Search results for 'Russo-Williamson thesis' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Federica Russo & Jon Williamson (2012). EnviroGenomarkers: The Interplay Between Mechanisms and Difference Making in Establishing Causal Claims. Medicine Studies 3 (4):249-262.score: 29700.0
    According to Russo and Williamson (Int Stud Philos Sci 21(2):157–170, 2007, Hist Philos Life Sci 33:389–396, 2011a, Philos Sci 1(1):47–69, 2011b), in order to establish a causal claim of the form, ‘C is a cause of E’, one typically needs evidence that there is an underlying mechanism between C and E as well as evidence that C makes a difference to E. This thesis has been used to argue that hierarchies of evidence, as championed by evidence-based movements, tend to (...)
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  2. Federica Russo & Jon Williamson (2007). Interpreting Causality in the Health Sciences. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 21 (2):157 – 170.score: 2400.0
    We argue that the health sciences make causal claims on the basis of evidence both of physical mechanisms, and of probabilistic dependencies. Consequently, an analysis of causality solely in terms of physical mechanisms or solely in terms of probabilistic relationships, does not do justice to the causal claims of these sciences. Yet there seems to be a single relation of cause in these sciences - pluralism about causality will not do either. Instead, we maintain, the health sciences require a theory (...)
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  3. Phyllis McKay Illari, Federica Russo & Jon Williamson (eds.) (2011). Causality in the Sciences. Oxford University Press.score: 2400.0
    The book tackles these questions as well as others concerning the use of causality in the sciences.
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  4. Federica Russo & Jon Williamson (2011). Generic Versus Single-Case Causality: The Case of Autopsy. [REVIEW] European Journal for Philosophy of Science 1 (1):47-69.score: 2400.0
    This paper addresses questions about how the levels of causality (generic and single-case causality) are related. One question is epistemological: can relationships at one level be evidence for relationships at the other level? We present three kinds of answer to this question, categorised according to whether inference is top-down, bottom-up, or the levels are independent. A second question is metaphysical: can relationships at one level be reduced to relationships at the other level? We present three kinds of answer to this (...)
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  5. Lorenzo Casini, Phyllis Mckay Illari, Federica Russo & Jon Williamson (2011). Models for Prediction, Explanation and Control. Theoria 26 (1):5-33.score: 2400.0
    The Recursive Bayesian Net (RBN) formalism was originally developed for modelling nested causal relationships. In this paper we argue that the formalism can also be applied to modelling the hierarchical structure of mechanisms. The resulting network contains quantitative information about probabilities, as well as qualitative information about mechanistic structure and causal relations. Since information about probabilities, mechanisms and causal relations is vital for prediction, explanation and control respectively, an RBN can be applied to all these tasks. We show in particular (...)
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  6. Federica Russo & Jon Williamson (2007). Interpreting Probability in Causal Models for Cancer. In Federica Russo & Jon Williamson (eds.), Causality and Probability in the Sciences. 217--242.score: 2400.0
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  7. Brendan Clarke, Donald Gillies, Phyllis Illari, Federica Russo & Jon Williamson (forthcoming). Mechanisms and the Evidence Hierarchy. Topoi:1-22.score: 2400.0
    Evidence-based medicine (EBM) makes use of explicit procedures for grading evidence for causal claims. Normally, these procedures categorise evidence of correlation produced by statistical trials as better evidence for a causal claim than evidence of mechanisms produced by other methods. We argue, in contrast, that evidence of mechanisms needs to be viewed as complementary to, rather than inferior to, evidence of correlation. In this paper we first set out the case for treating evidence of mechanisms alongside evidence of correlation in (...)
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  8. Brendan Clarke, Donald Gillies, Phyllis Illari, Frederica Russo & Jon Williamson, The Evidence That Evidence-Based Medicine Omits.score: 2400.0
    According to current hierarchies of evidence for EBM, evidence of correlation (e.g., from RCTs) is always more important than evidence of mechanisms when evaluating and establishing causal claims. We argue that evidence of mechanisms needs to be treated alongside evidence of correlation. This is for three reasons. First, correlation is always a fallible indicator of causation, subject in particular to the problem of confounding; evidence of mechanisms can in some cases be more important than evidence of correlation when assessing a (...)
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  9. Federica Russo & Jon Williamson (2011). Epistemic Causality and Evidence-Based Medicine. History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences 33 (4).score: 2400.0
    Causal claims in biomedical contexts are ubiquitous albeit they are not always made explicit. This paper addresses the question of what causal claims mean in the context of disease. It is argued that in medical contexts causality ought to be interpreted according to the epistemic theory. The epistemic theory offers an alternative to traditional accounts that cash out causation either in terms of “difference-making” relations or in terms of mechanisms. According to the epistemic approach, causal claims tell us about which (...)
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  10. Phyllis McKay Illari, Federica Russo & Jon Williamson (2011). Why Look at Causality in the Sciences? In Phyllis McKay Illari, Federica Russo & Jon Williamson (eds.), Causality in the Sciences. Oup Oxford.score: 2400.0
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  11. Phyllis McKay Illari, Federica Russo & Jon Williamson (eds.) (2011). Causality in the Sciences. Oxford University Press.score: 2400.0
    There is a need for integrated thinking about causality, probability and mechanisms in scientific methodology. Causality and probability are long-established central concepts in the sciences, with a corresponding philosophical literature examining their problems. On the other hand, the philosophical literature examining mechanisms is not long-established, and there is no clear idea of how mechanisms relate to causality and probability. But we need some idea if we are to understand causal inference in the sciences: a panoply of disciplines, ranging from epidemiology (...)
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  12. Federica Russo & Jon Williamson (eds.) (2007). Causality and Probability in the Sciences.score: 2400.0
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  13. George Darby & Jon Williamson (2011). Imaging Technology and the Philosophy of Causality. Philosophy and Technology 24 (2):115-136.score: 900.0
    Russo and Williamson (Int Stud Philos Sci 21(2):157–170, 2007) put forward the thesis that, at least in the health sciences, to establish the claim that C is a cause of E, one normally needs evidence of an underlying mechanism linking C and E as well as evidence that C makes a difference to E. This epistemological thesis poses a problem for most current analyses of causality which, in virtue of analysing causality in terms of just one of mechanisms (...)
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  14. Jon Williamson (2011). Imaging Technology and the Philosophy of Causality. Philosophy and Technology 24 (2):115-136.score: 900.0
    Russo and Williamson (Int Stud Philos Sci 21(2):157–170, 2007) put forward the thesis that, at least in the health sciences, to establish the claim that C is a cause of E, one normally needs evidence of an underlying mechanism linking C and E as well as evidence that C makes a difference to E. This epistemological thesis poses a problem for most current analyses of causality which, in virtue of analysing causality in terms of just one of mechanisms (...)
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  15. Phyllis McKay Illari (2011). Mechanistic Evidence: Disambiguating the Russo–Williamson Thesis. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 25 (2):139 - 157.score: 360.0
    Russo and Williamson claim that establishing causal claims requires mechanistic and difference-making evidence. In this article, I will argue that Russo and Williamson's formulation of their thesis is multiply ambiguous. I will make three distinctions: mechanistic evidence as type vs object of evidence; what mechanism or mechanisms we want evidence of; and how much evidence of a mechanism we require. I will feed these more precise meanings back into the Russo?Williamson thesis and argue that it is both true (...)
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  16. Claudio Pizzi & Timothy Williamson (1997). Strong Boethius' Thesis and Consequential Implication. Journal of Philosophical Logic 26 (5):569-588.score: 300.0
    The paper studies the relation between systems of modal logic and systems of consequential implication, a non-material form of implication satisfying "Aristotle's Thesis" (p does not imply not p) and "Weak Boethius' Thesis" (if p implies q, then p does not imply not q). Definitions are given of consequential implication in terms of modal operators and of modal operators in terms of consequential implication. The modal equivalent of "Strong Boethius' Thesis" (that p implies q implies that p (...)
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  17. Phyllis Illari & Federica Russo (forthcoming). Information Channels and Biomarkers of Disease. Topoi:1-16.score: 300.0
    Current research in molecular epidemiology uses biomarkers to model the different disease phases from environmental exposure, to early clinical changes, to development of disease. The hope is to get a better understanding of the causal impact of a number of pollutants and chemicals on several diseases, including cancer and allergies. In a recent paper Russo and Williamson (Med Stud, 2012) address the question of what evidential elements enter the conceptualisation and modelling stages of this type of biomarkers research. Recent research (...)
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  18. Brendan Clarke (2011). Causality in Medicine with Particular Reference to the Viral Causation of Cancers. Dissertation, University College Londonscore: 270.0
    In this thesis, I give a metascientific account of causality in medicine. I begin with two historical cases of causal discovery. These are the discovery of the causation of Burkitt’s lymphoma by the Epstein-Barr virus, and of the various viral causes suggested for cervical cancer. These historical cases then support a philosophical discussion of causality in medicine. This begins with an introduction to the Russo- Williamson thesis (RWT), and discussion of a range of counter-arguments against it. Despite these, (...)
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  19. Donald Gillies (2011). The Russo-Williamson Thesis and the Question of Whether Smoking Causes Heart Disease. In Phyllis McKay Illari, Federica Russo & Jon Williamson (eds.), Causality in the Sciences. Oxford University Press. 110--125.score: 270.0
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  20. Colwyn Williamson (1969). Watkins and the Taylor-Warrender Thesis. Mind 78 (312):600-606.score: 240.0
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  21. Patrick Greenough, Duncan Pritchard & Timothy Williamson (eds.) (2009). Williamson on Knowledge. Oxford University Press.score: 150.0
    16 leading philosophers offer critical assessments of Timothy Williamson's ground-breaking work on knowledge and its impact on philosophy today.
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  22. Stefan Dragulinescu (2012). On 'Stabilising' Medical Mechanisms, Truth-Makers and Epistemic Causality: A Critique to Williamson and Russo's Approach. Synthese 187 (2):785-800.score: 144.0
    In this paper I offer an anti-Humean critique to Williamson and Russo’s approach to medical mechanisms. I focus on one of the specific claims made by Williamson and Russo, namely the claim that micro-structural ‘mechanisms’ provide evidence for the stability across populations of causal relationships ascertained at the (macro-) level of (test) populations. This claim is grounded in the epistemic account of causality developed by Williamson, an account which—while not relying exclusively on mechanistic evidence for justifying causal judgements—appeals nevertheless to (...)
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  23. Timothy Williamson (2009). The Philosophy of Philosophy • by Timothy Williamson • Blackwell, 2007. X + 332 Pp. £ 15.99 Paper: Summary. [REVIEW] Analysis 69 (1):99-100.score: 120.0
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  24. C. Pizzi & T. Williamson (2005). Conditional Excluded Middle in Systems of Consequential Implication. Journal of Philosophical Logic 34 (4):333 - 362.score: 120.0
    It is natural to ask under what conditions negating a conditional is equivalent to negating its consequent. Given a bivalent background logic, this is equivalent to asking about the conjunction of Conditional Excluded Middle (CEM, opposite conditionals are not both false) and Weak Boethius' Thesis (WBT, opposite conditionals are not both true). In the system CI.0 of consequential implication, which is intertranslatable with the modal logic KT, WBT is a theorem, so it is natural to ask which instances of (...)
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  25. Timothy Williamson, B. O. Chen & Koji Nakatogawa (2009). Thinking Deeply, Contributing Originally: An Interview with Timothy Williamson (Special Contribution). Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science 18:57-87.score: 120.0
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  26. Timothy Williamson (2011). Williamson's Philosophy of Philosophy Reply. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (2):534-542.score: 120.0
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  27. L. Williamson (2008). The Quality of Bioethics Debate: Implications for Clinical Ethics Committees. Journal of Medical Ethics 34 (5):357-360.score: 120.0
    Bioethicists have recently expressed concern over a lack of quality control within the field. This apprehension focuses on bioethics expanding in ways that obscure its distinctive ethical remit and the specialist reasoning skills it requires. This thesis about the quality and conduct of bioethics may have particular relevance for clinical ethics. As one of the youngest offshoots of bioethics, the field focuses on the ethical issues that arise specifically in a clinical context. However, non-ethics specialists are increasingly involved in (...)
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  28. J. H. Quincey & C. F. Russo (1953). Hesiodi Scutum. Introduzione, testo critico e commento con traduzione e indici a cura di C. F. Russo. Journal of Hellenic Studies 73:149.score: 120.0
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  29. Timothy Williamson (2011). Williamson on the A Priori and the Analytic Reply. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (2):498-506.score: 120.0
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  30. François Claveau (2012). The Russo–Williamson Theses in the Social Sciences: Causal Inference Drawing on Two Types of Evidence. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C 43 (4):806-813.score: 84.0
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  31. Jordan Bartol (2013). Causality in the Sciences. Edited by Russo, Williamson and Illari. Oxford University Press, 2011, Pp. 952, £95. ISBN: 978-0-19-957413-1. [REVIEW] Philosophy 88 (3):487-493.score: 84.0
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  32. Raffaella Campaner (2011). Understanding Mechanisms in the Health Sciences. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 32 (1):5-17.score: 81.0
    This article focuses on the assessment of mechanistic relations with specific attention to medicine, where mechanistic models are widely employed. I first survey recent contributions in the philosophical literature on mechanistic causation, and then take issue with Federica Russo and Jon Williamson’s thesis that two types of evidence, probabilistic and mechanistic, are at stake in the health sciences. I argue instead that a distinction should be drawn between previously acquired knowledge of mechanisms and yet-to-be-discovered knowledge of mechanisms and that (...)
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  33. Stamatios Gerogiorgakis (2013). [Review of] Jon Williamson/Federica Russo (Eds.), Key Terms in Logic, London: Continuum, 2010. [REVIEW] Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy 16:384-386.score: 72.0
  34. John Turri (2010). Does Perceiving Entail Knowing? Theoria 76 (3):197-206.score: 48.0
    This article accomplishes two closely connected things. First, it refutes an influential view about the relationship between perception and knowledge. In particular, it demonstrates that perceiving does not entail knowing. Second, it leverages that refutation to demonstrate that knowledge is not the most general factive propositional attitude.
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  35. Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (2005). Williamson on Knowledge, Action, and Causation. SATS 6 (1):15-28.score: 42.0
    In his Knowledge and its Limits (2000) Timothy Williamson argues that knowledge can be causally efficacious and as such figure in psychological explanation. His argument for this claim figures as a response to a key objection to his overall thesis that knowing is a mental state. In this paper I argue that although Williamson succeeds in establishing that knowledge in some cases is essential to the power of certain causal explanations of actions, he fails to do this in a (...)
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  36. Helge Rückert (2004). A SOLUTION TO FITCH'S PARADOX OF KNOWABILITY. In S. Rahman J. Symons (ed.), Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science. Kluwer Academic Publisher. 351--380.score: 36.0
    There is an argument (first presented by Fitch), which tries to show by formal means that the anti-realistic thesis that every truth might possibly be known, is equivalent to the unacceptable thesis that every truth is actually known (at some time in the past, present or future). First, the argument is presented and some proposals for the solution of Fitch's Paradox are briefly discussed. Then, by using Wehmeier's modal logic with subjunctive marks (S5*), it is shown how the (...)
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  37. J. Adam Carter & Duncan Pritchard (2013). Knowledge‐How and Epistemic Luck. Noûs 47 (4).score: 24.0
    Reductive intellectualists (e.g., Stanley & Williamson ; Stanley ; ; Brogaard ; ; ) hold that knowledge-how is a kind of knowledge-that. For this thesis to hold water, it is obviously important that knowledge-how and knowledge-that have the same epistemic properties. In particular, knowledge-how ought to be compatible with epistemic luck to the same extent as knowledge-that. It is argued, contra reductive intellectualism, that knowledge-how is compatible with a species of epistemic luck which is not compatible with knowledge-that, and (...)
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  38. Aaron Rizzieri (2009). Evidence Does Not Equal Knowledge. Philosophical Studies 153 (2):235-242.score: 24.0
    Timothy Williamson has argued that a person S ’s total evidence is constituted solely by propositions that S knows. This theory of evidence entails that a false belief can not be a part of S ’s evidence base for a conclusion. I argue by counterexample that this thesis (E = K for now) forces an implausible separation between what it means for a belief to be justified and rational from one’s perspective and what it means to base one’s beliefs (...)
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  39. John Hawthorne (2005). Knowledge and Evidence. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):452–458.score: 24.0
    Most of us, tacitly or explicitly, embrace a more or less Cartesian conception of our epistemic condition. According to such a conception, "what we have to go on" in learning about the world is, on the one hand, that which is a priori accessible to us, and, on the other, the inner experiences - visual imagery, tactile sensations, recollective episodes and so on - that pop into our Carte- sian theaters. One of the central themes of Knowledge and its Limits (...)
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  40. E. J. Lowe (2012). What is the Source of Our Knowledge of Modal Truths? Mind 121 (484):919-950.score: 24.0
    There is currently intense interest in the question of the source of our presumed knowledge of truths concerning what is, or is not, metaphysically possible or necessary. Some philosophers locate this source in our capacities to conceive or imagine various actual or non-actual states of affairs, but this approach is open to certain familiar and seemingly powerful objections. A different and ostensibly more promising approach has been developed by Timothy Williamson, according to which our capacity for modal knowledge is just (...)
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  41. Mark Schroeder, Knowledge is Belief for Sufficient (Objective and Subjective) Reason.score: 24.0
    This paper defends a simple thesis: that knowledge is belief for reasons that are both objectively and subjectively sufficient. I take a dogmatic approach, devoting the bulk of the paper to an explanation of what this means, and of why it explains both what knowledge is like, and why it is important; the theory is justified by its fruits. I go on to illustrate, by appeal to my main thesis, how knowledge comes to play some of the key (...)
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  42. Gerhard Preyer & Georg Peter (eds.) (2005). Contextualism in Philosophy: Knowledge, Meaning, and Truth. Oxford University Press.score: 24.0
    In epistemology and in philosophy of language there is fierce debate about the role of context in knowledge, understanding, and meaning. Many contemporary epistemologists take seriously the thesis that epistemic vocabulary is context-sensitive. This thesis is of course a semantic claim, so it has brought epistemologists into contact with work on context in semantics by philosophers of language. This volume brings together the debates, in a set of twelve specially written essays representing the latest work by leading figures (...)
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  43. Jessica Brown (2013). Knowing-How: Linguistics and Cognitive Science. Analysis 73 (2):220-227.score: 24.0
    Stanley and Williamson have defended the intellectualist thesis that knowing-how is a subspecies of knowing-that by appeal to the syntax and semantics of ascriptions of knowing-how. Critics have objected that this way of defending intellectualism places undue weight on linguistic considerations and fails to give sufficient attention to empirical considerations from the scientific study of the mind. In this paper, I examine and reject Stanley's recent attempt to answer the critics.
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  44. Terry Horgan (1995). Transvaluationism: A Dionysian Approach to Vagueness. Southern Journal of Philosophy 33 (S1):97-126.score: 24.0
    I advocate a two part view concerning vagueness. On one hand I claim that vagueness is logically incoherent; but on the other hand I claim that vagueness is also a benign, beneficial, and indeed essential feature of human language and thought. I will call this view transvaluationism, a name which seems to me appropriate for several reasons. First, the term suggests that we should move beyond the idea that the successive statements in a sorites sequence can be assigned differing truth (...)
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  45. Erik Weber (2009). How Probabilistic Causation Can Account for the Use of Mechanistic Evidence. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 23 (3):277-295.score: 24.0
    In a recent article in this journal, Federica Russo and Jon Williamson argue that an analysis of causality in terms of probabilistic relationships does not do justice to the use of mechanistic evidence to support causal claims. I will present Ronald Giere's theory of probabilistic causation, and show that it can account for the use of mechanistic evidence (both in the health sciences—on which Russo and Williamson focus—and elsewhere). I also review some other probabilistic theories of causation (of Suppes, Eells, (...)
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  46. Elisabetta Lalumera (2007). Reference, Knowledge, and Scepticism About Meaning. Sorites (19):1-18.score: 24.0
    This paper explores the possibility of resisting meaning scepticism – the thesis that there are many alternative incompatible assignments of reference to each of our terms - by appealing to the idea that the nature of reference is to maximize knowledge. If the reference relation is a knowledge maximizing-relation, then some candidate referents are privileged among the others - i.e., those referents we are in a position to know about – and a positive reason against meaning scepticism is thus (...)
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  47. Alexander Jackson (2012). Two Ways to Put Knowledge First. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (2):353 - 369.score: 24.0
    This paper distinguishes two ways to ?put knowledge first?. One way affirms a knowledge norm. For example, Williamson [2000] argues that one must only assert that which one knows. Hawthorne and Stanley [2008] argue that one must only treat as a reason for action that which one knows. Another way to put knowledge first affirms a determination thesis. For example, Williamson [2000] argues that what one knows determines what one is justified in believing. Hawthorne and Stanley [2008] argue that (...)
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  48. Michael Joffe (2013). The Concept of Causation in Biology. Erkenntnis 78 (2):179-197.score: 24.0
    This paper sets out to analyze how causation works by focusing on biology, as represented by epidemiology and by scientific information on how the body works (“physiology”). It starts by exploring the specificity of evolved physiological systems, in which evolutionary, developmental and proximal causes all fit together, and the concept of function is meaningful; in contrast, this structure does not apply in epidemiology (or outside biology). Using these two contrasting branches of biology, I examine the role both of mechanism and (...)
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  49. Alfredo Tomasetta (2010). Counting Possibilia. Theoria 25 (2):163-174.score: 24.0
    Timothy Williamson supports the thesis that every possible entity necessarily exists and so he needs to explain how a possible son of Wittgenstein’s, for example, exists in our world: he exists as a merely possible object (MPO), a pure locus of potential. Williamson presents a short argument for the existence of MPOs: how many knives can be made by fitting together two blades and two handles? Four: two, at the most, are concrete objects, the others being merely possible knives (...)
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  50. Alexander Gebharter (2014). A Formal Framework for Representing Mechanisms? Philosophy of Science 81 (1):138-153.score: 24.0
    In this article I tackle the question of how the hierarchical order of mechanisms can be represented within a causal graph framework. I illustrate an answer to this question proposed by Casini, Illari, Russo, and Williamson and provide an example that their formalism does not support two important features of nested mechanisms: (i) a mechanism’s submechanisms are typically causally interacting with other parts of said mechanism, and (ii) intervening in some of a mechanism’s parts should have some influence on the (...)
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