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  1. Stefania Pighin, Ruth M. J. Byrne, Donatella Ferrante, Michel Gonzalez & Vittorio Girotto (2011). Counterfactual Thoughts About Experienced, Observed, and Narrated Events. Thinking and Reasoning 17 (2):197 - 211.
    Four studies show that observers and readers imagine different alternatives to reality. When participants read a story about a protagonist who chose the more difficult of two tasks and failed, their counterfactual thoughts focused on the easier, unchosen task. But when they observed the performance of an individual who chose and failed the more difficult task, participants' counterfactual thoughts focused on alternative ways to solve the chosen task, as did the thoughts of individuals who acted out the event. We conclude (...)
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  2. Ruth M. J. Byrne & Philip N. Johnson-Laird (2010). Models Redux: Response to Evans and Over. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 14 (1):6.
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  3. Ruth M. J. Byrne & P. N. Johnson-Laird (2009). 'If' and the Problems of Conditional Reasoning. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 13 (7):282-287.
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  4. Ruth M. J. Byrne & Philip N. Johnson-Laird (2009). Corrigendum: 'If' and the Problems of Conditional Reasoning. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 13 (9):371.
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  5. Philip N. Johnson-Laird, Ruth M. J. Byrne & Vittorio Girotto (2009). The Mental Model Theory of Conditionals: A Reply to Guy Politzer. Topoi 28 (1):75-80.
    This paper replies to Politzer’s ( 2007 ) criticisms of the mental model theory of conditionals. It argues that the theory provides a correct account of negation of conditionals, that it does not provide a truth-functional account of their meaning, though it predicts that certain interpretations of conditionals yield acceptable versions of the ‘paradoxes’ of material implication, and that it postulates three main strategies for estimating the probabilities of conditionals.
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  6. Clare R. Walsh & Ruth M. J. Byrne (2007). How People Think “If Only …” About Reasons for Actions. Thinking and Reasoning 13 (4):461 – 483.
    When people think about how a situation might have turned out differently, they tend to imagine counterfactual alternatives to their actions. We report the results of three experiments which show that people imagine alternatives to actions differently when they know about a reason for the action. The first experiment ( n = 36) compared reason - action sequences to cause - effect sequences. It showed that people do not imagine alternatives to reasons in the way they imagine alternatives to causes: (...)
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  7. Alice McEleney & Ruth M. J. Byrne (2006). Spontaneous Counterfactual Thoughts and Causal Explanations. Thinking and Reasoning 12 (2):235 – 255.
    We report two Experiments to compare counterfactual thoughts about how an outcome could have been different and causal explanations about why the outcome occurred. Experiment 1 showed that people generate counterfactual thoughts more often about controllable than uncontrollable events, whereas they generate causal explanations more often about unexpected than expected events. Counterfactual thoughts focus on specific factors, whereas causal explanations focus on both general and specific factors. Experiment 2 showed that in their spontaneous counterfactual thoughts, people focus on normal events (...)
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  8. José Luis Bermudez, Martijn Blaauw, Ruth M. J. Byrne, C. Casadio, P. J. Scott, R. A. G. Seely, R. G. Collingwood, Earl Conee, Theodore Sider & Ian Dearden (2005). Appearance in This List Neither Guarantees nor Precludes a Future Review of the Book. Bartsch, Renate, Memory and Understanding: Concept Formation in Proust's A la Recher-Che du Temps Perdu, Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamin's Publishing Company, 2005, Pp. Ix+ 158, $114.00,€ 95.00. Bermudez, Jose Luis, Philosophy of Psychology: A Contemporary Introduction, London. [REVIEW] Mind 114:456.
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  9. Ruth M. J. Byrne (2005). The Rational Imagination: How People Create Alternatives to Reality. Mit Press.
    A leading scholar in the psychology of thinking and reasoning argues that the counterfactual imagination—the creation of "if only" alternatives to ...
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  10. Ruth M. J. Byrne (2002). Mental Models and Counterfactual Thoughts About What Might Have Been. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 6 (10):426-431.
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  11. Rachel McCloy & Ruth M. J. Byrne (2002). Semifactual ''Even If'' Thinking. Thinking and Reasoning 8 (1):41 – 67.
    Semifactual thinking about what might have been the same, e.g., ''even if Philip had not chosen the chocolate ice-cream sundae, he would have developed an allergic reaction'' has been neglected compared to counterfactual thinking about what might have been different, e.g., ''if only Philip had not chosen the chocolate ice-cream sundae, he would not have developed an allergic reaction''. We report the first systematic comparison of the two sorts of thinking in two experiments. The first experiment showed that counterfactual ''if (...)
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  12. P. N. Johnson-Laird & Ruth M. J. Byrne (2000). Mental Models and Pragmatics. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (2):284-285.
    Van der Henst argues that the theory of mental models lacks a pragmatic component. He fills the gap with the notion that reasoners draw the most relevant conclusions. We agree, but argue that theories need an element of “nondeterminism.” It is often impossible to predict either what will be most relevant or which particular conclusion an individual will draw.
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  13. P. N. Johnson-Laird & Ruth M. J. Byrne (1999). Models Rule, OK? A Reply to Fetzer. Minds and Machines 9 (1):111-118.
  14. P. N. Johnson-Laird & Ruth M. J. Byrne (1996). Mental Models and Syllogisms. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (3):543-546.
    We resolve the two problems that Hardman raises. The first problem arises from a misunderstanding: the crucial distinction is between one-model and multiple-model problems. The second problem illuminates a deeper principle: conclusions depend on the procedures for interpreting models. We describe an algorithm that obviates the problem and empirical work that reveals a new view of syllogistic reasoning.
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  15. P. N. Johnson-laird & Ruth M. J. Byrne (1995). A Model Point of View. Thinking and Reasoning 1 (4):339 – 350.
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  16. P. N. Johnson-Laird & Ruth M. J. Byrne (1994). Models, Necessity, and the Search for Counterexamples. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (4):775.
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  17. Philip N. Johnson-Laird & Ruth M. J. Byrne (1993). Mental Models or Formal Rules? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):368.
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  18. Philip N. Johnson-Laird & Ruth M. J. Byrne (1993). Précis of Deduction. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):323.
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  19. Paul Bertelson, Ruth M. J. Byrne, Stanislas Dehaene, Ruma Falk, Gerd Gigerenzer, Klaus Hug, Phillip N. Johnson-Laird, Susan Jones, Peter W. Jusczyk & Barbara Landau (1992). Ex 0. Cognition 43:2.
     
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  20. Philip N. Johnson-Laird & Ruth M. J. Byrne (1992). Modal Reasoning, Models, and Manktelow and Over. Cognition 43 (2):173-182.
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  21. Ruth M. J. Byrne (1991). Can Valid Inferences Be Suppressed? Cognition 39 (1):71-78.
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  22. P. N. Johnson-Laird & Ruth M. J. Byrne (1990). Meta-Logical Problems: Knights, Knaves, and Rips. Cognition 36 (1):69-84.
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  23. Ruth M. J. Byrne (1989). Suppressing Valid Inferences with Conditionals. Cognition 31 (1):61-83.
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