Search results for 'Rory Smead Brian Skyrms' (try it on Scholar)

998 found
Sort by:
  1. Simon M. Huttegger, Brian Skyrms, Rory Smead & Kevin J. S. Zollman (2010). Evolutionary Dynamics of Lewis Signaling Games: Signaling Systems Vs. Partial Pooling. [REVIEW] Synthese 172 (1):177 - 191.score: 19200.0
    Transfer of information between senders and receivers, of one kind or another, is essential to all life. David Lewis introduced a game theoretic model of the simplest case, where one sender and one receiver have pure common interest. How hard or easy is it for evolution to achieve information transfer in Lewis signaling?. The answers involve surprising subtleties. We discuss some if these in terms of evolutionary dynamics in both finite and infinite populations, with and without mutation.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Rory Smead (2011). Brian Skyrms , Signals: Evolution, Learning, and Information . New York: Oxford University Press (2010), 208 Pp., $27.00 (Paper). [REVIEW] Philosophy of Science 78 (4):702-705.score: 3180.0
  3. Brian McLoone & Rory Smead (2014). The Ontogeny and Evolution of Human Collaboration. Biology and Philosophy 29 (4):559-576.score: 810.0
    How is the human tendency and ability to collaborate acquired and how did it evolve? This paper explores the ontogeny and evolution of human collaboration using a combination of theoretical and empirical resources. We present a game theoretic model of the evolution of learning in the Stag Hunt game, which predicts the evolution of a built-in cooperative bias. We then survey recent empirical results on the ontogeny of collaboration in humans, which suggest the ability to collaborate is developmentally stable across (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Brian Skyrms (2010). Signals: Evolution, Learning, and Information. OUP Oxford.score: 510.0
    Brian Skyrms presents a fascinating exploration of how fundamental signals are to our world. He uses a variety of tools -- theories of signaling games, information, evolution, and learning -- to investigate how meaning and communication develop. He shows how signaling games themselves evolve, and introduces a new model of learning with invention. The juxtaposition of atomic signals leads to complex signals, as the natural product of gradual process. Signals operate in networks of senders and receivers at all (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Brian Skyrms (1996). Evolution of the Social Contract. Cambridge University Press.score: 510.0
    In this book, Brian Skyrms, a recognised authority on game and decision theory, investigates traditional problems of the social contract in terms of evolutionary dynamics. Game theory is employed to offer new interpretations of a wide variety of social phenomena, including justice, mutual aid, commitment, convention and meaning. Skyrms eschews any grand, unified theory. Rather, he presents the reader with tools drawn from evolutionary game theory for the purpose of analysing and coming to understand the social contract. (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Brian Skyrms (2014). Social Dynamics. Oup Oxford.score: 510.0
    Brian Skyrms applies adaptive dynamics (of cultural evolution and individual learning) to social theory, investigating altruism, spite, fairness, trust, division of labor, and signaling. Correlation is seen to be fundamental. Spontaneous emergence of social structure and of signaling systems are examined in the context of learning dynamics.
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Brian Skyrms (1967). The Explication of "X Knows That P". Journal of Philosophy 64 (12):373-389.score: 240.0
  8. Brian Skyrms (1981). Tractarian Nominalism. Philosophical Studies 40 (2):199 - 206.score: 240.0
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Brian Skyrms (1976). Possible Worlds, Physics and Metaphysics. Philosophical Studies 30 (5):323 - 332.score: 240.0
    No categories
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Brian Skyrms (1994). Sex and Justice. Journal of Philosophy 91 (6):305-320.score: 240.0
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Brian Skyrms (1994). Darwin Meets the Logic of Decision: Correlation in Evolutionary Game Theory. Philosophy of Science 61 (4):503-528.score: 240.0
    The proper treatment of correlation in evolutionary game theory has unexpected connections with recent philosophical discussions of the theory of rational decision. The Logic of Decision (Jeffrey 1983) provides the correct framework for correlated evolutionary game theory and a variant of "ratifiability" is the appropriate generalization of "evolutionarily stable strategy". The resulting theory unifies the treatment of correlation due to kin, population viscosity, detection, signaling, reciprocal altruism, and behavior-dependent contexts. It is shown that (1) a strictly dominated strategy may be (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Brian Skyrms & Bill Harms, Evolution of Moral Norms.score: 240.0
    Moral norms are the rules of morality, those that people actually follow, and those that we feel people ought to follow, even when they don’t. Historically, the social sciences have been primarily concerned with describing the many forms that moral norms take in various cultures, with the emerging implication that moral norms are mere arbitrary products of culture. Philosophers, on the other hand, have been more concerned with trying to understand the nature and source of rules that all cultures ought (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Brian Skyrms (2008). Trust, Risk, and the Social Contract. Synthese 160 (1):21 - 25.score: 240.0
    The problem of trust is discussed in terms of David Hume’s meadow-draining example. This is analyzed in terms of rational choice, evolutionary game theory and a dynamic model of social network formation. The kind of explanation that postulates an innate predisposition to trust is seen to be unnecessary when social network dynamics is taken into account.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Ellery Eells, Brian Skyrms & Ernest W. Adams (eds.) (1994). Probability and Conditionals: Belief Revision and Rational Decision. Cambridge University Press.score: 240.0
    This is a 'state of the art' collection of essays on the relation between probabilities, especially conditional probabilities, and conditionals. It provides new negative results which sharply limit the ways conditionals can be related to conditional probabilities. There are also positive ideas and results which will open up new areas of research. The collection is intended to honour Ernest W. Adams, whose seminal work is largely responsible for creating this area of inquiry. As well as describing, evaluating, and applying Adams' (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Brian Skyrms (1975). Choice and Chance: An Introduction to Inductive Logic. Dickenson Pub. Co..score: 240.0
  16. Jason Alexander & Brian Skyrms (1999). Bargaining with Neighbors: Is Justice Contagious? Journal of Philosophy 96 (11):588-598.score: 240.0
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Brian Skyrms (2010). The Flow of Information in Signaling Games. Philosophical Studies 147 (1):155 - 165.score: 240.0
    Both the quantity of information and the informational content of a signal are defined in the context of signaling games. Informational content is a generalization of standard philosophical notions of propositional content. It is shown how signals that initially carry no information may spontaneously acquire informational content by evolutionary or learning dynamics. It is shown how information can flow through signaling chains or signaling networks.
    No categories
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Brian Skyrms (1982). Causal Decision Theory. Journal of Philosophy 79 (11):695-711.score: 240.0
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Brian Skyrms (2008). Signals. Philosophy of Science 75 (5).score: 240.0
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Brian Skyrms (1966). Nomological Necessity and the Paradoxes of Confirmation. Philosophy of Science 33 (3):230-249.score: 240.0
    Some of the concerns which motivate attempts to provide a philosophical reduction of nomological necessity are briefly introduced in I. In II, Hempel's treatment of the paradoxes is contrasted with a position which holds that nomological necessity is a pragmatic dimension of laws of nature, and that this pragmatic dimension is of such a type that it prevents laws of nature from contraposing. Such a position is, however, untenable unless (i) the sense of 'pragmatics' at issue is specified, and the (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. Brian Skyrms (2001). The Stag Hunt. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 75 (2):31 - 41.score: 240.0
    If it was a matter of hunting a deer, everyone well realized that he must remain faithful to his post; but if a hare happened to pass within reach of one of them, we cannot doubt that he would have gone off in pursuit of it without scruple..." Rousseau's story of the hunt leaves many questions open. What are the values of a hare and of an individual's share of the deer given a successful hunt? What is the probability that (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. Cristina Bicchieri, Richard C. Jeffrey & Brian Skyrms (eds.) (1999). The Logic of Strategy. Oxford University Press.score: 240.0
    Edited by three leading figures in the field, this exciting volume presents cutting-edge work in decision theory by a distinguished international roster of contributors. These mostly unpublished papers address a host of crucial areas in the contemporary philosophical study of rationality and knowledge. Topics include causal versus evidential decision theory, game theory, backwards induction, bounded rationality, counterfactual reasoning in games and in general, analyses of the famous common knowledge assumptions in game theory, and evaluations of the normal versus extensive form (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. William Harms & Brian Skyrms, Evolution of Moral Norms.score: 240.0
    Moral norms are the rules of morality, those that people actually follow, and those that we feel people ought to follow, even when they don’t. Historically, the social sciences have been primarily concerned with describing the many forms that moral norms take in various cultures, with the emerging implication that moral norms are mere arbitrary products of culture. Philosophers, on the other hand, have been more concerned with trying to understand the nature and source of rules that all cultures ought (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. Brian Skyrms (1993). Logical Atoms and Combinatorial Possibility. Journal of Philosophy 60 (5):219-232.score: 240.0
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. Brian Skyrms (1984). EPR: Lessons for Metaphysics. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 9 (1):245-255.score: 240.0
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. Brian Skyrms (1992). Coherence, Probability and Induction. Philosophical Issues 2:215-226.score: 240.0
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. Rory Smead (2010). Indirect Reciprocity and the Evolution of “Moral Signals”. Biology and Philosophy 25 (1):33-51.score: 240.0
    Signals regarding the behavior of others are an essential element of human moral systems and there are important evolutionary connections between language and large-scale cooperation. In particular, social communication may be required for the reputation tracking needed to stabilize indirect reciprocity. Additionally, scholars have suggested that the benefits of indirect reciprocity may have been important for the evolution of language and that social signals may have coevolved with large-scale cooperation. This paper investigates the possibility of such a coevolution. Using the (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. Brian Skyrms (1978). An Immaculate Conception of Modality or How to Confuse Use and Mention. Journal of Philosophy 75 (7):368-387.score: 240.0
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. Brian Skyrms (2000). Just Playing: Game Theory and the Social Contract Vol. 2, Ken Binmore. MIT Press, 1998, XXIII + 589 Pages. [REVIEW] Economics and Philosophy 16 (1):147-174.score: 240.0
  30. Brian Skyrms & Ernest Sosa (1965). Necessity, the a Priori, and Unexpressible Statements. Philosophical Studies 16 (5):65 - 74.score: 240.0
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. Brian Skyrms (1977). Resiliency, Propensities, and Causal Necessity. Journal of Philosophy 74 (11):704-713.score: 240.0
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. Brian Skyrms, Evolution of Signaling Systems with Multiple Senders and Receivers.score: 240.0
    To coordinate action, information must be transmitted, processed, and utilized to make decisions. Transmission of information requires the existence of a signaling system in which the signals that are exchanged are coordinated with the appropriate content. Signaling systems in nature range from quorum signaling in bacteria [Schauder and Bassler (2001), Kaiser (2004)], through the dance of the bees [Dyer and Seeley (1991)], birdcalls [Hailman, Ficken, and Ficken (1985), Gyger, Marler and Pickert (1987), Evans, Evans, and Marler (1994), Charrier and (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  33. Brian Skyrms (2002). Signals, Evolution and the Explanatory Power of Transient Information. Philosophy of Science 69 (3):407-428.score: 240.0
    Pre‐play signals that cost nothing are sometimes thought to be of no significance in interactions which are not games of pure common interest. We investigate the effect of pre‐play signals in an evolutionary setting for Assurance, or Stag Hunt, games and for a Bargaining game. The evolutionary game with signals is found to have dramatically different dynamics from the same game without signals. Signals change stability properties of equilibria in the base game, create new polymorphic equilibria, and change the basins (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. Brian Skyrms (1998). Subjunctive Conditionals and Revealed Preference. Philosophy of Science 65 (4):545-574.score: 240.0
    Subjunctive conditionals are fundamental to rational decision both in single agent and multiple agent decision problems. They need explicit analysis only when they cause problems, as they do in recent discussions of rationality in extensive form games. This paper examines subjunctive conditionals in the theory of games using a strict revealed preference interpretation of utility. Two very different models of games are investigated, the classical model and the limits of reality model. In the classical model the logic of backward induction (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  35. Daniel C. Dennett, Brian Skyrms & Lawrence Sklar, -2001.score: 240.0
    Paul Valéry1 Valéry’s “Variation sur Descartes” excellently evokes the vanishing act that has haunted philosophy ever since Darwin overturned the Cartesian tradition. If my body is composed of nothing but a team of a few trillion robotic cells, mindlessly interacting to produce all the large-scale patterns that tradition would attribute to the nonmechanical workings of my mind, there seems to be nothing left over to be me. Lurking in Darwin’s shadow there is a bugbear: the incredible Disappearing Self.2 One of (...)
    No categories
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  36. Patrick Forber & Rory Smead (2014). An Evolutionary Paradox for Prosocial Behavior. Journal of Philosophy 111 (3):151-166.score: 240.0
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  37. Simon Huttegger & Rory Smead (2011). Efficient Social Contracts and Group Selection. Biology and Philosophy 26 (4):517-531.score: 240.0
    We consider the Stag Hunt in terms of Maynard Smith’s famous Haystack model. In the Stag Hunt, contrary to the Prisoner’s Dilemma, there is a cooperative equilibrium besides the equilibrium where every player defects. This implies that in the Haystack model, where a population is partitioned into groups, groups playing the cooperative equilibrium tend to grow faster than those at the non-cooperative equilibrium. We determine under what conditions this leads to the takeover of the population by cooperators. Moreover, we compare (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  38. Brian Skyrms, A Dynamic Model of Social Network Formation.score: 240.0
    This contribution is part of the special series of Inaugural Articles by members of the National Academy of Sciences elected on April 27, 1999.
    No categories
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  39. Brian Skyrms, Fermat and Pascal on Probability.score: 240.0
    Italian writers of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, notably Pacioli (1494), Tartaglia (1556), and Cardan (1545), had discussed the problem of the division of a stake between two players whose game was interrupted before its close. The problem was proposed to Pascal and Fermat, probably in 1654, by the Chevalier de M´er´e, a gambler who is said to have had unusual ability “even for the mathematics.” The correspondence which ensued between Fermat and Pascal, was fundamental in the development of modern (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  40. Brian Skyrms (1996). The Structure of Radical Probabilism. Erkenntnis 45 (2-3):285 - 297.score: 240.0
    Does the philosophy of Radical Probabilism have enough structure to enable it to address fundamental epistemological questions? The requirement of dynamic coherence provides the structure for radical probabilist epistemology. This structure is sufficient to establish (i) the value of knowledge and (ii) long run convergence of degrees of belief.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  41. Brian Skyrms (1982). Counterfactual Definiteness and Local Causation. Philosophy of Science 49 (1):43-50.score: 240.0
    Bell's Theorem is proved for locality and conservation formulated in terms of subjunctive conditionals with chance consequents, rather than the usual conditional probability formulation. This brings into sharp focus the minimal counterfactual assumptions needed for Bell's theorem.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  42. Brian Skyrms (1991). Carnapian Inductive Logic for Markov Chains. Erkenntnis 35 (1-3):439 - 460.score: 240.0
    Carnap's Inductive Logic, like most philosophical discussions of induction, is designed for the case of independent trials. To take account of periodicities, and more generally of order, the account must be extended. From both a physical and a probabilistic point of view, the first and fundamental step is to extend Carnap's inductive logic to the case of finite Markov chains. Kuipers (1988) and Martin (1967) suggest a natural way in which this can be done. The probabilistic character of Carnapian inductive (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  43. Brian Skyrms (2006). Diachronic Coherence and Radical Probabilism. Philosophy of Science 73 (5):959-968.score: 240.0
    The question of diachronic coherence, coherence of degrees of belief across time, is investigated within the context of Richard Jeffrey’s radical probabilism. Diachronic coherence is taken as fundamental, and coherence results for degrees of belief at a single time, such as additivity, are recovered only with additional assumptions. Additivity of probabilities of probabilities is seen to be less problematic than additivity of first-order probabilities. Without any assumed model of belief change, diachronic coherence applied to higher-order degrees of belief yields the (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  44. Brian Skyrms (1965). On Failing to Vindicate Induction. Philosophy of Science 32 (3/4):253-268.score: 240.0
    The structure of Reichenbach's pragmatic vindication of induction is analysed in detail. The argument is seen to proceed in two stages, the first being a pragmatic justification of the frequency interpretation of probability which is taken as a license for considering the aim of induction to be the discovery of limiting relative frequencies, and the second being the pragmatic justification of induction itself. Both justifications are found to contain flaws, and the arguments used to support Reichenbach's definition of the aim (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  45. Brian Skyrms (2008). Presidential Address: Signals. Philosophy of Science 75 (5):489-500.score: 240.0
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  46. Rory Smead (2008). The Evolution of Cooperation in the Centipede Game with Finite Populations. Philosophy of Science 75 (2):157-177.score: 240.0
    The partial cooperation displayed by subjects in the Centipede Game deviates radically from the predictions of traditional game theory. Even standard, infinite population, evolutionary settings have failed to provide an explanation for this behavior. However, recent work in finite population evolutionary models has shown that such settings can produce radically different results from the standard models. This paper examines the evolution of partial cooperation in finite populations. The results reveal a new possible explanation that is not open to the standard (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  47. Brian Skyrms (1992). Chaos in Game Dynamics. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 1 (2):111-130.score: 240.0
    Two examples demonstrate the possibility of extremely complicated non-convergent behavior in evolutionary game dynamics. For the Taylor-Jonker flow, the stable orbits for three strategies were investigated by Zeeman. Chaos does not occur with three strategies. This papers presents numerical evidence that chaotic dynamics on a strange attractor does occur with four strategies. Thus phenomenon is closely related to known examples of complicated behavior in Lotka-Volterra ecological models.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  48. Brian Skyrms (2000). Stability and Explanatory Significance of Some Simple Evolutionary Models. Philosophy of Science 67 (1):94-113.score: 240.0
    even if an equilibrium is asymptotically stable, that is no guarantee that the system will reach that equilibrium unless we know that the system's initial state is sufficiently close to the equilibrium. Global stability of an equilibrium, when we have it, gives the equilibrium a much more powerful explanatory role. An equilibrium is globally asymptotically stable if the dynamics carries every possible initial state in the interior of the state space to that equilibrium. If an equilibrium is globally stable, it (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  49. Brian Skyrms (1998). Salience and Symmetry-Breaking in the Evolution of Convention. Law and Philosophy 17 (4):411 - 418.score: 240.0
    Since monkeys certainly understand much that is said to them by man, and when wild, utter signal-cries of danger to their fellows; and since fowls give distinct warnings for danger on the ground, or in the sky from hawks (both, as well, a third cry, intelligible to dogs), may not some unusually wise ape-like animal have imitated the growl of a beast of prey, and thus told his fellow-monkeys the nature of the expected danger? This would have been the first (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  50. Brian Skyrms (1974). Contraposition of the Conditional. Philosophical Studies 26 (2):145 - 147.score: 240.0
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
1 — 50 / 998