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Profile: Rowland Stout (University College Dublin)
  1.  67
    Rowland Stout (2010). Seeing the Anger in Someone's Face. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 84 (1):29-43.
    Starting from the assumption that one can literally perceive someone's anger in their face, I argue that this would not be possible if what is perceived is a static facial signature of their anger. There is a product–process distinction in talk of facial expression, and I argue that one can see anger in someone's facial expression only if this is understood to be a process rather than a product.
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  2.  39
    Rowland Stout (2008). Moral Philosophy. In Dermot Moran (ed.), The Routledge Companion to Twentieth-Century Philosophy. Routledge
    Despite being somewhat long in the tooth at the time, Aristotle, Hume and Kant were still dominating twentieth century moral philosophy. Much of the progress made in that century came from a detailed working through of each of their approaches by the expanding and increasingly professionalized corps of academic philosophers. And this progress can be measured not just by the quality and sophistication of moral philosophy at the end of that century, but also by the narrowing of some of the (...)
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  3.  46
    Rowland Stout (2012). What Someone's Behaviour Must Be Like If We Are to Be Aware of Their Emotions in It. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (2):135-148.
    What someone’s behaviour must be like if we are to be aware of their emotions in it Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-14 DOI 10.1007/s11097-011-9224-0 Authors Rowland Stout, School of Philosophy, UCD Dublin, Dublin 4, Republic of Ireland Journal Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences Online ISSN 1572-8676 Print ISSN 1568-7759.
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  4.  16
    Rowland Stout (2016). The Category of Occurrent Continuants. Mind 125 (497):41-62.
    Arguing first that the best way to understand what a continuant is is as something that primarily has its properties at a time rather than atemporally, the paper then defends the idea that there are occurrent continuants. These are things that were, are, or will be happening—like the ongoing process of someone reading or my writing this paper, for instance. A recently popular philosophical view of process is as something that is referred to with mass nouns and not count nouns. (...)
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  5.  90
    Rowland Stout (2005). Action. Mcgill-Queen's University Press.
    Action is a fresh and engaging introduction to the many philosophical problems associated with agency and is ideally suited for students taking courses in philosophy of action, philosophy of mind and metaphysics.
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  6.  45
    Rowland Stout (1996). Things That Happen Because They Should: A Teleological Approach to Action. Oxford University Press.
    Rowland Stout presents a new philosophical account of human action which is radically and controversially different from all rival theories. He argues that intentional actions are unique among natural phenomena in that they happen because they should happen, and that they are to be explained in terms of objective facts rather than beliefs and intentions.
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  7.  58
    Rowland Stout (1997). Processes. Philosophy 72 (279):19-27.
    A natural picture to have of events and processes is of entities which extend through time and which have temporal parts, just as physical objects extend through space and have spatial parts. While accepting this picture of events, in this paper I want to present an alternative conception of processes as entities which, like physical objects, do not extend in time and do not have temporal parts, but rather persist in time. Processes and events belong to metaphysically distinct categories. Moreover (...)
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  8. Rowland Stout (2006). The Inner Life of a Rational Agent: In Defence of Philosophical Behaviourism. Edinburgh University Press.
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  9.  11
    Rowland Stout (2015). Adopting Roles: Generosity and Presumptuousness. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 77:141-161.
    Generosity is not the same thing as kindness or self-sacrifice. Presumptuousness is incompatible with generosity, but not with kindness or self-sacrifice. I consider a kind but interfering neighbour who inappropriately takes over the role of mother to my daughter; her behaviour is not generous. Presumptuousness is the improper exercise of a disposition to adopt a role that one does not have. With this in mind I explore the idea that generosity is the proper exercise of the disposition to adopt a (...)
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  10. Rowland Stout, Mechanisms That Respons to Reasons.
    in O’Rourke, F. (ed.), Human Destinies (Notre Dame Press, forthcoming).
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  11.  51
    Rowland Stout (2010). What You Know When You Know an Answer to a Question. Noûs 44 (2):392 - 402.
    A significant argument for the claim that knowing-wh is knowing-that, implicit in much of the literature, including Stanley and Williamson (2001), is spelt out and challenged. The argument includes the assumption that a subject's state of knowing-wh is constituted by their involvement in a relation with an answer to a question. And it involves the assumption that answers to questions are propositions or facts. One of Lawrence Powers' counterexamples to the conjunction of these two assumptions is developed, responses to it (...)
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  12. Rowland Stout (2003). Behaviourism. Think 5 (5):37-44.
    The central claim of philosophical behaviourism is this: what it is to be in a certain state of mind is to be disposed to behave in a certain way. Most philosophers think that this claim is obviously false. They also think it is offensive. They think it is offensive because it appears to reduce or eliminate what is most valuable to us – our minds. It puts the notion of behaviour in the place of mind, and so removes what distinguishes (...)
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  13.  74
    Rowland Stout (2004). Internalising Practical Reasons. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 104 (3):229–243.
    Practical reasons figure in both the justification and the causal explanation of action. It is usually assumed that the agent’s state of believing rather than what they believe must figure in the causal explanation of action. But, that the agent believes something is not a reason in the sense of being part of the justification of what they do. So it is often concluded that the justifying reason is a different sort of thing from the causally motivating reason. But this (...)
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  14.  30
    Rowland Stout, Acting and Causing: On Pietroski's Causing Actions.
    The book is an extended argument against neuralism (or against a sort of argument for neuralism), where neuralism is understood to be the identification of mental events with neurophysiological events. So an event of a trying is not supposed to be inner in the sense that a brain event is. And although Pietroski accepts Descartes metaphysical distinction between mental events and physical events, he does not need to extend this to the thought that mental events occupy a special mental realm. (...)
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  15.  5
    Rowland Stout (2015). On Shame – In Response to Dan Zahavi, Self and Other. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 23 (5):634-638.
    In chapter 14 of Zahavi’s recent book, Self and Other, the notion of shame is discussed. In feeling shame one experiences oneself as experienced by others. For Sartre, that experience in itself is sufficient for shame, as one experiences oneself as determined in the experience of others and hence as shamefully not self-determining. But Zahavi introduces an extra condition for shame, which is a ‘global decrease in self-esteem’. This paper questions the need for this condition and argues that seeing oneself (...)
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  16.  6
    Rowland Stout (2003). Ryle's behaviourism. Revue Internationale de Philosophie 1:37-49.
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  17.  54
    Rowland Stout (2009). She Ran Because She Thought a Bear Was Chasing Her. In Constantine Sandis (ed.), New Essays on the Explanation of Action.
    Arguing against the claim that beliefs are reasons for action.
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  18.  49
    Rowland Stout (2007). Two Ways to Understand Causality in Agency. In A. Leist (ed.), Action in Context.
    An influential philosophical conception of our mind’s place in the world is as a site for the states and events that causally mediate the world we perceive and the world we affect. According to this conception, states and events in the world cause mental states and events in us through the process of perception. These mental states and events then go on to produce new states and events in the world through the process of action. Our role is as hosts (...)
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  19.  4
    Rowland Stout (2003). The Life of a Process. In Guy Debrock (ed.), Process Pragmatism. Rodopi
  20.  40
    Rowland Stout (2010). Anti-Externalism – Joseph Mendola. Philosophical Quarterly 60 (240):656-658.
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  21.  44
    Rowland Stout (1998). Descartes's Hidden Argument for the Existence of God. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 6 (2):155 – 168.
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  22.  9
    Rowland Stout (2013). Can There be Virtue in Violence? Revue Internationale de Philosophie 3:323-336.
  23.  1
    Rowland Stout (2010). Being Subject to the Rule to Do What the Rules Tell You to Do. In Bernhard Weiss & Jeremy Wanderer (eds.), Reading Brandom. Routledge 145-156.
  24.  8
    Rowland Stout (1998). The Evolution of Theoretically Useful Traits. Biology and Philosophy 13 (4):529-540.
    The purely theoretical notion of fitness or optimality that is employed for instance in optimization theory has come under attack from those who think that only a more historically based notion of fitness could have a central role in evolutionary explanation. They argue that the key notion is proven usefulness rather than theoretical usefulness. This paper articulates a notion of theoretical usefulness and defends its role in functional evolutionary explanations.
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  25.  7
    Rowland Stout (1999). A World of States of Affairs by D. M. Armstrong. Cambridge University Press, 1997, XIII + 285pp., £14.95 & £40.00. ISBN 0521589487 (Pbk); 0521580641 (Hbk). [REVIEW] Philosophy 74 (1):122-139.
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  26. Rowland Stout (2014). Action. Routledge.
    The traditional focus of debate in philosophy of action has been the causal theory of action and metaphysical questions about the nature of actions as events. In this lucid and lively introduction to philosophy of action, Rowland Stout shows how these issues are subsidiary to more central ones that concern the freedom of the will, practical rationality and moral psychology. When seen in these terms, agency becomes one of the most exciting areas in philosophy and one of the most useful (...)
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  27. Rowland Stout (ed.) (forthcoming). Process, Action, and Experience. Oxford UP.
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  28. Rowland Stout (1991). The Teleological Explanation of Action.
     
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  29. Rowland Stout (2009). Was Sally's Reason for Running From the Bear That She Thought It Was Chasing Her? In Constantine Sandis (ed.), New Essays on the Explanation of Action. Palgrave Macmillan
  30. Rowland Stout (2002). What You Know When You Know How Someone Behaves. Electronic Journal of Anlaytic Philosophy 7.
    [1] In chapter 2 of _The Concept of Mind_, “Knowing How and Knowing That”, and especially in the section on “Understanding and Misunderstanding”, Ryle rejects two approaches to the question of the interpretation of other minds that correspond quite closely with what are now called functionalism, or theory theory, and simulation theory. There is a painful irony here that the functionalist approach to the philosophy of mind, which developed in the late 60s and 70s, has widely been regarded as completely (...)
     
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