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  1. Ruth Garrett Millikan, Learning Language.
    Many students of pragmatics and child language have come to believe that in order to learn a language a child must first have a 'theory of mind,' a grasp that speakers mentally represent the content they would convey when they speak. This view is reinforced by the Gricean theory of communication, according to which speakers intend their words to cause hearers to believe or to do certain things and hearers must recognize these intentions if they are to comply. The view (...)
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  2. Ruth Garrett Millikan, On Reading Signs; Some Differences Between Us and The Others.
    On Reading Signs; Some Differences between Us and The Others If there are certain kinds of signs that an animal cannot learn to interpret, that might be for any of a number of reasons. It might be, first, because the animal cannot discriminate the signs from one another. For example, although human babies learn to discriminate human speech sounds according to the phonological structures of their native languages very easily, it may be that few if any other animals are capable (...)
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  3. Ruth Garrett Millikan (2013). 5 The Tangle of Natural Purposes That Is Us. In Bana Bashour Hans Muller (ed.), Contemporary Philosophical Naturalism and its Implications. Routledge. 63.
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  4. Ruth Garrett Millikan (2013). Troubles with Plantinga's Reading of Millikan. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (2):454-456.
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  5. Ruth Garrett Millikan (2012). Are There Mental Indexicals and Demonstratives? Philosophical Perspectives 26 (1):217-234.
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  6. Ruth Garrett Millikan (2011). Loosing the Word–Concept Tie. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 85 (1):125-143.
    Sainsbury and Tye (2011) propose that, in the case of names and other simple extensional terms, we should substitute for Frege's second level of content—for his senses—a second level of meaning vehicle—words in the language of thought. I agree. They also offer a theory of atomic concept reference—their ‘originalist’ theory—which implies that people knowing the same word have the ‘same concept’. This I reject, arguing for a symmetrical rather than an originalist theory of concept reference, claiming that individual concepts are (...)
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  7. Ruth Garrett Millikan (2009). It is Likely Misbelief Never has a Function. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (6):529-530.
    I highlight and amplify three central points that McKay & Dennett (M&D) make about the origin of failures to perform biologically proper functions. I question whether even positive illusions meet criteria for evolved misbelief.
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  8. Ruth Garrett Millikan (2008). A Difference of Some Consequence Between Conventions and Rules. Topoi 27 (1-2):87-99.
    Lewis’s view of the way conventions are passed on may have some especially interesting consequences for the study of language. I’ll start by briefly discussing agreements and disagreements that I have with Lewis’s general views on conventions and then turn to how linguistic conventions spread. I’ll compare views of main stream generative linguistics, in particular, Chomsky’s views on how syntactic forms are passed on, with the sort of view of language acquisition and language change advocated by usage-based or construction grammars, (...)
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  9. Ruth Garrett Millikan (2007). Précis of Varieties of Meaning. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (3):655–662.
  10. Ruth Garrett Millikan (2007). Reply to Bermúdez. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (3):670–673.
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  11. Ruth Garrett Millikan (2007). Reply to Recanati. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (3):682–691.
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  12. Ruth Garrett Millikan (2007). Reply to Rosenberg. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (3):701–702.
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  13. Ruth Garrett Millikan (2007). Reply to Taylor. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (3):710–715.
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  14. Ruth Garrett Millikan (2006). Styles of Rationality. In Susan Hurley & Matthew Nudds (eds.), Rational Animals? Oxford University Press.
    By whatever general principles and mechanisms animal behavior is governed, human behavior control rides piggyback on top of the same or very similar mechanisms. We have reflexes. We can be conditioned. The movements that make up our smaller actions are mostly caught up in perception-action cycles following perceived Gibsonian affordances. Still, without doubt there are levels of behavior control that are peculiar to humans. Following Aristotle, tradition has it that what is added in humans is rationality ("rational soul"). Rationality, however, (...)
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  15. Ruth Garrett Millikan (2001). A Theory of Representation to Complement TEC. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (5):894-895.
    The target article can be strengthened by supplementing it with a better theory of mental representation. Given such a theory, there is reason to suppose that, first, even the most primitive representations are mostly of distal affairs; second, the most primitive representations also turn out to be directed two ways at once, both stating facts and directing action.
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  16. Ruth Garrett Millikan (2001). Cutting Philosophy of Language Down to Size. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 48:125-140.
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  17. Ruth Garrett Millikan (2001). Purposes and Cross-Purposes. The Monist 84 (3):392-416.
    Both the human capacity for language and individual languages have evolved, in part, by natural selection. This paper considers certain aspects and consequences of this, concerning, among other things, the semantics-pragmatics distinction.
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  18. Ruth Garrett Millikan (2000). On Clear and Confused Ideas: An Essay About Substance Concepts. Cambridge University Press.
    Written by one of today's most creative and innovative philosophers, Ruth Garrett Millikan, this book examines basic empirical concepts; how they are acquired, how they function, and how they have been misrepresented in the traditional philosophical literature. Millikan places cognitive psychology in an evolutionary context where human cognition is assumed to be an outgrowth of primitive forms of mentality, and assumed to have 'functions' in the biological sense. Of particular interest are her discussions of the nature of abilities as different (...)
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  19. Ruth Garrett Millikan (1999). On Sympathies with J. J. Gibson and on Focusing Reference. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (4):732-733.
    Something of the relation of my work on substance concepts to Gibsonian theories of perception–action is discussed. What historical relations tie a particular substance concept to a particular substance is discussed.
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  20. Ruth Garrett Millikan (1999). Response to Boyd's Commentary. Philosophical Studies 95 (1-2):99-102.
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  21. Ruth Garrett Millikan (1999). Wings, Spoons, Pills, and Quills: A Pluralist Theory of Function. Journal of Philosophy 96 (4):191-206.
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  22. Ruth Garrett Millikan (1998). A Common Structure for Concepts of Individuals, Stuffs, and Real Kinds: More Mama, More Milk, and More Mouse. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (1):55-65.
    Concepts are highly theoretical entities. One cannot study them empirically without committing oneself to substantial preliminary assumptions. Among the competing theories of concepts and categorization developed by psychologists in the last thirty years, the implicit theoretical assumption that what falls under a concept is determined by description () has never been seriously challenged. I present a nondescriptionist theory of our most basic concepts, which include (1) stuffs (gold, milk), (2) real kinds (cat, chair), and (3) individuals (Mama, Bill Clinton, the (...)
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  23. Ruth Garrett Millikan (1998). Language Conventions Made Simple. Journal of Philosophy 95 (4):161-180.
    At the start of Convention (1969) Lewis says that it is "a platitude that language is ruled by convention" and that he proposes to give us "an analysis of convention in its full generality, including tacit convention not created by agreement." Almost no clause, however, of Lewis's analysis has withstood the barrage of counter examples over the years,1 and a glance at the big dictionary suggests why, for there are a dozen different senses listed there. Left unfettered, convention wanders freely (...)
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  24. Ruth Garrett Millikan (1998). Words, Concepts, and Entities: With Enemies Like These, I Don't Need Friends. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (1):89-100.
    A number of clarifications of the target article and some corrections are made. I clarify which concepts the thesis was intended to be about, what “descriptionism” means, the difference between “concepts” and “conceptions,” and why extensions are not determined by conceptions. I clarify the meaning of “substances,” how one knows what inductions to project over them, the connection with “basic level categories,” how it is determined what substance a given substance concept is of, how equivocation in concepts occurs, and the (...)
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  25. Ruth Garrett Millikan (1998). Book Review:Complexity and the Function of Mind in Nature Peter Godfrey-Smith. [REVIEW] Philosophy of Science 65 (2):375-.
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  26. Ruth Garrett Millikan (1990). The Myth of the Essential Indexical. Noûs 24 (5):723-734.
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  27. Ruth Garrett Millikan (1987). What Peter Thinks When He Hears Mary Speak. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 10 (4):725.
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  28. Ruth Garrett Millikan (1986). Metaphysical Anti-Realism? Mind 95 (380):417-431.
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  29. Ruth Garrett Millikan (1986). Of What Use Categories? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 9 (4):663.
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  30. Ruth Garrett Millikan (1986). The Price of Correspondence Truth. Noûs 20 (4):453-468.
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  31. Ruth Garrett Millikan (1985). Why Propensities Cannot Be Probabilities, Paul Humphreys Proposed Accounts of Probability Are Usually Required to Satisfy the Standard Axioms of the Probability Calculus. Because of the Fundamentally Causal Nature of Propensities, They Cannot Do This, Primarily Because in-Version Formulas Such as the Multiplication Axiom and Bayes' Theorem Do. Philosophical Review 94 (4).
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  32. Ruth Garrett Millikan (1983). Dennett' Rational Animals: And How Behavorism Overlooked Them. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):372.
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