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  1. Ruth Garrett Millikan, Learning Language.
    Many students of pragmatics and child language have come to believe that in order to learn a language a child must first have a 'theory of mind,' a grasp that speakers mentally represent the content they would convey when they speak. This view is reinforced by the Gricean theory of communication, according to which speakers intend their words to cause hearers to believe or to do certain things and hearers must recognize these intentions if they are to comply. The view (...)
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  2. Ruth Garrett Millikan, On Reading Signs; Some Differences Between Us and The Others.
    On Reading Signs; Some Differences between Us and The Others If there are certain kinds of signs that an animal cannot learn to interpret, that might be for any of a number of reasons. It might be, first, because the animal cannot discriminate the signs from one another. For example, although human babies learn to discriminate human speech sounds according to the phonological structures of their native languages very easily, it may be that few if any other animals are capable (...)
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  3. Ruth Millikan, Handbook of Embedded Cognition.
    Embedded Rationality1 Philosophers and laymen alike have traditionally assumed that whether you can reason well, make valid inferences, avoid logical mistakes and so forth is entirely a matter of how well the cogs in your head are fashioned and oiled. Partner to this is the assumption that careful reflection is always the method by which we discover whether an inference or reasoning process is correct. In particular, further experience, observation or experiment never bear on the question whether an inference is (...)
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  4. Ruth Garrett Millikan (2013). 5 The Tangle of Natural Purposes That Is Us. In Bana Bashour Hans Muller (ed.), Contemporary Philosophical Naturalism and its Implications. Routledge. 63.
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  5. Ruth Garrett Millikan (2013). Troubles with Plantinga's Reading of Millikan. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (2):454-456.
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  6. Ruth Garrett Millikan (2012). Are There Mental Indexicals and Demonstratives? Philosophical Perspectives 26 (1):217-234.
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  7. Ruth G. Millikan (2011). Die eingebettete Vernunft. Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 59 (4):493-496.
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  8. Ruth Garrett Millikan (2011). Loosing the Word–Concept Tie. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 85 (1):125-143.
    Sainsbury and Tye (2011) propose that, in the case of names and other simple extensional terms, we should substitute for Frege's second level of content—for his senses—a second level of meaning vehicle—words in the language of thought. I agree. They also offer a theory of atomic concept reference—their ‘originalist’ theory—which implies that people knowing the same word have the ‘same concept’. This I reject, arguing for a symmetrical rather than an originalist theory of concept reference, claiming that individual concepts are (...)
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  9. Ruth G. Millikan (2010). On Knowing the Meaning; With a Coda on Swampman. Mind 119 (473):43-81.
    I give an analysis of how empirical terms do their work in communication and the gathering of knowledge that is fully externalist and that covers the full range of empirical terms. It rests on claims about ontology. A result is that armchair analysis fails as a tool for examining meanings of ‘basic’ empirical terms because their meanings are not determined by common methods or criteria of application passed from old to new users, by conventionally determined ‘intensions’. Nor do methods of (...)
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  10. Ruth G. Millikan (2010). Replik auf Elder. Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 58 (6):975-979.
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  11. Markus Wild, Martin Lenz & Ruth G. Millikan (2010). Interview. Gedacht wird in der Welt, nicht im Kopf. Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 58 (6):981-1000.
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  12. Ruth Millikan (2009). Embedded Rationality. In Murat Aydede & P. Robbins (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition. Cambridge. 171--183.
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  13. Ruth G. Millikan (2009). Biosemantics. In Brian P. McLaughlin & Ansgar Beckerman (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press. 281--297.
    "Biosemantics" was the title of a paper on mental representation originally printed in The Journal of Philosophy in 1989. It contained a much abbreviated version of the work on mental representation in Language Thought and Other Biological Categories (1984). There I had presented a naturalist theory of intentional signs generally, including linguistic representations, graphs, charts and diagrams, road sign symbols, animal communications, the "chemical signals" that regulate the function of glands, and so forth. But the term "biosemantics" has usually been (...)
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  14. Ruth Garrett Millikan (2009). It is Likely Misbelief Never has a Function. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (6):529-530.
    I highlight and amplify three central points that McKay & Dennett (M&D) make about the origin of failures to perform biologically proper functions. I question whether even positive illusions meet criteria for evolved misbelief.
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  15. Ruth Millikan (2008). Chapter jc W 1 4. In Aloysius Martinich (ed.), The Philosophy of Language. Oxford University Press. 363.
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  16. Ruth Garrett Millikan (2008). A Difference of Some Consequence Between Conventions and Rules. Topoi 27 (1-2):87-99.
    Lewis’s view of the way conventions are passed on may have some especially interesting consequences for the study of language. I’ll start by briefly discussing agreements and disagreements that I have with Lewis’s general views on conventions and then turn to how linguistic conventions spread. I’ll compare views of main stream generative linguistics, in particular, Chomsky’s views on how syntactic forms are passed on, with the sort of view of language acquisition and language change advocated by usage-based or construction grammars, (...)
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  17. J. L. Austin, Anthony Brueckner, Noam Chomsky, Donald Davidson, Keith Donnellan, Michael Dummett, Gareth Evans, Gottlob Frege, H. P. Grice, Paul Horwich, David Kaplan, Saul Kripke, David Lewis, John McDowell, Michael McKinsey, Ruth Millikan, Stephen Neale, Hilary Putnam, W. V. Quine, Bertrand Russell, Nathan Salmon, Stephen Schiffer, John Searle, P. F. Strawson, Alfred Tarski & Ludwig Wittgenstein (2007). Philosophy of Language: The Central Topics. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
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  18. Ruth G. Millikan (2007). An Input Condition for Teleosemantics? Reply to Shea (and Godfrey-Smith). Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (2):436-455.
    In his essay "Consumers Need Information: Supplementing Teleosemantics with an Input Condition" (this issue) Nicholas Shea argues, with support from the work of Peter Godfrey-Smith (1996), that teleosemantics, as David Papinau and I have articulated it, cannot explain why "content attribution can be used to explain successful behavior." This failure is said to result from defining the intentional contents of representations by reference merely to historically normal conditions for success of their "outputs," that is, of their uses by interpreting or (...)
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  19. Ruth Garrett Millikan (2007). Précis of Varieties of Meaning. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (3):655–662.
  20. Ruth Garrett Millikan (2007). Reply to Bermúdez. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (3):670–673.
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  21. Ruth Garrett Millikan (2007). Reply to Recanati. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (3):682–691.
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  22. Ruth Garrett Millikan (2007). Reply to Rosenberg. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (3):701–702.
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  23. Ruth Garrett Millikan (2007). Reply to Taylor. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (3):710–715.
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  24. Ruth G. Millikan (2006). Styles of Rationality. In Susan L. Hurley & Matthew Nudds (eds.), Rational Animals? Oxford University Press.
    By whatever general principles and mechanisms animal behavior is governed, human behavior control rides piggyback on top of the same or very similar mechanisms. We have reflexes. We can be conditioned. The movements that make up our smaller actions are mostly caught up in perception-action cycles following perceived Gibsonian affordances. Still, without doubt there are levels of behavior control that are peculiar to humans. Following Aristotle, tradition has it that what is added in humans is rationality ("rational soul"). Rationality, however, (...)
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  25. Ruth G. Millikan (2006). Useless Content. In Graham F. Macdonald & David Papineau (eds.), Teleosemantics. Oxford University Press.
  26. Ruth Garrett Millikan (2006). Styles of Rationality. In Susan Hurley & Matthew Nudds (eds.), Rational Animals? Oxford University Press.
    By whatever general principles and mechanisms animal behavior is governed, human behavior control rides piggyback on top of the same or very similar mechanisms. We have reflexes. We can be conditioned. The movements that make up our smaller actions are mostly caught up in perception-action cycles following perceived Gibsonian affordances. Still, without doubt there are levels of behavior control that are peculiar to humans. Following Aristotle, tradition has it that what is added in humans is rationality ("rational soul"). Rationality, however, (...)
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  27. Ruth G. Millikan (2005). Some Reflections on the Theory Theory - Simulation Theory Discussion. In Susan Hurley & Nick Chater (eds.), Perspectives on Imitation: From Mirror Neurons to Memes, Vol II. MIT Press.
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  28. Ruth G. Millikan (2005). Language: A Biological Model. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
    Ruth Millikan is well known for having developed a strikingly original way for philosophers to seek understanding of mind and language, which she sees as biological phenomena. She now draws together a series of groundbreaking essays which set out her approach to language. Guiding the work of most linguists and philosophers of language today is the assumption that language is governed by prescriptive normative rules. Millikan offers a fundamentally different way of viewing the partial regularities that language displays, comparing them (...)
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  29. Ruth G. Millikan (2005). The Father, the Son, and the Daughter: Sellars, Brandom, and Millikan. Pragmatics and Cognition 13 (1):59-71.
    The positions of Brandom and Millikan are compared with respect to their common origins in the works of Wilfrid Sellars and Wittgenstein. Millikan takes more seriously the ¿picturing¿ themes from Sellars and Wittgenstein. Brandom follows Sellars more closely in deriving the normativity of language from social practice, although there are also hints of a possible derivation from evolutionary theory in Sellars. An important claim common to Brandom and Millikan is that there are no representations without function or ¿attitude¿.
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  30. Ruth G. Millikan (2004). Comments on "Millikan's Compromised Externalism". In Richard Schantz (ed.), The Externalist Challenge. De Gruyter.
     
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  31. Ruth G. Millikan (2004). Existence Proof for a Viable Externalism. In Richard Schantz (ed.), The Externalist Challenge. Berlin & New York: De Gruyter.
  32. Ruth G. Millikan (2004). Varieties of Meaning: The 2002 Jean Nicod Lectures. MIT Press.
    How the various things that are said to have meaning—purpose, natural signs, linguistic signs, perceptions, and thoughts—are related to one another.
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  33. Ruth G. Millikan (2003). In Defense of Public Language. In Louise M. Antony & H. Hornstein (eds.), Chomsky and His Critics. Blackwell.
    ....a notion of 'common, public language' that remains mysterious...useless for any form of theoretical explanation....There is simply no way of making sense of this prong of the externalist theory of meaning and language, as far as I can see, or of any of the work in theory of meaning and philosophy of language that relies on such notions, a statement that is intended to cut rather a large swath. (Chomsky 1995, pp. 48-9) It is a striking fact that despite the (...)
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  34. Ruth G. Millikan, On Reading Signs.
    On Reading Signs; Some Differences between Us and The Others If there are certain kinds of signs that an animal cannot learn to interpret, that might be for any of a number of reasons. It might be, first, because the animal cannot discriminate the signs from one another. For example, although human babies learn to discriminate human speech sounds according to the phonological structures of their native languages very easily, it may be that few if any other animals are capable (...)
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  35. Ruth G. Millikan (2002). Biofunctions: Two Paradigms. In Andre Ariew (ed.), Functions. Oxford University Press. 113-143.
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  36. Ruth G. Millikan (2002). Teleological Theories of Mental Content. In L. Nagel (ed.), Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science. Macmillan.
  37. Ruth Garrett Millikan (2002). Mental Content, Teleological Theories Of. In Lynn Nadel (ed.), The Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science. Macmillan.
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  38. Nathan Salmon, Andrew Melnyk, Trenton Merricks, John Stuart Mill, Matt Millen, Ruth G. Millikan, Piet Mondrian, Isaac Newton, David Owens & David Papineau (2002). Ramsey 311,314 Rembrandt 388 Rosenberg, Alexander Xxi Ross, WD. 274. In Jaegwon Kim (ed.), Supervenience. Ashgate. 397.
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  39. Ruth G. Millikan (2001). The Language-Thought Partnership: A Bird's Eye View. Language and Communication 21 (2):157-166.
    I sketch in miniature the whole of my work on the relation between language and thought. Previously I have offered closeups of this terrain in various papers and books, and I reference them freely. But my main purpose here is to explain the relations among the parts, hoping this can serve as a short introduction to my work on language and thought for some, and for others as a clarification of the larger plan.
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  40. Ruth G. Millikan (2001). The Myth of Mental Indexicals. In Andrew Brook & Richard Devidi (eds.), Self-Reference Amd Self-Awareness, Advances in Consciousness Research Volume 11. John Benjamins.
  41. Ruth G. Millikan (2001). What has Natural Information to Do with Intentional Representation? In D. Walsh (ed.), Evolution, Naturalism and Mind. Cambridge University Press. 105-125.
    "According to informational semantics, if it's necessary that a creature can't distinguish Xs from Ys, it follows that the creature can't have a concept that applies to Xs but not Ys." (Jerry Fodor, The Elm and the Expert, p.32).
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  42. Ruth Garrett Millikan (2001). A Theory of Representation to Complement TEC. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (5):894-895.
    The target article can be strengthened by supplementing it with a better theory of mental representation. Given such a theory, there is reason to suppose that, first, even the most primitive representations are mostly of distal affairs; second, the most primitive representations also turn out to be directed two ways at once, both stating facts and directing action.
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  43. Ruth Garrett Millikan (2001). Cutting Philosophy of Language Down to Size. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 48:125-140.
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  44. Ruth Garrett Millikan (2001). Purposes and Cross-Purposes. The Monist 84 (3):392-416.
    Both the human capacity for language and individual languages have evolved, in part, by natural selection. This paper considers certain aspects and consequences of this, concerning, among other things, the semantics-pragmatics distinction.
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  45. Ruth G. Millikan (2000). Introducing Substance Concepts. In , On Clear and Confused Ideas. Cambridge.
  46. Ruth G. Millikan (2000). Naturalizing Intentionality. In Bernard Elevitch (ed.), Philosophy of Mind, Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy. Philosopy Documentation Center. 83-90.
    Brentano was surely mistaken, however, in thinking that bearing a relation to something nonexistent marks only the mental. Given any sort of purpose, it might not get fulfilled, hence might exhibit Brentano's relation, and there are many natural purposes, such as the purpose of one's stomach to digest food or the purpose of one's protective eye blink reflex to keep out the sand, that are not mental, nor derived from anything mental. Nor are stomachs and reflexes "of" or"about" anything. A (...)
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  47. Ruth G. Millikan (2000). Reading Mother Nature's Mind. In Don Ross, Andrew Brook & David L. Thompson (eds.), Dennett's Philosophy: A Comprehensive Assessment. MIT Press.
    I try to focus our differences by examining the relation between what Dennett has termed "the intentional stance" and "the design stance." Dennett takes the intentional stance to be more basic than the design stance. Ultimately it is through the eyes of the intentional stance that both human and natural design are interpreted, hence there is always a degree of interpretive freedom in reading the mind, the purposes, both of Nature and of her children. The reason, or at least a (...)
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  48. Ruth G. Millikan (2000). Representations, Targets and Attitudes. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (1):103-111.
  49. Ruth Garrett Millikan (2000). On Clear and Confused Ideas: An Essay About Substance Concepts. Cambridge University Press.
    Written by one of today's most creative and innovative philosophers, Ruth Garrett Millikan, this book examines basic empirical concepts; how they are acquired, how they function, and how they have been misrepresented in the traditional philosophical literature. Millikan places cognitive psychology in an evolutionary context where human cognition is assumed to be an outgrowth of primitive forms of mentality, and assumed to have 'functions' in the biological sense. Of particular interest are her discussions of the nature of abilities as different (...)
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