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  1. Rosanna Keefe (2014). What Logical Pluralism Cannot Be. Synthese 191 (7):1375-1390.
    Logical Pluralists maintain that there is more than one genuine/true logical consequence relation. This paper seeks to understand what the position could amount to and some of the challenges faced by its formulation and defence. I consider in detail Beall and Restall’s Logical Pluralism—which seeks to accommodate radically different logics by stressing the way that they each fit a general form, the Generalised Tarski Thesis (GTT)—arguing against the claim that different instances of GTT are admissible precisifications of logical consequence. I (...)
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  2. Rosanna Keefe (2012). Modelling Vagueness: What Can We Ignore? Philosophical Studies 161 (3):453-470.
    A theory of vagueness gives a model of vague language and of reasoning within the language. Among the models that have been offered are Degree Theorists’ numerical models that assign values between 0 and 1 to sentences, rather than simply modelling sentences as true or false. In this paper, I ask whether we can benefit from employing a rich, well-understood numerical framework, while ignoring those aspects of it that impute a level of mathematical precision that is not present in the (...)
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  3. Rosanna Keefe (2011). Phenomenal Sorites Paradoxes and Looking the Same. Dialectica 65 (3):327-344.
    Taking a series of colour patches, starting with one that clearly looks red, and making each so similar in colour to the previous one that it looks the same as it, we appear to be able to show that a yellow patch looks red. I ask whether phenomenal sorites paradoxes, such as this, are subject to a unique kind of solution that is unavailable in relation to other sorites paradoxes. I argue that they do not need such a solution, nor (...)
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  4. Rosanna Keefe (2010). Relative Validity and Vagueness. In T. J. Smiley, Jonathan Lear & Alex Oliver (eds.), The Force of Argument: Essays in Honor of Timothy Smiley. Routledge.
     
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  5. Rosanna Keefe (2010). Supervaluationism, Indirect Speech Reports, and Demonstratives. In Richard Dietz & Sebastiano Moruzzi (eds.), Cuts and Clouds: Vaguenesss, its Nature and its Logic. Oup Oxford.
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  6. Rosanna Keefe (2010). Teaching & Learning Guide For: Vagueness: Supervaluationism. Philosophy Compass 5 (2):213-215.
    Vagueness is an extremely widespread feature of language, famously associated with the sorites paradox. One instance of this paradox concludes that a single grain of sand is a heap of sand, by starting with a large heap of sand and invoking the plausible premise that if you take one grain of sand away from a heap of sand, then you still have a heap. The supervaluationist theory of vagueness states that a sentence is true if and only if it is (...)
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  7. Rosanna Keefe (2008). Vagueness: Supervaluationism. Philosophy Compass 3 (2):315–324.
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  8. Rosanna Keefe & Libor Běhounek (2008). Special Issue on Vagueness. Studia Logica 90 (3):287-289.
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  9. Rosanna Keefe (2007). Vagueness Without Context Change. Mind 116 (462):275-292.
    In this paper I offer a critique of the recent popular strategy of giving a contextualist account of vagueness. Such accounts maintain that truth-values of vague sentences can change with changes of context induced by confronting different entities (e.g. different pairs through a sorites series). I claim that appealing to context does not help in solving the sorites paradox, nor does it give us new insights into vagueness per se. Furthermore, the contextual variation to which the contextualist is committed is (...)
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  10. Rosanna Keefe (2004). Context, Vagueness, and the Sorites. In J. C. Beall (ed.), Liars and Heaps: New Essays on Paradox. Clarendon Press.
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  11. Rosanna Keefe (2003). Unsolved Problems with Numbers: Reply to Smith. Mind 112 (446):291-293.
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  12. Rosanna keefe (2002). Review: Indeterminate Identity: Metaphysics and Semantics. [REVIEW] Mind 111 (442):466-470.
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  13. Rosanna Keefe (2002). When Does Circularity Matter? Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 102 (3):253–270.
    This paper asks whether a good philosophical account of something can ever be circular. It explores the kind of circumstances in which an account of F might involve F itself while still serving the functions of and meeting the requirements on a philosophical account. The paper discusses two criteria for acceptable circularity, based on ideas from Humberstone 1997. And it illustrates the surprisingly wide variety of kinds of accounts in which circularity need not be bad.
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  14. Rosanna Keefe (2000). Supervaluationism and Validity. Philosophical Topics 28 (1):93-105.
  15. Rosanna Keefe (2000). Theories of Vagueness. Cambridge University Press.
    Most expressions in natural language are vague. But what is the best semantic treatment of terms like 'heap', 'red' and 'child'? And what is the logic of arguments involving this kind of vague expression? These questions are receiving increasing philosophical attention, and in this timely book Rosanna Keefe explores the questions of what we should want from an account of vagueness and how we should assess rival theories. Her discussion ranges widely and comprehensively over the main theories of vagueness and (...)
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  16. Rosanna Keefe (1998). Vagueness and Language Clusters. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (4):611 – 620.
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  17. Rosanna Keefe (1998). Vagueness by Numbers. Mind 107 (427):565-579.
    Degree theories of vagueness build on the observation that vague predicates such as 'tall' and 'red' come in degrees. They employ an infinite-valued logic, where the truth values correspond to degrees of truth and are typically represented by the real numbers in the interval [0,1]. In this paper, the success with which the numerical assignments of such theories can capture the phenomenon of vagueness is assessed by drawing an analogy with the measurement of various physical quantities using real numbers. I (...)
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  18. Rosanna Keefe & Peter Smith (eds.) (1997). Vagueness: A Reader. MIT Press.
  19. Rosanna Keefe (1995). Contingent Identity and Vague Identity. Analysis 55 (3):183 - 190.
    Evan's influential argument against vague objects (_Analysis, 1978) has a parallel directed against contingent identity. I argue that Noonan failed in his attempt to accept Evans's argument but save contingent identity by establishing a disanalogy between the two arguments (in The Philosophical Quarterly 1991). Instead, I suggest an alternative way to block the argument against contingent identity and argue that its analogue provides a satisfactory response to Evans's original argument.
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  20. Rosanna Keefe & Timothy Williamson (1995). Vagueness. Philosophical Quarterly 45 (180):392.
    If you keep removing single grains of sand from a heap, when is it no longer a heap? From discussions of the heap paradox in classical Greece, to modern formal approaches like fuzzy logic, Timothy Williamson traces the history of the problem of vagueness. He argues that standard logic and formal semantics apply even to vague languages and defends the controversial, realist view that vagueness is a form of ignorance - there really is a grain of sand whose removal turns (...)
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