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  1. Roy A. Sorensen, Truthmaker Gaps and the No-No Paradox.
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  2. Roy A. Sorensen (2011). Das Chinesische Musikzimmer. Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 59 (1).
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  3. Roy A. Sorensen (2009). Hearing Silence: The Perception and Introspection of Absences. In Matthew Nudds & Casey O'Callaghan (eds.), Sounds and Perception. Oxford University Press.
    in Sounds and Perception: New Philosophical Essays, ed. by Matthew Nudds and Casey O’Callaghan (Oxford University Press, forthcoming in 2008).
     
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  4. Roy A. Sorensen (2008). Seeing Dark Things: The Philosophy of Shadows. Oxford University Press.
    The eclipse riddle -- Seeing surfaces -- The disappearing act -- Spinning shadows -- Berkeley's shadow -- Para-reflections -- Para-refractions : shadowgrams and the black drop -- Goethe's colored shadows -- Filtows -- Holes in the light -- Black and blue -- Seeing in black and white -- We see in the dark -- Hearing silence.
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  5. Roy A. Sorensen (2007). Knowledge Beyond the Margin for Error. Mind 116 (463):717 - 722.
    Epistemicists say there is a last positive instance in a sorites sequence-we just cannot know which is the last. Timothy Williamson explains that knowledge requires a margin for error and this ensures that the last heap will not be knowable as a heap. However, there is a class of disjunctive predicates for which knowledge at the thresholds is possible. They generate sorites paradoxes that cannot be diagnosed with the margin for error principle.
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  6. Roy A. Sorensen (2006). Vagueness and the Logic of Ordinary Language. In Dale Jacquette (ed.), Philosophy of Logic. North Holland. 155.
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  7. Roy A. Sorensen (2005). The Ethics of Empty Worlds. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (3):349 – 356.
    Drawing inspiration from the ethical pluralism of G. E. Moore's Principia Ethica, I contend that one empty world can be morally better than another. By 'empty' I mean that it is devoid of concrete entities (things that have a position in space or time). These worlds have no thickets or thimbles, no thinkers, no thoughts. Infinitely many of these worlds have laws of nature, abstract entities, and perhaps, space and time. These non-concrete differences are enough to make some of them (...)
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  8. Roy A. Sorensen (2004). A Definite No-No. In J. C. Beall (ed.), Liars and Heaps: New Essays on Paradox. Clarendon Press.
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  9. Roy A. Sorensen (2004). We See in the Dark. Noûs 38 (3):456-480.
    Do we need light to see? I argue that the black experience of a man in a perfectly dark cave is a representation of an absence of light, not an absence of representation. There is certainly a difference between his perceptual knowledge and that of his blind companion. Only the sighted man can tell whether the cave is dark just by looking. But perhaps he is merely inferring darkness from his failure to see. To get an unambiguous answer, I switch (...)
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  10. Roy A. Sorensen (2003). A Brief History of the Paradox: Philosophy and the Labyrinths of the Mind. Oxford University Press.
    Can God create a stone too heavy for him to lift? Can time have a beginning? Which came first, the chicken or the egg? Riddles, paradoxes, conundrums--for millennia the human mind has found such knotty logical problems both perplexing and irresistible. Now Roy Sorensen offers the first narrative history of paradoxes, a fascinating and eye-opening account that extends from the ancient Greeks, through the Middle Ages, the Enlightenment, and into the twentieth century. When Augustine asked what God was doing before (...)
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  11. Roy A. Sorensen (2002). Meaningless Beliefs and Mates's Problem. American Philosophical Quarterly 39 (2):169 - 182.
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  12. Roy A. Sorensen (2001). Vagueness and Contradiction. Oxford University Press.
    Roy Sorenson offers a unique exploration of an ancient problem: vagueness. Did Buddha become a fat man in one second? Is there a tallest short giraffe? According to Sorenson's epistemicist approach, the answers are yes! Although vagueness abounds in the way the world is divided, Sorenson argues that the divisions are sharp; yet we often do not know where they are. Written in Sorenson'e usual inventive and amusing style, this book offers original insight on language and logic, the way world (...)
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  13. Roy A. Sorensen (2000). A Plenum of Palindromes for Lewis Carroll. Mind 109:17 - 20.
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  14. Roy A. Sorensen (2000). A Vague Demonstration. Linguistics and Philosophy 23 (5):507-522.
    Poindexter points and asserts `That is Clinton''. But it is vague as to whether he pointed at Clinton or pointed at the more salient man, Gore. Since the vagueness only occurs at the level of reference fixing, the content of the identity proposition is precise. Indeed, it is either a necessary truth or a necessary falsehood. Since Poindexter''s utterance has a hidden truth value by virtue of vagueness, it increases the plausibility of epistemicism. Epistemicism says that vague statements have hidden (...)
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  15. Roy A. Sorensen (1999). Mirror Notation: Symbol Manipulation Without Inscription Manipulation. [REVIEW] Journal of Philosophical Logic 28 (2):141-164.
    Stereotypically, computation involves intrinsic changes to the medium of representation: writing new symbols, erasing old symbols, turning gears, flipping switches, sliding abacus beads. Perspectival computation leaves the original inscriptions untouched. The problem solver obtains the output by merely alters his orientation toward the input. There is no rewriting or copying of the input inscriptions; the output inscriptions are numerically identical to the input inscriptions. This suggests a loophole through some of the computational limits apparently imposed by physics. There can be (...)
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  16. Roy A. Sorensen (1999). Seeing Intersecting Eclipses. Journal of Philosophy 96 (1):25-49.
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  17. Roy A. Sorensen (1998). Logical Luck. Philosophical Quarterly 48 (192):319-334.
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  18. Roy A. Sorensen (1998). Sharp Boundaries for Blobs. Philosophical Studies 91 (3):275-295.
  19. Roy A. Sorensen (1998). Self-Strengthening Empathy. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (1):75-98.
    Stepping into the other guy's shoes works best when you resemble him. After all, the procedure is to use yourself as a model: in goes hypothetical beliefs and desires, out comes hypothetical actions and revised beliefs and desires. If you are structurally analogous to the empathee, then accurate inputs generate accurate outputs-just as with any other simulation. The greater the degree of isomorphism, the more dependable and precise the results. This sensitivity to degrees of resemblance suggests that the method of (...)
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  20. Roy A. Sorensen (1998). Yablo's Paradox and Kindred Infinite Liars. Mind 107 (425):137-155.
    This is a defense and extension of Stephen Yablo's claim that self-reference is completely inessential to the liar paradox. An infinite sequence of sentences of the form 'None of these subsequent sentences are true' generates the same instability in assigning truth values. I argue Yablo's technique of substituting infinity for self-reference applies to all so-called 'self-referential' paradoxes. A representative sample is provided which includes counterparts of the preface paradox, Pseudo-Scotus's validity paradox, the Knower, and other enigmas of the genre. I (...)
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  21. Roy A. Sorensen (1997). The Metaphysics of Precision and Scientific Language. Philosophical Perspectives 11 (s11):349-374.
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  22. Roy A. Sorensen (1996). Modal Bloopers: Why Believable Impossibilities Are Necessary. American Philosophical Quarterly 33 (3):247 - 261.
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  23. Roy A. Sorensen (1996). Unbeggable Questions. Analysis 56 (1):51–55.
    I can get away with it because no one is in a position to call me on it. Professor Robinson cannot consistently complain that (A) begs the question against his thesis that there is no such fallacy. He would discourage anyone from "helping" him by accusing me of committing the fallacy against him. With advocates like that, who needs adversaries? I. EMBEDDING PERSPECTIVES After all, Robinson has a viable reply to my argument. He should simply deny my premise. Later I (...)
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  24. Roy A. Sorensen (1995). Commentary. Southern Journal of Philosophy 33 (Supplement):161-170.
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  25. Roy A. Sorensen (1995). The Epistemic Conception of Vagueness: Comments on Wright. Southern Journal of Philosophy 33 (S1):161-170.
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  26. Roy A. Sorensen (1994). Symposium: Vagueness and Sharp Boundaries. Mind 103 (409):47-54.
  27. Roy A. Sorensen (1994). A Thousand Clones. Mind 103 (409):47-54.
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  28. Roy A. Sorensen (1994). Symposium: Vagueness and Sharp Boundaries: A Thousand Clones. Mind 103 (409):47-54.
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  29. Roy A. Sorensen (1993). Pseudo-Problems: How Analytic Philosophy Gets Done. Routledge.
    In the twentieth century, philosophers tackled many of the philosophical problems of previous generations by dissolving them--attacking them as linguistic illusions and showing that the problems, when closely inspected, were not problems at all. Roy A. Sorensen takes the most important and interesting examples from one hundred years of analytic philosophy to consolidate a different theory of dissolution. Pseudo-Problems offers a fascinating alternative history of twentieth century analytic philosophy. It seeks to outline a unified account of dissolution that can consolidate (...)
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  30. Roy A. Sorensen (1993). The Earliest Unexpected Class Inspection. Analysis 53 (4):252 -.
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  31. Roy A. Sorensen (1992). Thought Experiments. Oxford University Press.
    Sorensen presents a general theory of thought experiments: what they are, how they work, what are their virtues and vices. On Sorensen's view, philosophy differs from science in degree, but not in kind. For this reason, he claims, it is possible to understand philosophical thought experiments by concentrating on their resemblance to scientific relatives. Lessons learned about scientific experimentation carry over to thought experiment, and vice versa. Sorensen also assesses the hazards and pseudo-hazards of thought experiments. Although he grants that (...)
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  32. Roy A. Sorensen (1992). Thought Experiments and the Epistemology of Laws. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 22 (1):15-44.
  33. Roy A. Sorensen (1992). The Egg Came Before the Chicken. Mind 101 (403):541-2.
    Vagueness theorists tend to think that evolutionary theory dissolves the riddle "Which came first, the chicken or the egg?". After all, 'chicken' is vague. The idea is that Charles Darwin demonstrated that the chicken was preceded by borderline chickens and so it is simply indeterminate as to where the pre-chickens end and the chickens begin.
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  34. Roy A. Sorensen (1991). Rationality as an Absolute Concept. Philosophy 66 (258):473 - 486.
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  35. Roy A. Sorensen (1991). Debunkers and Assurers. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 69 (4):469 – 491.
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  36. Roy A. Sorensen (1991). Fictional Incompleteness as Vagueness. Erkenntnis 34 (1):55 - 72.
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  37. Roy A. Sorensen (1991). Moral Dilemmas, Thought Experiments, and Conflict Vagueness. Philosophical Studies 63 (3):291 - 308.
  38. Roy A. Sorensen (1991). `P, Therefore, P' Without Circularity. Journal of Philosophy 88 (5):245-266.
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  39. Roy A. Sorensen (1991). Vagueness Within the Language of Thought. Philosophical Quarterly 41 (165):389-413.
  40. Roy A. Sorensen (1990). Process Vagueness. Linguistics and Philosophy 13 (5):589 - 618.
  41. Roy A. Sorensen (1990). Vagueness Implies Cognitivism. American Philosophical Quarterly 27 (1):1 - 14.
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  42. Roy A. Sorensen (1989). Slipping Off the Slippery Slope: A Reply to Professor Jacquette. Philosophy and Rhetoric 22 (3):195 - 202.
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  43. Roy A. Sorensen (1989). The Ambiguity of Vagueness and Precision. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 70 (2):174-183.
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  44. Christopher Boorse & Roy A. Sorensen (1988). Ducking Harm. Journal of Philosophy 85 (3):115-134.
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  45. Roy A. Sorensen (1988). Precisification by Means of Vague Predicates. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 29 (2):267-275.
  46. Roy A. Sorensen (1988). Blindspots. Oxford University Press.
    Sorensen here offers a unified solution to a large family of philosophical puzzles and paradoxes through a study of "blindspots": consistent propositions that cannot be rationally accepted by certain individuals even though they might by true.
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  47. Roy A. Sorensen (1988). Dogmatism, Junk Knowledge, and Conditionals. Philosophical Quarterly 38 (153):433-454.
  48. Roy A. Sorensen (1988). Vagueness, Measurement, and Blurriness. Synthese 75 (1):45 - 82.
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  49. Roy A. Sorensen (1987). Are Enthymemes Arguments? Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 29 (1):155-159.
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  50. Roy A. Sorensen (1987). Time Travel, Parahistory and Hume. Philosophy 62 (240):227 - 236.
    THE PURPOSE OF THIS ARTICLE IS TO SHOW HOW HUME’S SCEPTICISM ABOUT MIRACLES GENERATES "EPISTEMOLOGICAL" SCEPTICISM ABOUT TIME TRAVEL. SO THE PRIMARY QUESTION RAISED HERE IS "CAN ONE KNOW THAT TIME TRAVEL HAS OCCURED?" RATHER THAN "CAN TIME TRAVEL OCCUR?" I ARGUE THAT ATTEMPTS TO SHOW THE EXISTENCE OF TIME TRAVEL WOULD FACE THE SAME METHODOLOGICAL PROBLEMS AS THE ONES CONFRONTING ATTEMPTS TO DEMONSTRATE THE EXISTENCE OF PARANORMAL EVENTS. SINCE HUMEAN SCEPTICISM EXTENDS TO THE STUDY OF PARANORMAL EVENTS (PARAPSYCHOLOGY), HUMEANS (...)
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