23 found
Sort by:
See also:
Profile: Ruth Chang (Rutgers University)
  1. Ruth Chang, Preventing the Existence of People with Disabilities.
    It is commonly held that there are both cases in which there is a strong moral reason not to cause the existence of a disabled person and cases in which, although it would be permissible to cause a disabled person to exist, it would be better not to. Yet many disabled people are affronted by the idea that it is sometimes better to prevent people like themselves from existing, precisely because these people would be disabled. One of their grounds for (...)
    No categories
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Ruth Chang (forthcoming). &Quot;commitment, Reasons, and the Will&Quot;. Oxford Studies in Metaethics.
    This paper argues that there is a particular kind of ‘internal’ commitment typically made in the context of romantic love relationships that has striking meta-normative implications for how we understand the role of the will in practical normativity. Internal commitments cannot plausibly explain the reasons we have in committed relationships on the usual model – as triggering reasons that are already there, in the way that making a promise triggers a reason via a pre-existing norm of the form ‘If you (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Ruth Chang (forthcoming). &Quot;practical Reasons: The Problem of Gridlock&Quot;. In Barry Dainton & Howard Robinson (eds.), Companion to Analytic Philosophy. Continuum Press.
    The paper has two aims. The first is to propose a general framework for organizing some central questions about normative practical reasons in a way that separates importantly distinct issues that are often run together. Setting out this framework provides a snapshot of the leading types of view about practical reasons as well as a deeper understanding of what are widely regarded to be some of their most serious difficulties. The second is to use the proposed framework to uncover and (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Ruth Chang (2013). Incommensurability (and Incomparability). In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Wiley-Blackwell.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Ruth Chang (2013). Grounding Practical Normativity: Going Hybrid. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 164 (1):163-187.
    In virtue of what is something a reason for action? That is, what makes a consideration a reason to act? This is a metaphysical or meta-normative question about the grounding of reasons for action. The answer to the grounding question has been traditionally given in ‘pure’, univocal terms. This paper argues that there is good reason to understand the ground of practical normativity as a hybrid of traditional ‘pure’ views. The paper 1) surveys the three leading ‘pure’ answers to the (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Ruth Chang (2012). Are Hard Choices Cases of Incomparability? Philosophical Issues 22 (1):106-126.
    This paper presents an argument against the widespread view that ‘hard choices’ are hard because of the incomparability of the alternatives. The argument has two parts. First, I argue that any plausible theory of practical reason must be ‘comparativist’ in form, that is, it must hold that a comparative relation between the alternatives with respect to what matters in the choice determines a justified choice in that situation. If comparativist views of practical reason are correct, however, the incomparabilist view of (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Ruth Chang (2012). &Quot;value Pluralism&Quot;. In James Wright (ed.), International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behaviorial Sciences.
    ‘Value pluralism’ as traditionally understood is the metaphysical thesis that there are many values that cannot be ‘reduced’ to a single supervalue. While it is widely assumed that value pluralism is true, the case for value pluralism depends on resolution of a neglected question in value theory: how are values properly individuated? Value pluralism has been thought to be important in two main ways. If values are plural, any theory that relies on value monism, for example, hedonistic utilitarianism, is mistaken. (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Ruth Chang (2009). Reflections on the Reasonable and the Rational in Conflict Resolution. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 83 (1):133 - 160.
    Most familiar approaches to social conflict moot reasonable ways of dealing with conflict, ways that aim to serve values such as legitimacy, justice, morality, fairness, fidelity to individual preferences, and so on. In this paper, I explore an alternative approach to social conflict that contrasts with the leading approaches of Rawlsians, perfectionists, and social choice theorists. The proposed approach takes intrinsic features of the conflict—what I call a conflict's evaluative 'structure'—as grounds for a rational way of responding to that conflict. (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Ruth Chang (2009). Voluntarist Reasons and the Sources of Normativity. In David Sobel & Steven Wall (eds.), Reasons for Action. Cambridge University Press.
    In virtue of what does a consideration provide a practical reason? Suppose the fact that an experience is painful provides you with a reason to avoid it. In virtue of what does the fact that it’s painful have the normativity of a reason – where, in other words, does its normativity come from? As some philosophers put the question, what is the source of a reason’s normativity?
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Sarah Buss, Angela M. Smith, Sophia R. Moreau, Maria Merritt, Ruth Chang & Cass R. Sunstein (2005). 10. Chandran Kukathas, The Liberal Archipelago: A Theory of Diversity and Freedom Chandran Kukathas, The Liberal Archipelago: A Theory of Diversity and Freedom (Pp. 422-427). [REVIEW] Ethics 115 (2).
    No categories
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Ruth Chang (2005). Parity, Interval Value, and Choice. Ethics 115 (2):331-350.
    This paper begins with a response to Josh Gert’s challenge that ‘on a par with’ is not a sui generis fourth value relation beyond ‘better than’, ‘worse than’, and ‘equally good’. It then explores two further questions: can parity be modeled by an interval representation of value? And what should one rationally do when faced with items on a par? I argue that an interval representation of value is incompatible with the possibility that items are on a par (a mathematical (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Ruth Chang (2004). All Things Considered. Philosophical Perspectives 18 (1):1–22.
    One of the most common judgments of normative life takes the following form: With respect to some things that matter, one item is better than the other, with respect to other things that matter, the other item is better, but all things considered – that is, taking into account all the things that matter – the one item is better than the other. In this paper, I explore how all-things-considered judgments are possible, assuming that they are. In particular, I examine (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Ruth Chang (2004). Can Desires Provide Reasons for Action? In R. Jay Wallace (ed.), Reason and Value: Themes From the Moral Philosophy of Joseph Raz. Oxford University Press. 56--90.
    No categories
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Ruth Chang (2004). Putting Together Morality and Well-Being. In Peter Baumann & Monika Betzler (eds.), Practical Conflicts: New Philosophical Essays. Cambridge. 118--158.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Justin D’Arms, Jovan Babic, Eric Cavallero, Ruth Chang, Kai Draper, A. E. Fuchs, Ann Garry, Ishtiyaque Haji, George W. Harris & Richard G. Hensen (2004). Manuscript Referees for The Journal of Ethics Volume 8: September 2003–August 2004. Journal of Ethics 8 (473).
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Ruth Chang (2002). Making Comparisons Count. Routledge.
    The central aim of this book is to answer two questions: Are alternatives for choice ever incomparable? and, In what ways can items be compared? The arguments offered suggest that alternatives for choice no matter how different are never incomparable, and that the ways in which items can be compared are richer and more varied than commonly supposed. This work is the first book length treatment of the topics of incomparability, value, and practical reason.
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Ruth Chang (2002). The Possibility of Parity. Ethics 112 (4):659-688.
    This paper argues for the existence of a fourth positive generic value relation that can hold between two items beyond ‘better than’, ‘worse than’, and ‘equally good’: namely ‘on a par’.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Ruth Chang, Allen Buchanan, Mathias Risse, Scott A. Anderson & Thaddeus Metz (2002). 10. Nenad Miscevic, Ed., Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict: Philosophical Perspectives Nenad Miscevic, Ed., Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict: Philosophical Perspectives (Pp. 843-846). [REVIEW] Ethics 112 (4).
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Ruth Chang (2001). Review: Two Conceptions of Reasons for Action. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (2):447 - 453.
    On a ‘comparative’ conception of practical reasons, reasons are like ‘weights’ that can make an action more or less rational. Bernard Gert adopts instead a ‘toggle’ conception of practical reasons: something counts as a reason just in case it alone can make some or other otherwise irrational action rational. I suggest that Gert’s conception suffers from various defects, and that his motivation for adopting this conception – his central claim that actions can be rational without there being reasons for them (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Ruth Chang (2001). Two Conceptions of Reasons for Action. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (2):447–453.
  21. Ruth Chang (2001). Against Constitutive Incommensurability or Buying and Selling Friends. Noûs 35 (s1):33 - 60.
    Recently, some of the leading proponents of the view that there is widespread incommensurability among goods have suggested that the incommensurability of some goods is a constitutive feature of the goods themselves. So, for example, a friendship and a million dollars are incommensurable because it is part of what it is to be a friendship that it be incommensurable with money. According to these ‘constitutive incommensurabilists’ incommensurability follows from the very nature of certain goods. In this paper, I examine this (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. Ruth Chang (ed.) (1997). Introduction, Incommensurability, Incomparability, and Practical Reasoning. Harvard University Press.
    This paper is the introduction to the volume. It gives an argumentative view of the philosophical landscape concerning incommensurability and incomparability. It argues that incomparability, not incommensurability, is the important phenomenon on which philosophers should be focusing and that the arguments for the existence of incomparability are so far not compelling.
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. Ruth Chang (ed.) (1997). Incommensurability, Incomparability and Practical Reason. Harvard University Press.
    And what are the implications for moral and legal decision making? In this book, some of the sharpest minds in philosophy struggle with these questions.
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation