Nature and civilization are often regarded in opposition to each other. However, civilization employs technologies and is based on laws of nature. Also, the historical world is a result of the development of the natural world. An “anti-nature” must thus be contained somewhere within nature. The idea of “ anti-nature ” is neither alien to the Eastern nor to the Western traditional concepts of nature. The philosophy of Lao Zi never embraces mere naturalism. Lao Zi has observed that things in (...) the world are not always “ so on their own ” but rather in the mode of anti-nature. A nti-nature in nature itself does not become expressive until Christian theology, in which the origin of evil is reflected upon. The last part of the paper begins with one Buddhist thought expressed in the Diamond Sutra: “The world is not the world that is named the world.” Through naming of a thing, this thing is objectified or substantialized, and an objectified thing is not the thing itself. This self is “ śūnya ”, a non-world, which is what the world is. This non-world (as well nature) is first and foremost concealed by ego-consciousness that tends to objectify the things. E go-consciousness as this anti-nature tends to conceal this non-nature, and begins to act in the form of technology. The radical way of solving the problems caused by this “anti-nature” must begin with gaining an insight into the nature of ourselves as well as the nature of technology. (shrink)

In this article, the author begins by noticing a statistical fact: from the seven Japanese translations of Being and Time, in five cases the German word Sein has been translated as sonzai, and in two cases as u. This fact invites the author to a discussion about the Japanese understanding of “Being”, which is developed on three levels: the question of language, the question of historical-cultural world, and the question of the “European”, understood as a Western principle, depictingthis “Abend-land” as (...) a region threatened by night. (shrink)

This study presents and discusses the essential “nearness” and “farness” between Nishitani philosophy and Nishida philosophy, where such “nearness” and “farness” are not meant to be words that simply express the relative positions in which Nishida and Nishitani philosophy stand with respect to each other, but present the internal structure of the very problems at the core of both. Taking as a clue, Nishitani’s words, “nearer to me than I am to myself,” we examine these philosophies by situating their interpretations (...) of Eckhart as an axis for our considerations and then introducing their understandings of an expression from Daitō Kokushi 大燈国師. In conclusion, we consider the problems remaining for both. While it was Nishida philosophy that made it possible to take on the foundation of the history of philosophy as a problem, it would be left to Nishitani to actually carry this out. In turn, while Nishitani presents a criticism of the “intellect,” we must speak of the elucidation of logic as an undeveloped problem left within Nishitani philosophy. (shrink)

This essay is an overview of the intellectual itinerary of the Japanese philosopher Kuki Shūzō . Kuki first came to the attention of Western readers in Heidegger’s A Dialogue on Language between a Japanese and an Inquirer. After correcting the record on Kuki with regards to this famous piece, the essay turns to the work that Heidegger and the Japanese Inquirer were discussing, namely, The Structure of Iki. The essay discusses both the background and basic arguments of this work. The (...) essay then expands on Kuki’s Western reception, indicating that his thinking evolved beyond his early work with the phenomenon of iki. His later thinking concerns the problem of contingency and the essay concludes with a discussion of his late work, The Problem of Contingency. The essay reviews Kuki’s thinking as a whole in order to develop a sense of his hermeneutics. (shrink)