflict have also been used. Many of these models have solutions, in the form of equilibria, corresponding to possible (...)
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  24.  27
    Jeffrey A. Barrett & Brian Skyrms (forthcoming). Self-Assembling Games. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axv043.
    We consider how cue-reading, sensory-manipulation, and signalling games may initially evolve from ritualized decisions and how more complex games may evolve from simpler games by polymerization, template transfer, and modular composition. Modular composition is a process that combines simpler games into more complex games. Template transfer, a process by which a game is appropriated to a context other than the one in which it initially evolved, is one mechanism for modular composition. And polymerization is a particularly salient example of modular (...)
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  25.  14
    Simon M. Huttegger & Brian Skyrms (forthcoming). Learning to Transfer Information. Studia Logica.
  26. Brian Skyrms (1980). Higher Order Degrees of Belief. In D. H. Mellor (ed.), Prospects for Pragmatism. Cambridge University Press 109--137.
     
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  27. Jason Alexander & Brian Skyrms (1999). Bargaining with Neighbors: Is Justice Contagious? Journal of Philosophy 96 (11):588-598.
  28.  29
    Simon M. Huttegger, Brian Skyrms & Kevin J. S. Zollman (2013). Probe and Adjust in Information Transfer Games. Erkenntnis 79 (S4):1-19.
    We study a low-rationality learning dynamics called probe and adjust. Our emphasis is on its properties in games of information transfer such as the Lewis signaling game or the Bala-Goyal network game. These games fall into the class of weakly better reply games, in which, starting from any action profile, there is a weakly better reply path to a strict Nash equilibrium. We prove that probe and adjust will be close to strict Nash equilibria in this class of games with (...)
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  29. Brian Skyrms (1975). Choice and Chance: An Introduction to Inductive Logic. Dickenson Pub. Co..
  30.  58
    Ellery Eells, Brian Skyrms & Ernest W. Adams (eds.) (1994). Probability and Conditionals: Belief Revision and Rational Decision. Cambridge University Press.
    This is a 'state of the art' collection of essays on the relation between probabilities, especially conditional probabilities, and conditionals. It provides new negative results which sharply limit the ways conditionals can be related to conditional probabilities. There are also positive ideas and results which will open up new areas of research. The collection is intended to honour Ernest W. Adams, whose seminal work is largely responsible for creating this area of inquiry. As well as describing, evaluating, and applying Adams (...)
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  31.  56
    Brian Skyrms (1982). Causal Decision Theory. Journal of Philosophy 79 (11):695-711.
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  32. Cristina Bicchieri & Brian Skyrms (1996). Rationality and Coordination. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 47 (4):627-629.
    This book explores how individual actions coordinate to produce unintended social consequences. In the past this phenomenon has been explained as the outcome of rational, self-interested individual behaviour. Professor Bicchieri shows that this is in no way a satisfying explanation. She discusses how much knowledge is needed by agents in order to coordinate successfully. If the answer is unbounded knowledge, then a whole variety of paradoxes arise. If the answer is very little knowledge, then there seems hardly any possibility of (...)
     
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  33.  27
    Brian Skyrms (2000). Stability and Explanatory Significance of Some Simple Evolutionary Models. Philosophy of Science 67 (1):94-113.
    even if an equilibrium is asymptotically stable, that is no guarantee that the system will reach that equilibrium unless we know that the system's initial state is sufficiently close to the equilibrium. Global stability of an equilibrium, when we have it, gives the equilibrium a much more powerful explanatory role. An equilibrium is globally asymptotically stable if the dynamics carries every possible initial state in the interior of the state space to that equilibrium. If an equilibrium is globally stable, it (...)
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  34.  8
    Brian Skyrms & Simon M. Huttegger (2013). Emergence of a Signaling Network with Probe and Adjust. In Kim Sterelny, Richard Joyce, Brett Calcott & Ben Fraser (eds.), Cooperation and its Evolution. MIT Press 265.
  35.  27
    Brian Skyrms (1987). Dynamic Coherence and Probability Kinematics. Philosophy of Science 54 (1):1-20.
    The question of coherence of rules for changing degrees of belief in the light of new evidence is studied, with special attention being given to cases in which evidence is uncertain. Belief change by the rule of conditionalization on an appropriate proposition and belief change by "probability kinematics" on an appropriate partition are shown to have like status.
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  36.  7
    Rory Smead (2014). Deception and the Evolution of Plasticity. Philosophy of Science 81 (5):852-865.
    Recent models using simple signaling games provide a theoretical setting for investigating the evolutionary connection between signaling and behavioral plasticity. These models have shown that plasticity is typically eliminated in common-interest signaling games. In many real cases of signaling, however, interests do not align. Here, I present a model of the evolution of plasticity in signaling games and consider games of common, opposed, and partially aligned interests. I find that the setting of partial common interest is most conducive to the (...)
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  37. Brian Skyrms (1994). Sex and Justice. Journal of Philosophy 91 (6):305-320.
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  38.  4
    Brian Skyrms (1966). Choice and Chance. Belmont, Calif.,Dickenson Pub. Co..
  39. Brian Skyrms (1981). Tractarian Nominalism. Philosophical Studies 40 (2):199 - 206.
  40.  21
    Rory Smead (2008). The Evolution of Cooperation in the Centipede Game with Finite Populations. Philosophy of Science 75 (2):157-177.
    The partial cooperation displayed by subjects in the Centipede Game deviates radically from the predictions of traditional game theory. Even standard, infinite population, evolutionary settings have failed to provide an explanation for this behavior. However, recent work in finite population evolutionary models has shown that such settings can produce radically different results from the standard models. This paper examines the evolution of partial cooperation in finite populations. The results reveal a new possible explanation that is not open to the standard (...)
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  41.  60
    Brian Skyrms (1994). Darwin Meets the Logic of Decision: Correlation in Evolutionary Game Theory. Philosophy of Science 61 (4):503-528.
    The proper treatment of correlation in evolutionary game theory has unexpected connections with recent philosophical discussions of the theory of rational decision. The Logic of Decision (Jeffrey 1983) provides the correct framework for correlated evolutionary game theory and a variant of "ratifiability" is the appropriate generalization of "evolutionarily stable strategy". The resulting theory unifies the treatment of correlation due to kin, population viscosity, detection, signaling, reciprocal altruism, and behavior-dependent contexts. It is shown that (1) a strictly dominated strategy (...)
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  42.  51
    Brian Skyrms, Evolution of Signaling Systems with Multiple Senders and Receivers.
    To coordinate action, information must be transmitted, processed, and utilized to make decisions. Transmission of information requires the existence of a signaling system in which the signals that are exchanged are coordinated with the appropriate content. Signaling systems in nature range from quorum signaling in bacteria [Schauder and Bassler, Kaiser ], through the dance of the bees [Dyer and Seeley ], birdcalls [Hailman, Ficken, and Ficken, Gyger, Marler and Pickert, Evans, Evans, and Marler, Charrier and Sturdy ], and alarm calls (...)
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  43. Brian Skyrms (1967). The Explication of "X Knows That P". Journal of Philosophy 64 (12):373-389.
  44. Gabriele Taylor, Brian Mcguinness, Sir Michael Dummett, Patrick Suppes, Brian Skyrms & Stathis Psillos (2006). Cambridge and Vienna: Frank P. Ramsey and the Vienna Circle. Springer Netherlands.
     
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  45.  5
    Brian Skyrms (1981). Conditional Probability, Taxicabs, and Martingales. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):351.
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  46. Brian Skyrms (1966). Nomological Necessity and the Paradoxes of Confirmation. Philosophy of Science 33 (3):230-249.
    Some of the concerns which motivate attempts to provide a philosophical reduction of nomological necessity are briefly introduced in I. In II, Hempel's treatment of the paradoxes is contrasted with a position which holds that nomological necessity is a pragmatic dimension of laws of nature, and that this pragmatic dimension is of such a type that it prevents laws of nature from contraposing. Such a position is, however, untenable unless (i) the sense of 'pragmatics' at issue is specified, and the (...)
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  47. Brian Skyrms (1992). Coherence, Probability and Induction. Philosophical Issues 2:215-226.
  48.  13
    Rory Smead & Kevin J. S. Zollman, The Stability of Strategic Plasticity.
    Recent research into the evolution of higher cognition has piqued an interest in the effect of natural selection on the ability of creatures to respond to their environment. It is believed that environmental variation is required for plasticity to evolve in cases where the ability to be plastic is costly. We investigate one form of environmental variation: frequency dependent selection. Using tools in game theory, we investigate a few models of plasticity and outline the cases where selection would be expected (...)
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  49.  23
    Rory Smead & Kevin J. S. Zollman, The Stability of Strategic Plasticity.
    Recent research into the evolution of higher cognition has piqued an interest in the effect of natural selection on the ability of creatures to respond to their environment (behavioral plasticity). It is believed that environmental variation is required for plasticity to evolve in cases where the ability to be plastic is costly. We investigate one form of environmental variation: frequency dependent selection. Using tools in game theory, we investigate a few models of plasticity and outline the cases where selection would (...)
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  50.  46
    Brian Skyrms (2010). The Flow of Information in Signaling Games. Philosophical Studies 147 (1):155 - 165.
    Both the quantity of information and the informational content of a signal are defined in the context of signaling games. Informational content is a generalization of standard philosophical notions of propositional content. It is shown how signals that initially carry no information may spontaneously acquire informational content by evolutionary or learning dynamics. It is shown how information can flow through signaling chains or signaling networks.
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