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Mark Rowlands [77]Stuart Rowlands [9]Peter Rowlands [6]Anna Rowlands [4]
M. Rowlands [3]P. Rowlands [2]Mark N. J. Rowlands [1]I. Rowlands [1]

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See also:
Profile: Martyn Rowlands
Profile: Erinna Rowlands (Victoria University of Wellington)
Profile: Hannah Rowlands (Cardiff University)
Profile: Tom Rowlands (Oxford University)
Profile: Thomas James Rowlands (University of Wollongong)
  1.  13
    Mark Rowlands (2010). The New Science of the Mind: From Extended Mind to Embodied Phenomenology. A Bradford Book.
    There is a new way of thinking about the mind that does not locate mental processes exclusively "in the head." Some think that this expanded conception of the mind will be the basis of a new science of the mind. In this book, leading philosopher Mark Rowlands investigates the conceptual foundations of this new science of the mind. The new way of thinking about the mind emphasizes the ways in which mental processes are embodied, embedded, enacted, and extended. The new (...)
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  2. Mark Rowlands (2009). The Extended Mind. Zygon 44 (3):628-641.
    The extended mind is the thesis that some mental—typically cognitive—processes are partly composed of operations performed by cognizing organisms on the world around them. The operations in question are ones of manipulation, transformation, or exploitation of environmental structures. And the structures in question are ones that carry information pertinent to the success or efficacy of the cognitive process in question. This essay examines the thesis of the extended mind and evaluates the arguments for and against it.
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  3. Mark Rowlands (2009). Extended Cognition and the Mark of the Cognitive. Philosophical Psychology 22 (1):1 – 19.
    According to the thesis of the extended mind (EM) , at least some token cognitive processes extend into the cognizing subject's environment in the sense that they are (partly) composed of manipulative, exploitative, and transformative operations performed by that subject on suitable environmental structures. EM has attracted four ostensibly distinct types of objection. This paper has two goals. First, it argues that these objections all reduce to one basic sort: all the objections can be resolved by the provision of an (...)
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  4. Mark Rowlands (1999). The Body in Mind: Understanding Cognitive Processes. Cambridge University Press.
    In this book, Mark Rowlands challenges the Cartesian view of the mind as a self-contained monadic entity, and offers in its place a radical externalist or environmentalist model of cognitive processes. Drawing on both evolutionary theory and a detailed examination of the processes involved in perception, memory, thought and language use, Rowlands argues that cognition is, in part, a process whereby creatures manipulate and exploit relevant objects in their environment. This innovative book provides a foundation for an unorthodox but increasingly (...)
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  5.  47
    Mark Rowlands (2006). Body Language: Representation in Action. Cambridge MA: Bradford Book/MIT Press.
    This is not to say simply that these forms of acting can facilitate representation but that they are themselves representational.
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  6. Mark Rowlands (2009). Enactivism and the Extended Mind. Topoi 28 (1):53-62.
    According to the view that has become known as the extended mind , some token mental processes extend into the cognizing organism’s environment in that they are composed (partly) of manipulative, exploitative, and transformative operations performed by that subject on suitable environmental structures. Enactivist models understand mental processes as (partly) constituted by sensorimotor knowledge and by the organism’s ability to act, in appropriate ways, on environmental structures. Given the obvious similarities between the two views, it is both tempting and common (...)
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  7.  9
    Mark Rowlands (2003). Externalism: Putting Mind and World Back Together Again. Acumen.
    An examination of the view that mental states and processes are essentially dependent on the world for their nature and contents.
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  8. Mark Rowlands (1997). Contractarianism and Animal Rights. Journal of Applied Philosophy 14 (3):235–247.
    It is widely accepted, by both friends and foes of animal rights, that contractarianism is the moral theory least likely to justify the assigning of direct moral status to non-human animals. These are not, it is generally supposed, rational agents, and contractarian approaches can grant direct moral status only to such agents. I shall argue that this widely accepted view is false. At least some forms of contractarianism, when properly understood, do, in fact, entail that non-human animals possess direct moral (...)
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  9. Mark Rowlands, Animals That Act for Moral Reasons.
    Non-human animals (henceforth, “animals”) are typically regarded as moral patients rather than moral agents. Let us define these terms as follows: 1) X is a moral patient if and only if X is a legitimate object of moral concern: that is, roughly, X is something whose interests should be taken into account when decisions are made concerning it or which otherwise impact on it. 2) X is a moral agent if and only if X can be morally evaluated–praised or blamed (...)
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  10.  8
    Mark Rowlands (2012). Can Animals Be Moral? OUP Usa.
    Can animals act morally? Philosophical tradition answers 'no,' and has apparently convincing arguments on its side. Cognitive ethology supplies a growing body of empirical evidence that suggests these arguments are wrong. This groundbreaking book assimilates both philosophical and ethological frameworks into a unified whole and argues for a qualified 'yes.'.
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  11. Mark Rowlands (2009). Animal Rights: Moral Theory and Practice. Palgrave Macmillan.
    Animal rights and moral theories -- Arguing for one's species -- Utilitarianism and animals : Peter Singer's case for animal liberation -- Tom Regan : animal rights as natural rights -- Virtue ethics and animals -- Contractarianism and animal rights -- Animal minds.
     
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  12.  27
    E. Wager, S. Fiack, C. Graf, A. Robinson & I. Rowlands (2009). Science Journal Editors' Views on Publication Ethics: Results of an International Survey. Journal of Medical Ethics 35 (6):348-353.
    Background: Breaches of publication ethics such as plagiarism, data fabrication and redundant publication are recognised as forms of research misconduct that can undermine the scientific literature. We surveyed journal editors to determine their views about a range of publication ethics issues. Methods: Questionnaire sent to 524 editors-in-chief of Wiley-Blackwell science journals asking about the severity and frequency of 16 ethical issues at their journals, their confidence in handling such issues, and their awareness and use of guidelines. Results: Responses were obtained (...)
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  13. Mark Rowlands (2006). Sensorimotor Activity. Psyche 12 (1).
    This paper explores the concept of _sensorimotor activity_ that is central to the enactive model of visual perception developed in Alva Noë’s book, _Action in Perception_. The appeal to sensorimotor activity is, I shall argue, subject to a dilemma. On one interpretation, such activity presupposes representational states, and therefore is unable to aid us in the project of understanding how an organism is able to represent the world. On the other interpretation, sensorimotor activity fails to accommodate the essential normativity of (...)
     
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  14.  28
    Mark Rowlands (forthcoming). Arguing About Representation. Synthese:1-18.
    The question of whether cognition requires representations has engendered heated discussion during the last two decades. I shall argue that the question is, in all likelihood, a spurious one. There may or may not be a fact of the matter concerning whether a given item qualifies as a representation. However, even if there is, attempts to establish whether cognition requires representation have neither practical nor theoretical utility.
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  15.  90
    Mark Rowlands (2001). The Nature of Consciousness. Cambridge University Press.
    In The Nature of Consciousness, Mark Rowlands develops an innovative and radical account of the nature of phenomenal consciousness, one that has significant consequences for attempts to find a place for it in the natural order. The most significant feature of consciousness is its dual nature: consciousness can be both the directing of awareness and that upon which awareness is directed. Rowlands offers a clear and philosophically insightful discussion of the main positions in this fast-moving debate, and argues that the (...)
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  16.  13
    Mark Rowlands (2015). The Immortal, the Intrinsic and the Quasi Meaning of Life. Journal of Ethics 19 (3-4):379-408.
    Through the examination of the lives of several immortal beings, this paper defends a version of Moritz Schlick’s claim that the meaning of life is play. More precisely: a person’s life has meaning to the extent it there are things in it that the person values intrinsically rather than merely instrumentally and above a certain threshold of intensity. This is a subjectivist account of meaning in life. I defend subjectivism about meaning in life from common objections by understanding statements about (...)
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  17. Mark Rowlands (1989). Discussion of Jackson and Pettit, Functionalism and Broad Content. Mind 98 (April):269-275.
  18. Mark Rowlands (2003). Externalism: Putting Mind and World Back Together Again. Mcgill-Queen's University Press.
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  19.  7
    Mark Rowlands & Susana Monsó (forthcoming). Animals as Reflexive Thinkers: The Aponoian Paradigm. In Linda Kalof (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Animal Studies. Oxford University Press
    The ability to engage in reflexive thought—in thought about thought or about other mental states more generally—is regarded as a complex intellectual achievement that is beyond the capacities of most nonhuman animals. To the extent that reflexive thought capacities are believed necessary for the possession of many other psychological states or capacities, including consciousness, belief, emotion, and empathy, the inability of animals to engage in reflexive thought calls into question their other psychological abilities. This chapter attacks the idea that reflexive (...)
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  20. Mark Rowlands (2009). Situated Representation. In Murat Aydede & P. Robbins (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition. Cambridge 117--133.
     
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  21.  16
    Marc Rowlands (2015). Hard Problems of Intentionality. Philosophia 43 (3):741-746.
    This paper argues that Hutto and Satne’s three-pronged attempt to solve the problem of intentionality – or, at least, to provide an outline of how this problem should be approached – suffers from two shortcomings. First, the idea of Ur-intentionality is problematic. Second, Hutto and Satne have not provided us with a way of getting from Ur-intentionality to content intentionality.
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  22.  60
    Mark Rowlands (1997). Teleological Semantics. Mind 106 (422):279-304.
    Teleological theories of content are thought to suffer from two related difficulties. According to the problem of indeterminacy, biological function is indeterminate in the sense that, in the case of two competing interpretations of the function of an evolved mechanism, there is often no fact of the matter capable of determining which function is the correct one. Therefore, any attempts to construct content out of biological function entail the indeterminacy of content. According to the problem of transparency, statements of biological (...)
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  23. Mark Rowlands (2007). Understanding the "Active" in "Enactive". Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (4):427-443..
    Much recent work on cognition is characterized by an augmentation of the role of action coupled with an attenuation of the role of representation. This coupling is no accident. The appeal to action is seen either as a way of explaining representation or explaining it away. This paper argues that the appeal to action as a way of explaining, supplementing, or even supplanting, representation can lead to a serious dilemma. On the one hand, the concept of action to which we (...)
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  24.  6
    Mark Rowlands (forthcoming). Erratum To: Hard Problems of Intentionality. Philosophia:1-1.
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  25.  33
    Mark Rowlands (2013). Enactivism, Intentionality, and Content. American Philosophical Quarterly 50 (3):303-316.
    Enactivism has, perhaps, come to mean different things to different people. The version of enactivism that I am going to build on in this paper is that defended in my book The New Science of the Mind (henceforth NSM). That view is, I think, recognizably enactivist. Others might disagree, and I myself not only characterized it in other terms but was careful to distinguish it from other views that fall under the rubric "enactivist." However, the view I defended is, I (...)
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  26.  28
    Mansoor Niaz & Stuart Rowlands (2001). Roberto de Andrade Martins is a Professor at the Physics Institute 'Gleb Wataghin', State University of Campinas (UNICAMP), Brazil. He Received a First Degree in Physics at Sao Paulo University, and PhD in Logic and Philosophy of Science at UNICAMP. His Main Research Interests and the History and Philosophy of Physics. [REVIEW] Science and Education 10:321-322.
  27. Mark Rowlands (2002). Two Dogmas of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (5-6):158-80.
    Most recent discussions of phenomenal consciousness are predicated on two deeply entrenched assumptions. The first is objectualism, the claim that what it is like to undergo an experience is something of which we are or can be aware in the having of that experience. The second is internalism, the claim that what it is like to undergo an experience is constituted by states, events and processes that are located inside the skins of experiencing subjects. This paper argues that both assumptions (...)
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  28.  64
    Mark Rowlands (2011). Jean-Paul Sartre's Being and Nothingness. Topoi 30 (2):175-180.
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  29.  44
    Mark Rowlands (2012). Representing Without Representations. Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies 3 (1):133-144.
    There is a problem of representation and an apparatus of representations that was devised to solve this problem. This paper has two purposes. First, it will show why the problem of representation outstrips the apparatus of representations in the sense that the problem survives the demise of the apparatus. Secondly, it will argue that the question of whether cognition does or not involve representations is a poorly defined question, and far too crude to be helpful in understanding the nature of (...)
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  30.  3
    Geoff Moore, Ron Beadle & Anna Rowlands (2014). Catholic Social Teaching and the Firm. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 88 (4):779-805.
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  31.  88
    Mark Rowlands (2008). From the Inside: Consciousness and the First-Person Perspective. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 16 (3):281 – 297.
    To adopt a first-person perspective on consciousness is typically understood as a matter of inwardly engaging one's awareness in such a way as to make one's conscious states and their properties into objects of awareness. When awareness is thus inwardly engaged, experience functions as both act and object of awareness. As objects of awareness, an experience-token and its various properties are items of which a subject is aware. As an act of awareness, an experience-token is that in virtue of which (...)
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  32.  16
    Robert N. Carson & Stuart Rowlands (2007). Teaching the Conceptual Revolutions in Geometry. Science and Education 16 (9-10):921-954.
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  33.  5
    Mark Rowlands (2013). The New Science of the Mind: From Extended Mind to Embodied Phenomenology. A Bradford Book.
    There is a new way of thinking about the mind that does not locate mental processes exclusively "in the head." Some think that this expanded conception of the mind will be the basis of a new science of the mind. In this book, leading philosopher Mark Rowlands investigates the conceptual foundations of this new science of the mind. The new way of thinking about the mind emphasizes the ways in which mental processes are embodied, embedded, enacted, and extended. The new (...)
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  34.  86
    Mark Rowlands (2006). The Normativity of Action. Philosophical Psychology 19 (3):401-416.
    The concept of action is playing an increasingly prominent role in attempts to explain how subjects can represent the world. The idea is that at least some of the role traditionally assigned to internal representations can, in fact, be played by the ability of subjects to act on the world, and the exercise of that ability on appropriate occasions. This paper argues that the appeal to action faces a serious dilemma. If the concept of action employed is a representational one, (...)
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  35.  67
    Mark Rowlands (1995). Against Methodological Solipsism: The Ecological Approach. Philosophical Psychology 8 (1):5-24.
    This paper argues that an ecological approach to psychology of the sort advanced by J. J. Gibson provides a coherent and powerful alternative to the computational, information-processing, paradigm. The paper argues for two principles. Firstly, one cannot begin to understand what internal information processing an organism must accomplish until one understands what information is available to the organism in its environment. Secondly, an organism can process information by acting on or manipulating physical structures in its environment. An attempt is made (...)
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  36.  66
    Mark N. J. Rowlands (1989). Property Exemplification and Proliferation. Analysis 49 (4):194 - 197.
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  37.  50
    Mark Rowlands (2001). Consciousness and Higher-Order Thoughts. Mind and Language 16 (3):290-310.
  38.  66
    Mark Rowlands (2003). Consciousness: The Transcendalist Manifesto. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2 (3):205-21.
    Phenomenal consciousness, what it is like to have or undergo an experience, is typically understood as an empirical item – an actual or possible object of consciousness. Accordingly, the problem posed by phenomenal consciousness for materialist accounts of the mind is usually understood as an empirical problem: a problem of showing how one sort of empirical item – a conscious state – is produced or constituted by another – a neural process. The development of this problem, therefore, has usually consisted (...)
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  39.  6
    Mark Rowlands (2011). Friendship and Animals: A Reply to Frööding and Peterson. Journal of Animal Ethics 1 (1):70-79.
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  40.  36
    Mark Rowlands (2011). Intentionality and Embodied Cognition. Philosophical Topics 39 (1):81-97.
    The theses of embodied and extended cognition are usually regarded as recherché doctrines, at odds with common sense. They are also, typically, regarded as theses that must be evaluated by way of their implications for the development of cognitive science. If they cohere with the likely trajectory of cognitive science they can be accepted. If they do not, they must be rejected. This paper argues against both these claims. At the conceptual heart of the theses of embodied and extended cognition (...)
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  41. Mark Rowlands (2009). The Nature of Consciousness. Cambridge University Press.
    In The Nature of Consciousness, Mark Rowlands develops an innovative account of the nature of phenomenal consciousness, one that has significant consequences for attempts to find a place for it in the natural order. The most significant feature of consciousness is its dual nature: consciousness can be both the directing of awareness and that upon which awareness is directed. Rowlands offers a clear and philosophically insightful discussion of the main positions in this fast-moving debate, and argues that the phenomenal aspects (...)
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  42. Mark Rowlands (1998). Animal Rights: A Philosophical Defence. St. Martin's Press.
    The question of the nature and extent of our moral obligations to non-human animals has featured prominently in recent moral debate. This book defends the novel position that a contradictarian moral theory can be used to justify the claim that animals possess a substantial and wide-ranging set of moral rights. Critiquing the rival accounts of Peter Singer and Tom Regan, this study shows how an influential form of the social contract idea can be extended to make sense of the concept (...)
     
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  43.  80
    Mark Rowlands (1994). Connectionism and the Language of Thought. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 45 (2):485-503.
    In an influential critique, Jerry Fodor and Zenon Pylyshyn point to the existence of a potentially devastating dilemma for connectionism (Fodor and Pylyshyn [1988]). Either connectionist models consist in mere associations of unstructured representations, or they consist in processes involving complex representations. If the former, connectionism is mere associationism, and will not be capable of accounting for very much of cognition. If the latter, then connectionist models concern only the implementation of cognitive processes, and are, therefore, not informative at the (...)
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  44.  21
    Mark Rowlands (2007). Mysterianism. In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell 335--345.
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  45.  29
    Mark Rowlands (2013). Sartre, Consciousness, and Intentionality. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (3):521-536.
  46.  18
    Mark Rowlands (2013). Animals and Moral Motivation: A Response to Clement. Journal of Animal Ethics 3 (1):15-24.
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  47.  10
    Mark Rowlands (2005). Further Watching. The Philosophers' Magazine 30:66-69.
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  48. Mark Rowlands (2010). Consciousness Broadly Construed. In Richard Menary (ed.), The Extended Mind. MIT Press
     
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  49.  6
    Mark Rowlands (2014). Good Dog. The Philosophers' Magazine 64:26-32.
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  50.  41
    Mark Rowlands (1995). Externalism and Token-Token Identity. Philosophia 24 (3-4):359-75.
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