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  1.  25
    Rosemary Lowry & Martin Peterson (2011). Pure Time Preference. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (4):490-508.
    Pure time preference is a preference for something to come at one point in time rather than another merely because of when it occurs in time. In opposition to Sidgwick, Ramsey, Rawls, and Parfit we argue that it is not always irrational to be guided by pure time preferences. We argue that even if the mere difference of location in time is not a rational ground for a preference, time may nevertheless be a normatively neutral ground for a preference, and (...)
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    Rosemary Lowry & Martin Peterson (2015). Pure Time Preference: Reply to Johansson and Rosenqvist. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (1):n/a-n/a.
    Johansson and Rosenqvist reject our argument for the rational permissibility of pure time preferences. Johansson and Rosenqvist's main objection is that where two options, X and Y, have equal intrinsic value, there will be a reason to be indifferent between X and Y, and therefore a reason to not hold a PTP for X or Y. In this reply, we argue that if two options have equal intrinsic value, it does not follow that you have a reason to be indifferent. (...)
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    Rosemary Lowry & Martin Peterson (2012). Cost-Benefit Analysis and Non-Utilitarian Ethics. Politics, Philosophy and Economics 11 (3):1470594-11416767.
    Cost-benefit analysis is commonly understood to be intimately connected with utilitarianism and incompatible with other moral theories, particularly those that focus on deontological concepts such as rights. We reject this claim and argue that cost-benefit analysis can take moral rights as well as other non-utilitarian moral considerations into account in a systematic manner. We discuss three ways of doing this, and claim that two of them (output filters and input filters) can account for a wide range of rights-based moral theories, (...)
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    Rosemary Lowry (2012). Reasons for Action and Psychological Capacities. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (4):521 - 531.
    Most moral philosophers agree that if a moral agent is incapable of performing some act ϕ because of a physical incapacity, then they do not have a reason to ϕ. Most also claim that if an agent is incapable of ϕ-ing due to a psychological incapacity, brought about by, for example, an obsession or phobia, then this does not preclude them from having a reason to ϕ. This is because the 'ought implies can' principle is usually interpreted as a claim (...)
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