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Ross P. Cameron [29]Ross Paul Cameron [2]
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Profile: Ross Cameron (University of Leeds)
  1. Ross P. Cameron, Truthmakers.
    Truthmaker theory says that there is an intimate link between truth and ontology: i.e. between what is the case and what there is. According to truthmaker theory, for a proposition to be true requires there to be some thing (or things) that makes it true. The truthmaker is the ontological ground of the truth; its existence explains why the proposition in question is true.
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  2. Ross P. Cameron, Quantification, Truthmaking and Ontological Commitment: Reply to Schaffer.
    Truthmaking and ontological commitment How do we determine the ontological commitments of a theory? Quine told us to look to the quantifier.1 What must be in the domain of the quantifiers if the (regimented) sentences of the theory are all to be true? Those are the ontological commitments of the theory.
     
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  3. Ross P. Cameron (forthcoming). Parts Generate the Whole, but They Are Not Identical to It. In Donald Baxter & Aaron Cotnoir (eds.), Composition as Identity. Oxford University Press.
    The connection between whole and part is intimate: not only can we share the same space, but I’m incapable of leaving my parts behind; settle the nonmereological facts and you thereby settle what is a part of what; wholes don’t seem to be an additional ontological commitment over their parts. Composition as identity promises to explain this intimacy. But it threatens to make the connection too intimate, for surely the parts could have made a different whole and the whole have (...)
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  4. Ross P. Cameron (2013). A Fictional Realist. In Christy Mag Uidhir (ed.), Art and Abstract Objects. Oxford University Press. 179.
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  5. Ross P. Cameron (2013). How to Be a Nominalist and a Fictional Realist. In Christy Mag Uidhir (ed.), Art and Abstract Objects. Oxford University Press. 179.
  6. Ross P. Cameron (2012). Composition as Identity Doesn't Settle the Special Composition Question1. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (3):531-554.
    Orthodoxy says that the thesis that composition is identity (CAI) entails universalism: the claim that any collection of entities has a sum. If this is true it counts in favour of CAI, since a thesis about the nature of composition that settles the otherwise intractable special composition question (SCQ) is desirable. But I argue that it is false: CAI is compatible with the many forms of restricted composition, and SCQ is no easier to answer given CAI than otherwise. Furthermore, in (...)
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  7. Ross P. Cameron (2012). Nie ma obiektów, które byłyby utworami muzycznymi. Sztuka I Filozofia 40.
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  8. Ross P. Cameron (2012). Why Lewis's Analysis of Modality Succeeds in its Reductive Ambitions. Philosophers' Imprint 12 (8).
    Some argue that Lewisian realism fails as a reduction of modality because in order to meet some criterion of success the account needs to invoke primitive modality. I defend Lewisian realism against this charge; in the process, I hope to shed some light on the conditions of success for a reduction. In §1 I detail the resources the Lewisian modal realist needs. In §2 I argue against Lycan and Shalkowski’s charge that Lewis needs a modal notion of ‘world’ to ensure (...)
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  9. Elizabeth Barnes & Ross P. Cameron (2011). Back to the Open Future1. Philosophical Perspectives 25 (1):1-26.
    Many of us are tempted by the thought that the future is open, whereas the past is not. The future might unfold one way, or it might unfold another; but the past, having occurred, is now settled. In previous work we presented an account of what openness consists in: roughly, that the openness of the future is a matter of it being metaphysically indeterminate how things will turn out to be. We were previously concerned merely with presenting the view and (...)
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  10. Ross P. Cameron (2010). From Humean Truthmaker Theory to Priority Monism. Noûs 44 (1):178 - 198.
    I argue that the truthmaker theorist should be a priority monist if she wants to avoid commitment to mysterious necessary connections. In section 1 I briefly discuss the ontological options available to the truthmaker theorist. In section 2 I develop the argument against truthmaker theory from the Humean denial of necessary connections. In section 3 I offer an account of when necessary connections are objectionable. In section 4 I use this criterion to narrow down the options from section 1. In (...)
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  11. Ross P. Cameron (2010). How to Have a Radically Minimal Ontology. Philosophical Studies 151 (2):249 - 264.
    In this paper I further elucidate and defend a metaontological position that allows you to have a minimal ontology without embracing an error-theory of ordinary talk. On this view 'there are Fs' can be strictly and literally true without bringing an ontological commitment to Fs. Instead of a sentence S committing you to the things that must be amongst the values of the variables if it is true, I argue that S commits you to the things that must exist as (...)
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  12. Ross P. Cameron (2010). Necessity and Triviality. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (3):401-415.
    In this paper I argue that there are some sentences whose truth makes no demands on the world, being trivially true in that their truth-conditions are trivially met. I argue that this does not amount to their truth-conditions being met necessarily: we need a non-modal understanding of the notion of the demands the truth of a sentence makes, lest we be blinded to certain conceptual possibilities. I defend the claim that the truths of pure mathematics and set theory are trivially (...)
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  13. Ross P. Cameron (2010). The Grounds of Necessity. Philosophy Compass 5 (4):348-358.
    Some truths are necessary, others could have been false. Why? What is the source of the distinction between the necessary and the contingent? What's so special about the necessary truths that account for their necessity? In this article, we look at some of the most promising accounts of the grounds of necessity: David Lewis' reduction of necessity to truth at all possible worlds; Kit Fine's reduction of necessity to essence; and accounts of necessity that take the distinction between the necessary (...)
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  14. Ross P. Cameron (2010). Vagueness and Naturalness. Erkenntnis 72 (2):281 - 293.
    I attempt to accommodate the phenomenon of vagueness with classical logic and bivalence. I hold that for any vague predicate there is a sharp cut-off between the things that satisfy it and the things that do not; I claim that this is due to the greater naturalness of one of the candidate meanings of that predicate. I extend the thought to the problem of the many and Benacerraf cases. I go on to explore the idea that (...)
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  15. Lucy Allais, Louise Antony, Elizabeth Barnes, John Bigelow, Alexander Bird, Ross P. Cameron, John Campbell & Roberto Casati (2009). Notes on The. In Robin Le Poidevin (ed.), The Routledge Companion to Metaphysics. Routledge.
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  16. Ross P. Cameron (2009). Introduction to Part II : Being and Related Matters. In Robin Le Poidevin (ed.), The Routledge Companion to Metaphysics. Routledge. 221.
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  17. Robin Le Poidevin, Simons Peter, McGonigal Andrew & Ross P. Cameron (eds.) (2009). The Routledge Companion to Metaphysics. Routledge.
    The Routledge Companion to Metaphysics is an outstanding, comprehensive and accessible guide to the major themes, thinkers, and issues in metaphysics. The Companion features over fifty specially commissioned chapters from international scholars which are organized into three clear parts: History of Metaphysics Ontology Metaphysics and Science. Each section features an introduction which places the range of essays in context, while an extensive glossary allows easy reference to key terms and definitions. The Routledge Companion to Metaphysics is essential reading for students (...)
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  18. Ross P. Cameron (2008). Comments on Merricks'struth and Ontology. Philosophical Books 49 (4):292-301.
    In his Truth and Ontology,1 Trenton Merricks argues against the truthmaker principle: Truthmaker: ∀p( p → ∃xxᮀ(Exx → p)). Truthmaker says that for any true proposition, there are some things whose existence guarantees the truth of that proposition: that is, some things which couldn’t all exist and the proposition fail to be true. His main arguments against Truthmaker are that there cannot be satisfactory truthmakers for (i) negative existentials, (ii) modal truths, (iii) truths about the past (given that presentism is (...)
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  19. Ross P. Cameron (2008). How to Be a Truthmaker Maximalist. Noûs 42 (3):410 - 421.
    When there is truth, there must be some thing (or things) to account for that truth: some thing(s) that couldn’t exist and the true proposition fail to be true. That is the truthmaker principle. True propositions are made true by entities in the mind-independently existing external world. The truthmaker principle seems attractive to many metaphysicians, but many have wanted to weaken it and accept not that every true proposition has a truthmaker but only that some important class of propositions require (...)
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  20. Ross P. Cameron (2008). Recombination and Intrinsicality. Ratio 21 (1):1–12.
    In this paper I argue that warrant for Lewis' principle of recombination presupposes warrant for a combinatorial analysis of intrinsicality, which in turn presupposes warrant for the principle of recombination. This, I claim, leads to a vicious circularity: warrant for neither doctrine can get off the ground.
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  21. Ross P. Cameron (2008). Truthmakers and Ontological Commitment: Or How to Deal with Complex Objects and Mathematical Ontology Without Getting Into Trouble. Philosophical Studies 140 (1):1 - 18.
    What are the ontological commitments of a sentence? In this paper I offer an answer from the perspective of the truthmaker theorist that contrasts with the familiar Quinean criterion. I detail some of the benefits of thinking of things this way: they include making the composition debate tractable without appealing to a neo-Carnapian metaontology, making sense of neo-Fregeanism, and dispensing with some otherwise recalcitrant necessary connections.
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  22. Ross P. Cameron (2008). Turtles All the Way Down: Regress, Priority and Fundamentality. Philosophical Quarterly 58 (230):1-14.
    I address an intuition commonly endorsed by metaphysicians, that there must be a fundamental layer of reality, i.e., that chains of ontological dependence must terminate: there cannot be turtles all the way down. I discuss applications of this intuition with reference to Bradley’s regress, composition, realism about the mental and the cosmological argument. I discuss some arguments for the intui- tion, but argue that they are unconvincing. I conclude by making some suggestions for how the intuition should be argued for, (...)
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  23. Ross P. Cameron (2008). Truthmakers, Realism and Ontology. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 62 (62):107-128.
    in LePoidevinMcGonigalBeing, pp. (forthcoming).
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  24. Ross Paul Cameron (2008). Truthmakers and Modality. Synthese 164 (2):261 - 280.
    This paper attempts to locate, within an actualist ontology, truthmakers for modal truths: truths of the form or . In Sect. 1 I motivate the demand for substantial truthmakers for modal truths. In Sect. 21 criticise Armstrong's account of truthmakers for modal truths. In Sect. 31 examine essentialism and defend an account of what makes essentialist attributions true, but I argue that this does not solve the problem of modal truth in general. In Sect. 41 discuss, and dismiss, a theistic (...)
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  25. Ross Paul Cameron (2008). Truthmakers and Necessary Connections. Synthese 161 (1):27-45.
    In this paper I examine the objection to truthmaker theory, forcibly made by David Lewis and endorsed by many, that it violates the Humean denial of necessary connections between distinct existences. In Sect. 1 I present the argument that acceptance of truthmakers commits us to necessary connections. In Sect. 2 I examine Lewis’ ‘Things-qua-truthmakers’ theory which attempts to give truthmakers without such a commitment, and find it wanting. In Sects. 3–5 I discuss various formulations of the denial of necessary connections (...)
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  26. Ross P. Cameron (2007). Lewisian Realism: Methodology, Epistemology, and Circularity. Synthese 156 (1):143 - 159.
    In this paper I argue that warrant for Lewis’ Modal Realism is unobtainable. I consider two familiar objections to Lewisian realism – the modal irrelevance objection and the epistemological objection – and argue that Lewis’ response to each is unsatisfactory because they presuppose claims that only the Lewisian realist will accept. Since, I argue, warrant for Lewisian realism can only be obtained if we have a response to each objection that does not presuppose the truth of Lewisian realism, this circularity (...)
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  27. Ross P. Cameron (2007). The Contingency of Composition. Philosophical Studies 136 (1):99-121.
    There is widespread disagreement as to what the facts are concerning just when a collection of objects composes some further object; but there is widespread agreement that, whatever those facts are, they are necessary. I am unhappy to simply assume this, and in this paper I ask whether there is reason to think that the facts concerning composition hold necessarily. I consider various reasons to think so, but find fault with each of them. I examine the theory of composition as (...)
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  28. Ross P. Cameron (2006). Much Ado About Nothing: A Study of Metaphysical Nihilism. Erkenntnis 64 (2):193-222.
    This paper is an investigation of metaphysical nihilism: the view that there could have been no contingent or concrete objects. I begin by showing the connections of the nihilistic theses to other philosophical doctrines. I then go on to look at the arguments for and against metaphysical nihilism in the literature and find both to be flawed. In doing so I will look at the nature of abstract objects, the nature of spacetime and mereological simples, the existence of the empty (...)
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  29. Ross P. Cameron (2005). Truthmaker Necessitarianism and Maximalism. Logique Et Analyse 48 (189-192):43-56.
    In this paper I examine two principles of orthodox truthmaker theory: truthmaker maximalism - the doctrine that every (contingent) truth has a truthmaker, and truthmaker necessitarianism - the doctrine that the existence of a truthmaker necessitates the truth of any proposition which it in fact makes true. I argue that maximalism should be rejected and that once it is we only have reason to hold a restricted form of necessitarianism.
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  30. Ross P. Cameron (2004). Possible Worlds. International Philosophical Quarterly 44 (1):116-118.
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  31. Ross P. Cameron, CAI Doesn't Settle SCQ.
    The thesis that composition is identity (CAI) is the thesis that the Xs compose A iff the Xs is identical to A.1 If this thesis is to be compatible with any mereological view other than mereological nihilism, we must allow that many-one identity statements make sense: that is, that it makes sense to say of a plurality of things that they are (collectively) identical to some one thing. Identity, on this view, holds between every thing and itself, but can also (...)
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