27 found
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  1. P. N. Johnson-Laird & Ruth M. J. Byrne (1991). Deduction. Monograph Collection (Matt - Pseudo).
     
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  2.  72
    Ruth M. J. Byrne (2005). The Rational Imagination: How People Create Alternatives to Reality. MIT Press.
    A leading scholar in the psychology of thinking and reasoning argues that the counterfactual imagination—the creation of "if only" alternatives to ...
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  3.  7
    Ruth M. J. Byrne (1989). Suppressing Valid Inferences with Conditionals. Cognition 31 (1):61-83.
    Three experiments are reported which show that in certain contexts subjects reject instances of the valid modus ponens and modus tollens inference form in conditional arguments. For example, when a conditional premise, such as: If she meets her friend then she will go to a play, is accompanied by a conditional containing an additional requirement: If she has enough money then she will go to a play, subjects reject the inference from the categorical premise: She meets her friend, to the (...)
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  4.  5
    Philip N. Johnson-Laird & Ruth M. J. Byrne (1992). Modal Reasoning, Models, and Manktelow and Over. Cognition 43 (2):173-182.
  5.  4
    P. N. Johnson-Laird & Ruth M. J. Byrne (1990). Meta-Logical Problems: Knights, Knaves, and Rips. Cognition 36 (1):69-84.
  6. Ruth M. J. Byrne (1991). Can Valid Inferences Be Suppressed? Cognition 39 (1):71-78.
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  7.  16
    Ruth M. J. Byrne & P. N. Johnson-Laird (2009). ‘If’ and the Problems of Conditional Reasoning. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 13 (7):282-287.
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  8.  18
    Ruth M. J. Byrne (2002). Mental Models and Counterfactual Thoughts About What Might Have Been. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 6 (10):426-431.
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  9.  73
    Philip N. Johnson-Laird, Ruth M. J. Byrne & Vittorio Girotto (2009). The Mental Model Theory of Conditionals: A Reply to Guy Politzer. Topoi 28 (1):75-80.
    This paper replies to Politzer’s ( 2007 ) criticisms of the mental model theory of conditionals. It argues that the theory provides a correct account of negation of conditionals, that it does not provide a truth-functional account of their meaning, though it predicts that certain interpretations of conditionals yield acceptable versions of the ‘paradoxes’ of material implication, and that it postulates three main strategies for estimating the probabilities of conditionals.
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  10.  2
    Philip Johnson-Laird & Ruth M. J. Byrne (2002). Conditionals: A Theory of Meaning, Pragmatics, and Inference. Psychological Review 109 (4):646-678.
    The authors outline a theory of conditionals of the form If A then C and If A then possibly C. The 2 sorts of conditional have separate core meanings that refer to sets of possibilities. Knowledge, pragmatics, and semantics can modulate these meanings. Modulation can add information about temporal and other relations between antecedent and consequent. It can also prevent the construction of possibilities to yield 10 distinct sets of possibilities to which conditionals can refer. The mental representation of a (...)
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  11.  11
    Philip N. Johnson-Laird & Ruth M. J. Byrne (1993). Précis of Deduction. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):323.
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  12.  14
    Clare R. Walsh & Ruth M. J. Byrne (2007). How People Think “If Only …” About Reasons for Actions. Thinking and Reasoning 13 (4):461 – 483.
    When people think about how a situation might have turned out differently, they tend to imagine counterfactual alternatives to their actions. We report the results of three experiments which show that people imagine alternatives to actions differently when they know about a reason for the action. The first experiment ( n = 36) compared reason - action sequences to cause - effect sequences. It showed that people do not imagine alternatives to reasons in the way they imagine alternatives to causes: (...)
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  13.  26
    Alice McEleney & Ruth M. J. Byrne (2006). Spontaneous Counterfactual Thoughts and Causal Explanations. Thinking and Reasoning 12 (2):235 – 255.
    We report two Experiments to compare counterfactual thoughts about how an outcome could have been different and causal explanations about why the outcome occurred. Experiment 1 showed that people generate counterfactual thoughts more often about controllable than uncontrollable events, whereas they generate causal explanations more often about unexpected than expected events. Counterfactual thoughts focus on specific factors, whereas causal explanations focus on both general and specific factors. Experiment 2 showed that in their spontaneous counterfactual thoughts, people focus on normal events (...)
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  14.  4
    Philip N. Johnson-Laird & Ruth M. J. Byrne (1993). Mental Models or Formal Rules? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):368.
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  15.  17
    P. N. Johnson-Laird & Ruth M. J. Byrne (1999). Models Rule, OK? A Reply to Fetzer. Minds and Machines 9 (1):111-118.
  16.  1
    Ruth M. J. Byrne, Simon J. Handley & Philip N. Johnson-Laird (1995). Reasoning From Suppositions. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology Section A 48 (4):915-944.
    Two experiments investigated inferences based on suppositions. In Experiment 1, the subjects decided whether suppositions about individuals' veracity were consistent with their assertions—for example, whether the supposition “Ann is telling the truth and Beth is telling a lie”, is consistent with the premises: “Ann asserts: I am telling the truth and Beth is telling the truth. Beth asserts: Ann is telling the truth”. It showed that these inferences are more difficult than ones based on factual premises: “Ann asserts: I live (...)
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  17.  5
    P. N. Johnson-laird & Ruth M. J. Byrne (1995). A Model Point of View. Thinking and Reasoning 1 (4):339 – 350.
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  18.  5
    P. N. Johnson-Laird & Ruth M. J. Byrne (1994). Models, Necessity, and the Search for Counterexamples. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (4):775.
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  19.  11
    Ruth M. J. Byrne & Philip N. Johnson-Laird (2010). Models Redux: Response to Evans and Over. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 14 (1):6.
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  20.  28
    Rachel McCloy & Ruth M. J. Byrne (2002). Semifactual ''Even If'' Thinking. Thinking and Reasoning 8 (1):41 – 67.
    Semifactual thinking about what might have been the same, e.g., ''even if Philip had not chosen the chocolate ice-cream sundae, he would have developed an allergic reaction'' has been neglected compared to counterfactual thinking about what might have been different, e.g., ''if only Philip had not chosen the chocolate ice-cream sundae, he would not have developed an allergic reaction''. We report the first systematic comparison of the two sorts of thinking in two experiments. The first experiment showed that counterfactual ''if (...)
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  21.  21
    Stefania Pighin, Ruth M. J. Byrne, Donatella Ferrante, Michel Gonzalez & Vittorio Girotto (2011). Counterfactual Thoughts About Experienced, Observed, and Narrated Events. Thinking and Reasoning 17 (2):197 - 211.
    Four studies show that observers and readers imagine different alternatives to reality. When participants read a story about a protagonist who chose the more difficult of two tasks and failed, their counterfactual thoughts focused on the easier, unchosen task. But when they observed the performance of an individual who chose and failed the more difficult task, participants' counterfactual thoughts focused on alternative ways to solve the chosen task, as did the thoughts of individuals who acted out the event. We conclude (...)
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  22.  5
    Ruth M. J. Byrne & Philip N. Johnson-Laird (2009). Corrigendum: ‘If’ and the Problems of Conditional Reasoning. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 13 (9):371.
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  23.  8
    P. N. Johnson-Laird & Ruth M. J. Byrne (2000). Mental Models and Pragmatics. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (2):284-285.
    Van der Henst argues that the theory of mental models lacks a pragmatic component. He fills the gap with the notion that reasoners draw the most relevant conclusions. We agree, but argue that theories need an element of “nondeterminism.” It is often impossible to predict either what will be most relevant or which particular conclusion an individual will draw.
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  24.  2
    P. N. Johnson-Laird & Ruth M. J. Byrne (1996). Mental Models and Syllogisms. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (3):543-546.
    We resolve the two problems that Hardman raises. The first problem arises from a misunderstanding: the crucial distinction is between one-model and multiple-model problems. The second problem illuminates a deeper principle: conclusions depend on the procedures for interpreting models. We describe an algorithm that obviates the problem and empirical work that reveals a new view of syllogistic reasoning.
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  25. Paul Bertelson, Ruth M. J. Byrne, Stanislas Dehaene, Ruma Falk, Gerd Gigerenzer, Klaus Hug, Phillip N. Johnson-Laird, Susan Jones, Peter W. Jusczyk & Barbara Landau (1992). Ex 0. Cognition 43:2.
     
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  26. P. N. Johnson-Laird, Ruth M. J. Byrne & Patrizia Tabossi (1989). Reasoning by Model: The Case of Multiple Quantification. Psychological Review 96 (4):658-673.
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  27. P. N. Johnson-Laird, Ruth M. J. Byrne & Walter Schaeken (1994). Why Models Rather Than Rules Give a Better Account of Propositional Reasoning: A Reply to Bonatti and to O'Brien, Braine, and Yang. Psychological Review 101 (4):734-739.
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